DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

New Caledonia´s Wake

Expanding the Story of Company of Scotland Expeditions to Darien, 1698-1700

Orr, Julie M

Award date:
2014

NEW CALEDONIA´S WAKE: EXPANDING THE STORY OF COMPANY OF SCOTLAND EXPEDITIONS TO DARIEN, 1698-1700

Julie M. Orr

Doctor of Philosophy, History
University of Dundee
November 2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MAPS AND FIGURES

Notes on Dates and Currency:

At the time of the events studied here, Spain had adopted the use of the Gregorian calendar. Scotland and England continued to utilize the Julian calendar, which resulted in dates 10 days prior to those of the Spaniards. Dates contained in the following chapters are those cited by the individual document or author relevant to the event being discussed and have not been altered.

By the mid-seventeenth century the *maravedi,* the unit of account serving as the base for Spanish currency, had the following values:

375 maravedis = 1 ducat or ducado
450 maravedis = 1 peso

Declaration:

I certify that I am the author of this thesis, all references cited have been consulted by me, the work of which the thesis is a record has been done by me, and the thesis has not previously been accepted for a higher degree.

Julie M. Orr

SUMMARY

Although previous examinations of the failed 1698-1700 Company of Scotland initiative to establish a colony on the Isthmus of Panama have emphasized its impact on the political future of Great Britain, the endeavor also intruded into a broader spectrum of geography, commercial enterprise and sociopolitics. Coinciding with Europe´s preoccupation with the Spanish succession and the reality of a thriving and unchecked contraband trade in goods and slaves in the Caribbean, Scotland´s entry into an unsettled and lucrative commercial arena provoked strong reaction throughout the Atlantic World. While the Courts of Europe challenged their diplomatic corps with the outfall of Scotland´s blatant incursion into the established dominions of the Spanish King, colonial officials from Lima to Mexico City struggled to successfully check the establishment of the colony as they anticipated the armada deployed from the motherland. British Governors from New York to Jamaica were lured into the fray, finding themselves concerned over losing members of their marginally populated territories, a growing Scottish sense of authority, and the arrival of desperate survivors. Merchants plying the coasts of the Caribbean, regardless of national or religious affiliation, warily observed the arrival of the Scottish fleet, assessed the opportunities and risks it presented, and replenished the stream of intelligence ricocheting across the Atlantic.

Most intimately involved were the indigenous Cuna, in whose territories the Scots had opted to construct their fortifications. Far from a desolate, unpopulated region, New Caledonia rose and fell within a matrix of native groups who had experienced over 200 years of European contact. The divisions that they would experience as a result of the Scottish presence, along with the resulting campaigns of Spanish colonial officials to assure their subjugation and prevent further foreign incursion, would attest to the lasting impacts of the attempted colony and its dire affront to the sovereignty of Spanish America.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Although the story of the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies has traditionally been examined by historians for its justifiably profound role in the evolution of the 1707 political union between Scotland and England, the impacts of the Darien expeditions, despite their ephemeral existence, also acutely manifested themselves across a much broader geographical, diplomatic and economic scope. Utilizing original documents principally from archives in Spain, but also from collections in the United Kingdom, Jamaica and the United States, the following chapters present major but previously unacknowledged consequences of the Scottish endeavor, expanding the story beyond one restricted to Britain and exposing a much larger context of impacted lands and peoples and greater influence on the close of the seventeenth century than previously considered. Not only does the trial of five Darien survivors in Sevilla come to light through the discovery of their expansive court record, but the legal culpability assigned by the Spanish judges to the Company of Scotland and its promoters such as the Duke of Hamilton raises major new questions about political influence and financial vulnerability. The cross-referencing of naval logs from Admiral Benbow´s 1698-1700 cruise to the Caribbean with correspondence from the Spanish Governors he came in contact with exposes a more extensive undermining of the Company´s efforts by King William III than previously understood, documenting offers of English assistance to assure the elimination of New Caledonia and the presence of Royal Navy personnel in the vicinity during Spain´s successful military action to eliminate the Scottish presence. Motivations driving the English response are broadened through new details of reactions across the Caribbean that impeded the Portuguese slave trade and its English and Dutch subcontractors, as well as conflicts between Jewish and English merchants on Jamaica vying for the lucrative potential trade with the Scottish colony.

Frequent and thorough reports from Madrid´s Ambassador to London, now held in Spain´s *Archivo General de Simancas*, make new contributions to the understanding of international cooperation and collusion, verifying intelligence provided directly to the

Spanish by Darien participant and pamphleteer Walter Herries. The surgeon´s mutually beneficial agreement with English Secretary of State Vernon clarifies the motivation for the effective espionage that closely monitored and sought to sabotage Scottish activities.

The expanded story of New Caledonia provided in the following chapters is, however, not restricted to a European cast. The native Cuna of Darien not only had to strategize how to advantageously maneuver through the presence of the latest group of intruders and the inevitable Spanish offensive, but they also were left to absorb the wrath of colonial authority following the unfulfilled alliance for protection promised by the Scots. Long after the final abandonment of Fort St. Andrew, the ruins of which stood as a stark reminder of foreign incursion, the indigenous population was left to cope with recurring initiatives to obtain their subjugation and reassert Spanish control over the region.

Across the vastness of Spanish America there was a formidable reaction to the Scottish presence and great celebration at their eventual expulsion. Correspondence from the Viceroys of Peru and Mexico held in Spain´s *Archivo General de Indias* and a publicly distributed *Gazeta* found in the personal collection of Francis Russell Hart at the Massachusetts Historical Society are among newly acknowledged sources attesting to the importance of New Caledonia throughout the region. Nor was North America exempt from impacts across its colonies. Investigation into the histories of British settlements from Jamaica to Jersey to Boston to New York document a diffused settlement of Darien survivors, creating an unintended diaspora that established itself in a variety of roles across the northern colonies and Caribbean.

The accumulated evidence presented in the following pages supporting New Caledonia´s wide wake across the Atlantic World exposes new complexities of a story that coincide with a fundamental premise shared by Scots and Spaniards in their respective predictions regarding the potential of the Company of Scotland and reflect their mutual intentions for inclusion in evolving world economic expansion.[1] Although the Scots´ aspirations were

[1] For a discussion of the larger context of economic globalization and the contemporary strife it created, see in William R. Thompson´s *The Emergence of the Global Political*

not achieved and the Spaniards´ ultimate fears not realized, neither party had anticipated the project´s impact to be confined to a singular coastline, province, country, or ocean. Both the intruder and the established colonial claimant considered the scope of the endeavor to be of immense expanse and critical importance. In printed declarations distributed from the barely established site of New Caledonia in December of 1698, its governing Council, seeking reinforcements for their fledgling settlement, stated

> . . . the chief Captains and Supream Leaders of the People of Darien, in compliance with former Agreements, having now in most kind and obliging manner received us into their Friendship and Country with promise and contract to assist and join in defense . . . against such as shall be their or our Enemies in any time to come: Which, besides its being one of the most healthful, rich, and fruitful Countries upon Earth, hath the advantage of being a narrow ISTHMUS, seated in the heighth of the World, between two vast Oceans, which renders it more convenient than any other for being the common Store-house of the insearchable and immense Treasures of the Spacious South Seas, the door of Commerce to China and Japan, and, the Emporium and Staple for the Trade of both Indies.[2]

Spain´s reciprocal concerns, causing her to mobilize both European and American resources to meet the threat, paralleled those of the Scots and acknowledged the additional element of religious protectionism. Responding to verification of the arrival and installation of the intruders on the Isthmus, the Council of the Indies, the peak of the hierarchy of administrative organization overseeing the Spanish King´s overseas

---

Economy (London 2000), especially Chapter 6 ("The emergence of a challenge process", pp. 103-118) and Chapter 7 ("Mountains of Gold and Iron", pp. 119-133). Holton cautions that the expanding economic exchanges initiated with European activity in the Americas do not necessarily mark the origins of globalization. Robert J. Holton, *Globalization and the Nation-State* (New York 1998), pp. 24-26.

[2] The declaration, entitled `Caledonia: The Declaration of the Council constituted by the Indian and African Company of Scotland, for the government and direction of their Colonies and Settlements in the Indies´, is included in printed form in: Anonymous, *An Enquiry into the Causes of the Miscarriage of the Scots Colony at Darien or an Answer to a Libel Entituled ` A Defence of the Scots Abdicating Darien´. Submitted to the Good People of England* (Glasgow 1700), pp. 67-69. The entire declaration is included in this work as Appendix I.

dominions, expressed the gravity of the situation in an advisory *consulta* to its monarch, Carlos II, in May of 1699 . . .

> The Council represents to your majesty that with great regret and pain it hears not only confirmation that Scotch have obtained a foothold in Darien . . . that which previously was menace only is today fact, and shortly these dominions will begin to experience violence, robbery, usurpation of provinces, in course of which the Catholic religion will perish, which is what will most deeply grieve your majesty´s Catholic Heart. And although the nations will combat each other in those quarters, which may serve us as diversion yet, in the long run, all falls upon us, since their object is to seize those rich, far-extended kingdoms, whose treasure fertilizes, maintains, conserves these dominions, and although these nations be divided among themselves, ours must decline, for its commerce will fall off, and we will find ourselves lacking the substance which supports the body of this monarchy.[3]

Clearly, neither the Company of Scotland nor the Council of the Indies regarded the former´s campaign to establish a trading entrepot in Darien as an inconsequential colonial initiative symptomatic of the essentially unrestrained and pervasive illicit trading of the last decade of the seventeenth century.[4] Both of the major protagonists acknowledged

---

[3] MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item #13. The document is an English translation of a *consulta* from the Council of the Indies to his Majesty, dated Madrid, May 9, 1699, and originally found in AGI, *Panamá* 160. A discussion of the men who comprised the prestigious Council of the Indies, and the acquisition of the decades of colonial administrative experience they experienced during their careers, prompted J.H. Elliott to describe the body as "staffed by elderly, status-conscious officials, tenacious of tradition and legalistically inclined, who were above all determined to enjoy in comfort the prestige and rich pickings of the high office which they had worked for so long to secure." *Spain and Its World 1500-1700* (New Haven 1989), p. 17. For a discussion of the role of the Council of the Indies during the reign of King Carlos II see Ernesto Schafer, *El Consejo Real y Supremo de las Indias, Su historia, organización y labor administrative hasta la terminación de la Casa de Austria, Tomo 1, Historia y organización del Consejo y de la Casa de la Contratación de las Indias* (Sevilla 1935), pp. 268-350. Appendix 1 of the same work provides listings of the members and employees of the Council. Ibid, pp. 351-376.

[4] For a review of conditions in Spanish America during the relevant time period and particularly the phenomenon of contraband trade see Ramón María Serrera´s *La América de Los Habsburgo (1517-1700)* (Sevilla 2011), especially `El siglo del contrabando´ on pages 276-280. Additional material is provided by Peter Bakewell in *A History of Latin America-Empire and Sequels 1450-1930* (Oxford 1997) in his chapter entitled `The

menace and opportunity, dosed with critical native alliances, defense of religious faith and major economic stakes. The perceived field of competition was not limited to a small peninsula of land extending into the Caribbean Sea, but instead extended across the Isthmus to the South Sea, down that coast to Peru, and across the Pacific to China and Japan. Nor was the Old World exempted from entangling itself in the conflict. While Scotland experienced challenges from competing external interests, Spain received disavowals of complicity from King William III, fielded offers of assistance from the French, and solicited financial support from the Papacy, all designed to seek advantage against a horizon of imminent dynastic change, the threat of heresy and the desire to maintain and increase commercial opportunity. Far from an insular event manifesting itself in the troubled relationship between Scotland and her southern neighbor, New Caledonia imposed itself on the history of three continents as players across the Atlantic World simultaneously sought advantage and stability.

A DISTRACTED CONTINENT, A CHALLENGED CONTINENT

The story of the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, with its resulting disastrous losses,[5] exemplifies the high stakes of the chaotic interplay between competing interests that characterized the Atlantic World of 1698-1700. The 1690s in Scotland were characterized by crop failure and hunger, rising tariffs imposed on vital linen exports to

---

Seventeenth Century: A Slacker Grip ´, pp. 210-253. Various manifestations of illegal commerce related to the establishment of New Caledonia are further addressed here, particularly in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

[5] Of 1200 individuals who sailed from Leith with the first expedition, 44 died on the voyage to Darien, 300 at the site of the colony and 400 during the middle voyage between Darien and Jamaica and New York. An estimated 30 eventually returned to Scotland. F. Cundall, *The Darien Venture* (New York 1926), p. 93. Douglas Watt succinctly describes the economic loss by commenting that "The Company failed and every penny of capital was lost." D. Watt, *The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union and the Wealth of Nations* (Edinburgh 2007), p. xviii.

England, resulting social unrest, and, following the 1697 termination of the Nine Year´s War, the influx of newly unemployed veterans from King William´s Scottish troops.[6] The greater European world had become distracted by the implications of the anticipated death of Spain´s childless King Carlos II and the potential for French acquisition of the throne in Madrid, prompting diplomatic efforts that formulated the Partition Treaties seeking to assign an acceptable heir and reallocate the boundaries of the Spanish Empire.[7] In the words of John C. Rule . . .

> The drafting of the Partition Treaties was one of the most remarkable achievements of diplomacy in the Early Modern period. Between early 1698 and the death of Charles II of Spain in November 1700, two of the most powerful princes of the period, Louis XIV and William III together supervised the delicate surgery, which dissected the Spanish behemoth.[8]

The simultaneous occurrence of the Scottish presence in Darien and the eclipsing drama of the diplomatic "delicate surgery" being performed in Europe explains not only why the establishment of the colony was a dramatically unwelcome distraction, but also why the

---

[6] For a review of the situation in Scotland, and its role in the implementation of the Darien expeditions, see Chapter Four, `The 1690s: a nation in crisis´ in Christopher Whatley and Derek Patrick´s *The Scots and Union* (Edinburgh 2006), pp. 139-183. Analysis is also provided by Michael Fry in *The Union: England, Scotland and the Treaty of 1707* (Edinburgh 2006), pp. 16-22. The Prologue of George Pratt Insh´s *The Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies* (London 1932) explores the specific development of the Company within the same time period.

[7] For an explanation of the formulation of and preoccupation with the treaties through the correspondence of the principal protagonists, see Paul Grimblot (ed.), *Letters of William III and Louis XIV and of Their Ministers, Illustrative of the Domestic and Foreign Politics of England from The Peace of Ryswick to The Accession of Philip V of Spain, 1697-1700* (London 1848).

[8] John C. Rule, `The Partition Treaties, 1698-1700´, in E. Mijers and D. Onnekink (eds.), *Redefining William III, The Impact of the King-Stadholder in International Context* (Aldershot, Hampshire 2007), pp. 91-105. For a discussion of the role of the Partition Treaties in the later context of the War of the Spanish Succession, see John B. Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession, A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702-1712* (New York and London 1987). Hattendorf´s contention that "studies for each and every participant in the war need to be completed before one can accurately write a true and international history of it" (Ibid, p. xvi) can equally be applied to the study of Darien expeditions.

wider ramifications of the Scottish enterprise have not been fully explored by historians. At the October 1698 ratification of the First Partition Treaty, with its reasonable assurances of secure maritime commerce, the initial Company of Scotland fleet was in the Caribbean, sailing to the mainland of Darien after having secured a pilot on the Danish island of St. Thomas.[9] In February 1699, at the unexpected death of the Bavarian Electoral Prince, Spain´s designated heir under the initial Partition Treaty, New Caledonia was not only experiencing the loss of the *Dolphin* below the walls of Cartagena and the capture of her crew and cargo, but both high-ranking French and English naval emissaries were attempting to ingratiate themselves to local Governors with offers of assistance against the Scots. As news reached Madrid in March 1700 of the completion of the 2nd Partition Treaty, Spanish forces were receiving the capitulation of the final expedition survivors. In October of the same year, as the failing Carlos II seized the initiative and designated Philip, Duke of Anjou as heir "to the succession of all my Kingdoms and dominions, without exception of any"[10], the quiet departure of the four Darien survivors convicted of piracy in Sevilla was recorded in the prison log of the *Casa de la Contratación*[11]. As Julio Luis Arroyo Vozmediano recognizes in his recent study of England´s role in the Spanish succession, the Scottish initiative had a pronounced impact, jeopardizing William III´s ties with Spain and providing a convenient opportunity for Louis XIV to solicit Spanish favor

---

[9] Insh, *The Company*, pp. 123-125.

[10] Henry Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century 1665-1700* (New York 1980), p. 392. Kamen devotes his final chapter, `Succession´ (pp. 379-394) to the preoccupation over an heir to the Spanish monarchy and to conditions in Spain at the long-anticipated death of Carlos II on 1 November 1700, describing the dismal fiscal situation facing Spain ("throughout the 1690s . . . the government existed in a state of what can suitably be called permanent bankruptcy", Ibid, p. 387), government instability and rioting provoked by food shortages. Further explanation of the country´s woeful condition as it related to declining income from the Americas is provided by A. García-Baquero González´s `Andalusia and the crisis of the Indies trade, 1610-1720´, in I.A.A. Thompson and B. Yun Casalilla (eds.), *The Castilian crisis of the seventeenth century* (Cambridge 1994), pp. 115-135.

[11] AGI, *Contratación* 4887, *Entrada de Presos*. The trial of the men is the subject of Chapter 5.

and obligation through magnanimous offers of assistance in eliminating the Scottish threat.[12]

Conditions in the Spanish America to which the Scots sailed were no less urgent than in the Europe they left behind and dramatically expanded the cast to be impacted by their reckless attempt to establish a permanent presence on the opposite side of the Atlantic and potentially beyond. The extent and complexity of Spain´s overseas dominions and their governance, coupled with the recent history of internal unrest and hostile foreign incursions addressed in the following chapters, dictated that New Caledonia would provoke a broad and powerful reaction. The offense of constructing a fortified settlement on the Isthmus received the rapid attention of both of the King´s principal representatives in the New World, the Viceroy of Peru and the Viceroy of New Spain, whose territories covered the vast Spanish acquisitions across North and South America.

The site chosen for New Caledonia lay between the principal Pacific administrative and ecclesiastical center of Panama, with its Atlantic access at Portobello, and the major Caribbean port and slave-trading center of Cartagena. The two cities, each under the authority of the distant Viceroy of Peru in Lima, fell within different *audiencias* (see Figure 1), both of which had established histories of over 140 years and had suffered devastating raids by foreign intruders well within the memories of the victimized communities.[13] Of vital consequence to the Scots, and reflecting the prominence of both urban centers in the maintenance of the Spanish colonial empire, both Panama and Cartagena were ruled by individuals simultaneously holding the title of Governor and Captain-General and thus exercising notable authority in matters of defense and military campaigns as well as civic affairs.[14]

---

[12] Julio Luis Arroyo Vozmediano, *El Gran Juego. Inglaterra y la Sucesión Española,* unpublished PhD thesis, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (Madrid, 2012). The role of the Darien campaign is discussed on pages 70-90.

[13] The impact of the foreign incursions is discussed in Chapter 6.

[14] Lillian Fisher, *Viceregal administration in the Spanish-American colonies* (University of California 1926), p. 82. Fisher also notes the importance of the *junta de guerras*, or war councils, which provided advice to both Viceroys and Governors in military matters. The prevalent role of the *juntas* is documented numerous times in the pages that follow.



Figure 1 Spanish-American Viceroyalties and Audiencias 16th and 17th Centuries

Source: J.H. Elliot, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (London 2006), p. 124.

Predominant across Spanish America, and particularly so for its function in providing intelligence and mobilizing resources in reaction to the activities of the Company of Scotland, was the interconnectedness of the colonial bureaucracy, a characteristic that ought to have given the Scots pause for thought while formulating their plans should they have fully comprehended what they might provoke from the shores of Darien. In the words of J. H. Elliott . . .

> For all the flaws and defects in the system-the built-in conflicts between competing authorities, the numerous opportunities for procrastination, obstruction and graft- this creation of a `State of the Indies´ was by any measure a remarkable achievement, not least because it seems to have defied successfully the normal laws of time and space.[15]

Nor would American attention elicited by the Scottish enterprise be limited to Spanish held territories. An international conglomerate of cast members from colonies along the northern Atlantic seaboard and across the Caribbean, some sanctioned by monarchs and others operating outside any treaty or legal agreement, keenly watched, assessed and often participated in the Darien initiative, simultaneously wary and enticed by the entry of a new actor into a world of high-stakes commercial risk and opportunity.[16]

---

[15] J.H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in the Atlantic World 1492-1830* (New Haven 2006), p. 129.

[16] For studies of the development of colonial trade within and among the Americas see Christian Koot, *Empire at the Periphery-British Colonists, Anglo-Dutch Trade, and the Development of the British Atlantic, 1621-1713* (New York 2011), Bernard Bailyn, *The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge 1955), Cathy Matson, *Merchants & Empire, Trading in Colonial New York* (Baltimore 1998), and Nuala Zahedieh, `Economy´, in D.Armitage and Michael Braddick (eds.), *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800* (New York 2002), pp. 51-68. Zahedieh emphasizes the necessity of developing "trust networks able to provide reasonably fast and accurate information about business conditions, coordinate multiple far-flung transactions, and secure good behaviour from distant, difficult-to-monitor agents", qualities that will repeatedly reveal their importance and influence in the following pages. Ibid, p.66.

EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE

In striving to investigate and expose broader implications of the Darien expeditions, the words of two particular groups of participants, compiled primarily but not exclusively from Spanish interrogations, provide access to new material only facilitated by desperate events. The distinctly unintended itineraries of deserters and prisoners are examined in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively, revealing a multi-national cast of participants among both the Scottish enterprise and the Spanish-American communities and outposts where the parties came into contact with each other. The fortunate circumstance of the availability of these thorough and well-distributed records reveals that the Scottish ships carried crew from Greece, Italy, Holland and even England. There was also a uniformly recognized military character to the composition of the colonists, despite the Company´s declared motivation of peaceful trade.

The records of deserters´ interrogations not only supplied intelligence and detail to Spanish adversaries, but also provide historians with the documentation necessary to recognize the degree and geographic dispersal of desertion, defining the heavy toll it took on the meager resources of the colony, the extent to which the Company of Scotland ignored it and the scattering of individuals it created. Among these men voluntarily leaving the colony were two notable individuals whose influence was extended by their own later publications and who successfully marketed their experiences and acquired knowledge, but whose roles have not previously been fully defined. Walter Herries, the surgeon who at the earliest opportunity left the colony and took up his pen against it, is identified by Spanish records to have been a spy reporting directly to the Spanish Ambassador while under the protection of the English Secretary of State. Robert Allen, after spending years working among the Spanish-American administration, would expediently return to England and provide important understanding of the complex internal workings of Spain´s colonial governance.

The instances of prisoners falling into Spanish hands include dramatic cases which would contribute not only extended and multiple declarations, but would also involve torture, transportation to Old Spain and formal charges of piracy. Through the record of their own

words and those of their Spanish captors, the accounts of the arrest of translator Benjamin Spencer on Cuba and the Cartagena beaching and seizure of the *Dolphin,* under the command of one of the colony´s Councilors, serve both to substantiate the extent and degree of alarm that the Company of Scotland created and provide specific examples of how that alarm penetrated Spanish America. The captures and resulting acquisition and distribution of timely intelligence not only bear witness to the effectiveness of the comprehensive communication network that characterized both the offended Spanish colonial empire and the world of Caribbean and Atlantic commerce, but also illustrate the ways in which that intelligence would be integrated into military strategy and judicial process.

Threats created by events surrounding the establishment of New Caledonia not only impacted English interests, but also those of Portugal, Holland and France. These previously unacknowledged ramifications are illustrated in Chapter 4 through the investigation of the 1698-1700 voyage to the Caribbean of Admiral John Benbow.[17] Although he stringently respected the confidentiality of his oral commands from King William III, the compilation of the Admiral´s reports and their comparison with the logs of individuals under his command and Spaniards with whom he communicated clarify the attention he paid the Scottish endeavor and extend the depth and breadth of English complicity in assuring the failure of New Caledonia. Examination of the role of the Portuguese slave-trading *asiento* and its personnel, reliant upon English and Dutch subcontractors, expands the web of mercantile entities with vested interests in the success or failure of the novel colony on the Isthmus. The seizure by the Spanish, in response to the activity at New Caledonia, of ships engaged in both sanctioned and illicit trade increased the challenges of delivering slaves and other trade goods to the Spanish colonial mainland, igniting a new set of tensions and deliberations both in Europe and across the

[17] Sam Willis´s *The Admiral Benbow: The Life and Times of a Naval Legend* (London 2010) makes a solid contribution to the story of New Caledonia by describing his subject´s first sail to the Caribbean. The inclusion by Willis of his sources from the National Archives at Kew and Greenwich´s National Maritime Museum was instrumental to the cross-referencing of English and Spanish reports of specific conversations and events vital to the new information presented here in Chapter 4.

Caribbean. These circumstances, however, also provided opportunity, strategically exploited by both French and English naval commands, to engage in direct dialogue with Spanish-American Governors and Generals in their home ports. Discussions of offers of assistance regarding the Scottish insult served as convenient justification for the acquisition of unprecedented intelligence, the chance to indulge in illegal trade, and the occasion to become familiar with many of the same individuals, defenses and geography that would soon witness conflict during the War of the Spanish Succession.

Chapter 5 returns to the group of prisoners first taken into custody in Cartagena who, following transportation to Havana and a reunion with the Company´s translator, found themselves forwarded to Old Spain and tried for piracy before the formidable judges of the *Casa de la Contratación*. The discovery of their lengthy court record in Sevilla´s Archive of the Indies not only furnishes numerous details about the men themselves and activities at New Caledonia, but also defines what Spain considered to be the most critical elements of the Scottish intrusion. Having compiled and studied documents acquired from the wide array of intelligence sources available to them, the judges were aghast at the pleas of their defendants that mariners with such experience would possess no knowledge of their destination prior to departure. They expressed equal skepticism that King Carlos II´s sovereignty over Darien, a territory claimed by Spain since 1513[18], had not been comprehended.

The high stakes trade played in motivating the establishment of New Caledonia, and particularly who were the intended recipients of that trade, was also a significant emphasis of the court´s examination. Contrary to historians´ criticism of the appropriateness of the Scottish cargo for Caribbean commerce, the three *Casa* judges declared the suitability of

[18] Accounts of initial Spanish discovery and acquisition of the region are provided in David Howarth, *The Golden Isthmus* (London 1966) and K. Romoli, *Balboa of Darién: Discoverer of the Pacific* (New York 1953). Gonzalo Fernández Oviedo´s contemporary first-hand account is available as *Writing from the Edge of the World: The Memoirs of Darién, 1514-1527, translation and introduction by G.F. Dille* (University of Alabama 2006).

the goods aboard the *Dolphin* as consummate proof of intent to illegally conduct trade with Spanish communities along the porous coast.

In its eventual conviction of the defendants the court also illustrated its knowledge of the organization of the Company of Scotland who had employed the four men and one boy standing before them. Not only did they sentence the elder quartet of defendants to be executed as pirates, but they held the Directors and financial supporters of the expeditions liable. In the ensuing international diplomatic effort between London and Madrid to stay the death sentence, fueled by King William´s tardy recognition of volatile discontent in Scotland, the condemnation of Company principals by the Spanish court would linger, causing concern for those prominent Scots who had supported the venture but never glimpsed a Caribbean coastline.

The previously unexamined multi-faceted impact of the Company of Scotland initiative across the Americas constitutes the subject of the final two chapters. A broader geographical context encompassing both continents is the initial focus, illustrating the spectrum of Spanish colonial endeavor that found itself involved in the response to the founding of New Caledonia. Both the established history of foreign intrusion and recent memories of devastating raids ensured that the Viceroys of both Peru and New Spain, far from the Darien coast in their capitols of Lima and Mexico City, would nevertheless become involved in the military response. Intelligence and military support came from their Governors in Caracas, Havana, Panama, Cartagena and Santo Domingo. Conversely, the eventual capitulation would be celebrated collectively, with fireworks and special masses celebrated not just in those cities intimately involved, but as far away as Lima. Churches across the two-continent expanse of Spanish-America would also find themselves impacted, becoming responsible for a *donativo* funding new defenses designed to prevent future foreign intrusions and their accompanying threat to the Catholic faith.

British North America from Jamaica to New Jersey, New York and Boston would also become actively involved in events on the Isthmus. It was with acute interest, fueled by a combination of mercantile, familial and religious concerns, that the Darien initiative was

simultaneously observed, thwarted and supported. The lure of the proposed new trading entrepot and talk of gold mines caused friction on near-by Jamaica, where an insufficient labor force was a chronic concern and initiatives by Jewish merchants to serve New Caledonia created conflict with English interests seeking their own advantage. King William´s 1699 prohibition of trade, communication with and provision of sustenance to the Scots, followed a year later by the formal capitulation to Spanish forces, prompted a highly diffused and unorganized exodus of survivors throughout British America. While the Governor of Jamaica witnessed a welcome influx of Darien veterans, South Carolina, the Jerseys, New York and Boston would all experience new and existing Scottish communities fortified by individuals often possessing years of military experience and now well-versed in conditions of the wider world of the Caribbean.

The long-term impact of New Caledonia upon Darien was no less profound. Ignorant of the long-established history of entangled and virulent socio-politics in the region to which they sailed, the Company of Scotland exacerbated a myriad of existing conflicts. Having implemented the fortifications of Fort Andrew and forged alliances with factions of resident indigenous Cuna, the Scots literally constructed the strongest possible reminder to the Spanish of the vulnerability and attraction of the Darien region to outside invaders. Not only did the area have to endure the responding presence of Spanish armed forces and actual combat, but Scottish promises to defend their local allies against Spanish authority were abruptly negated by the March 1700 capitulation, causing both immediate reprisals upon the native population and the formulation of longer-term strategies to prevent future such occurrences. Considering the lengthy and complex history of discord and foreign influence on the Isthmus, including the murders of clergy and military personnel shortly before the Scots´ arrival, new attempts were initiated and additional resources deployed by Spain to permanently resolve the problems painfully highlighted by the presence of the Company of Scotland.

A FOUNDATION OF DARIEN HISTORIOGRAPHY

Despite the quantity of new historiography introduced in the following chapters, there exists a formerly established collection of information that merits discussion. Indicative of its critical impact on Scotland´s history, this "classic" historiography of the Company of Scotland has been heavily skewed in the direction of the Scottish perspective. Considering the inherent limitations, however, the accumulated manuscripts, pamphlets and books provide an important narrative of the Scots´ initiative and a vital frame from which further study, including these pages, can be constructed.

The following review of the established body of Darien historiography, however, deliberately omits one popular and consistently cited source. John Prebble´s *Darien-The Scottish Dream of Empire* (Edinburgh 2000), regardless of its lack of footnotes, has been almost uniformly utilized by historians. Although Prebble´s list of resources indicates an impressive extent of research, and the book´s distribution has undoubtedly fulfilled an important role since its original 1968 publication by exposing the story to an appreciable audience, its validity as a historical source is questionable. Prebble´s inclusion of some material, although contributing to the literary color of his book, fails to be substantiated from original documents. A notable example concerns the arrival of Cartagena´s Governor at the wreck of the *Dolphin* in a "gold and varnished coach"[19]. Not only is there no reference to the Governor´s mode of transportation in either his own correspondence or the accounts of any of his prisoners, but the devastation of recent French raids on his city (see Chapter 6) make it doubtful he would have at the time in question possessed such a carriage.

The Atlantic World

The five ships and 1200 adventurers sailing from Scotland in July 1698 towards a theoretically as yet undisclosed destination carried the hopes and travails of that nation as cargo. In a larger sense, what would become known as the Darien Scheme mirrored the

[19] John Prebble, *Darien-The Scottish Dream of Empire* (Edinburgh 2000), p. 178.

possibilities implemented by so many other ventures since Columbus´s landfall of 1492; hopes of expanding lucrative commerce between the Old and New Worlds, the provision of a relief valve for dissident or unwanted populations, and the opportunity to obtain new and easily gotten riches and social status. Each ship, whether departing Europe, Africa, South America or North America had its own prism of experience through which it defined its experience and aspirations. Understandably, histories attempting to provide a panorama of this burgeoning world place the Scots´ Darien venture, if they mention it at all, in the larger context of whatever comparative study they seek to address. In his highly detailed comparison *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven 2006), J. H. Elliott discusses the diminishing control of Habsburg Spain over her colonies and the concurrent growing and strategic presence of Great Britain, estimating a minimum 1000 London merchants plying their trade with the Americas by 1700. The author identifies the pivotal role of England´s 1655 conquest of Jamaica, sanctioned by Spain through the Treaty of Madrid of 1670, and the resulting increased penetration of the Caribbean by an array of European interests.[20] His description of the Scottish disaster at Darien, acknowledging only the impacts imposed on the initiating country, is succinctly depicted as the "high price to be paid for any attempt to establish independent Scottish overseas settlements in an America to which the larger European powers had already laid effective claim".[21]

A second perspective is offered by Germán Arciniegas in his *Caribbean: Sea of the New World*, which devotes twelve pages to New Caledonia and provides a limited Scotland vs. England rendition of events that transpired on the Isthmus. The author emphasizes the continuing interference and suppression of the venture by the English, but fails to address completely the internal weaknesses of the Company of Scotland that were crucial to its failure. The Scottish stereotypes ("being Scotch, the promoters of this venture kept an exact account in their journals" and, speaking of William Paterson, "like the good Scot he was-he made himself at home in the taverns"[22]) distract from the historical significance of

[20] Elliott, *Empires*, pp. 220-224.
[21] Ibid, p. 230.
[22] G. Arciniegas, *Caribbean: Sea of the New World* (New York 1946), p. 251.

the events. Arciniegas also promotes the pivotal role of Paterson in the scheme, a characteristic that is perpetuated through much of the Darien historiography, particularly the portion originally written in the Spanish language.[23] Amid continuing referrals to Scottish drunkenness, the account does address the Spanish effort to eliminate the Scots´ presence, crediting the decency and charity of the Spanish command[24], a fact more nuanced when considering the retribution imposed on the native Cuna for their alliances with the intruders studied in Chapter 7.

Two studies of the distinctly British role in the Atlantic World also acknowledge the Darien expeditions. Eliga Gould, in the chapter `Revolution and Counter-Revolution´ included in *The British Atlantic World*, *1500-1800*, emphasizes the unintended consequences and synergy of the failed Scottish colony in Darien. Its crucial role in the elimination of the Edinburgh parliament and the eventual passage of the 1707 Anglo-Scottish Treaty of Union is recognized for facilitating Scotland to fully and successfully

---

[23] The author goes so far as to declare in his summary timeline for 1698 that "Paterson occupies Darien". Ibid, p. 462. George Pratt Insh points out that Edinburgh merchants were the founders of the enterprise and that Paterson himself never claimed to be among its originators. Insh, *The Company*, pp. 28-29, 35. Other Spanish-language works that address Panamanian history and contain accounts of the Scottish initiative that perpetuate Paterson´s role as founder and central authority include Book 1 of Enrique J. Arce and Juan B. Sosa´s unfootnoted *Compendio de Historia de Panama* (Panama 1934, pp. 256-271), pages 57 to 59 of Ernesto J. Castillero Reyes´s *Historia de la Comunicación Interoceánica* (Panama 1948), and a single page in Alfred O. Castillero Calvo´s *Historia General de Panamá, Volumen 1, Tomo 1, Las Sociedades Originarios, El Orden Colonial* (Panama 2004), p. 501. An additional account, Pedro Martínez Cutillas´s *Colonial Panama-History and Images* (Barcelona 2008), p. 450, not only continues the assignment of the major force behind the Company to William Paterson, but presents another challenge for anyone studying the Darien expeditions: the use of the labels "British" (used by Martínez Cutillas on p. 452) or ""English" to describe the Scots, often requiring further investigation and/or corroboration to clarify the actual subject of the correspondence or narrative involved. Tellingly, the judges of the *Casa de la Contratación*, whose well-prepared examinations studied in Chapter 5 concerned themselves with Company principals, did not even bring up Paterson´s name. For additional debate over his specific influence in the enterprise, see Saxe Bannister (ed.), *Writings of William Paterson, Volume I* (London 1859), James Barbour´s *A History of William Paterson and the Darien Company: With Illustrations and Appendices* (Edinburgh 1907) and, illustrating that the debate has not ceased, Andrew Forrester´s *The Man Who Saw the Future* (New York 2004).

[24] Arciniegas, *Caribbean*, pp. 262-263.

participate in the full British empire encompassing England´s overseas colonies.[25] In *Making the Empire British: Scotland in the Atlantic World 1542-1707*, David Armitage addresses the motivations behind the formation of the Company of Scotland, the prior experience of Scots serving in other European colonies, the contemporary hardships Scotland had endured, and the domestic novelty of the subscription system. The case is made that, although the venture was presented as uniquely Scottish, it was essentially based on Dutch and Portuguese precedents.[26] Armitage labels the eventual access to the British empire acquired by Scotland through the Treaty of Union as "relief from the frustrations of provincial marginality" . . . and the "consolation prize" for the loss of sovereignty.[27]

An important contribution to the bilingual historiography is the 1962 effort of G.E. Vaughan, the British ambassador to Panama. Originally delivered as a lecture at the University of Panama and followed by written monographs in both Spanish and English, his *Historia de la colonia Escosesa en el Darién (1698-1700) y su Importancia en los Anales Britanicos* addresses the place of the Company of Scotland in the context of European affairs at the end of the seventeenth century. Vaughan discusses the difficulties the initiative posed for King William III as well as the attention given to events by the French, writing that New Caledonia "threatened the very peace of Europe . . (and) simultaneously created more more ground for conflict between William´s two kingdoms"[28] Although the work has had limited exposure through its publication in the the Panamanian

---

[25] E.H. Gould, `Revolution and Counter-Revolution´, in D. Armitage and M. Braddick (eds.), *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800* (Basingstroke 2009).
[26] D. Armitage, `Making the Empire British: Scotland in the Atlantic World 1542-1707´, *Past and Present*, Vol. 155 (May 1997), pp. 57-58.
[27] Ibid, p. 61.
[28] The Spanish version was originally published in volume VII:81 of *Loteria,* a rich source for regional history now available on-line, in August 1962. The English language version, apparently unpublished, bears the title `The Story of the Scottish Settlement in the Darien (1698-1700) and Its Importance in British History (improved version of lecture given in Spanish at the University of Panama 15 June 1962, and published in Panama in *Loteria*, Volume VII, No. 81, August 1962).´ Copies of both works are held by the National Library of Scotland.

journal *Loteria* it provides a significant contribution through its recognition of the context of contemporary politics in Europe.

The Scottish World

The organization and transcription of Company of Scotland documents currently housed in the National Library of Scotland has, understandably, created an invaluable base of Darien historiography. Following the discovery of much of the material in the basement of the Advocates Library in Edinburgh, the 1849 publication of *The Darien Papers* provides a vital record from which the Scottish, and more specifically, the Company perspective can be studied. In his introduction, editor John H. Burton unapologetically describes the documents he has chosen to include as "showing the unparalleled incapacity, producing endless blunders, of those who undertook the mighty task of establishing a new Colony for a people totally unacquainted with Colonial empire".[29]

Three quarters of a century later George Pratt Insh commenced the challenging task of preparing a comprehensive narrative history, describing events not only in Scotland and on the Isthmus, but also across Europe and as far as Company destinations in Africa and Asia. Describing his reluctance to prepare his work without consulting Spanish sources, he gives due credit to both Frank Cundall and Francis Russell Hart for their contributions[30], contending that the material they supplied from Spain´s Archive of the Indies, while adding detail, did not change the substance of the historical events provided by Scottish and English records.[31] Unfortunately, that supposition eliminates recognition of the scale of preparations in both Spain and Spanish America to assure the expulsion of the Scots, as

---

[29] J.H. Burton, (ed.), *The Darien Papers: Being a Selection of Original Letters and Official Documents Relating to the Establishment of a Colony at Darien by the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies 1695-1700* (Bannatyne Society, Edinburgh 1849), p. xv.

[30] Cundall´s work, published in 1926 in New York, is entitled *The Darien Venture*. Hart´s, published three years later in New York, is *The Disaster of Darien, The Story of the Scots Settlement and the Causes of its Failure 1699-1701.* While both do contain important translations of Spanish documents, only Hart´s are footnoted.

[31] G.W. Insh, *Historian´s Odyssey* (Edinburgh 1938), pp. 203-204.

well as lasting impacts in the Americas. Despite its restrictions, however, Insh does provide an introduction to the participation of the native Cuna, clarifying the divisions among them as well as the international experience they possessed. The author also acknowledges the effective communication networks that existed across the region, the Scots having been informed by both the pilot hired to take them to the coast and their first Indian contacts that they had been expected for a considerable time.[32] The collective history provided through Insh´s efforts, *The Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies* (London 1932) narrative and its companion source collection *Papers Relating to the Ships and Voyages of the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, 1696-1707* (Edinburgh 1924) are deservedly cited by virtually every later study.

Any comprehensive review of the interpretations and impact of the Darien expeditions appropriately includes analysis of events and conditions within Scotland during the surrounding years. The emphasis of Darien as a contributing rather than the predominant cause of the Treaty of Union of 1707 is presented by Christopher Whatley and Derek Patrick in *The Scots and Union* (Edinburgh 2007). Previous inclinations toward union are explored, as well as the synergistic series of calamities that impacted Scotland during the 1690s. The combination of crop failures of that decade, diminishing trade due to the demise of the French market during the Nine Years´ War, tariffs blocking specific Scottish exports to England, and the unprecedented failure of the Company of Scotland established the context for the political upheavals that lay ahead.[33] The authors compare the relative stability of England not only with Scotland´s inability to cope effectively with the succession of adversities, but also with her internal and protracted debates concerning religion, succession, government and her relationship with her southern neighbor.[34]

Although the tragic loss of life and property that resulted from the Darien venture would create a potent rallying point and extensive propaganda fodder*, The Scots and Union* effectively provides an exhaustive survey of the complexities of the circumstances leading

[32] Insh, *The Company*, pp. 125-126
[33] Whatley and Patrick, *The Scots and Union*, p. 139.
[34] Ibid, p. 140.

to union and the convoluted path taken to its establishment. As there was no single cause of the Darien disaster, there was no single cause nor connivance that precipitated the Treaty of Union. The complexities that Whatley and Patrick present are echoed in the following chapters with a parallel exposure of the wider array of consequences created by Company of Scotland efforts to establish New Caledonia and the diverse array of factors that ensured its failure.

The economic causes and consequences specific to Darien are more deeply explored in Douglas Watt´s *The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union and the Wealth of Nations* (Edinburgh 2007). Like Whatley and Patrick, Watt provides a comprehensive story, addressing the specifics of the endeavor by interweaving the story of events on the Isthmus with concurrent developments in Scotland and England. The author accurately assesses the lack of novelty in identifying the Isthmus as a strategic area for trade and settlement. Centuries of development and use of land and sea networks linking Panama and Portobello to the Iberian penninsula bore testimony to Spanish commitment to maintaining a presence in the region.[35] Spain would not ignore an intrusion in such a strategic location, yet the Company of Scotland Directors, after intense and lengthy debate, made the reckless determination that the "position, climate, fertile soil, and the absence of European settlement" of Darien merited its choice as a destination and that a declining Habsburg empire would not be able to muster sufficient military force to threaten its development.[36]

---

[35] Howarth dates the establishment of the 18-mile Royal Road across the Isthmus to about 1535, describing the mule trail as "the most important thoroughfare in the Spanish empire". Howarth, *The Golden Isthmus*, p. 60. The same author goes on to quantify the importance of the transportation link . . . "All the gold that was seized from the Incas crossed it, all the pearls of the Pacific, all the silver from the vast mines of Bolivia. For the silver, an estimate exists: between 1546 and 1600, twenty million kilograms, two hundred thousand tons. As for the gold and jewels, even if the quantities were known, one could not possibly give them a modern value. To the successive kings of Spain, the riches seemed to promise world-wide power and dominion." Ibid, p. 61. For a description of the system developed by Spain linking the Isthmus with incoming treasure and its transportation to Spain, see Clarence Haring, *Trade and navigation between Spain and the Indies in the time of the Hapsburgs* (Cambridge 1918), pp. 188-190.

[36] Watt, *The Price*, p. 143.

Watt guides the reader through the innovative subscription process, the administration by the inexperienced, often incompetent, and sometimes corrupt Directors, the tragic events during settlement and abandonment of New Caledonia, and the subsequent politicization of the failed venture. Characteristics of a financial mania, such as the large percentage of the population who became shareholders, the amount of funds raised in proportion to the country´s wealth, and the celebration of the enterprise from the pulpit, in poetry and song, and in universities all characterized the enterprise.[37] At the actual site of the colony inept management exposed itself in more immediate ways. Insufficient stores of food, and the shortages of fishing nets to supplement the supply, rapidly contributed to the mortality instigated by an array of unfamiliar tropical diseases.[38] Watt underscores the eventual and profound impact on Scotland of the Darien disaster and the major role of its economic consequences upon that country´s future . . .

> . . . the company failed and every penny of capital was lost. The Scots experienced the destructive force of the new financial world more acutely than any nation before them. A dose of realism followed which encouraged the political elite to trade sovereignty and independence for the more prosaic prospects of security, economic growth and cash in hand.[39]

The awkward position of King William as sovereign of both Scotland and England, and the extreme discomfort the Company of Scotland brought to bear on his reign and representatives, was an integral part of the Scottish world in the years encompassing Darien. P.W.J. Riley discusses the complexities between the King´s role as English monarch, his responsibilities to Spain and the political complications created by his Scottish subjects, particularly due to the unfortunate choice of New Caledonia´s location within the territories of the Spanish crown. Riley understates in *King William and the Scottish Politicians* (Edinburgh 1979) that "William´s relations with Spain were going through a delicate phase owing to his involvement in arranging the succession to the Spanish throne, so that the activities of his Scottish subjects were a great embarrassment to

---

[37] Ibid, pp. 80-85.
[38] Ibid, p. 124.
[39] Ibid, p. xviii.

him."[40] Riley contends that English responses to undermine Scottish success "did not so much attempt sabotage as withhold cooperation and persuade others to do the same"[41], a proposition refuted here in Chapter 4 through the introduction of new information verifying deliberate interference through the deployment of Admiral Benbow´s fleet to the Caribbean.

The Spanish World

Spain at the end of the seventeenth century was in no position to allow an enterprise such as the Company of Scotland to establish itself in such a valuable, albeit environmentally inhospitable, territory as the Isthmus. No matter how distracted Habsburg Spain might be by questions of succession or the protection of other overseas assets, it could not afford the threat and affront to the strategic heart of its empire and the revenues that passed through it.

Through both his narrative and accompanying translations of correspondence between various Spanish officials throughout the Caribbean and in Europe, F.R. Hart[42] offers insight into the intricacies of not only the response to the Scottish presence, but also the Spanish imperial world at the end of the Habsburg era. *The Disaster of Darien: The Story of the Scots Settlement and the Causes of Its Failure 1699-1701* (Cambridge 1929)

---

[40] Riley, *King William*, p. 131.
[41] Ibid, p. 132.
[42] Hart, trained as an engineer, had served as General Manager of a railroad in Colombia, President of the United Fruit Company and eventually as Consul of Colombia in Boston from 1908 to 1919. *MHS Francis Russell Hart Collection, 1573-1936: Guide to the Collection (Massachusetts Historical Society)*, p. 1, accessed 23 May 2011 at 10:40 a.m. via http://www.masshist.org/findingaids/doc.cfm?fa=fa0161. In addition to Hart´s published material, the personal papers that comprise his collection held by the Massachusetts Historical Society contain many transcriptions and translations invaluable to a study of the Darien expeditions. Notable among the documents are both an English translation and a copy of the printed version of *Gazeta extraordinaria del feliz successo: que las Armas Españolas invieron en el desalejamiento del Escoces que se avia fortificado en el Playon, Costa de Portovelo, Provincia del Darien en el Reyno de Tierra firme,á II de Abril de este presente año 1700*, an anonymously authored official account of the campaign against the Scots published in Lima shortly after the capitulation.

provides as much or more information about the Spanish as it does about the Scots. The actual landfall of the expedition in November 1698 did not catch Madrid unaware as sophisticated Spanish intelligence networks had long monitored the Scottish plans, and both diplomatic and military responses had been initiated.[43] Concerns were formalized by the Council of the Indies in February 1699 via their dire warning that

> . . . if the Scots procure a footing and fortify themselves in the island, situated so close to the Main, inasmuch as it may be justifiably feared from the unreliable character and natural perversity of the Darien Indians that they will assist the Scots in their purpose, they can readily spread thence and occupy that territory . . . From this would ensure irreparable damage-even graver than that experienced in regions which other nations have occupied.[44]

Some of the most dramatic record that Hart has made accessible is the translation of the diary of Don Juan Pimienta, newly arrived Governor of Cartagena and recipient of the above orders. Pimienta wrote his entries from the flagship *San Juan Bautista* during February and March 1700, responsibly recounting the daily efforts of the campaign against the Scots and the sequence of events leading to their capitulation. Interspersed with notes of weather and administrative duties are advisements of intelligence acquired from natives and Frenchmen, records of communication with other ships of the fleet, decisions of military strategy and the vital information received from Scottish deserters (see Chapter 2). The Governor´s entries become especially revealing as he includes his written exchanges with the Scots, who pleaded their need for a translator. The reader can only attempt to imagine Pimienta´s expression and frustration as he responds "I have understood very well your honours´ three communications (the first in English, the second translated into Latin, the third in French), but I recognize the replies which your honours make to me that you have not understood mine".[45]

Representative of aspects of contemporary Spanish military protocol and his own method of command, Pimienta does not hesitate to criticize members of his own forces, addressing

---

[43] Watt, *The Price*, p. 188.
[44] F.R. Hart, *The Disaster*, p. 252.
[45] Ibid, Appendix XXXI, p. 382.

one officer´s failure to notify him of the entry of an unidentified frigate into the bay at New Caledonia. The governor records his terse reply to the delinquent subordinate, who has pled complete ignorance of the suspicious vessel . . .

> In view of this reply I went to the place and told him that if he did not know how to command, to withdraw to camp, that I would put in his stead somebody who did; that this and various complaints against him, from the infantry, which had reached my ears, had annoyed me considerably.[46]

These events so efficiently documented by Pimienta and provided in translation by Hart are placed in the larger world of the reign of Carlos II of Spain by Christopher Storrs in `Disaster at Darien (1698-1700)? The Persistence of Spanish Imperial Power on the Eve of the Demise of the Spanish Habsburgs.´ Storrs utilizes records from both Spain´s *Archivo General de Indias* in Sevilla and its *Museo Naval* in Madrid to illustrate the substantial and deliberate response to the Scottish intrusion in Darien. Both naval and military preparations were implemented on both sides of the Atlantic despite the pressure of other demands involving ending the Nine Years´ War and defending the strategic Spanish North African outposts of Oran, Ceuta and Melilla.[47] Storrs also credits the instrumental role of the refined Spanish intelligence system, repeatedly referred to in the following chapters, as well as the diplomatic efforts across Europe to obtain financial support from the Vatican to thwart any incursion by non-Catholic "pirates" on Spanish colonial soil.[48] Although the Navarette expedition that was eventually launched from Cadiz in June 1700 was not ultimately required to eliminate the Scottish presence in Darien, its ten ship, 4800 man contingent speaks both to the value Spain placed on the Isthmus and the crown´s ability to deploy forces across the Atlantic when a substantial threat was perceived.[49]

---

[46] Ibid, pp. 390-391.
[47] C. Storrs, `Disaster at Darien (1698-1700)? The Persistence of Spanish Imperial Power on the Eve of the Demise of the Spanish Habsburgs´, *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 29:5 (1999), p. 16.
[48] Ibid, pp. 21-22.
[49] Ibid, p. 24.

As introduced above, the extensive documents held in Spain´s Archive of the Indies are fundamental to Darien historiography. The sheer quantity of the correspondence, interrogations, reports and administrative documents held in the *legajos* or bundles are cited by Joaquin Garcia Casares as signifying the acute importance of the Scottish incursion to both Spain and her American dominions.[50] Without negating the value of the quantity or quality of documents concerned, however, the tendency has been to confine research to what has become its own "classic" collection of Darien-related *legajos* within the vast holdings. Many of the significant new sources which are introduced in the following chapters were discovered by searching material outside of that currently indexed as pertaining to Scots, Darien, New Caledonia or any of the principal individuals involved. Primary examples are the voluminous court record of the trial studied in Chapter 5 and the related register of prisoners held by the *Casa de la Contratación*. It is also vital to acknowledge that, although the site of the colony fell within the jurisdiction of Panama, officials from Cartagena, within Santa Fé´s authority, actually conducted the majority of the direct contact with the Company of Scotland and its representatives due to their city´s position on the Caribbean coast. Undoubtedly, there is extensive material still to be uncovered within the immense collection.

The Darien World

Despite the ramifications of the events that transpired, the story of New Caledonia has not prompted a significant body of historiography specific to the site and the surrounding Darien territory. Certainly the web that was the Atlantic World makes it difficult to talk about any single geographic area in isolation, particularly as numerous factions continually jockeyed for advantage in territory and trade. Nevertheless, some authors do specifically

[50] Joaquín Garcia Casares, *Historia del Darién, Cuevas, Cunas, Españoles, Afros, presencia y actualidad de los Chocoes* (Panama 2008), p. 252. The account of New Caledonia and the ensuing reaction is covered on pages 250 to 261 and comprises an important new addition to Spanish-language Darien region historiography. Utilizing many of the sources discussed in this review, Garcia Casares provides an account of the armada deployed from Spain, as well as the involvement of the Viceroy of Peru and the eventual successful campaign by Governor Pimienta.

turn their attention to events unfolding in Darien and allow us to hear the indigenous voices of the Cuna people, as well as those of the Spanish and a cast of both established and itinerant foreign inhabitants.

Two contemporary narratives of New Caledonia have consistently provided source material for historians studying the Company of Scotland and, although colored by their authors´ cultural and personal biases, provide vital information of life and events in the colony. The first, by Reverend Francis Borland who participated in the final expedition, was written decades following the actual events but was based on the author´s diaries.[51] The second, highly controversial, is the collection of pamphlets written by first expedition surgeon-turned-deserter Walter Herries. His important role in the Company´s story, forged not only through his actual experience in the colony but also through his writings and espionage, is addressed in the following chapter. Pertaining to his credibility as a source of information, ample evidence is presented that the surgeon´s testimony should be given more regard than the skepticism and even ridicule his writings have provoked, particularly due to the substantiation found in Spanish correspondence of important details and accusations he recorded that have often been dismissed as bias and fiction. The highly controversial reception of Herries´ works at the time of their publication, fueled by his biting sarcasm directed at Company management and supporters, should not negate their value as historical sources.[52]

---

[51] Francis Borland, *The History of Darien 1700* (Glasgow 1779). Borland´s diaries, containing important but generally overlooked supplementary material, are currently held by the University of Edinburgh Library, Centre for Research Collections and catalogued as MS Laing 262, *Memorial or Diary of Mr. Francis Borland, 1661-1722.*

[52] The four primary pamphlets attributed to Herries, whose titles reflect the intensity of the pamphlet war that followed Darien events, are: *A Defence of the Scots Abdicating Darien: Including An Answer to the Defence of the Scot´s Settlement there*, published in Glasgow in 1700; *A Short Vindication of Phil. Scot´s Defence of the Scots abdicating Darien being in answer to the challenge of the author of the defence of that settlement, to prove the Spanish title to Darien, by inheritance, marriage, donation, purchase, reversion, surrender or conquest: with a prefatory reply to the false and scurrilous aspersions, of the new author of The just and modest vindication, &c., and some animadiversions on the material part of it, relating to the title of Darien,* published the same year in London; *An Enquiry into the Caledonian Project, with a Defence of England´s Procedure (In point of Equity) in Relation thereunto, In a Friendly Letter from London, to a member of the Scots African*

Atlthough the majority of her work involves the Scottish effort to prove their legal right to Darien, Bridget McPhail utilizes the proliferation of resulting pamphlets to which Herries contributed to distill descriptions of the Cuna and their society in *Through a Glass, Darkly: Scots and Indians Converge at Darien.* The vast majority of the accounts, which McPhail describes as biased, documented a people not unlike, and certainly not less prosperous, than many Scots. Religious differences, if they were a concern at all, were ameliorated by the fact that the Scottish ministers accompanying the expedition had a distinct lack of success in influencing their own brethren "who seemed curiously reluctant to observe the Sabbath or attend sermons, and whose behavior when they did attend was considerably less genteel than that of their Indian counterparts".[53] Citing several published sources, the author also proposes that the Scots´ historical familiarity with their own tribal societies eased their interactions with their neighbors, explaining that "the Scottish nation was to a large extent historically based on a society of independent clans owing allegiance to none but their chief, and the pattern still persisted in the highlands".[54]

While McPhail does reference broader implications of New Caledonia by writing that "long after the would-be colony collapsed, the drama of Darien played itself out in the theatre of Europe"[55] and does turn her attention to the indigenous population, she also perpetuates the critical false supposition that is fundamental to the opposing argument presented in the following chapters

> Caledonia left no lasting impression on the great map of the colonial world. It was a temporary irritation to the Spanish empire; and it had no discernable effect on the local inhabitants, who were once again left

---

and Indian company in Edinburgh, to guard against Paffion, a London publication of 1701; and *A New Darien Artifice Laid Open; in a notable instance of Captain Maclean´s name being used (in the Flying Post, February 11 and 13 1700/01) to vouch for the Caledonian Company, after that Gentleman hath been persecuted by them these thirteen months past for vouching against them*, also published in London in 1701.

[53] Bridget McPhail, `Through a Glass Darkly; Scots and Indians Converge at Darien´, *Eighteenth Century Life*, Vol. 18 (1994), p. 141.

[54] Ibid, p. 141.

[55] Ibid, p. 130.

in peace after the Spaniards had expelled the Scots.[56]

Perpetuating this same misconception of the enterprise´s incidental role in the history of the Isthmus and the Americas, Dennis Hidalgo refers to Storrs´s work, Insh´s publications and original sources in Scotland and England in `To Get Rich for Our Homeland: The Company of Scotland and the Colonization of the Isthmus of Darien´. Accentuating the novelty of how profoundly a European home country was impacted by events undertaken in the Americas, the article´s publication in the *Colonial Latin American Historical Review* does serve to expose the attempt at Isthmian colonization to a wider group of scholars, but, paradoxically, its concluding remarks that "the effects of the venture in Panama, where the event is remembered sketchily because of its modest consequences"[57] run counter to the evidence presented here of the array of consequences both in Panama and across the Americas.

A significant initial effort that does seek to chronicle the impact of New Caledonia on the Isthmus is the first chapter of a full-length study of the Scots and the Cuna intended to be completed by Panamanian anthropologist Reina Torres de Arauz. Tragically, Torres de Arauz died before she could complete her work, which, based on observations expressed in its first installment, promised to analyze the Scots´ presence within the lengthy and complex history of Darien, uniquely emphasizing the variety of previous initiatives by the Spanish to subdue the Cuna and suppress the extensive experience of interaction with foreigners, particularly English, which they possessed. Although the work was never completed, the introductory portion of the work is invaluable in providing an understanding of the dynamic state of affairs into which the Scots naively inserted themselves.[58]

---

[56] Ibid, p. 132.
[57] D. Hidalgo, `To Get Rich for Our Homeland: The Company of Scotland and the Colonization of the Isthmus of Darien´, *Colonial Latin American Historical Review*, Vol. 10:3 (Summer 2001), p. 350. The complete article comprises pages 311 to 350.
[58] Torrez de Arauz, Reina, `Nuevo Edimburgo del Darién, Los Cunas: Anfitriones de Los Escoceses´, *Loteria,* Volumes 314-316 (May-July 1982), pp. 134-155. Torres de Arauz utilized correspondence produced by the Scots in her wider work on the Cuna. She

Carrying Torres de Arauz´s theme forward and further exploring the Darien vantage point, including a focus on the savvy adaptation of the Cuna to centuries of Spanish, French, English, and, suddenly, Scottish interaction, is Ignacio Gallup-Diaz´s *The Door of the Seas and the Keys to the Universe* (New York 2004). The author reconstructs the multi-faceted, inconsistent and volatile world into which the Scots were only the latest European arrival, providing the resident population with yet another opportunity to exercise their skills in language, trade and political acumen. In effect, the Scots had sailed into a region recently rocked by political discord both within the structures of the Spanish colonial government and between the government and its presumed Indian subjects. Not only did the Conde de Canillas, under whose jurisdiction Darien fell, have to cope with recent murders of Franciscan missionaries, a bloody attack on a Spanish garrison, and a troubling French presence, but a flotilla of Scots had now brazenly intruded, exhibiting every intent of constructing fortifications and establishing a permanent presence. Governing the chaos from Panama City was not easy, despite the impressive intelligence networks and almost two centuries of Spanish administration. Luis Carrrisoli, the mestizo whose family had long been the crown´s primary representatives in Darien, received a written reprimand from Canillas, expressing the latter´s distinct lack of appreciation for the administrative tactics being implemented to subdue Darien and its inhabitants, both indigenous and foreign. Particularly upsetting to the royal administrator was the tendency of the Cuna to create unsettling alliances with whatever group of interlopers arrived on shore.[59]

The continued opportunities presented by these European arrivals, and their consistent quests to identify assumed "chiefs" with whom to treat, created, according to Gallup-Diaz,

---

describes the value of these primary sources, notably Borland´s *The History of Darien 1700,* to her anthropological studies in `Datos Etnohistoricos Cunas Segun Documentos (1699-1779) de la Colonia Escocesa en Darien´, *Universidad de Panamá, Centro de Investigaciones Antropológicas Instituto Nacional de Cultura y Deportes, Dirección del Patrimonio Histórico, Actas Del II Symposium Nacional de Antropologia, Arqueologia y Etnohistoria de Panamá* (Panama 1971)

[59] Gallup-Diaz, *The Door*, pp. 117-118. Gallup-Diaz uses the title Tule, the group´s name for itself, to refer to the alternatively-identified Cuna. The latter, one of numerous names used across the historical record, is used here to provide uniformity.

unique and innovative leadership opportunities for the native men of Darien. If the visitors wished political leaders, the indigenous population would be willing to create them, to the advantage of both parties. Spanish efforts to identify a hierarchical structure mimicking their own had initiated the phenomenon and the later arrival of French, English and Scottish visitors further provided "Indian men who wished to accrue social power that they did not formerly possess . . . an additional stage upon which to do so."[60] These self-appointed Cuna leaders were the same practiced ambassadors who were neither surprised by the arrival of the Scots nor hesitant in establishing relations and pressing martial opportunities. One unintended consequence of the Scottish arrival was the exposure of a wider array of artificially created Cuna leadership than the Spanish had previously assumed, a scenario that would continue to perplex and demand the resources of the Panamanian government long after the evacuation of New Caledonia.[61]

Gallup-Diaz´s identification of European, and particularly Scottish, failures to recognize the nuances of Darien society resonate and are elaborated upon throughout the following pages as new and varying aspects of the story of New Caledonia are presented, revealing the wide wake of consequences the Company of Scotland left in its path. Not only were politics on the Isthmus disturbed, but reaction was forthcoming from the courts of Europe, both Spanish and English America, an array of commercial interests, and a body of religious institutions. The watchful eyes of the Atlantic World were focused on an unprecedented enterprise, simultaneously daring and tragically naïve.

Paralleling this broader consideration of the Darien expeditions is an overriding lesson resulting from the composite of both the historiography presented above and the extensive resources listed in the bibliography. Regardless of the acquisition of a substantial quantity of new material, research has been limited by language and geography. Revealed is a story far more expansive than English and Spanish words relate. Potential future scholarship investigating French, German, Dutch and Danish sources, among others, will serve only to

[60] Ibid, p. 125.
[61] Ibid, p. 123.

further the story of New Caledonia and define its even broader wake across the evolution of the seventeenth century into the eighteenth.

THE COMPANY OF SCOTLAND

Events which the above historiography seek to explain and the following chapters seek to expand had their formal beginning in 1695 with the sanction by the Scottish Parliament of the newly created Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies. Notably, the required approval of King William, absent in the Low Countries, was instead provided by his High Commissioner in Scotland, an action which later would be utilized by the monarch to claim ignorance of Scottish intent to establish their colony within Spanish territory.

Originally intended to be guided by a combined contingent of Scottish and English Directors, the enterprise quickly succumbed to rival goals between London and Scotland based factions. As George Insh writes

> While the English directors, with their gaze fixed on the trade of the East and with their energies directed towards breaking into the *mare clausum*, stand for a limited sectional interest, the Scottish directors, among whom are represented both merchants and aristocracy, stand for a wide national interest. In Scotland there lay behind the movement for the founding of the Company the insistent though long-thwarted desire to establish a Scottish colony . . . and the eager, stirring, passionate longing of a country recently set free from the tyranny of theological controversy and impatient to direct its energies to that career of industry and commerce from which it had been so long excluded.[62]

The chasm that developed between the competing factions provoked the Company´s evolution into a distinctly Scottish joint-stock effort, based in Edinburgh and funded solely by Scottish subscribers. Along with the patriotic fueling of economic support came the

---

[62] Insh, *The Company*, p. 41.

opportunity for the Scottish projecter and former director of the Bank of England William Paterson to finally successfully promote his long-held personal dream of Darien as a trading entrepot.[63]

Preparations for the implementation of the enterprise, facing a myriad of economic and political obstacles, continued in earnest during 1696 and 1697, Company representatives being dispatched to Amsterdam and Hamburg to oversee acquisition of appropriate vessels while trade goods and provisions to establish a colony were consolidated in Scotland. Markedly absent was a serious study and debate regarding Spain´s history on the Isthmus and the reaction that could legitimately be expected from an initiative by any foreign entity to establish a permanent presence in the strategic heart of her American colonial holdings. As discussed in Chapter 5, Company of Scotland personnel would stand by their claims that they had sailed from Leith in July 1698 under sealed orders, ignorant of their final destination and unaware of the affront to the Spanish Empire they were about to create.

The subsequent tale of New Caledonia encompasses the successive abandonments of the site, arrivals of relief expeditions, issuance of proclamations ordered by King William prohibiting support or communication with the colony, the deliberate and forceful reaction of Spain, and the involvement of a multitude of non-Company concerns, all of which are explored in the following pages. The relative brevity of the enterprise on the Isthmus, lasting less than a year and a half from the anchorage off Golden Island in November 1698 until the final capitulation to Spanish forces in March of 1700, did not, however, result in the immediate demise of its sponsoring Company.

Despite the economic and human losses incurred in the Darien initiative, the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, concurrent with efforts to obtain justification for their right to colonize New Caledonia investigated in Chapter 5, had continued to dispatch

[63] D. Watt presents evidence that Paterson had been promoting Darien as the locale for a merchandizing center since at least since 1687. Watt, *The Price*, p. 6.

ships to Africa and the East Indies.[64] Meeting with their own series of questionable circumstances, these voyages added to the growing discord with English trading concerns and culminated with the seizure in the Downs of the Company´s *Annandale* in January 1704 and the retribution-fueled seizure and eventual hanging of crew from the *Worcester* by Scots in the following months.[65]

A semblance of resolution of the entire Darien affair would finally emerge among negotiations leading to 1707´s Treaty of Union. As with so many aspects of the intended establishment of New Caledonia, soothing political discord would provide the basis for assuring the initiative´s passage. The Scots would acquire not only their long-sought free trade with England and colonial markets, but the unprecedented creation of the Equivalent would pay back, with interest, a broad spectrum of Company of Scotland participants. In return, Scotland would not only relinquish vital aspects of her sovereignty, but the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, along with dreams of a rich and thriving Scottish trading empire, would be dissolved.[66]

---

[64] The efforts of the Company of Scotland in Africa and the East Indies are addressed in `Book III-Africa and the Indies´of Insh, *The Company*, pp. 245-312.
[65] Ibid. Insh records the story of the *Worcester* on pp. 284-312 and notes the inclusion in the related trial of affidavits provided by two seamen who were veterans of Darien and later participated as crew on Company voyages to India. Ibid, pp. 300-301.
[66] For discussion of the Equivalent in the negotiations see Chapter 17 (`Bailout´) in Watt, *The Price*, pp. 219-242 and Whatley, *The Scots*, especially pp. 254-256.

CHAPTER 2

UNINTENDED ITINERARIES I
DESERTERS, OPPORTUNISTS AND A SPY: DISSENT AND DISAPPOINTMENT FEED INTELLIGENCE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC

> These poor men who were design´d for Souldiers or Planters, finding themselves mistaken in their golden Hopes, and no appearance of any thing but felling huge Trees, and very shrimp allowance of Victuals (and those very bad) soon wearied of the Enterprize; and before they were a full month upon the place, several deserted, some by Land towards the Spaniard and others lurk´d in the Woods till they had an opportunity to transport themselves by water to Jamaica.[67]

[67] Herries, *An Enquiry*, pp. 34-35.

These words, written by the surgeon Walter Herries describing the early weeks of his experience in New Caledonia, introduce both the causes of desertion and the impact it was to have on the Company of Scotland´s colonial endeavor. Not only would the loss of human resources have a deleterious effect[68], but the intelligence, acquired experience and material goods that the deserters took with them would all combine to assist those interests seeking to assure the colony´s demise.

This chapter investigates the record of these participants in the Darien expeditions who made the critical decision to voluntarily separate themselves from the main body of colonists.[69] Their stories not only clarify the vital role of desertion, acknowledged by the perpetrators themselves to the Spanish[70], but also add new dimensions to our understanding of the Company of Scotland´s administration, participants, enemies and impacts. We are introduced to a decidedly more international cast of mariners and landsmen than generally presumed and acquire an understanding of the predominance of military hierarchy and personnel that comprised the expeditions. The chronicles of desertion explain how the perpetrators, devoid of familial resources and familiar environment to provide protection or sustenance, implemented their change of circumstances and struggled to capitalize on limited and foreign resources to survive. We often learn how they were treated as they embarked on their desperate and vague itineraries and how they coped with hunger, illness, failed expectations and unanticipated circumstances. In addition to diminishing the labor force and skills of the colony itself, some of the deserters effectively exploited their accumulated experience for self-promotion and monetary reward. The unintended and unacknowledged dispersal of these individuals constituted not only a significant threat to the Company of Scotland on the Isthmus, but

---

[68] Among the impacts of desertion was the eventuality of even more desertions due to the workload being shared between a dwindling number of men. Peter Earle, *Sailors: English Merchant Seamen 1650-1775* (London 1998), p. 169.

[69] Underscoring its desparate causes, the decision to desert would usually result in not only forfeiture of wages, but also the loss of a man´s personal sea chest. Ibid, p. 167.

[70] In his February 1699 report, Governor Diego de los Rios of Cartagena noted that cumulative intelligence indicated substantial loss of colonists due to death and desertion. AGI, *Panamá* 160, f. 169.bis.v. Unfortunately, the lack of documentation by the Councilors at New Caledonia negates computation of a valid rate of desertion.

their paths through New Caledonia reached across the Caribbean into the larger entanglement of links and conflicts that characterized the Atlantic World at the end of the seventeenth century.

In addition to scattered personal accounts and official reports, the extensive and methodical catalogue of Spanish interrogations of deserters gives voice to sectors of the population who were either illiterate and thus unable to provide their own record or who otherwise felt inclined to protect their anonymity following desertion. These interrogations, the majority of which are held in the Archive of the Indies in Sevilla, also provide a lens through which the effectiveness and intricacies of Spain´s extensive intelligence network, vital to the planning and execution of efforts to eradicate the Scottish presence, may be examined. Both administrative and military officials efficiently mobilized the needed support of translators, scribes and legal professionals to fully capitalize on the knowledge and experience of their unanticipated guests. The resulting cast, from illiterate Irish soldiers serving in the Spanish military to the President of Panama, the critical and often first-hand information they acquired, and its distribution throughout the vast network that was the structure of the empire, addresses how Spain sought to protect her interests amid the chaotic and threatening conditions as the era of Habsburg rule reached its conclusion. This synergistic relationship between those who voluntarily departed from the Company of Scotland and those who received them comprises a new perspective on the enterprise´s dramatic failure. The collective story of the men involved establishes the significance of desertion in the collapse of New Caledonia and provides an extended explanation of its related loss of human and economic resources.

EARLY, OFTEN, AND UNACKNOWLEDGED

Desertion had evolved into a problem even prior to the ships sailing from Scotland[71] and would continue essentially unabated until the eventual capitulation to the Spaniards in

[71] The minutes of the Court of Directors of the Company of Scotland for 20 July 1698 record the Directors´ request for a list of all who had deserted, as well as the apprehension

March 1700. This portion of the chapter will investigate early cases of desertion, what can be discerned of the causes, logistics and impacts, and how the colony initially chose to cope with the reality of diminishing human and material resources as they struggled to establish a presence on the Isthmus.



Figure 2: Route of Darien Fleet, September-November 1699

Source: J.S. Barbour, A History of William Paterson and the Darien Company (Edinburgh 1907), between pages 58-59.

The initial case of desertion in the Americas, weeks before the ships reached their final destination, was that of Michael Pearson. In his 7 October 1698 journal entry Commodore Robert Pennycook succinctly records that, upon the fleet´s departure from Crab Island "we left one Michael Pearson behind, who ran away from the Tent to the Woods".[72] Whatever

---

of David Dalrymple, who had fled through a window after receiving advance pay. Ordered to be prosecuted for mutiny and desertion was the boatswain John Wilson. NAS, RH4/135/1, Vol. 2.

[72] Insh, *Papers*, pp. 79-80.

his motivation or intent, Pearson´s action provides an indication of how desertion was initially addressed. As noted by Scottish historian George Insh in an appendix to *Papers Relating to the Ships and Voyages of the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, 1696-1707*, the acknowledgment of this and a series of impending desertions was deleted from the version of events submitted back to Edinburgh in the first packet of correspondence sent from the fledgling colony. A comparison with the official journal, prepared by Dr. Hugh Rose, reveals that the latter merely edited and revised the log of the Commodore, at the same time eliminating any reference to either Pearson´s desertion or any of the others that had occurred.[73] The omissions assured initial reports of unmitigated success, prompting celebrations in Edinburgh and enabling decisions by the Court of Directors to continue preparation of successive expeditions unmarred by the realities of conditions challenging the settlers on the Isthmus.

Desertions had, in fact, impacted New Caledonia within weeks of the November 1698 arrival of the fleet. On the 30th of that month ten planters[74] fled, along with arms taken

---

[73] Insh further notes that the failure to locate any of the anticipated and lucrative logwood groves was also deleted from Rose´s version of the journal. Ibid, p. 273. The supposed precise location of a stand of the dye-providing trees "whereof 300 Men could cut down so much in Six Months as should defray the whole charge of the Expedition" had been acquired by Company Directors in Edinburgh from the buccaneer surgeon and Darien veteran Lionel Wafer. Insh, *The Company*, p. 113. The poaching of *Haematoxylon campechianum* along the Caribbean coast was well established and could reap profits of up to 110 pounds per ton in England. Peter Galvin, *Patterns of Pillage, A Geography of Caribbean-based Piracy in Spanish America, 1536-1718* (New York 1958), pp. 89-90.

[74] The designation of planters was the lower part of a hierarchy of men created by the Company of Scotland for its military participants. The positions technically eliminated the need for the approval of the Privy Council for troops raised in Scotland. Herries, *A Defence*, p. 31. At the higher end of the hierarchy, Captains were assigned as Overseers, Lieutenants as Adjutants and Ensigns as Under-Adjutants. NAS, RH4/135/1, pp. 403-409. One such individual was Colonel Dowdall, a veteran of the Battle of the Boyne, who was convinced to forego his military status after "the Darien Company offered him extraordinary Encouragement to command their forces: on this he dropped his Commission, embarked with the rest, and was at last involved in the same general Misfortune." Charles Leslie, *A New History of Jamaica, From the Earliest Accounts to the Taking of Porto Bello by Vice-Admiral Vernon* (London 1740), pp. 264-265. The planters were to have been maintained by the Company for three years, after which they would receive 50 acres of countryside and a house in the main settlement. Herries, *A Defence*, p. 19.

from aboard the *Unicorn.*[75] Following a Council meeting that same afternoon a search party was sent out in a boat. It was successful in locating the men, who were brought back, put in irons and provided only bread and water.[76]

On the morning of 16 December another group of seven planters fled and, despite both land and sea parties being dispatched after them and requests of assistance made to local indigenous captains,[77] there is no indication of the men´s return to the colony. The transportation for at least part of this group may have been provided by a unique bounty program initiated by Governor Beeston of Jamaica to alleviate the labor shortage on his island. In a report prepared by Secretary of State Vernon, King William was informed that his Governor had commissioned a sloop to sail to New Caledonia during those early months, instructing her captain to "bring away such of the Scotch as are willing to come with him, and he is to have five pounds per head (from Beeston) for each man he shall bring". [78]

Whether or not the enticement of the bounty was involved, at least two of the men were confirmed to have been transported to Jamaica by George Chine, a Scot captaining a small sloop under the command of Englishman Richard Long.[79] Long, whose presence in the region slightly predated the Scots, had sailed into New Caledonia in mid-November and spent several days hosting and being hosted by the Company of Scotland. Although there was suspicion regarding Long´s avowed mission to hunt Spanish wrecks, the general assessment of his capabilities by the newer arrivals was that "he appear´d a most ridiculous

---

[75] The accompanying crime of theft, often to fund and aid the desertion, is identified as characteristic of a third of the men studied by Thomas Agostini in `"Deserted His Majesty´s Service": Military Runaways, the British-American Press, and the Problem of Desertion during the Seven Years´ War´, *Journal of Social History,* Vol. 40:4, Summer 2007, p. 970.
[76] Insh, *Papers*, pgs. 90-91. Entries from Pennycook´s log for 30 November and 1 December 1698.
[77] Ibid, p.93. Entry from Pennycook´s log, 16 December 1698.
[78] BL, ADD MS40774, f.82r. Vernon to the King, 4 July 1699. Unfortunately no report regarding the success or failure of the effort has been located.
[79] NAS, GD406/1/5437, Letter from Captain Richard Long to the Duke of Hamilton, 7 March 1707.

shallow-pated fellow, laught at and despis´d to his very face by his owne officers and continually drunk."[80]

The English Captain was shortly to create considerable animosity between himself and the Scots. According to a 1707 letter he wrote to the Duke of Hamilton, he had sailed his own ship to Jamaica and ordered Chine to Old Providence. The latter defied orders and instead sailed back to New Caledonia where he allowed two vitally needed carpenters to board and sail with him to Jamaica "for the sake of the gold which they gave him for their passage."[81]

SURVIVAL AND OPPORTUNITY

Another participant who evidence supports as among these early successful groups of deserters was Robert Allen who, like others, would experience the dual roles of deserter and prisoner, but whose uniquely acquired knowledge of Spanish America would benefit him in future years, particularly during the War of the Spanish Succession.[82] In 1708 Allen

---

[80] Insh, *Papers*, p. 88. Entries from Pennycook´s log November 13-20, 1698.

[81] NAS, GD406/1/5437, Richard Long to the Duke of Hamilton, 7 March 1707. Long´s letter is particularly intriguing as it solicits financial participation from the Duke of Hamilton in a scheme to seek recuperation of money lost on the Darien venture by trading linen and woolens along the Spanish-American coast. Long recounts the incident of the deserters to defend himself from the "great anger ye Scotch gentlemen have been in with me about carrying away the carpenters, If it was true, and done by my knowledge order or connivance I should justly deserve your Grace´s and their displeasure to my utter ruine." Ibid. There is no indication that Long´s petition to the Duke was successful.

[82] A Robert Allen is listed as a Captain´s Boy on the Rising Sun (NLS Adv. MS 83.7.4., f. 105v), which did not depart from Scotland until September 1699. A Robert Allan appears as a "sailor" on the *Unicorn*, which did participate in the initial expedition that arrived in Darien in 1698 . The latter listing is from the *Index to the receipts for payment of arrears due to seamen on Company of Scotland ships, 1698-1711*, a document compiled by the Group Archives of the Royal Bank of Scotland in 2010. The latter listing is intriguing as the Robert Allen discussed here had permanently departed Spanish America by 1711 and could have taken advantage of the opportunity to recoup wages regardless of his actual status as a deserter. Likewise, the individual considered here may have been among the planters with the first expedition or, more likely due to multiple references to his youth, erroneously reported the year of his departure from Darien. Discussions of the war, which provide the context for the information Allen would offer, are found in John Hattendorf´s *England in the War of the Spanish Succession, A Study of the English View and Conduct of*

authored and submitted a memorial to British Secretary of State Charles Spencer documenting an impressive resumé of his experience in Spanish America. Although Allen does not identify himself as a deserter, he does incriminate himself when he concedes that he left the Scottish colony of Darien in December of 1698 for Jamaica. From there he traveled widely throughout Spanish America, working for merchants on trading voyages. In 1701 he found himself back in Darien exploring for logwood, where he became the sole survivor of an Indian attack. After living approximately eighteen months with members of a decidedly friendlier indigenous community he was informed of the presence of nine English sloops, with which he made contact. Joining the combined force of 600 "of her Maty´s Subjects that had commissiones from the Governour of Jamaica", and confirming his value to the project by negotiating the recruitment of sixty additional native allies, Allen and the combined force completed a successful raid on the town and mines of Cana. A second smaller attempt on Antioquia proved far more hazardous. Finding their numbers reduced from 210 to 150, short on supplies, and surrounded by hostile forces, the survivors requested quarter and safe conduct to Cartagena. Within days, Allen and two comrades narrowly escaped being executed by the Spaniards. Over the following twelve months he was moved from location to location, witnessing the "Countreys of Peru for above 800 leagues". Finally he found himself imprisoned in Quito, where he came to the attention of Don Antonio de Ron Bernardo de Quiros, fiscal of the *Audiencia* and Surveyor General of the Province of Quito. Continuing to exhibit an uncanny ability to exploit his circumstances, Allen eventually spent seven years as the official´s Secretary, gaining a unique understanding of the internal workings of Spanish colonial administration. As both men were departing from Portobello in 1707 to sail for Old Spain, where Don Antonio was to take a prestigious position on the Council of the Indies, their ship was taken by Admiral Wager. His superior having been killed, Allen was convinced by the Admiral to return to Great Britain and seek employment in the expanding trade to the West Indies. Although Allen, having lost all his personal effects, wrote that he was compelled to accept offers to go to Holland to discuss offers with their West India Company, he added that he

---

Grand Strategy, 1702-1712 (New York and London 1987) and Henry Kamen´s *The War of Succession in Spain 1700-15* (Bloomington 1969).

considered it his duty to report to the Secretary of State, and "could be found at the house of Mr. James Campbell Merchant".[83]

Although the accompanying analysis of Allen´s manuscript contends that the contemporary political climate in London was not conducive to exploiting the knowledge and credentials of men like the bilingual deserter, it also emphasizes that such experience was consistent with London´s increased military concern with Spain and her dominions.[84]

Apparently not having had access to reports of early deserters from Darien or later works authored by Allen himself, Alsop also states the sole corroboration of Allen´s story to be the account of the first, successful raid on the mines.[85] In fact, the young deserter´s saga and accompanying documentation did continue, taking advantage of the heightened interest in Spanish America during the War of the Spanish Succession through his preparation of a thirty-seven page pamphlet entitled *An Essay on the Nature and Methods Of carrying on a Trade to the South-Sea.* The publication, printed in London in 1712 and coinciding with negotiations to end the war, schemes to acquire trade along the Pacific coast and the establishment of the South Sea Company, identified its author as someone "who resided some Years in the Kingdom of Peru" and was dedicated to "the most Honourable Robert Earl of Oxford, and Earl Mortimer, Lord High Treasurer of Great Britain".[86]

---

[83] J.D. Alsop, `A Darien Epilogue: Robert Allen in Spanish America´, *The Americas*, Vol. 43 (1986), pp. 197-201.
[84] Ibid, p. 198.
[85] Ibid, pp. 197-198, ft. 3. Additional corroboration is provided by Henry Barnham, in his unpublished *The Civil History of Jamaica to the Year 1722,* who writes of "one Allen an Irish lad" who served as interpreter for Admiral Wager. BL, MS ADD 12422, p. 231. Later in the same manuscript the author relates Allen´s successful pleas to his Spanish captors, telling them that he "was born in Ireland (certainly preferable to self-identifying himself as a Scot who had been at Darien) and was a servant to an Englishman and forced to come . . ." Ibid, p. 251.
[86] Allen´s pamphlet was originally printed and sold by John Baker in London. Reflecting the strategies and concerns of later decades, it would be reprinted in 1762 under the title *The Great Importance of the Havannah, set forth in An Essay on the Nature and Methods of carrying on a trade to the South Sea, and the Spanish West Indies* and in 1763 as *Essay on the nature and methods of carrying on a trade to the South Sea, A new trade laid open*

Markedly absent in Allen´s pamphlet, likely seeking to avoid any doubts regarding his allegiance to British initiatives, is any reference to Darien, the Company of Scotland, or prior employment within Spain´s colonial administration. What the author does provide is, in effect, a substantive primer of the workings of Spanish America, utilizing, not surprisingly, the *Audiencia* of Quito as a specific example. He broadens his geographical focus with lists of products from the various regions of the Spanish empire, as well as identifying the major ports of each geographical unit and providing a history of Spain´s management of trade. The assumed interests of his readers are specifically addressed by a discussion of "By what other means other European Nations, and in particular England, have always receiv´d some considerable Share of the Profits therof".[87] After describing various trade routes, including the transport of money remitted to Old Spain and the location and access to various mines of silver, gold and emeralds, the specific and lucrative illegal trade between the Spanish colonies and Jamaica encompassing the period of the Scottish establishment on the Isthmus is addressed . . . .

> But that which most of all favour´d this Jamaica-Trade, was the galleons not coming from Old Spain, as had been usual for Nine or Ten Years together, viz. from the taking of Carthegena by Monsieur Ponti, Anno

---

from the islands of Tobago, Granados . . . to the Spanish main, in the Kingdom of Peru, . . . By a gentleman who resided many years in both kingdom, printed, respectively, by J. Hinxman and Mrs. Hinxman & D. Wilson of London. The dedication of the original to the Earl of Oxford and Mortimer was significant, as the Earl was Chancellor of the Exchequer and considered de facto Prime Minister. He had also served as one of the commissioners negotiating the 1707 Treaty of Union with Scotland and as Secretary of State for the Northern Department. Having opened secret negotiations with Spain to end the war, the Earl was particularly interested in the potential for South Sea trade and would eventually acquire a position as a Governor of the South Sea Company. L. Stephen and S. Lee (eds.), *Dictionary of National Biography,* Vol. XXIV: entry for Robert Harley (London 1890), pp. 399-406. For discussion of the impacts of the eventual collapse of the South Sea Company and its synergy with the economic consequences of the Darien failure upon the economy of Scotland, see Patrick Walsh, `The Bubble on the Periphery: Scotland and the South Sea Bubble´, *The Scottish Historical Review,* Vol. XCI, 1:231 (April 2012), pp. 106-124. Both an analysis of Harley´s role and acknowledgment of Allen´s publication are addressed in Shinsuke Satsuma´s `The South Sea Company and its plan for a naval expedition in 1712´, *Historical Research,* Vol. 85:229 (August 2012), pp. 410-429.

[87] Allen, *An essay*, p. 8.

> Domino 1697, until the Year 1706, for the Spaniards, during that interval of time, receiving few or no Supplies from Old-Spain, and at the same time many of them coming down with their Money and other commodities, under pretence of waiting for the arrival of the Galleons, they took their opportunities, supply´d themselves privately from our Vessels, and by such Means the Merchants and Factors at Jamaica, drove a very considerable Clandestine Trade al along the Coast from Rio de la Hacha to Chagre, besides some small Trade which they also carri´d on to Mexico, Cuba and Hispaniola, but the largest and most beneficial part of that Trade was carri´d on within the aforesaid Limits, on the Coast of Porto-Belo and Carthagena, those Places being the Ports from whence all the Kingdoms of Peru, Chili and New-Granada were supply´d, and whereof our Merchants had then a very considerable Share, to the very great advantage of their Mother Kingdom.[88]

Allen continues, emphasizing the lucrative value of English merchants´ prior contracts with the Portuguese to supply the *Asiento* with slaves (see Chapter 4) and the subsequent loss of that business since "the intrusion of the Duke of Anjou into the Monarchy of Spain, and the commencement of the present War".[89] The potential presented by a South Sea trade along the coast of Chile and Peru, the author contends, has been exploited by the French, effectively supplanting British commerce through points of entry in Panama and Portobello. Validating his advice with what he declared were actual translations of correspondence from Spanish officials, French sea captains and Peruvian merchants, Allen traces the introduction of French trade along the Pacific and explains how the provision of goods at lower prices on the opposite coast could still confound French gains.[90] In closing, the resurrected deserter, relying on his years of acquired experience, writes of the benefits of assuring trade through both old Spain and Jamaica and expresses his hopes that

---

[88] Ibid, pp. 20-21.
[89] Ibid, p. 23.
[90] Ibid, pp. 21-32. For a discussion of French trade during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see Pierre Boulle´s `French Mercantilism, Commercial Companies and Colonial Profitability´, Pieter Emmer and Femme Gaastra (eds.), *The Organization of Interoceanic Trade in European Expansion, 1450-1800* (Aldershot 1996), pp. 233-253, and Holden Furber´s *Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800* (Minneapolis 1976), pp. 103-124. For a specific review of the situation in Spanish America see Geoffrey Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700-1789* (London 1979), especially Part 1 `The Threat from France´, pp. 19-33.

> the Authority and Incouragement of Parliament, and all the Assistance which can be reasonably be expected from Her Majesty, and those in Authority under Her, to whom this Trade has appear´d of so great Benefit and Importance, that no Incouragements or Assurances will be wanting for the Accomplishment of so great and good a Design.[91]

Hinting at more clandestine transfers of knowledge, Allen also notes that other of his proposals will not be made public, for they "may require Secrecy in Execution".[92]

Of vital concern regarding the impact of Darien and its deserters is that individuals such as the intellectually adept Allen had an opportunity to survive and thrive, marketing their acquired experience and skills and contributing to an unintended dispersal of Scots across the Atlantic World. Not only were these individuals of value to Spain, but their extensive first-hand knowledge of conditions within Spanish America, and often their fluency in the Spanish language, provided an important product that could be bartered to competing governments and commercial interests.

SURGEON, DESERTER, AUTHOR AND SPY

December 1698 also witnessed the departure from New Caledonia of the man who would become the most vocal and infamous of deserters, ultimately offering himself directly to the Spanish Ambassador to London as a spy operating on behalf of King William III and the English Secretary of State. Unaware of the man´s total portfolio, Company of Scotland Directors would describe him to their Councilors in the colony as being of "mutinous and

---

[91] Ibid, p. 34.

[92] Ibid, p. 36. Allen also provides a pragmatic list of "Manufactures and Commodities proper for the South-Sea-Trade", which includes " . . . all sorts of Woollen Manufactures, Stockings of all sorts, and Hats white and black" (Ibid, pp. 38-39). The inventory includes the same kinds of trade goods the judges of the *Casa de la Contratación* would identify during the trial discussed in Chapter 5 as indicative of the Company of Scotland´s intent to conduct illegal trade.

pernicious Temper" and alert them to the fact that "He had two Paquets from Caledonia with your Last to us, but from whom we know not".[93]

The man referred to was Walter Herries, a Scot from Dumbarton. His service in the Royal Navy from 1688 to 1695 was impressive, but he had also had a physical altercation with his commanding officer, resulting in not only the fact that he had been run through but that he faced a court martial.[94] No doubt he had been relieved to receive the offer of a position as surgeon when he was hired in London by the Company of Scotland in November 1696. He was contracted to proceed to Amsterdam or Hamburg, then on to Scotland to depart on a trading mission to either of the Indies "at the same time made tacitly to believe that I was to go to the East Indies and that the ships would sail next March at the farthest".[95] Although he would eventually be labeled a deserter by the Company, Herries would defend himself in his own printed exposés by explaining that he "had an honourable Discharge and Certificate sign´d by the Caledonian Council, with the Colony´s Great Seal affixed to it".[96] Supporting his words with action, he would also take the Company of Scotland before the Admiralty Court at Doctors´ Commons and, like many other merchant mariners of his era, successfully recoup his wages.[97] Likely provoked to some degree by

---

[93] NLS, MS Adv. 83.7.4, f. 185. Problems created by the transportation of unofficial and potentially unwelcome correspondence were not exclusive to the Company of Scotland. The Royal African Company dealt with the issue through a standard phrase in their Captains´ Orders, prohibiting them from delivering "any Paper Letter or concern whatsoever sent for England but by order in writing from us . . nor send up any Letters to post but such as are directed to us and the rest you must deliver to us at African house at your coming up." NA, T70/61, f. 150v.

[94] E. Bateson (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of William III, 1 January 1699-31 March 1700* (London 1937), p. 218 and Insh, *Historian´s Odyssey*, p. 169.

[95] Herries, *A Defence,* pp. 8-9. This comment would have referred to March 1697. The fleet actually departed from Scotland July 1698.

[96] Herries, *An Enquiry*, pp. 42-43.

[97] Admiralty Court hearings were conducted at the Doctors´ Commons in London, which was within walking distance of the docks, affording a chance of successful litigation for the sailor whose wages had not been received. George F. Steckley, `Litigious Mariners: Wage Cases in the Seventeenth-Century Admiralty Court,´ *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 42:2 (June 1999), p. 319. Steckley further explains that the Court was equally available to foreign seamen (Ibid, p. 323) and that cases involving claims of desertion were often decided in favor of the mariner based on ambiguous orders. Ibid, p. 335. Manuscripts at

the deserter moniker ascribed to him, Herries would evolve into a highly vocal critic of the Company of Scotland. His considerable writing skills were mobilized to ridicule his former employer and document what he considered to be the abysmal management of the Darien endeavor.

Leaving the site of the colony in late December 1698 in the company of two emissaries sent back with correspondence to Edinburgh, the surgeon had sailed first to Jamaica and then on to Bristol, arriving there 18 March 1699. After promising his comrades that he would not write anything concerning the Company of Scotland for two months, a trust he says he kept, he proceeded to London.[98] Once he turned to his writing, however, the virulent combination of his literary skill, biting satire, first-hand experience with the Company and familiarity with the principle cast of personalities became apparent. In the ensuing production of competing pamphlets he claimed the lack of any man in the fleet who had been on the Spanish main,[99] the understanding by seamen that they would proceed on a trading mission and return to Scotland following the delivery of the landsmen to New Caledonia,[100] and the inadequate quantity of provisions, which he illustrated with the information that

> Men sold their shirts to the Indians for 20 or 24 plantains a piece, which would not serve a Man above three or four days, and our council were oblig´d to give strict Orders that no Man should sell his Cloaths, else I verily believe our Men had been naked in two months after our Landing.[101]

Herries also addressed the larger controversies involving the Company of Scotland´s designs. He wrote of efforts to lure men from English and French Caribbean settlements to

---

the National Library of Scotland identify payment made to John Haldane of Gleneagles for clearing the "Decreit of the high Court of Admiralty of England against him with Charges for Pretended Wages due to Walter Harris." MS Adv.83.5.2, f. 175 and 83.8.8, f. 52.
[98] Herries, *A Defence*, p. 46.
[99] Ibid, p. 30.
[100] Ibid, p. 18.
[101] Ibid, p. 38.

Darien[102] and initiate lucrative contraband trade with communities along the Spanish Main.[103]

The surgeon´s accusations did not go uncontested. A campaign against him by the Company and its proponents eventually culminated in a 1 January 1701 warrant for his arrest, complete with a reward of 6000 pounds Scots and indemnification of "all persons from any hazard of slaughter, Mutilation, or other violence which they may commit . . . in apprehending of him".[104] The "blasphemous, scandalous and calumnious libels" that his writings were accused of containing resulted in a further order that the pamphlets themselves be burned by the hangman of the City of Edinburgh.[105]

Herries´s campaign against the Company was not, however, limited to the production of pamphlets or legal action to recoup wages. Evidence in English documents lends credence to his employment as an important informant in London promoting English interests, to whom he was known as Walter Harris. In the *Calender of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of William III*, covering the months from January 1699 through March 1700, are several references to the benefits of collaboration. As early as 2 June 1699 there is an entry addressing the request for a pardon, initiated by "one of the Secty´s of Scotland" so that he might return to the Royal Navy.[106] The following day the Admiralty Board considered the request, identified as originating with Secretary of State Vernon, but expressed concern over its potential to "be Prejuditiall to the Discipline of the Navy". It was decided to directly request the King "to Signafy his Command".[107] A response was forthcoming the following month through the Secretary, resulting in the passage of an

---

[102] Herries, *An Enquiry*, p.35. The distribution of "the Colony´s Declarations" would emerge as inflammatory and incriminating evidence against the Scots. A transcription of the document is provided as Appendix I. The existence of the solicitation and its acknowledgement by Spanish-American officials, adds to Herries´s credibility.
[103] Ibid, p. 44. Herries also turned his pen to circumstances surrounding the loss of the Company´s trading vessel *Dolphin* in Cartagena, an incident discussed in Chapters 3 and 5.
[104] UGSp, Spencer f. 45, *Proclamation For Apprehending Walter Herries*.
[105] Insh, *The Company,* p. 235.
[106] Bateson, *CSP, Domestic, 1699-1700,* p. 218.
[107] NA, ADM 3/15, minutes of Admiralty Board, 3 June 1699.

exceptional resolution pardoning the Surgeon and halting all punitive action regarding "ye late Quarrell betweene him and Capt. Graydon his Commander".[108]

In return for these rewards the surgeon provided intelligence and attempted to influence opinion through a variety of means ranging from letters to pamphlets to active intervention with Company of Scotland personnel. Results of his efforts were submitted to the English Secretary of State, who would in turn inform King William of relevant details. As early as a 13 June 1699 report to the monarch, Secretary Vernon described initiatives on Jamaica to promote Scottish interests, information he had received "out of the letters sent to Harris the surgeon".[109] On 7 January 1700 Herries informed Vernon of his direct intervention to avoid the censorship of reports by individuals returning from Darien. "Lest these gentlemen should have been biased by . . . agents of the Scotch company", the surgeon wrote, "I took care that the material part of what they had said before several witnesses should be inserted in the public prints". Herries was referring to Captain McLean, who had reportedly read his book and verified its truthfulness, while others interviewed regarding the "demise of Darien" would, for "the honor of Scotland" maintain a discreet silence. The surgeon added that he was departing for the country where, in addition to tending to his pregnant wife, "I design to answer the last scurrilous and rebellious pamphlet; I hope to the satisfaction of all sensible men, whether Scots or English."[110]

Indicating the importance assigned to such activity, although not mentioning Herries by name, correspondence dated 6 February 1700 from the attorney named Trevor[111] to

---

[108] NA, ADM 3/15, minutes of Admiralty Board, 10 July 1699.
[109] BL, ADD MS40774, f. 50v.
[110] Bateson, *CSP, Domestic, 1699-1700*, pp. 345-346. MacLean was one of four officers arriving in London from Darien at the beginning of 1700. Company interests were mobilized to quell the men´s criticisms of management of the colony but were countered with Herries´s efforts. Watt, *The Price*, p. 174. Among the surgeon´s strategies was the orchestration of an immediate visit to Secretary of State Vernon by the recent returnees. Collection of Blair Castle/Perthshire, NRAS 234, Box 45, Bundle 1, Item 63 (Copy of a letter of Basel Hamilton forwarded to the Earl of Tullibardine dated 4 January 1700).
[111] Reflecting involvement with Herries from the highest levels of government, the attorney involved was likely Thomas Trevor, who served as Attorney-General under William III. Robert Frankle, `Trevor, Thomas, first Baron Trevor (*bap*. 1658, *d.* 1730)´,

Secretary Vernon declared that, after a review of various documents "I cannot find any evidence to charge any person with being the author of the libel in relation to the Scotch colony at Darien . . ."[112]

Full exposure of Herries´s activities, and the substantive threat to Scottish interests that he actually presented, is, however, not provided by English sources. Although the surgeon may have refrained from writing about the Company for the agreed two months, Spanish records verify that he was far from inactive during his early weeks back in London. Spain´s Ambassador to London, the Marquis de Canales, describes an April 1699 visit from Herries, disclosing not only his acknowledged role as a spy operating with the full knowledge of the English Secretary of State, but also his motive of a full pardon and reinstatement in the Royal Navy. Although historians have justifiably suspected collusion between the surgeon and Vernon, two manuscripts held in the *Archivo de Simancas* in Spain give a vivid account of how Herries provided important and timely intelligence directly to the Spanish.[113]

In a packet of information submitted to Madrid for the "royal hands of His Majesty" and dated 11 May 1699, with material from the month prior, Canales recounts a gentleman caller, first identified as English, who had come looking for his secretary. The visitor would not identify himself, saying that he had matters of the highest importance to discuss solely with the Ambassador. Upon being allowed entry, the anonymous man revealed that he could provide all concerning the Scots in Darien, including their forces, their ships, and their plans for relief being prepared both in Scotland and Hamburg. The visitor further explained that he understood the insult Company of Scotland actions had given Spain and offered his services, adding that the two men could converse without anyone else present as they both spoke Latin.

Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford 2004); online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/27736, accessed 21 March 2014].

[112] Bateson, *CSP, Domestic, 1699-1700*, pp. 373-375.

[113] The two documents are found in AGS, *Estado* 4183, and comprise reports from the Marquis de Canales to the King dated 27 April 1699 and 11 May 1699. Unfortunately, the packet is not paginated nor in precise chronological order, but it contains solely documents relating to the Spanish reaction to the Company of Scotland´s activities.

During the initial three hours of the conversation Canales pressed his informant for his name and country without success. Finally, Walter Herries identified himself and explained that he was a Scot who had participated in the first expedition to Darien and had returned during the month of January with Mister Hamilton, who had gone to Edinburgh to report to the Company regarding the positive state of the colony. Herries elaborated that he knew the "calamities" that could occur from the enterprise for the King of Britain. He offered to divulge all the secrets he knew, showing the Ambassador a letter from Secretary of State Vernon to verify his role and identity. He also had come prepared with a small map of the Isthmus and demonstrated his authenticity by naming the vessels and Captains of the Scottish fleet and the Council of New Caledonia and recounting the stipulations of the original patents of the Company of Scotland.

Herries confirmed that he knew the principal operatives in Edinburgh and also that he had discussed the situation at different times with Secretary Vernon, who had ordered him to interact with the Scots instrumental in Darien affairs, especially the Duke of Hamilton and one Johnson, and to deliver the resulting intelligence to him personally. It was for the good of both England and Spain that the Scottish endeavor not succeed, Herries added, acknowledging the problems created for English merchants involved in the transportation of slaves[114] and Spanish initiatives to protect the sovereignty of their lands.

Following six hours of conversation the men concluded the session, Herries saying that he would need the Secretary of State´s permission before providing more information. He would return under cover of darkness, the need for secrecy being vital to protect himself from the Scots.

The subsequent visit did occur in the middle of the night, the Ambassador being informed that permission had been granted by Vernon. The spy reported on the disgust felt by his own King at the action undertaken in Darien, the "deceitful" way in which it had been

[114] The role of English merchants subcontracting with the Portuguese Cacheo Company to transport slaves to Spanish America is discussed in Chapter 4.

perpetrated by the Parliament of Scotland and its potential to rupture the relationship between the two crowns. The reports Herries would make, he assured the Ambassador, would not be frivolous and would help secure the peace between the reigns and in the Indies.

Verification that communication did continue is provided by a subsequent report sent to the Spanish King from the Ambassador´s residence in July 1699 documenting "I had with me the Scottish spy who has been previously named."[115] The value and frequency of intelligence, although not indicated as received from Herries, is exemplified in a dispatch sent to Spain the following month. In his 31 August correspondence, Canales refers to his previous report of 11 August regarding Darien, and provides the recent news that

> the latest letters from Edinboro in Scotland assert that on the 19th of that month there cleared for Darien a convoy consisting of five vessels . . . which sent 300 gentlemen, young volunteers, and 1200 men and some women, to settle the country, 400 seamen, in addition to the ordinary crews of these vessels, with all sorts of subsistence, munitions, war material, and other things necessary to offensive warfare and expansion into the region which they say they have taken under their protection. Further, that another convoy is making ready to clear before Christmas for, although they say they do not need further immediate relief, the wish to make themselves entirely safe against all enemies[116]

---

[115] AGS, *Estado* 4183, Marquis de Canales to the King, 6 July 1699.

[116] MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item #37 (English translation of letter dated 31 August 1699 from the Marquis de Canales to the Crown, original in AGI, *Panamá* 161). Not all the intelligence transmitted was correct, as exemplified by the Marquis´s report that the Duke of Hamilton had been appointed Governor in perpetuity of New Caledonia. AGS, *Estado* 4183, 11 August 1699. What is certain is that the provision of intelligence from Scotland continued. In June of 1700 a summary of Scottish politics and the popular determination to maintain the colony at Darien was submitted to Madrid by the Spanish Consul in London, Don Bernardo Navarro. AGI, *Panamá* 164, ff. 529v-537v. The continuing stream of information may indicate that Herries remained involved even following the expulsion of the Marquis of Canales in August of 1699. In retaliation for the Ambassador´s preparation of a letter criticizing King William´s role in negotiating the partition of Spanish territory and the succession of the Spanish crown, Canales had been given eighteen days to depart the country and forbidden from leaving his residence in the interim. Simultaneous concerns over activities on the Isthmus and the Partition Treaties are expressed in a *consulta* from Spain´s Council of State to the King in AGS, *Estado* 3944, 3 December 1699 (unfoliated).

Although lacking the verification of the surgeon´s active espionage, suspicion regarding Herries´s role in events, coupled with the virulent sarcasm of his writings, has impacted the credibility historians have assigned to his record. Insh describes the "reckless assertion and corrosive satire of his *Defence of the Scots abdicating Darien*"[117] and labels the work "a source so demonstrably untrustworthy".[118] Watt, while acknowledging the reliance historians have placed on Herries´s writings, also issues the warning that they "must be treated with some care given its viciously partisan nature".[119] Gallup-Diaz, however, while noting the controversy surrounding the surgeon´s publications, also concedes the indisputable fact that Herries had first-hand knowledge of the colony.[120]

A review of the facts presented by Herries regarding the loss of the *Dolphin,* and its corroboration with the Spanish record discussed in the following chapter, strongly suggests that more credit be given the accuracy of the surgeon´s accounts. His honest and direct presentation to the Spanish Ambassador, clearly admitting his motive of Royal Navy reinstatement, provides further evidence of his truthfulness, no matter how unpalatable. Herries was an unapologetic and effective literary talent who made no attempt to conceal his disillusionment and outright disgust. While his qualitative assessment of individual personalities is certainly open to criticism, a differentiation between those opinions and the record he presents of events, independently confirmed by Spanish officials, constitutes a more historically accurate path to pursue. The surgeon´s multiple roles as expedition participant, author and spy identify him as a key source who successfully maneuvered the entangled tentacles of international concerns alarmed at the establishment of New Caledonia, providing him with unique opportunities to record events from a variety of perspectives.

DESERTION ON VARYING FRONTS

---

[117] Insh, *Historian´s*, p. 171.
[118] Ibid, p. 174.
[119] Watt, *The Price*, p. 19.
[120] Gallup-Diaz, *The Door*, p. 112, ft. 101.

While debate and intelligence echoed across Europe, events continued to unfold at disparate points in the Americas. In April 1699 the problem of desertion finally forced itself into official correspondence. From New Caledonia the Councilors were compelled to send home a representative with dispatches "to inform you fully of the state of affairs with us, and to negotiate what else might concern us at home". A "most villainous and treacherous design, that was lately carrying on, for running away with the *St Andrew*" had been the provocation. Contributing to the Councilors´ shock was the fact that declarations taken from some of the conspirators revealed that the plot had been known not only to one of the sea captains and others weeks prior, but had not been reported to the governing body of the colony. The identified perpetrators were reported to be in irons and the Council expressed dismay

> How such unnatural, and dangerous enterprises should be hatched among ourselves, and in such a place; and at a time, when we could reasonably dread of no manner of hurt, but from our professed Enemys.[121]

One of the responses to the discovery of the intended plot was the passage later the same month of *Rules and Ordinances for the Good Government of this Colony*. Although the punishment for attempted desertion was designated as both whipping and a week of service for each day of absence, the failure to report discussion of desertion was far more dire . . .

> No man shall, upon pain of death, hold correspondence, give advice, or keep intelligence with any Rebell, or enemy, as also, he who shall know of any such intelligence, and shall not, with all Convenient Speed discover the same, and, the party, or parties, therin Concerned, to the Council, or some one of the Councilors . . .[122]

In August the reaction to the affair by Company of Scotland Directors in Edinburgh was documented in a response sent from Greenock on the 18th. Ignorant of the irony that the entire colony had been deserted, they posed the question

---

[121] NLS, MS Adv. 83.7.4., f. 171r.
[122] Ibid, ff. 172r-174r.

> . . . why Deserters of any kind should be allowed to pass unpunish´d severly is what we cannot understand, considering the charge we are at in transporting them and their effects, and that their transportation hinders so many more good men that would willingly have gone in their room.[123]

On the 20th of June 1699, following a decision by the Councilors, the surviving members of the original expedition, succumbing to dissent, sickness, hunger and the news of proclamations ordered by King William forbidding any assistance to them, "all dislodged, and left Darien". Two of the Company´s ships, the *Caledonia* and the *Unicorn*, eventually sailed into New York in early August, having suffered the loss of an estimated 300 men at sea.[124] The fact that the salvation presented by the resources of New York prompted a new wave of desertion could not have been surprising. While the absent Royal Governor, the Earl of Bellomont, and his on-site Lieutenant Governor debated over the means to deal with the Scots given the King´s order,[125] survivors began to drift away into the population of the English colony. As the men began to realize that their Captain intended to resupply and return to Darien to rendezvous with relief ships from Scotland they took "opportunityes to be gone; so yt he sayes, it seems impossible for Capt. Drummond to return with his ship".[126] The problem became so acute that on September 22nd a memorial was presented to Lieutenant Governor Nanfan and the Council of New York requesting assistance. It pled that

> since our arrival in this Port Severall as well Saylors as Planters have run away and deserted the Company´s service, and ships to which they belonged, by which and the great mortality which was among us, the ships are so disabled that scarce remains of what was in both so many as will be able to carry home one . . .[127]

---

[123] Ibid, f. 209r.
[124] Borland, *The History*, p. 22.
[125] The proclamations, issued by the various colonial Governors that spring, were prepared at King William´s behest to disavow his knowledge or sanction of the Company of Scotland´s Darien goal, and prohibited giving any form of assistance to its participants. A summary of the political context surrounding the proclamations is given in Insh, *The Company*, pp. 147-149.
[126] Burton, *The Darien Papers*, p. 155.
[127] Insh, *Papers*, p. 123. Included in pages 115-128 are several letters reflecting the controversies created by the presence of the Scots in New York and their efforts to

Despite the desertions and proclamations, Drummond stealthily managed to man and provision a vessel and, leaving behind a frustrated and legitimately suspicious Governor of New York, proceeded on a return voyage to the Isthmus[128], reaching the site of the colony in time to witness the arrival of the *Rising Sun* and her consort of three ships and 1200 would-be colonists on 30 November 1699. Having been denied water and provisions on Montserrat due to the proclamations and suffering the loss of an estimated 160 during their passage, the newcomers found their colony "Deserted and gone, their huts all burned, their Fort most part ruined, the ground which they had cleared adjoining to the Fort all overgrown with shrubs and weeds". It was "no wonder," wrote Francis Borland, "that our people were sadly discouraged upon their coming hither . . . because they were ill suited and furnished to begin a new plantation, and had not materials suitable to such a design . . . Our party were not sent forth to settle a colony, but only to be a recruit and supply to a colony."[129] A council held shortly afterwards determined to send 500 of the men to Jamaica in order to conserve provisions while they waited for direction from Scotland.[130]

That decision, coupled with dashed expectations and the harsh realities of clearing jungle and rebuilding fortifications, prompted a major desertion within two weeks of the fleet´s arrival. The incident is also the first for which we have both a Scottish and a Spanish version of events. Borland recounts that nine men of the *Rising Sun* stole one of her boats and fled during the night. They were not sought as their escape route could not be determined.[131]

---

optimize local resources to resupply, claiming only an intent to return to Scotland, but instead returning with provisions to New Caledonia.

[128] Ironically, a Spaniard who had fled Cartagena following commitment of a murder served as Drummond´s pilot. Renowned for his skill, the man would also guide the *Rising Sun* into Caledonia Bay. Being refused his offer to provide his talents further for the Scots, he was next witnessed piloting the Spanish fleet under Governor Pimienta into the now familiar bay. NLS, Adv. MS 83.7.5., f. 207v.

[129] Borland, *The History*, pp. 29-30.

[130] Ibid, p. 31.

[131] Ibid, p. 32.

Spain had firmly established and refined the value of gathering intelligence from deserters and prisoners of war[132] and, fortunately for the historian, made extensive use of documented and widely distributed interrogations during efforts to eliminate the Scots from Darien. The acknowledgement of the critical role of this network of intelligence is exemplified by the Viceroy of Peru, the Count of Monclova, in a letter to his King reporting receipt of news of the Scots´ return from the President of Panama, along with the depositions of the nine deserters and two others who opted to flee by land.[133] The detailed content of the declarations, along with their resulting distribution to increasingly broader and more elevated ranges of Spanish officials, provided a vital channel of uniform first-hand information with which to assess, plan and potentially alter operations.

The nine men that both Borland and Monclova wrote of had headed to Portobello, where they arrived safely and were brought forward for interrogation by the Spanish on the 29th of December 1699.[134] Juan Bauptista, Nicholas Grillo, Simon Modesto and Juan Coda were the four individuals interrogated and they provided evidence of the multinational composition of the expedition. Two of them were English, one Italian and one Greek. All of them are included on the pay list of the *Rising Sun*: "John Baptista" is listed as a yeoman, and "Nicholo Greilo", "Simon Amodesto" and "John Codd" as sailors.[135] They related to their inquisitors that they had departed from Scotland three months earlier in the fleet of four ships and described the firepower of each vessel and the state of the land defenses currently being rehabilitated. Total manpower of soldiers and sailors had

---

[132] C. Storrs, `Intelligence and the Formulation of policy and Strategy in Early Modern Europe: The Spanish Monarchy in the Reign of Charles II (1665-1799),´ *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 21:4, p. 498. That the acquisition of intelligence was also viable in the Americas is noted by Gallup-Diaz as he describes efforts undertaken by the President of Panama to distill information from indigenous, Spanish, and French sources to formulate a response to the arrival of the Scots. "Although the Spanish had been unable to prevent foreigners from intruding into the Darien, they certainly possessed the ability to gather information about a large invading force." Gallup-Diaz, *The Door,* pp. 129-131.
[133] Conde de Monclova to the King, 26 August 1700. AGI, *Panamá* 181, f. 640r.
[134] The record of their interrogations is contained in AGI, *Panamá* 164, ff. 587r-597v. The desertion of these nine men in one of the fleet´s own vessels illustrates one of a naval commander´s worst case scenarios, the simultaneous loss of crew and boat. Agostini, "Deserted His Majesty´s Service", p. 972.
[135] NLS, MS Adv. 83.7.4., ff. 103r-103v.

originally been 1,150 men, reduced by approximately 150 deaths to 1,000. They had understood they were coming to an established and functioning colony but had found only two small vessels, one English and one Scottish,[136] upon their arrival. They related to the Spaniards what they knew of the ships of the original expedition, that they had heard one had returned to Scotland and another was in Jamaica. Their intelligence regarding enthusiasm in New Caledonia for a possible raid against Santa Marta no doubt raised an alarm but may have been somewhat countered by the revelation of a tentative plan to send the sick and one or two ships of men to Jamaica in order to conserve dwindling food supplies. Queried as to why they had chosen to escape the men reported that they had been deceived and had no desire to take up arms against Spain as they were also Catholic. As with other intelligence gathered from deserters and prisoners, the declarations were copied and sent to a network of officials across the Spanish colonies in America, eventually being forwarded from the President of Panama to King Carlos II in Madrid on the 11th of January 1700.[137]

Similar information was acquired from a pair of Scots who also chose to desert, utilizing a very different method to make their escape. Their interrogations were conducted by the President of Panama on the 15th day of January 1700 and are illustrative of the standardization, formality, organization and thoroughness of the interrogation process. A team was mobilized to witness and document the procedure, accompanied by an Irish soldier serving in the *Barlovento* fleet[138] who was summoned to act as translator. The first deponent was named as Juan Jadin (John Jardine?), who gave his age as twenty-five and

---

[136] These two vessels would have been those coming from New York under Captain Drummond.

[137] AGI, *Panamá* 164, ff. 597r,v.

[138] Spain attempted to maintain security of her trade routes in the Caribbean through the establishment of the *Barlovento* (Windward) Fleet. Although of limited value given fluctuating financial resources and the daunting size of the territory it was assigned to secure, the squadron could present a deterrent to encroachment by unauthorized vessels. C. Haring, *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs* (Cambridge 1918), pp. 252-255 and G. Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700-1789* (London 1979), p. 6. The presence and activity of the squadron was recognized by the Scottish colonists as evidenced by the description of a Dutch ship in their bay "for sanctuary, the *Barlovento* Fleet being on the Cartagena coast". Herries, *A Defence*, p. 159.

his birthplace as Monte, Scotland. He related that he had come with the first expedition of five vessels and served on board *Caledonia* under the command of Captain Thomas Drummond. Their purpose was to establish themselves in Darien and conduct trade with the Spanish. Jadin gave a detailed review of the design and structure of the fortifications constructed by the first arrivals, as well as the placement and size of cannon and supplies of shotguns, grenades and ammunition. For sustenance, he related, they had flour, meat and fish coming from Jamaica until the King´s prohibition of any form of support. Because of the lack of provisions and high mortality and illness they had left for New England, where they received notice of additional ships having left Scotland for New Caledonia. With a crew of seventeen and a hold full of supplies, they then reembarked for the colony, where they arrived after a month and a half. Two days following, the squadron of four ships came in carrying 1270 new colonists, including twelve Captains, infantry and eight women. Questioned as to the cause and means of his escape, he simply said hunger had been his motive. Emphasizing the dire lack of provisions, he said that each day he had been allocated only two small biscuits and a little fish. He and his companion had not known how to negotiate the jungle terrain so they had given some of the local Indians linen to bring them to the Spanish. They had been delivered by their guides to Campmaster don Luis de Carrisoli, who had relayed them forward to Panama.[139]

The second deponent, named as thirty-four year old Guillermo Estrafan, had also originally sailed on *Caledonia.* Although he couldn´t provide the total number on the first expedition, he could clearly quantify its military composition of twelve companies of forty-five men each. He knew that for certain, he related, because he was a soldier in one. As his companion had done, he detailed the original fortifications and arms and reiterated their original intent to establish themselves for trade. Combined with the high rates of death and disease, he related the fear that there would eventually be insufficient survivors to man the ships. In response to why they had returned to Darien, he repeated Jadin´s information and added that a new vessel had been acquired in New England. The squadron that now lay at New Caledonia included ships of 60 and 30 cannon and two merchant vessels. The artillery had not yet been mounted, there was extensive damage to prior

[139] AGI, *Panamá* 164, ff. 603v-613r.

construction and there was much work but little food. He reiterated they had departed voluntarily, hunger being the motive, and that linen had been traded for guide services across the Isthmus to Real de Santa Maria, from where they had sailed to Panama.[140]

INCREASED DESPERATION, DISCORD AND DESERTION

The pair who had successfully negotiated a crossing of the Isthmus did mention the recent prior desertion of nine men in one of the Company´s boats,[141] but did not refer to, and may not have known about, a more dire but unsuccessful plot by some of their brethren. Alexander Campbell had been executed on 20 December 1699 following the revelation of his part in plans to seize members of the Council and sail away with two of the Company´s ships.[142] The current Council of New Caledonia showed no hesitation in reporting the intended mutiny to their Company administrators in Edinburgh. In a letter dated three days following the hanging of Campbell the harried governing body related the uncovered plot, noting that "Wee have lame and partiall proofs against severall others, but not so legall as they should be. So we must have patience." They also acknowledged that rumors were rife among the so-called planters, exacerbated by the shortage of provisions, that there was a design "of saving the victuals for private advantage, and selling the men to be sent to Jamaica". The earlier desertion of the nine men, compounded by the loss of the eight-oar boat they took with them, was also included in their report.[143]

The dire circumstances experienced a short-lived respite following the arrival on 11 February 1700 of Captain Campbell of Fonab with a sloop of provisions. Despite Campbell´s subsequent leadership during a skirmish with a Spanish patrol (described more fully in Chapter 7), within two weeks desparate conditions returned as New Caledonia

---

[140] AGI, *Panamá* 164, ff. 614r-619r. An English translation of the interrogations is included in Hart, *The Disaster*, as Appendix XXX, pp. 340-352.
[141] Ibid, p. 351.
[142] Ibid, pp. 126-127.
[143] Burton, *The Darien Papers*, pp. 209-217.

colonists witnessed the presence outside their bay of eleven Spanish vessels.[144] This forecasted arrival of the Spanish, led by Governor Don Juan Pimienta of Cartagena, also created new opportunities to desert. For the Spanish, these welcomed deserters would provide the critical and timely intelligence of conditions in New Caledonia that allowed the strategic management of resources that would successfully pressure the Scots toward capitulation.

From aboard *San Juan Bautista* Pimienta initiated his diary of the campaign. Within days of his arrival three Scots were brought to him, declaring themselves to have deserted six weeks prior, again due to hunger. They were able to quantify for Pimienta a force of 500 regulars in the Scottish settlement. In response, a council was held and two hundred foot soldiers were sent ashore, along with the chief engineer, to establish an infantry camp.[145] Having established himself on land, obtained additional intelligence from both Indian and French sources and dispatched his first message to the Scots, Pimienta lamented that "Not a deserter has come in to this camp nor have we succeeded in taking any prisoner, although I have endeavoured, and much wished to do so, in order to acquire news of their strength and stores."[146]

The Governor did not have long to wait. Within a day deserters began to appear with the strategic information Pimienta needed to effectively continue orchestrating his campaign.

> Now the enemy, either because they were afraid, or bored by the country, or wearied of their work, or vexed at the ill-treatment they received, were passing over to our side, among them a cadet and a sergeant who were at the first encounter. Others hid from their men until they had the opportunity to come to us, and said that they would all come if they had not been frightened by their superiors who told them that the Spaniards would give them no quarter. Senor Pimienta received them with great kindness, and sent them on board the ships with orders that they be treated well.[147]

---

[144] Borland, *The History*, pp. 57-59.
[145] Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XXXI, p. 367.
[146] Ibid, Appendix XXXIII, p. 402.
[147] MHS, Hart Collection, Anonymous (translated by G. Rivera), *Gazeta extraordinarioa del feliz successo: que las Armas Espanolas invieron en el desalejamiento del Escoces que*

The individual reports, though not always consistent, did constitute valuable information. A "gentleman or subordinate officer" reported only three months of stores of short rations in the Scottish camp, dysentery was rife, and there were only 300 veteran troops. A schooner had departed a little over a week earlier for Jamaica to obtain relief. A forward post had been established, implementing brass cannon covered in rawhide, to cover what was determined to be the only approach the Spanish could utilize. Armed fireships were being prepared and attempts were underway to reconnoiter the Spanish ships at night and set fire to them. To illustrate the poor quality of nourishment the Scots possessed, the deserter produced one of his meager biscuits.[148]

More intelligence regarding the vulnerability of New Caledonia was forthcoming. Substantiating the later Spanish report, another deserter, when asked why there were not more desertions, did recount that the rumor had been circulated that the Spaniards gave no quarter and that rewards for their sufferings would be forthcoming from Scotland. The same individual added that desertions would increase as soon as the Scots´ own guards would permit it. There was also news of the Scottish command´s reaction to Spanish ships not actually entering the port . . . "unless they receive relief it is hunger which will compel them to surrender". [149]

An interrogation recorded by the notary of the *San Juan Bautista* on 25 March 1700 substantiated the acute lack of food and provided critical intelligence on the status of defensive strategies. The deponent was twenty-two year old John Fraser of Aberdeen. The

---

se avia fortificado en el Playon, Costa de Portovelo, Provincia del Darien en el Reyno de Tierra firme, a 11 de Abril de este presente ano 1700 (Lima 1700), pp. 5-6.

[148] Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XXXIII, p. 404.

[149] Ibid, pp. 404-407. This information is included in a letter from Don Manuel de Toca y Velasco to the Conde de Canillas, President of Panama, and documents information received from a deserter sent to him by Governor Pimienta and identified as "one of the many traders they brought over". Additional intelligence was acquired from a "sargeant in active service". Although unclear if Pimienta and Toca both provided interrogations from the same individuals, the consolidation of the intelligence was invaluable.

Scots had enough supplies, he calculated, for six to seven months at only a half-pound of flour and a quarter pound of salt meat per day, plus any small quantities of fish they could catch and some fruit provided by the Indians. The artillery had not been landed, but a scheme had been formulated where the guns were mounted on one side of a ship, facing towards the port. The intent to use fireships was being successfully thwarted by the armed launches of the Spanish that patrolled the harbor mouth each night.[150]

Assisted by such precise and timely intelligence, and further motivated by concerns over the status of his own forces´ declining health and provisions, Pimienta was able to bring the engagement to a rapid conclusion. The final Articles of Capitulation were signed on 31 March 1700.

Having no knowledge of events since the prior December, recognition of the vital and continuing role of desertion finally received it due in Edinburgh. On 3 June 1700 a proclamation was issued by the Council-General of the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies prohibiting

> Any Person or Persons of what Degree or quality soever inhabiting the said Settlement of Caledonia not only to protest against but also to disobey and oppose any Such Resolution and that it shall be Death, either publickly or privately to move deliberate or reason upon any Desertion or Surrender of the said Settlement of Caledonia . . .[151]

The eventual acknowledgement of the severity of desertion came far too late to prevent the critical loss of men and resources upon which the fledgling colony was reliant. The extreme circumstances which provoked men to leave the settlement not only reflected fatal and unrelenting flaws in the management of New Caledonia, but also created a valuable flow of pragmatic information efficiently received, distributed and incorporated across Spanish America to expedite expulsion of the Scottish intruders. The critical role of the deserters would be further acknowledged by its incorporation into the *Gazeta*

---

[150] Ibid, pp. 413-416.
[151] NLS, MS Adv. 83.7.5., ff. 144r,v.

extraordinaria, publicly printed and distributed in Lima following the capitulation (See Chapter 6).

Providing his own on-site assessment of desertion and its causes, one of the Scottish ministers, writing from on board the *Rising Sun* in Caledonia Bay on Christmas Day 1699, lay the responsibility for desertion with the Company Directors. His letter, which eventually reached the English Secretary of State, declared that

> For it hath been our directors error first and last to send and entrust with their ships and concerns too many men who have no principle either of conscience or honour . . . too many knaves, too many fools, too many Lairds and lairds bairns that think it below them to work and finding themselves disappointed of their big Phantastick hopes of getting goupens of gold for the uptaking and never thinking of the necessities working and sweating for it. Felling trees, cutting down many groves, digging in the bowels of the earth, which now they find they must be put to with thrift and hunger. This makes many rue their voyage and long to be at home again . . .[152]

[152] HL, MSBL9, *Copy of Mr. Sheil's letter*.

CHAPTER 3
UNINTENDED ITINERARIES II: PRISONERS

Although desperate and often just as hungry, ill and exhausted as deserters, the prisoners examined in this chapter, by their very definition, found themselves in very different circumstances. They had made no deliberate decision to depart from their comrades and often had no or minimal time to plan a strategy or consolidate any form of provisions. Nor could they choose their companions, a factor that could and did create the danger of exposing plans and identities jeopardizing both welfare and lives.

The vulnerability of the prisoners did not diminish their role in the conflicts that reverberated across the Atlantic. Some of those captured would find themselves transported back to Old Spain and the focus of the highest level of international diplomacy. Others would find their acquired intelligence valuable closer to home and still others would lose their lives for establishing alliances with New Caledonia. Although the majority of captives were members of the Company of Scotland expeditions, they were by no means all Scots, and clearly demonstrate the multinational face of participants, both intentional and otherwise. Fueled by the mutual goals of intelligence gathering and reprisal, and often caused by blatantly coincidental circumstances, prisoners were taken by not only the Spanish, but also by representatives of the colony. The exposure of

conflicting records surrounding instances of capture and imprisonment also furthers the argument of how censorship and bias affected the understanding and deliberation of management of the Company of Scotland and propelled its initiatives toward wholly unintended consequences from the Courts of Europe to the Isthmus of Darien.

CAPTAIN ROBERT PINCARTON AND THE CREW OF THE DOLPHIN

The first prisoners came to the Spanish without warning by literally grounding themselves on the beach adjacent to the city of Cartagena on a Sunday afternoon in February 1699. The crew of thirty men and one boy provided not only a wealth of intelligence, but also a most welcome and strategic category of prisoner in the person of Captain and Councilor of New Caledonia Robert Pincarton. The dramatic beaching of the *Dolphin* immediately outside the walls of Cartagena has largely been ignored by historians,[153] but it is evident that the resulting rewards of material goods and information suddenly available to the Spanish were substantial. The intended trading mission had been vehemently but unsuccessfully opposed by Councilor William Paterson on the basis that sending two highly valued and experienced sea captains with a crew of over two dozen seamen on a single mission in a vessel marginally able to handle current windward conditions would be reckless. In addition, sailing with the vessel would be a substantial portion of commercial assets, the loss of which would be a critical economic blow.[154] His warnings would be prophetic.

---

[153] Douglas Watt does address the significance of the economic loss of the cargo, estimating it at 18% of trading assets. Watt, *The Price*, p. 154. A contemporary appraisal was provided by Secretary of State Vernon to the Duke of Shewsbury in a letter dated 8 June 1699 as "goods to the value of 15,000*l*". G. P. R. James (ed.), *Letters Illustrative of the Reign of William III from 1696 to 1708 addressed to The Duke of Shrewsbury, by James Vernon, Esq. Secretary of State* (London 1841), p. 304.

[154] Report by William Paterson to the Directors, 19 December 1699, in Burton, *The Darien Papers*, p. 183.

Governor of Cartagena don Diego de los Rios y Quesada wrote of his good fortune to his superiors, relating that, between three and four p.m. on that Sunday he had immediately responded to signals from the Santo Domingo guard-posts, where a ship had run up onto the beach. Although the vessel flew an English flag and her command presented themselves as English, papers thrown overboard from the vessel were recovered and, among them, was discovered correspondence from the Councilors of New Caledonia to their parent company in Scotland.[155] There was also the intelligence acquired from the French naval officer who was a passenger and from an Italian serving among the crew. Particularly notable was the capture of Captain Robert Pincarton, not only one of the Councilors of the colony at Darien, but Captain of the *Unicorn*, one of its principal vessels. With the information acquired from documents and interrogations, the Governor was able to write the General of the *Barlovento* fleet that the Scots had only 700 to 900 men and only three war ships of poor construction due to their original design as merchant vessels. The colony was suffering from a lack of supplies and was full of fear of an attack. Copies of the report were also sent to Spain, both to the King and to the Council of the Indies, being carried by one of the ships of the *asiento*.[156]

The beached vessel was the *Dolphin*, which had sailed from New Caledonia only days prior. Although her real mission was subject to debate, her cargo could be readily inventoried and, of extreme interest, her command was of the highest rank. The ship carried such trade goods as shoes and wool to be traded for provisions. An examination of

---

[155] The recovered documents also included copies of the Act establishing the Company of Scotland and its generous terms, causing credibility problems for King William III as he sought to avoid conflict with Spain: copies of documents "showing the permission of King William were sent to the President of Panama." AGI, *Santa Fé* 79, Testimony of Governor Pimienta, prepared August 1699.

[156] AGI, *Panamá* 215, ff. 230r-231r, 263r-265r. The *asiento,* a formal contract to provide negroes to Spain´s overseas colonies, had become so lucrative by the end of the seventeenth century that its acquisition and implementation "acquired all the characteristics of an international treaty." J.H. Parry, *The Spanish Seaborne Empire* (London 1966), p. 268. The dispersed shipping activities of the *asiento*, examined more thoroughly in the following chapter, provided not only slaves and a range of contraband products but also constitued an invaluable venue for communication.

the three records of the capture of the *Dolphin* and the subsequent imprisonment and interrogation of her crew exposes not only additional non-Scots among the sailors, but also unacknowledged goals of the Company to engage in contraband trade, continuing censorship of official reports to Edinburgh Directors, and the accuracy of Walter Herries´s writings. The odyssey of the principle protagonists would prompt action from both London and Madrid and require a demonstration of highly skilled and complex international diplomacy to reach resolution.[157]

Captain Pincarton and pilot James Graham would both eventually prepare depositions for their employer upon their return to Scotland in early 1701, following their transportation to and trial and conviction of piracy in Old Spain. Editor J. H. Burton, in a footnote to the published versions of the men´s accounts, notes that both appear to be in Pincarton´s handwriting and the style and substance of the content is remarkably uniform. There are numerous identical phrases in both reports, an opinion verified by review of the original documents.[158] Pincarton writes that a collision with a rock, so severe that baling and pumping were ineffective, required the run onto shore. The subsequent arrival of the Governor and his officers resulted in a canoe being dispatched for the men, who were ordered ashore. The initial plea for assistance to retrieve the goods from the *Dolphin* received a positive response, but a brief consultation among the Spanish was followed by a rapid change of attitude. The crew was suddenly put under strong guard and marched to town, where they were imprisoned. Pincarton himself suffered a broken rib and was put into solitary confinement and irons. Following his interrogation a few days later he was taken to the "upper prison", where he was held for three months. In response to his pleas for food and clothing, he was instructed to petition "as a favor" for the liquidation of some of the cargo in order to provide for him and his men. By that time some of the crew had died and he himself was "in a starving condition". His forthcoming petition was approved,

---

[157] The men´s experiences following their imprisonment in Cartagena will be addressed in Chapter 5, *The Long Reach of Spanish Justice.*

[158] The printed statements are included on pages 105-112 of Burton´s *The Darien Papers*, along with other material pertaining to the men´s imprisonment and trial. The original statements are held at the National Library of Scotland, Adv. MS 83.7.5., f. 160 being Pincarton´s statement and f. 158 being Graham´s.

following which allocations were made for daily meals and cloth retrieved from the stores for clothing for both himself and Captain John Malloch. Pincarton witnessed the cargo and fittings of the Company´s ship being carried away and would notice some of her guns remounted on his later transport to Havana. While Captains Pincarton and Malloch were kept in a "house of office for the guards" where they cleaned a place to sleep every night, the remainder of the crew was sent out daily to work on the massive city walls and clean streets, during which time they had to beg passers-by for charity. Upon receiving the intelligence that New Caledonia had been deserted, Pincarton petitioned the Governor for the group´s release, but was denied with the explanation that he would be sent to Old Spain.

Graham´s almost identical account does add that he was searched for papers and had his money confiscated. He also witnessed his personal effects, including books, instruments and clothes, carried away, being able to retain only "one cap, one wescoat, one pair of drawers, one shift, one pair of shoes."

Neither man elaborates on their interrogations in Cartagena, which constitute the second version of events. Initiated the morning following the beaching of the *Dolphin* the Spaniards, having mobilized an efficient and experienced team, including an Irishman to serve as translator, began by considering the seized documents. In addition to the retrieved Company of Scotland papers, a French lieutenant, seeking to return to his native country after being shipwrecked near New Caledonia, had judiciously prepared a written statement and expeditiously submitted it to Spanish authorities.[159] Both sets of material had been translated and studied for the morning´s proceedings.

John Malloch, Captain of the *Dolphin,* was first to be interrogated and maintained that he was Diego Tamayson (Jameson?), English and a thirty-eight year old Protestant from

[159] A packet of the interrogations, along with Spanish translations of the seized documents, are included in AGI, *Panamá* 215, ff. 193v-256v. Correspondence destined for Edinburgh comprises ff. 196v-199v. The interrogations begin with f. 199v. The French Lieutenant was given a passport to embark for Curacao on one of the ships of the *asiento*. Ibid, f. 256r.

London. He was cautioned by his captors to tell the truth or he would be manacled and held in solitary confinement. He continued to maintain his English identity despite continued warnings and the information that the orders from New Caledonia concerning intentions to dispose of the cargo along the coast of Caracas were in his interrogators´ hands. Still maintaining he only had sailed from Jamaica, he explained he knew little of the situation in New Caledonia as he had been there only a short time to seek shelter from the winds. Asked about the whereabouts of Vice-Admiral Benbow, Malloch responded that he had heard in Jamaica that his squadron was in the area, but he had not seen the Vice-Admiral.[160] The Captain related that, also in Jamaica, he had heard that the Scots had the permission of their King to settle in lands not claimed by any European monarch. He explained that he had been in New Caledonia only to trade salted meat and wine that he had brought from Madeira, assuring his questioners he had not brought arms to the colonists. When asked if the Governor of Jamaica had sent assistance to the Scots, and what was said in Jamaica concerning the colony, Malloch related differing opinions and that most of the correspondence with the Scots had been with merchants.[161]

Having completed what must have been a frustrating interrogation with Jameson/Malloch, the next deponent was Captain Robert Pincarton, who initially identified himself as Diego Robesson (Robertson?), an Englishman from London. Presented with the evidence to the contrary and the sanctity of his oath, the Councilor of New Caledonia dropped his false identity, admitting he was the said Pincarton and a Scot from Prestonpons. He continued, providing a wealth of information regarding the arms and personnel aboard each of the Scottish ships. He added that he was not fully aware of the land force numbers, but that there were approximately 2000 individuals, including eight or nine women, who had embarked from Scotland. So far there had been few deaths and general good health. A detailed explanation of fortifications, including the construction of forty-five platforms for artillery, was described, as were the navigational challenges and capacity of the port itself. Five relief ships from Scotland were anticipated, but none of them belonged to the English

[160] Benbow had sailed from Cartagena only days before the arrival of the *Dolphin.* The Admiral´s activities are addressed in the following chapter.
[161] AGI, *Panamá* 215, ff. 199v-208r.

King. Pincarton was also asked about what he knew of Benbow´s activities, to which he responded that he knew of him, but was unaware of his whereabouts and that he had not been at New Caledonia. He further explained that a Company messenger had been sent back to Scotland via Jamaica with pleas for supplies. The trade goods on the *Dolphin* such as shoes, slippers, wool, and linen were to be traded for sugar and tobacco in Barbados, which were then to be transported to Scotland. With the exception of one Italian and one man from Holland, the thirty-man crew was from Scotland. Help had not been solicited from Jamaica and there had been no communication with that island´s Governor. Questioned regarding the Indians, Pincarton related that they had established friendly relations, especially with certain of their Captains, but that the colonists maintained they did not wish to trade arms or make war with the Spanish, but wished peace with all parties. He assured his interrogators that the Company of Scotland had no intention of expanding into other parts of the region and explained that the governance of the colony was not hierarchical, but rotated weekly among the seven Councilors. Completing the customary signing and swearing to the truthfulness of his declaration, Pincarton gave his age as forty-three years.[162]

Next to be interrogated was the Italian, Juan Bautista Acame. He declared himself to be a seaman who had originally sailed from Scotland on the *Unicorn* under Captain Pincarton. The mariner reiterated accounts of arms, mortality, food supply and defensive meaures, noting that the latter were hampered by the lack of appropriate construction materials. There had been searches for gold, but they had none in their possession. The French lieutenant that accompanied the *Dolphin* had been at the colony about a month and a half and was wishing to return to France after his ship had been lost. Acame gave his age as twenty-seven, but did not know how to sign his declaration.[163]

With the assistance of a French translator, the contents of the paper provided by the Lieutenant were then introduced into the record. The author, who gave his name as

---

[162] Ibid, ff. 208r-215v.
[163] Ibid, ff. 216r-218v. A Joan Baptista is listed as originally sailing on the The *Unicorn* under command of Captain Robert Pincarton. MS Adv. 83.7.4., f. 93r,v.

Durinan, recounted his service under Captain Duvivier Thomas. At the behest of the King of France, they had been hunting pirates to assist the security of Spanish dominions until they had lost their ship in Caledonia Bay. Identifying himself as Catholic, twenty-five years old and an official of the marine guard of Rochefort, he provided a detailed description of what he had learned of the housing, defense and governance of the Scottish colony, as well as the presence there of a Dutch vessel. He clarified that the Indians of the area had assured the Scots that they had never been conquered by the Spanish and that they had given permission for the colonists to establish themselves.[164]

The seaman from Holland, for whom yet another translator was utilized, received particular attention from the interrogators. He identified himself as Esteban de Berga from Breda and of the reformed Calvinist faith. During his first session he denied having been at New Caledonia, with the result that he was manacled and placed in solitary confinement.[165] After substitution of a German resident of Cartagena to serve as translator he was brought back before the inquisitors and explained that his city was under Swedish jurisdiction. He had sailed with the Company of Scotland´s original fleet in the *Unicorn* and transmitted what he knew of ships, men and arms at New Caledonia.[166]

As the interrogations continued on into the week, twenty-three year old pilot James Graham was questioned, declaring that they had been sailing to Barbados to trade for rum, sugar and tobacco to carry to Scotland. In response to the Spanish inquiry into the mission of the Dutch ship at New Caledonia, he replied that it needed to be watered and careened. He elaborated that his role as pilot limited his knowledge of land activities to

---

[164] AGI, *Panamá* 215, ff. 218v-225v. The Lieutenant had been aboard the *Maurepas*, which had broken apart on rocks as it had attempted to leave New Caledonia, eliciting a rescue by the Scots. The actual reason for the ship´s visit was understood to be more for gathering intelligence than the need for routine maintenance and supply. Forrester, *The Man*, pp. 220-221.

[165] AGI, *Panamá* 215, f. 226r

[166] Ibid, ff. 236v-237v. Stephen Deberg is included as a sailor on the *Unicorn´*s pay list. NLS, MS Adv. 83.7.4., f. 94v.

acquiring water and wood.[167] Thomas "Bachah", a twenty-seven year old Scottish seaman related that he had not known their destination when he left Scotland, but was concerned solely with his salary for his service on the *Unicorn*. He also admitted that Captain Pincarton had given the order as they ran aground at Cartagena that they should all deny having come from New Caledonia and maintain they were from Jamaica bound for Barbados.[168] The twenty-nine year old surgeon Andrew Livingston, who would escape his imprisonment and eventually return to New Caledonia, was asked for information similar to that demanded of his shipmates, but emphasized that he could not be precise about current details as they had sailed fifteen days prior.[169]

The re-interrogation of Captain "Diego Tamayson/Jameson" resulted in the admission of his actual identity as the Scot John Malloch and that he had sailed from New Caledonia. After giving intelligence regarding the defensive capacity of the colony, he reiterated Pincarton´s order to present themselves as bound for Barbados and further confirmed the latter´s elevated status within New Caledonia.[170]

The consolidated information acquired from the ten documented interrogations was of extreme value for its quality, quantity and timeliness. The Governor of Cartagena de Indias, with minimal effort and expense, had been able to capitalize on his enemy´s misfortune to compile both a complete and current portfolio of the situation at Darien and beyond and forward it to his superiors and compatriots. No doubt he would have been surprised to see additional details of events exposed by the pen of a source in England. In turn, the censored Walter Herries would have appreciated the vindication of his own work

---

[167] AGI, *Panamá* 215, ff. 227r-229r. Graham had originally sailed as first mate on the *Dolphin*. NLS, MS Adv. 83.7.4., f. 100r.
[168] AGI, *Panamá* 215, ff. 229v-231v.
[169] Ibid, ff. 232r-233v. Livingston somehow reached Jamaica, where he joined one of the relief ships headed for the colony. The news was sent to the Directors in Edinburgh in a letter from Councilor Daniel MacKay dated 13 February 1700. Burton, *The Darien Papers,* p. 298. Apparently the surgeon´s escape was not unprecedented. The 1705 investigations, or *residencias,* of the administrations of both Governors Rios and Pimienta cited lax prison security and record-keeping, resulting in a number of escapes. AGI, *Escribania de Cámara* 1192, unfoliated.
[170] AGI, *Panamá* 215, ff. 233v-235r.

that Spanish documents provide. In his 1701 pamphlet *An Enquiry into The Caledonian Project, With A Defence Of England´s Procedure (In point of Equity) in Relation thereunto-In a Friendly Letter from London, to a Member of the Scots African and Indian Company in Edinburgh, to guard against Passion,* the surgeon-spy turned author gives yet a third version of events in Cartagena. Based on claimed conversations with Pincarton, Captain John Malloch and Surgeon Livingston held in London shortly after their return and only three months prior to publication, Herries writes that the actual mission of the *Dolphin* was to trade with ports along the Spanish Main near Riohacha and Santa Marta. The ship was then to seek Barbados or other English or French possessions where, under the pretense of needing water and wood, they were not only to conduct Company business but also to distribute their own declarations. Discovering heavy leakage in the ship, however, they turned back toward the colony. As they passed off shore of Cartagena they noticed another vessel and collided with a rock as they were attempting to approach close enough to communicate. The sole option for survival being a run ashore, the entire group, recognizing the danger they faced should they be revealed as Scots from New Caledonia, agreed to pass themselves as Englishmen from Jamaica heading towards Barbados. Acknowledging the Spanish well knew the identity of their Councilors and Captains,[171] Pincarton and Malloch were to use the pseudonyms of James Jamison and John Robertson, respectively. The incriminating declarations[172] were thrown overboard, while Pincarton´s clerk John Neilson[173] ("either designedly or negligently") kept a packet of letters to Edinburgh in his pocket. A Frenchman on board, after swearing to not betray the origin of the crew, was allowed to accompany the men ashore. As the English flag was flown from the *Dolphin* the immediate reception as they beached the ship was welcoming, but "upon

---

[171] The 4 November 1698 entry from a journal attributed to Dr. Wallace of the first expedition to Darien states ¨For as great a secret as we thought the project, it was known all the West Indies over . . . At Madera they seemed to know it; at St. Thomas I´m sure they knew it; at Portobelo their intelligence was so good that they knew the names of all our Councillors and Captains of Ships before we landed, and had that particular observation that there were four Roberts among them." Insh, *Papers*, pp. 76-77.

[172] Herries explains on p. 157 of *A Defence* that these declarations (see Appendix 1) were prepared, liberally using King William´s name, to entice additional men from various Caribbean colonies to the Darien undertaking.

[173] John Neilson is included on the pay list of *Unicorn* as Captain Pincarton´s clerk. NLS, MS Adv. 83.7.4., f. 95r.

suspicion (or some discovery of the French Lieutenant)," Captains Pincarton and Malloch were each placed in solitary confinement. Interrogations began the following day, with Malloch maintaining his identity as James Jamison, even when faced with contrary evidence. The incriminating documents, besides proclaiming the men´s actual origin, included their intention to trade in Spanish-held dominions along the coast. Refusing to concede his contrived name or origin, Malloch was taken away and "loaded with iron". Pincarton was then sent for and initially declared himself as John Robertson. Warned about the condition of his soul and informed about the letter submitted by their French passenger, he confessed his true identity and answered thoroughly questions regarding circumstances at New Caledonia. He was then "kindly treated", as opposed to Malloch, who was "used like a dog". Upon completion of his interrogation Pincarton sent for Livingston, directing him to notify the remainder of the men that the Spanish knew their identities and that they need not maintain any pretense of being Englishmen. Based on full recognition of who the men were, their attempted false identities and colors, and the intent to blatently violate the Treaty of 1670 by trading directly with subjects of Spain[174], both the ship and her cargo were confiscated.[175]

The striking corroboration between original Spanish documents and Herries´s publication provides vital credence to their versions of events, particularly when it is considered that the material was produced within a relatively short time frame on two continents in two different languages by two men who had never met. Herries also would have been well acquainted with the Scots involved, having served with them on the voyage to Darien and having sailed from the colony on a Jamaican sloop only weeks prior to the ill-fated departure of the *Dolphin*.[176]

---

[174] While the "American Treaty" technically prohibited trade between colonial holdings of Spain and Great Britain in the Americas, it had forced Madrid to acknowledge England´s expanded territory in the Caribbean. The proximity and porosity of the Spanish American coastline, and the magnet of its trading opportunities, was too lucrative to escape exploitation. S. Stein and B. Stein, *Silver, Trade and War-Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore 2000), pp. 63-64.
[175] Herries, *An Enquiry*, pp. 44-47.
[176] Herries, *A Defence*, p. 160.

The entire story of this first group of prisoners[177] not only substantiates the credibility of Herries as a source and the inclusion of non-Scottish participants, but, of greater importance, it acknowledges the goal of the Company of Scotland to establish illicit trade along the Spanish main. Such a pretense underscores the complications the entire enterprise created for Scotland´s King, the competition it presented to English, Portuguese, French and Dutch interests, and its flagrant violation of Spain´s territorial claims and international treaties. The level of concern from London is evidenced in the effective and remarkably timely reports submitted to King William by his Secretary of State. As early as June 1699 notification of the capture of the *Dolphin,* relayed from Admiral Benbow in the Caribbean, was submitted by Secretary Vernon to the King.[178]

PRISONERS OF THE INTRUDERS: ESCORTED AND RELEASED

While the drama unfolded in Cartagena, the Scots in turn took their first prisoners. Following a skirmish with the Spanish, Barbour makes the extravagant claim that over 100 prisoners were taken, including the supposed Chief Commander, Don Domingo de la Rada.[179] The Spaniard would find himself a negotiating tool, but first he was interrogated on board the *St. Andrew* 10 February 1699. He repeatedly refers to the Scots as "English" and relates his orders to command a patrol of 230 men to Tubacanti. From that position a scouting party of twenty-five men had been sent forward to try to obtain prisoners. The Indian Captain Pedro had promised his men could obtain ten or twenty "English"[180], but,

---

[177] Of the thirty-one men, seven had died "with badd usage" prior to Pincarton´s September 1699 transportation to Havana (Burton, *The Darien Papers,* p. 103) and one eventually converted to Catholicism and elected to stay in Spanish America, "living very well amongst them." Ibid, p. 351. As explained previously, surgeon Livingston made a successful escape to Jamaica.

[178] BL, ADD MS 40774, f.41v.

[179] Barbour, *A History of William Paterson*, p. 250. The claim of 100 prisoners from a "skirmish" in thick woods is countered by Borland´s account, which notes only a single prisoner, who would have been de la Rada. Borland, *The History*, p. 21.

[180] The frequent use of "English" to denote the Scots presents a particular challenge when investigating the Spanish records and requires a careful review of the material and/or corroboration from other sources to verify the actual group being referenced.

after being informed the Spanish did not have sufficient gold with them to pay for the services, negotiations broke down. The following morning, expecting to speak again with Pedro, the Spaniards were instead surprised by the force from New Caledonia. De la Rada found himself cut off from escape by the Indians and expediently surrendered himself.[181]

An attempt was made to capitalize on de la Rada´s capture by preparing a letter for the President of Panama, assuring him of the Scots´ peaceful intentions and offering to initiate diplomatic efforts.[182] The message was first relayed to the Governor of Santa Maria, notifying him that they also had the Spaniard in their possession, whom they would "continue to treat with all kindness and civility until we have advice from you how to dispose of him".[183] Campmaster Luis Carrisoli produced a rapid and polite reply, writing that he had forwarded the Scots´correspondence and would wait for a direction from his own superior prior to making any judgments. As for de la Rada´s future, he replied "I thank you for the offer, and leave it to your selves to dispose of him as you shall please."[184]

As witnessed by his eventual deposition taken in Santa Maria by Carrisoli in May, de la Rada was well able to fend for himself. The purported Commander arrived at Carrisoli´s home in the company of two Scotsmen and was identified as one of the twenty-five men who had participated in the patrol against the Scots. When he did not return following the skirmish it had been said he had gone into the Scottish camp. He had indeed been in New Caledonia and brought back with him a first-hand account of events in the colony, a marked contrast to the minimal information he had provided in the deposition taken by his Scottish captors. The thirty-eight year old said he was actually a trader from Barbacoas and had accompanied the patrol. Witnessing his comrade wounded by an arrow, suffering from the flux, and finding himself cut off by Indian fighters from whom he knew he would receive no quarter, he strategically decided to turn himself over to the Scots. Near their settlement he had met two Frenchmen who were salvaging the wreck of their ship. These men eventually took him to the Scottish Vice-Admiral, who in turn had released him on 4

[181] NLS, MS Adv. 83.7.4., f. 136r,
[182] Ibid., f. 141r.
[183] NLS, MS Adv. 83.7.3., f. 140r.
[184] Ibid, ff. 149-150.

May. He had been provided with a gun, two pistols and a supply of linen for his return journey, as well as the two-man escort. The pair was expected to accompany him only part way, but de la Rada, "through deceit and flattery", had brought them to Carrisoli. The former prisoner explained that he had been released because he had recognized the Scots´ desire to trade with the Spanish, their ample supplies of textiles and their great interest in procuring gold. He had thus proposed to act as their agent and would use his reputation and knowledge of the country to obtain the metal and return within a month to barter for their goods. He would also notify others of the possibilities available at New Caledonia and thus establish an even larger market. De la Rada conscientiously emphasized this ruse was only to obtain his freedom and not to actually enter illicit trade with the Scots. He had even asked for and received assurances from the seven heads of the government of the colony that they would protect him as he proceeded with his trading initiatives.

Characteristic of other interrogations completed by the Spanish, detailed intelligence as to the quantity and quality of the enemy was collected. Although he had not been allowed the freedom to walk throughout the colony, the former prisoner had been befriended by one of the Scots and had been told there were approximately 1300 residents and that there was a defensive moat full of water. Ever willing to exploit his circumstances, de la Rada updated his countrymen on the firepower of the Scottish fleet and the arrival of trading vessels from Jamaica with provisions. He claimed he had heard that the Jamaicans, declaring that Panama could easily be taken, had offered 7000 men to help the Scots fight the Spaniards. The proposal was denied by the colonists, unless they were to suffer an attack themselves. There were six to seven thousand additional Scots expected, including families, and their intention was to establish good relations with the Spanish. De la Rada expressed his own opinion that, if adequate forces were not available to exterminate the colony, it would be more prudent to leave them as they were. There was the possibility of attacking the intruders from the sea but it would be effective only if activated before reinforcements, expected hourly from New England, arrived. He reemphasized he did not think the Scots would initiate an attack, but they had established allies, both overt and covert, with the local Indians. The presence of five English ships off Portobello had been discussed openly in the colony. They were under the command of Admiral Benbow, but, contrary to

Spanish belief, they were not there to assist the Scots. He did expect, though, that they would aid New Caledonia if it came under attack.

Carrisoli and his men then turned to de la Rada´s escort, utilizing an Irishman serving in the Spanish navy as translator. The first individual identified himself as George Drummond, a soldier from Edinburgh who had served in King James´s guard. The Lieutenant explained the Company´s license from King William to settle in unoccupied territory and its intent to avoid war. He was thoroughly questioned about the details of the design and size of defenses, adding that recovered cannon from the wrecked French vessel were being hauled up to and mounted at the fortifications. Admiral Benbow´s squadron belonged to the King of England and not to the Company, but was prepared to give the Scots assistance if needed. The only communication between New Caledonia and the Admiral had taken place when the English fleet had met the ship the Scots had sent to Cartagena to demand the *Dolphin* and her crew. Since Benbow had been in Portobello, two Scottish vessels had sailed there, but he did not know their mission. The Jamaican vessels which had come to New Caledonia brought only food as arms were not necessary, the Scots being amply supplied.

Perhaps attempting to deter the Spanish from aggressive action, Drummond gave the population of New Caledonia as an astounding 5000 and then went on to describe the seven-Councilor government, with Robert Pennycook at its head. He noted that they had brought with them a large supply of trade goods such as clothing and textiles. One brigantine had been sent to Cartagena, which was the one that was lost, and one Councilor had returned to Scotland to report to the Directors. Six relief vessels were expected hourly from home, and they were anticipated to transport “the most important personage in Scotland”. Families were also expected, but he did not know how many. The Indians were regular visitors to sell fruit, but no Spaniards or mulattoes had appeared. When asked about negros, Drummond said they had brought none to sell nor to use in building their fortifications, nor did they anticipate any.

Turning to the events concerning de la Rada, Drummond said they had accompanied him because he had asked their command to provide an escort across the mountains for protection from the Indians. When they had intended to turn back at Tubacanti, they had been prevented from doing so by an edict from the President of Panama. He did not know the reason for de la Rada´s release from New Caledonia, but he did understand a general order to not arrest any Spaniard, instead to allow them freedom of movement. Verifying the military composition of the population, he recounted that their squadron had twelve captains, all of whom had served in Flanders.[185]

An account of the skirmish that had brought de la Rada into New Caledonia was also provided by Borland, giving Scottish strength in the encounter as an estimated 150. He mentions de la Rada only as the sole prisoner acquired and that his escort was never heard from again.[186] The second escort-turned-prisoner does, however, reappear. George Cowan´s case was presented before the Directors in Edinburgh 19 March 1700. Having accompanied de la Rada as ordered, he had been sent as a prisoner to Panama and eventually to Cartagena, where he had escaped on a trading vessel bound for Jamaica. From there he had found his passage home and was rewarded with six pounds sterling. The Company acknowledged the strategic value of his experience "traversing the most important places possessed by the Spaniards upon the Continent of America" and praised his offer of continued service. Cowan would find himself on board the relief ship *Providence* headed back to New Caledonia.[187]

The variety of circumstances and prisoners following the evacuation of the first expedition provided a new wave of dramatic intelligence across the Caribbean and the Atlantic, illustrating both intricate and effective networks of communication that existed and the high priority given the Scots´ activities. On the 10th of July 1699 Governor William

---

[185] The original of de la Rada´s interrogation is in AGI, *Panamá* 160 (unfoliated). Material described here is from its translation in MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 32. AGI, *Panamá* 109 (unfoliated) also contains the declarations, forwarded by the President of Panama to Madrid 9 May 1699.
[186] Borland, *The History*, pp. 21-22.
[187] NLS, MS Adv. 83.7.5., f. 148r., NAS, RH4/135/1, entry for 19 March 1700.

Beeston of Jamaica wrote to Secretary of State Vernon in London. Although the Governor had a packet of correspondence already on board a vessel prepared to depart for England, that ship had been delayed and he had urgent news to supplement his original dispatches. Beeston related that the desertion had taken place seventeen days earlier and, based on the Scots´ lack of provisions, "whither we cannot hear nor guess unless they are gon to disperse themselves amongst the Northern Plantations." After offering the circumstances that he felt may have led to the desertion, he provided details of how he had obtained the information . . .

> The Master of the Vesell tells me that he met three Canoes at the Barnes that came from Callidonia and had three Spaniards on them who had been Prisonors with the Scotch and Freed by them when they saild and also that those Canoes were laden with Iron Crows Shot and other Iron Tools the Scotch left behinde them which seems to Indicate that they went away in haste.[188]

Upon arrival of the news in London, the Spanish Ambassador immediately wrote Madrid, reporting the resulting clamor running through the English capital, the validity of which he had confirmed by "instantly taking his coach" and seeking out Secretary of State Vernon.[189]

Released Spanish prisoners also carried the news to their own dominions. Shortly after arriving in Cartagena in July 1699, Admiral of the *Barlovento* fleet Andrés de Pez, while proceeding with his own preparations to sail against the Scots, received surprising intelligence from seven arriving Spaniards. They had been held prisoner at New Caledonia and deposed that the site had been deserted, its former inhabitants heading to New England. Writing to his monarch, de Pez provided his own self-aggrandizing interpretation of the reason for the departure of the Scots. . .

> The great anxiety occasioned them during the seven full months that this fleet remained in their vicinity, making war upon them both by sea and

[188] NA, CO137/4, f. 135r,v.
[189] AGS, *Estado* 3971, Marques de Canales to Madrid, date illegible but referring to letter written by Governor Beeston 10/20 June 1699.

> also by land, and by its having come to this port to assemble greater force, of which they were informed. This fear, added to certain lack of subsistence they suffered and sicknesses which came upon them, moved them to the aforesaid resolution.[190]

BENJAMIN SPENCER: STRANDED, IMPRISONED AND TORTURED

That the evacuees experienced no exclusion from potential imprisonment or fear of the Spanish is illustrated by the dramatic case of Benjamin Spencer, the expedition´s translator. William Paterson, who had also departed the colony 20 June on board the *Unicorn,* recounted events in his eventual report to the Directors of the Company upon his return to Scotland. By the 25th of July their solitary ship had struggled into the Cuban Bay of Matanzas. Intending to obtain water, a pinnance was sent into shore the following day. Rather than water, however, they found themselves in the immediate vicinity of a Spanish fort. "By some inadvertency," Spencer stepped ashore and was captured. The Spanish troops then endeavored to obtain the pinnance, but the Scots were able to escape, dodging both shots and a small boat of pursuers. That evening they set sail without their linguist.[191]

As for Spencer, his version of what occurred was well documented by his captors and their superiors. Gallup-Diaz acknowledges the value of the depth and breadth of Spencer´s depositions,[192] enhanced by the translator´s fluency in Spanish and resulting ability to converse directly with his inquisitors. The declarations provide a first-hand account of the

---

[190] Hart, *The Disaster,* Appendix XXII*,* pp. 306-308. Andrés de Pez to the King, 26 July 1699.

[191] Patterson´s report is available as an appendix in Barbour, *A History of William Paterson.* The account of Spencer´s capture is given on page 126. Patterson´s original report is at NLS, MS Adv. 83.7.5., starting with f. 37.

[192] Gallup-Diaz, *The Door*, p. 128. The author notes that "The record of his questioning is an extraordinarily rich source for the history of the settlement, and merits transcription, translation, and publication so that it might be more widely consulted by historians." Fortunately, a translation of the original from AGI, *Panamá* 161 has been completed and is available as MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 48. An additional copy of the original Spanish version is also contained in AGI, *Panamá* 181, starting with folio 177r. The translation provided in the Hart Collection has been utilized here.

initial expedition, full of detail not recorded elsewhere and further substantiating both the military character of the expedition and the international composition of its participants. They also relate the harrowing story of the survivor abandoned on the beach, his torture and interrogations, and his transfer to Havana.[193] Notably, the documents also testify to the impact of the Scottish activity across the Caribbean and the magnitude of the geographic area that concerned itself with events at New Caledonia.

The Spanish account of the encounter with the *Unicorn* is included in a packet sent to the King by Governor Don Diego de Cordoba Lasso de la Vega of Havana on 25 September 1699 covering events initiated the previous August 5th. On that day a large vessel had been spotted off Matanzas. A launch sent ashore bore a Spanish-speaking individual who spoke with the local fort´s Captain Serrano, identifying his ship as English, from Jamaica and headed for New England. Because they had lost their mast and required wood and water, they requested permission to land. As the Captain extended his questioning the men remaining in the launch appeared to become alarmed and departed, abandoning their Spanish-speaking comrade. Alerted by that action and the subsequent departure of the mother ship from view, the Captain threatened torture (according to the Governor, a threat not carried out) unless the prisoner fully explained his circumstances. Spencer then revealed his ship had been one of those at Darien, and that New Caledonia had now been abandoned. Recognizing the critical nature of the news, a message was sent immediately to Havana, from which a command was returned to forward the prisoner to the Governor.

After hearing that the colony had been deserted due to high mortality, lack of expected relief from Scotland and the declarations of the English King, Lasso de la Vega prepared and forwarded packets of Spencer´s depositions to the Viceroy of New Spain and General don Martin de Zavala, General of the *Guarda Costa*[194], sending them via a dispatch boat that departed the 14th of August. Zavala himself sailed into Havana on the 26th, followed

---

[193] The latter portion of Spencer´s case, along with that of Captain Pincarton and some of his crew, is the subject of Chapter 5, *The Long Reach of Spanish Justice*.

[194] Initiated in 1633 to secure the American coastline, the *Guarda Costa* was composed of ships to be built and maintained within the colonies. Its implementation, however, was subject to erratic funding and reassignment. Haring, *Trade and Navigation*, pp. 253-254.

on the 3rd, 4th and 6th of September by vessels from Cartagena bringing verification of the departure of the Scots from both the General of the *Barlovento* fleet and the city´s Governor.

In the hands of his Havana captors, Spencer´s interrogations had become more intense. They had been initiated only a week after his capture at Matanzas and started with the prisoner declaring himself a native of Holland. He recounted his original departure from Scotland, the census of ships and personnel, and the military organization of the expedition. He stated clearly that there were Italians and Frenchmen among the men, as well as other foreigners. Five women had come with the expedition from Scotland, but only one had survived Darien to depart the colony. Within a day after sailing they could see smoke and flames at the settlement, recognizing that the houses and buildings were being burned as the fort was not constructed of combustible materials.

A chronological description was given of their arrival and settlement at New Caledonia. During their clearing of the land and initial construction the Indians began to bring notice of imminent Spanish offensive action to drive them out. In response 160 men were sent under command of James Montgomery to the camp of one of their Indian allies. The combined force moved on and had a skirmish with an estimated 25 Spaniards and twelve Indians, resulting in two Scottish fatalities and up to fifteen wounded. The Spaniards withdrew hastily due to the far greater number of Scottish forces, but left behind bread and cheese. In return for acquisition of the provisions, the Scots left behind a musket and withdrew. They also had found a Spanish merchant named Don Domingo de (la) Rada, who had “lost his way”. The man said he was from Santa Maria, which was near the gold mines of Cana and reported that there was a Spanish force of 250 near Tubacanti, which included the men they had just encountered. After holding de (la) Rada two months at the settlement, the Council of New Caledonia decided to release him, accompanied by two escorts to go as far as Tubacanti. The two escorts had been detained and had never returned to the settlement.

Addressing further questions regarding circumstances and intentions beyond the immediate area of New Caledonia, Spencer said he did not know whether or not their departure was known in Cartagena, but he did know they knew of it in Santa Maria. There had been no trade with that town, but it was only a day and a half from their settlement and the Scots knew it was adjacent to the gold mine called Cana. Trade with the Indians was minor, basically food materials. There had not been talk of crossing to Panama as they had been occupied establishing their settlement, at which no one had been left behind. A French ship, which apparently was spying on their activities, had been sent by Monsieur DuCasse. The evidence of its intent had been acquired from a letter found in a bottle on a vessel taken along the coast by the Scots. In that discovered document DuCasse, who was the Governor of Pitiguao, offered to assist the Governor of Portobello to dislodge the Scots.

Returning to events at the colony, Spencer explained that the failure of pledged relief from Scotland created serious confusion and was only understood when news of King William´s proclamations was received. That edict, according to the colonists, was why their own Company´s relief ships had not appeared. At that point "they resolved to abandon their scheme to settle, because they could not maintain it". The four ships that had abandoned New Caledonia had become separated, and Spencer´s vessel had entered Matanzas Bay not knowing where it was. As Spencer had been speaking to the Spanish guard ashore, his shipmates, remaining in the launch, had become frightened by the arms of the Spanish and the fire they heard as they rowed away from shore.

Spencer also provided information regarding the Scots´ reaction to the imprisonment of Captain Pincarton and the taking of the *Dolphin* in Cartagena. After the return of the men had been refused, the decision had been made to attempt to capture "persons of esteem" to negotiate an exchange.

The interrogation then led into a discussion of authority for their settlement, which Spencer said had come from the King of England. He recalled the stipulations regarding the requirement to settle in lands unoccupied by any European power or monarch, and that the

permission of any native population was obligatory. The indigenous people were to be exempt from taxation for a period of twenty-one years.

Spencer´s role in the enterprise was solely because of his language abilities. He had signed with the Company of Scotland for a salary of ten pounds for himself and a servant.

The questioning then turned to identification of ships that had visited the Scots in New Caledonia, providing the Spaniards with a localized census of not only vessels in the immediate vicinity, but also who was communicating, and potentially collaborating, directly with the colony. The response was that Spencer had seen five English ships and several French vessels. One of the latter he had heard had come to trade along the coast, and this was the one that wrecked as it was leaving the bay. The Scots had responded to her distress signals. Spencer had heard that some gold and considerable amounts of silver had been salvaged. Commodore Pennycook had some of the treasure in his possession, which prompted discord with the French Captain. Eventually an agreement was reached giving the Scots one eighth of the gold and silver saved, but the argument did not end and arms were eventually raised over the allocation.

Some gold had also been obtained from the native cacique Diego, as compensation for the hospitality of the Scots and "in recognition of a perpetual league and alliance". Having an estimated value of 300 pounds sterling, it had been presented following an incident involving a launch belonging to the colony being retained by Diego´s people. Some additional gold had been acquired from the nose and ear jewelry worn by the native men and women.

Trade goods originally brought to Darien included English cloth, including many types of linen. They were intended for trade with the English and also with the Spanish. There were also wrought iron implements, arms of all kinds, and various tin, iron and copper plates, as well as cups and goblets designed for barter with Kings along the Guinea coast for negroes. Some of these original stores were still on board the *Unicorn*, which, according to what he had heard his Captain say, was headed to New England to secure

provisions. The ship was leaking badly and they estimated they had only a month´s worth of supplies. Spencer had heard no word about returning to Darien.

As the questioning wore on, the Governor returned to the subject of fortifications at New Caledonia. He was told that there had been no engineer at the colony. A Captain who had served in Flanders was in charge of the construction and the intent was to expand the fort when reinforcements arrived from Scotland. At the present time it was more of a battery than a regular castle. Work had not begun on the fort until two to three months following their initial arrival.

Tension seemed to intensify between captor and prisoner as the Governor indicated doubt over some of Spencer´s responses to the hierarchy of command and his explanation for the presence of the Scots on Cuba. Mention was also made of the content of the documents seized at Cartagena, which had previously been provided to Havana. Spencer found himself remanded to jail, where he was ordered "pressed" regarding the most critical issues of Darien´s abandonment and his arrival on Cuba. Overtly threatened with torture, the translator repeated that the survivors, amounting to approximately 500 individuals, had departed in their four remaining ships, leaving behind four or five Frenchmen. Recounting again his abandonment at Matanzas he pled "and this is the truth and God fail him if it is not, and may his soul burn endlessly in hell if he is lying". He was taken to a torture chamber where he was stripped and placed on "the horse"[195] and again commanded to tell the truth. At that point the Governor, "seeing how heavily this illness bore upon him", suspended the interrogation.

Contributing to Spencer´s difficulties was material in the original messages from Captain Serrano of Matanzas, also contained in the same document of the Hart collection, which related the initial claim that the *Unicorn* was English. It had only been under threat of torture that the translator had originally admitted otherwise. The status of Spencer´s

---

[195] "The Horse" was a punishment for delinquent soldiers consisting of a wooden frame having a sharp ridge on which the accused was forced to sit. Lesley Brown (ed.), *The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles* (Oxford 1993), Vol. 1, p. 1264.

religion also surfaced, identifying him as a Jew, which would also bear on his trial in Sevilla the following year.[196] The statement that he "was sick of `the horse´" before he left Matanzas appears to indicate that, contrary to the Governor´s claim, he had also been tortured earlier. Serrano did relate that they had suspected the *Unicorn* of being pirate and that Spencer´s initial requests to wood and water and repair had been regarded as ruses.

As word drifted into Havana verifying the abandonment of New Caledonia, Spencer´s testimony gained credibility. His surprise and relief at discovering himself reunited with Captain Pincarton and his three companions from Cartagena must have been profound, and the exchange of information regarding what had happened to each of them, as well as the grand design of the Company of Scotland, must have been related numerous times.

For the captors,[197] the news of the Scots´ departure must have seemed no less dramatic. The systems of communication, even faced with the considerable impediments of the time, had functioned well. Word had criss-crossed the Caribbean and been forwarded home to Spain, compiling a vast amount of information. Advantages presented by unexpected events had been fully exploited by a well established, consistent and refined system of intelligence gathering, achieving nothing less than an on-going journal of events not only at New Caledonia, but also across the larger Caribbean and Atlantic Worlds. Data received from both deserters and prisoners provided immeasurable assistance to Spanish concerns mounting the effective land and sea operation against the Scots, but it also comprised a highly valuable supplement to the portfolio of knowledge concerning

---

[196] Spencer would claim in Sevilla that, through consultations with a priest in Havana, he had converted to Catholicism. See Chapter 5.

[197] The Governor of Havana would find himself faced with another set of desperate Scots following the final capitulation. The *Hope* was lost on the western portion of Cuba, her Captain Miller going to Port Royal in Jamaica by long boat, but the remainder of the crew and passengers sent aboard a Spanish sloop to Havana where they were "strip´t.", UGSp, MS1685, Item 3, *Letter to "Dear Blakeder" from Fra. Hislope, Port Royal, Jamaica, March 1701*. Fourteen of these individuals found themselves transported to Spain. Based on the capitulation and likely intending to avoid a negative response from William III, an order from the new Spanish King dated 14 March 1701 secured their release. NA, SP94/75 (unfoliated). At a meeting of the Court of Directors of the Company of Scotland on 18 July 1701 it was agreed to settle debts stemming from loans obtained from the Governor of Havana by some of the survivors. NAS, R4/135/1, vol. 3.

geographically dispersed activities of both allies and enemies. The continuing and consistent evidence of the military character of the Company of Scotland´s expeditions, and repetitive evidence of intentions to participate in the thriving world of contraband trade, could only have alerted the diverse web of legal and illicit interests to the validity of a Scottish threat and underscore the need for prompt and definitive action. Whatever the impacts of the actions of the Company of Scotland in its home country and England, Spanish America and the wider cast of Caribbean players had vital investments to protect and would not shirk from doing so.

Although examined more thoroughly in Chapter 7, any review of the cast of prisoners involved in the attempted establishment of New Caledonia would be incomplete without addressing the decidedly unacknowledged role of the local indigenous population. The *Memoirs of Mr. William Veitch and George Brysson* relates that

> Some of the Indian chiefs who had been most friendly to the colony, were taken from the side of the Scottish ships and made prisoners. The ministers, pitying the poor natives, drew up a petition in their favour and sent it to the Spanish[198]

The request being denied, we are once again reliant on Walter Herries for a record of the punishment imposed on the allies of the Scots. Unlike the trials and release of other prisoners, and indicating policies to be implemented to prevent further alliances with foreigners and assure control over the indigenous populations, the native prisoners were, the surgeon wrote, "impaled alive."[199]

CHAPTER 4
ADMIRALS, GOVERNORS AND SLAVETRADERS: ENTANGLED INTERESTS COPE WITH SCOTTISH INTRUDERS

[198] Thomas M´Crie, (ed.), *Memoirs of Mr. William Veitch and George Brysson* (Edinburgh 1835), p. 58.
[199] Herries, *An Enquiry*, p. 40.

With the implementation of their Darien enterprise, the Company of Scotland initiated ripples of action and reaction that extended across the Atlantic World, touching Europe, Africa and the Americas. Focusing on action within the Caribbean basin and the voyage of English Admiral John Benbow and his fleet, given virtually no previous credit for its role in the unfolding story of the Darien expeditions, this chapter explores how the Scottish threat manifested itself among the entangled interests that plied the Atlantic and Caribbean attempting to establish bases of colonial enterprise and commercial advantage. Relying heavily on primary sources from England and Spain, Benbow´s activities and interactions with Spanish officials and New Caledonia colonists are traced, illustrating a previously unrecognized complicity by William III in ensuring the failure of the Scottish enterprise. Not only were overt offers of assistance made to colonial officials along the Spanish Main to eliminate the Scottish presence, but examination of Benbow´s itinerary also provides a record of the range of interactions and initiatives among Portuguese, Dutch, and French interests, as well as English and Spanish. No major party was remotely interested in witnessing the success of a new player establishing themselves in the vicinity, dictating the conclusion that there was no means by which New Caledonia would survive, much less flourish.

The importance of these various interactions and international efforts was not only pertinent to the Company of Scotland and its mother country, but also provided a deliberate opportunity for intelligence-gathering and practical rehearsals for future deployment. Benbow and his entire fleet would return to England with acquired documentation and practical experience that would soon prove its worth. As uncertainty, speculation and intrigue prevailed at the end of the seventeenth century over the anticipated death of the King of Spain and that country´s succession, the Scottish initiative inadvertently provided the web of intertwined interests with invaluable knowledge of and familiarity with the names, places, vulnerabilities and capacities of both potential enemies and potential allies.

Efforts previously undertaken from London to undermine implementation of the Scottish venture are summarized by English Secretary of State Vernon in a 7 March 1699 letter to Ambassador to Spain Alexander Stanhope. First, he related, parliament had taken action to thwart proposed London subscriptions. William III had then dismissed his Secretaries in Scotland over the affair and further intervened to suppress proposals in Hamburg. Once the Scots had "settled themselves", effectively revived their plans, and successfully sailed their fleet as far as St. Thomas, the King went further, issuing orders to the respective Governors of his plantations to provide "no correspondence or succour".[200] "His majesty", Vernon summarized, "has of himself done all the Spaniards could have desired of him". The Secretary ended the letter with orders to the Ambassador to "take care to make this matter rightly understood".[201]

Mounting alarm over the activities of the Company of Scotland was not, however, limited to London-based concerns and potential commercial rivals. Rather, they came from a wide-ranging array of sources with varied investments to protect. Governor Beeston of Jamaica, writing home on 5 December 1698, had spoken for his fellow royal representatives in struggling Caribbean colonies when he notified the Council of Trade and Plantations that

> The Scotch fleet is arrived at Darien, into which bay one of our sloops saw them sail. If they settle there and are healthy, the noise of gold (of which there is great plenty in those parts) will carry away all our debtors,

---

[200] Advice regarding these and other potential methods of thwarting "the Scotch East India Company trading to Spanish West Indies" had been submitted to the English Lord Justices as early as July 1697. HL, MS BL6, *Considerations about the Scotch East India Company trading to Spanish West Indies,* 10 August 1697.

[201] KHLC, U1590, 053/8, Secretary of State Vernon to Stanhope. As discussed later in this chapter, Stanhope vigorously addressed the assignment, informing the Spaniards of the measures taken by King William to thwart the activities of the Scots, adding that both Crowns shared a mutual interest in the circumstances, for "if the Scots succeed in establishing themselves in those parts it will be as prejudicial to the English as to the Spanish." Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XVIII, p. 290. Vernon´s reference to Hamburg addresses the successful campaign implemented by that city´s English Resident, Paul Rycaut, to effectively warn local merchants and officials against providing support for the Scottish enterprise. Insh, *The Company*, pp. 87-96.

> servants and ordinary people in the hope of mending their fortunes, and will much weaken what little strength we have.[202]

Walter Herries, the surgeon-turned-critic (and spy), provided a contemporary substantiation of Beeston´s concerns. In his 1701 pamphlet the man who had first-hand experience in New Caledonia wrote of declarations printed in Boston that were to be "secretly and industriously spread . . . over the Leeward islands . . . to invite Men of all Nations . . . to come over to Caledonia". Newcomers were enticed to join the Scots through assurances that they would enjoy equal privileges with the original colonists of the "free port and Corporation". Jamaica, being the closest colony where the documents were dispersed, had been the "first acquainted with the Tidings".[203]

In *History of His Own Time,* published in 1734, Bishop Gilbert Burnet reiterated that the dual lure of gold and Spanish plunder was regarded as having an irresistible appeal to a labor force desperately needed in the colonies, with the result that "Our English plantations grew also very jealous . . ."[204] Nor was the anxiety relegated solely to the realms of King William III. Burnet notes not only that the establishment of New Caledonia in close proximity to vital Spanish ports at Portobello, Panama and Cartagena caused intense Spanish alarm, but that "The King of France complained also of this, as an invasion of the Spanish dominion, and offered the Court of Madrid a fleet to dislodge them."[205] Perhaps the most inflammatory of his accusations, supporting the Bishop´s view that William´s continued devotion to his homeland markedly hindered his popularity[206], was that

---

[202]Cundall, *The Darien Venture*, p. 36.
[203] Herries, *An Enquiry*, pp. 26, 41. For a full transcription of the declaration, see Appendix I.
[204] Bishop Gilbert Burnet, *History of His Own Time, Volume II: From the Revolution to the Conclusion of the Treaty of Peace at Utrecht in the Reign of Queen Anne* (London 1734), p. 217.
[205] Ibid, p. 216. As will be discussed in the pages ahead, there would be multiple offers of French assistance to assure the demise of New Caledonia. The exploitation of the Scottish threat by the French, and its role in the upcoming conflict over the Spanish succession, underscore the need for research in French archives.
[206] T. Clarke and H. Foxcroft, *A Life of Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury* (Cambridge 1907), p. 358.

> It was further given out, to raise the national disgust even higher, that the opposition the King gave to the Scotch colony, flowed neither from a regard to the interests of England, nor to the Treaties with Spain, but from a Care of the Dutch, who from Curacao drove a coasting trade, among the Spanish plantations, with great advantage; which, they said, the Scotch colony, of once well settled, would draw wholly from them.[207]

Support for the accusation is provided by a standard phrase included in contemporary orders of the Royal African Company to their Captains. They were directed "to not hinder the ships belonging to the Dutch Guinea Company or to follow attack or seize the ships and effects of the Interlopers of that Nation."[208]

There remained an additional concern impacting yet another monarchy. At the time the Scots chose to proceed with their efforts for commercial advancement, the *asiento,* assuring its holder a monopoly over delivery of slaves to Spain´s American dominions, was held by the Portuguese Cacheo Company. Their contract required the delivery of slaves to Cartagena and other designated ports[209] by a variety of means, not limited to their own vessels. The lucrative trade could be and was subcontracted to English ships from London and Jamaica and Dutch ships from the Low Countries and Curacao.[210] The Portuguese had established their presence by providing 4000 slaves annually in 1693, when they had contracted with the Spanish company then holding the *asiento*.[211] Three years later they had secured the business for themselves for a period of six years and eight

---

[207] Burnet, *History*, p. 235. In his introduction to Burnet´s biography, C. H. Firth, addresses the controversy of the Bishop´s *History,* stating "Many people denied it was history." (Clarke and Foxcroft, *A Life*, p. xxxiii.). In presenting the contrasting opinion, Firth acknowledges Burnet´s tendency to rely on gossip but gives his subject credit for having the "inestimable advantage of personal acquaintance". (Ibid, p. xxxvi).
[208] NA, T70/61. An example of such an order is in f.150v, Orders to Captain John Proude, London, 26 Oct 1699.
[209] Cumana, Caracas, Havana, Portobello, Honduras and Veracruz were the other approved destinations. NA, SP103/66-Vol. 1, *Asiento between Spain and Portugal.*
[210] J. Palacios Preciado, *La Trata De Negros por Cartagena De Indias* (Tunja 1973), p. 52.
[211] G. Brooks, *Eurafricans in Western Africa: Commerce, Social Status, Gender and Religious Observance from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century* (Ohio 2003), p. 192.

months, promising to deliver 30,000 negroes "neither old nor decrepit."[212] Among the investors realizing considerable profits was Portugal´s King Pedro.[213]

As extensive as the financial rewards of the slave trade were, however, the potential for accompanying contraband trade translated into substantially increased revenues. Opportunities to transport additional merchandise, both human and otherwise, were enhanced by the fact that slaves did not have to be registered or taxed by Spain´s *Casa de la Contratación.* In exchange for the human cargo, as well as whatever bundles of linen, silk, hardware and liquor might be supplemented, silver bullion would be received.[214] The beneficial circumstances of on-board human labor and contraband goods provided a unique opportunity that could be efficiently exploited. As reported to the Board of Trade in 1685, English merchants made up packs of English dry goods sized for human transport. The bundles would be carried to a designated isolated location by the slaves prior to the ship´s entry into port. The jettisoned contraband goods would be guarded until they could later be moved into secure storage under cover of night.[215] The advantageous condition of legal entry into Spanish ports, coupled with opportunities for additional illicit profits, created a dedicated cast of competitors wary of new participants seeking to share the proven financial reward.[216]

---

[212] A.D. Francis, *The Methuens and Portugal 1691-1708* (Cambridge 1966), p. 18.
[213] Ibid, p. 101. Interactions with the *asiento* also provided a valuable avenue for intelligence gathering. The Adminstrator of the Cacheo Company based in Jamaica wrote to the Council of the Indies in Spain in February 1699, informing them of the arrival of four Scottish vessels. AGS, *Estado* 4183, *Consulta de Consejo de Indias, Mayo 1699*. The presence of a factor for the *asiento* on Jamaica facilitated the direct sale of slaves by merchants of the island to the Portuguese. In a letter to the Board of Trade dated 5 July 1698, Governor Beeston wrote "the merchants have sold that factor three hundred negroes to be delivered at Veracruz." Beeston went on to explain he had allowed one of his King´s ships to escort the slave cargo and return with the revenue. E. Donnan, *Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America, Volume 1 1441-1700* (Washington, D.C. 1930), Item 165, p. 420.
[214] W. Klooster, *Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648-1795*, p. 87.
[215] C. Nettels, `England and the Spanish-American Trade, 1680-1715,´ *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. III:1 (March 1931), p.15.
[216] Geoffrey Walker states bluntly that "The *Asiento de Negros* in fact made a mockery of the pretended commercial monopoly of the Indies." Walker, *Spanish Politics*, p. 12. For a discussion and comparison of the impact of the foreign contraband trade with that

Despite numerous and inevitable frictions with the *asiento,* its liberal movements across the Atlantic and within the Caribbean, enhanced by international crews,[217] created a valuable alternative pathway for transmission of written and verbal intelligence, as well as for the transport of officials and religious personnel. Don Juan de Castro y Gallego, returning to Madrid from royal service in Chile, had sailed from Havana to Lisbon on one of the Portuguese Company´s vessels and produced testimony regarding not only what he had experienced in his own position, but what notice he had acquired of the Scots and English from other passengers.[218] That the factor of the *Asiento de Negros* was included in the War Council called by the President of Panama in response to initial word of the arrival of the Scots in Darien testifies to the importance attributed to the role, influence and resources of the slave trade contractors.[219]

MISSION TO THE CARIBBEAN: ADMIRAL JOHN BENBOW

In March of 1698, months prior to the Scots embarking on their first expedition from Leith, English Admiral John Benbow, who had conducted himself admirably both in recent campaigns against the French and by providing convoy escort service[220] had been called

---

perpetrated domestically see José María Oliva Melgar, `La metropoli sin territorio. ¿Crisis del comercio de Indias en el siglo XVII o pérdida del control del monopolio´, in Carlos Martínez Shaw and José María Oliva Melgar (eds.), *Sistema atlántico español: (siglos XVII-XIX)* (Madrid 2005), pp. 19-73.

[217] An April 1699 declaration taken in Madrid from a passenger on a ship of the *asiento* included the description of a crew comprised of Dutch, Portuguese, English and Spanish mariners. AGI, *Escribania de Cámara*, 1048B (unfoliated), declaration of Don Joseph de Quevedo.

[218] AGI, *Panamá* 181, Declaration of Don Juan de Castro y Gallego, 26 June 1699, Madrid, (unfoliated).

[219] Ibid, f. 171r.

[220] Benbow is best known for his controversial (and final) 1702 battle against the French fleet in the Caribbean, In his biography, author Sam Willis devotes a chapter to the Admiral´s prior campaign in the Caribbean studied here, noting that "Everyone in the

before the Admiralty. He was informed that the King had resolved to put him in command of a squadron destined for the West Indies. Preparations were hindered by lack of funds but reports from the Caribbean of threats against the trade to New Spain and, more notably, that English commerce with the Spanish Main was actively being stifled by the Spanish, pushed the preparation process.[221] Formal written orders, notably vague and frustratingly brief, were finally issued in Novembe 1698, the same month the Scots arrived in Darien. The Admiral was directed

> . . .to visit his Majesty´s respective islands to windward (of Jamaica) taking particular care that the ships under your command be from time to time so employed as may most conduce to the safety of his majesty´s islands and plantations, and the trade in those parts, until such time you shall receive further orders.[222]

Sailing from Portsmouth on 29 November and arriving first in Barbados, Benbow soon was informed by infuriated officials of injustices committed by the Spanish. Ignoring both stipulations of the contract strictly forbidding interference with movements of slavetrading vessels and the hindrance of commerce that it would create, the Governor of Cartagena had

---

Caribbean, with the exception of poor slaves forced to work the plantations, was on the make, and Benbow was no different." Willis, *The Admiral,* p. 258. The entry for Benbow in the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, written prior to Willis´s biography, credits the Admiral with thwarting Spain´s offensive against the Scots through the liberation of two detained English merchant vessels, a statement, as this chapter will reveal, which is far from accurate. John B. Hattendorf, `Benbow, John (1653?-1702)´, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Oct 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2076, accessed 21 March 2014].

[221] W.G. Bassett, *The Caribbean in International Politics (1670-1707)*, unpublished PhD Thesis (University of London 1934), pp. 410-411.

[222] NA, ADM2/25, f. 178. Insinuating more comprehensive orders, Secretary of State Vernon updated the King on 13 June 1699 that "the Lord Justices can´t tell what to make of Benbow´s Expedition." BL, ADD MS 40774, f. 51r. In a dispatch from the Viceroy of the *Audiencia* of Mexico to the Spanish King dated 14 July 1699, it is related that during Benbow´s presence in Cartagena "The English captain had stated that his orders had been that if the Scots had not settled he was to prevent it but if already settled he was to do nothing until he had reported to his King." Substantiating the importance of the role of the *asiento* in providing intelligence, the Viceroy also included information originating with the "the negro-commissioner" in Jamaica that the Scots were operating without the authority of their King. Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XVI, p. 302.

seized two English ships involved in the *asiento* trade. The declared purpose of the seizure was to use the vessels in the campaign to oust the Scots from Darien.[223]

The contemporary tensions, the impact of the seizures, the relief of merchants involved in the slave trade at the arrival of the Admiral´s fleet, and the ensuing complications all the activity created is expressed in an advice to London from Josiah Heathcote. The factor for the Royal African Company wrote in his 4 March 1699 report . . .

> You will heare what fine Voyages the Ships made with their Negroes at Cartagena, and how they were used by the Government and Factor of the Asiento, and the two Ships that lately Stopt there and are gone to Veracruz will meet with the same Civilitys, to say the truth, the Spaniards are in all things where they have the Advantage and Power very Rude to us and use the French and Dutch with much more liberty and Respect so that its Pitty we have not liberty to make them Sensible of their indignitys. Rear Admiral Benbow is now goeing over and Severall Merchants are with him, he intends to . . . them out of some of our Vessells they have taken from us without any Reason, and use the men worse than prisoners . . . which is a great indignity to our nation and to His Maj.s honour to be so treated by them, and I hope some Wider . . . be given that we may not so tamely be obliged to . . . insults. When you hear that they put the Negroes . . . for which they paid the Master out 22 or 23 and Sold Each Negroe before their faces for 200 . . you will admire their impudence, but you must know that this is the Roguery of the officials Real, who doe this to cheate the King of so much of his due, and share it amongst them . . but should be laid before their Ambassadour [224]

Regardless of potential alleviation of the affronts, however, Heathcote included a complaint predicting undesirable impacts, most notably the flight of the meager Jamaican labor force to the Scots, caused by the presence of Benbow´s fleet . . .

> Notwithstanding the Expresse Commands of the King that none shall impresse men here without the Govs. Warrant, and Confirm´d by the Lors of the Admiralty, yet the rear Adml. Orders his Captains to impresse the inhabitants, which is not onely interfering with all

---

[223] J. Campbell, *Lives of the admirals and other eminent British seamen; containing their personal histories, and a detail of all their public services* (London 1761), Vol. 3, p. 236.
[224] NA, T70/61, f. 150v.

> Authority but will frighten away all our seamen and Ordinary People to the Scotch or any Place Else where they think they can be Easie, so that it seems to me this Island can never be well settled, having so many disadvantageous Putbacks[225]

Heathcote was not alone in his criticism of the Admiral´s actions. Governor of Jamaica Beeston had his own questions about Benbow´s tactics. Late in January, he wrote to Secretary of State Vernon, two of Benbow´s ships had arrived and reported that their Commander had parted from them at Nevis. He had apparently sailed in company of a slave-trading vessel to the coast of the Spanish Main without explaining his intentions to those of his fleet which he directed to Jamaica.[226] The logs of the Master and the Lieutenant of Benbow´s flagship *Gloucester* do, however, chart the progress of their mission. At the same time Beeston was writing to London, the Admiral was conducting a strained dialogue with the Spanish Governor of Cartagena, Don Diego de los Rios y Quesada. Benbow had arrived outside the city in late January, pleading the need to water. The Governor had refused to allow their ships inside the narrow channel leading into the port, but did send the requested water to them by two Portuguese boats. The Admiral then initiated his personal campaign of diplomacy and threat to obtain the release of the detained English merchant ships, with the successful result that all the vessels were cleared to depart on the 3rd of February.[227]

A distinctly different interpretation of the interaction between the Spanish Governor and the English Admiral, complicated by simultaneous French proposals, is covered in the former´s report to his own King dated 24 February 1699 and dramatically expands the

---

[225] NA, CO137/4, f.107, extract of advice from Mr. Heathcote to the Board.
[226] Bateson, *CSP, Domestic, 1699-1700,* p. 187. The news of Benbow´s departure for the Spanish Main would have especially alarmed Beeston since the Governor was maintaining delicate diplomatic correspondences with the President of Panama, the General of the *Barlovento* Fleet and the Governor of Portobello, seeking to assure the Spanish authorities of King William´s lack of support for the Company of Scotland. HL, MSBL10, *Copies of Severall Letters From The Governors of the Spanish West Indies to Sir Wm. Beeston, With His Answers to Them.*
[227] NA, ADM52/39 contains *An Account of the Proceedings of His Majesties Shipp Glouster*, completed by Master Robert Thompson. The Lieutenant Logs of the flagship, held at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, are catalogued as ADM/L/G/47.

motivations for the English presence. Rios first recounted the heavy demands upon his position, providing his own self-appraisal that he was handling his responsibilities admirably. In the midst of trying to organize action against the Scots and control contraband trade, the Governor had received an offer of assistance against the Scots from French Captain Juan Rache. Within days of vetting the validity of that offer, and sending Rache in the company of the *Barlovento* fleet to gain intelligence, two additional arrivals had caught the Governor by surprise. The pair of vessels had immediately posted English colors and sent in a launch with a letter from one Admiral Benbow. In it the author reported he was concerned over the site and intent of the Scottish settlement, declaring that his total fleet was "ready for any eventuality should the Scotch commit any evil". They were also hunting for pirates, Benbow elaborated, which were reported to be operating off the coast of Hispaniola. He was so concerned about getting accurate information, he declared, that he had come alone so as not to alarm the local jurisdictions. He requested water, explaining that it had been fifty days since their departure from England and they had had no previous opportunity to replenish their supply. They would, he offered, be departing for Jamaica once the task was completed. The Captain assigned with relaying the letter ashore added that their squadron was under direction from King William to "gather up the Scotch",[228] also offering to the Governor the information that additional ships of the fleet were standing at Nevis and off the coast of Santo Domingo.

Rios was particularly wary that the English visitors simply wanted intelligence on how much the Spanish knew of the Scottish initiatives, and that they might actually comprise the relief fleet he had heard was expected from Scotland. Exercising prudence, the Governor decided to dispatch a contingent of officials to meet directly with the Admiral and evaluate the situation. The embassy was received cordially and given surprising news

[228] The claim by the Captain that "his orders had been that if the Scots had not settled he was to prevent it, but if already settled he was to do nothing until he had reported to his King" was transmitted across Spanish America, reaching the Viceroy in Mexico City, who forwarded it to his King in a dispatch dated 14 July 1699. Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XXI, p. 302.

> The Englishman stated that it was by command of his king to inform himself of the governor concerning the place and position where the Scotch had landed and were founding a settlement, in order to advise his majesty and later to return to execute them all for having come without the authorization of their king, who was in Flanders when they left, and who, as soon as he learned of it, sent this admiral after them with the purpose stated, to which end he had in Jamaica as many as ten ships, and a supply of bombs.

The Spaniards continued the consultation, but regarded what they had heard as somewhat contradictory to the original written message they had received. The English continued to press their case, emphasizing peace and amity between their two sovereigns. The representatives from Cartagena were given gifts of cloth and departed on amiable terms "talking among themselves of how to return the courtesy shown, but cautiously".

Governor Rios then wrote back to Benbow, expressing appreciation for both the offer of assistance and the cloth sent him for a coat. He provided information regarding the Scots and assured the Admiral that he was confident the English would remove the Scots immediately, adding that the dominions of Spanish America were taking their own measures to assure elimination of the colony at Darien. Negotiations over watering the *Gloucester* continued, with the Governor declaring he needed his king´s permission to allow the English access and Benbow countering that, in order to save the lives of those under his command, he may have to force his way in.[229] A compromise was finally reached with an offer from Rios to send men to obtain the empty barrels and return them to the English replenished. An acceptable arrangement was also forged to allow the small *asiento* vessel accompanying the Admiral into port to unload its cargo of slaves and obtain its own water supply.

There remained the issue of the detained *asiento* slave-ships. The Governor had been pressured for their release as early as the 15th of January by the local representative of the Portuguese concessionaire, who requested that the pair of his company´s ships be allowed

---

[229] The specific messages that comprised much of the political dance between the Governor and the Admiral are contained in AGI, *Panamá* 215, ff. 153v-171r.

to clear for Lisbon, as well as the same number of English ships for their home port. It was claimed that the vessels had been held a month, causing heavy detriment and expense, without the intended formulation of any firm plans for operations against the Scots. Whatever Benbow´s diplomatic pressures[230], the issue was settled with the Governor acknowledging the stipulation of the Slave Trade Concession prohibiting detention of its vessels, graciously adding that he wished to save expenses for all concerned.[231]

In spite of consistently finding himself in receipt of assurances that the "sole object of their coming was to remove the Scotch, who, they said, had come hither without order of their king" Governor Rios was no doubt relieved to witness the departure of the English the 12th of February. That same day he would receive word of an additional offer from the French to assist in eliminating the Scottish presence. Monsieur DuCasse, Governor of Pitiguao, offered "munitions, firearms, and all the assistance possible" to expel "this evil people from these parts".[232]

No doubt feeling somewhat satisfied with the success of his efforts, Benbow sailed for Port Royal, Jamaica, from where he was able to file a report to London dated 3 March 1699. The document, which would be provided by Secretary of Vernon to the King, informed his superiors that he had found the Spaniards in Cartagena very disposed towards the French and very "jealous of us on the Scotch account". He was able to provide the latest information on New Caledonia, including the current news that the *Dolphin* and her crew were being held in Cartagena and that there had been an initial armed skirmish between the

---

[230] Campbell writes that Benbow was forced to resolve the issue by threatening to come in after the ships if they were not released within twenty-four hours, notifying the Governor that "if they were kept longer he would have the opportunity of seeing what respect an English officer had to his word". Campbell, *Lives*, p. 237.

[231] MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item #8 (English translation of AGI, *Panamá* 160, ff. 148-174). The stipulation in question prohibited *asiento* ships from being "stopped, hindered or arrested upon any motive or preference whatsoever by any Vice-Roy, Governor or any of your Majesty´s ministers". NA, SP103/66, Vol. 1, *Asiento between Spain and Portugal*, Article 22.

[232] MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 8, (English translation of AGI, *Panamá* 160, ff. 1-18). Two days following the communication from DuCasse, the Governor would experience yet another surprise with the running aground of the Company of Scotland´s *Dolphin* outside his city´s walls.

Spanish and the Scots in Darien. He was sailing the following day for Portobello, he wrote, to gain a better account of the situation and demand additional English-owned trade goods, men and ships that had been seized by the *Barlovento* fleet.[233] Vernon added his own assessment of the situation, noting to his King "The Spaniards are very little sensible of the declarations that you did not approve of the Scotch, since they make no end of the seizing of our ships. Benbow is taking a course that will either make them very civil or very angry."[234] New Caledonia was clearly inserting itself into international politics, adding strain to an environment where an array of allies and enemies had interests to protect.

DEBATING CARIBBEAN EVENTS IN EUROPE

Both Spanish seizures of English resources and the related interruption of the Portuguese *asiento´*s slave-trading contract were attracting attention on both sides the Atlantic. Not only did King William mount a campaign to assure the Spanish King of his lack of complicity in the Scottish effort in Darien, but increased expressions of concern from both English and Portuguese commercial interests required a response. After receiving Benbow´s report from Jamaica, Secretary of State Vernon wrote Ambassador Stanhope in Madrid, informing him of English ships seized and taken to Portobello. He related that merchants involved with the *asiento* had paid him a visit "to complain that some of their ships there and the Negros (were) taken away from them without paying for them". He included in his letter a deposition taken 2 March 1699 that effectively illustrated the tactics and impacts that were causing the complaints. John Chapman and John Noale had been Chief Mate and gunner, respectively, on board the *Good Will*, sailing with their prescribed cargo of slaves from Guinea. They had arrived in Cartagena on 27 September and delivered their human merchandise to the Portuguese as ordered. Preparing to return to England, they were consistently denied permission to clear and their rudder was ordered

[233] NMM, PLA/23 (Phillips Collection), f. 3r. Letter from Rear Admiral Benbow, on board the *Gloucester* in Port Royal, 3 March 1699.
[234] BL, ADD MS 40774, f. 41v.

unhung by the Admiral of the *Barlovento* fleet, effectively incapacitating their ship. This was followed by a visit from the Governor, who "took away all small arms, locked up the great cabin, powder room and hatches and ordered the Captain and two doctors on shore . . . at their own expense". After two days the men had been allowed to return to the ship, but powder, provisions, iron bars and two sets of sails had been seized. The explanation given by the Spaniards was that the Spanish and French were to "join against the English, then that the reason was because the Scotch had landed on Golden Island". They were all to be held prisoner, they were informed, until word was received from Spain regarding their future. They were, however, able to escape with their captain´s consent "in an English brigantine who rode there under Dutch colors bound for Jamaica". The Secretary added a footnote to Stanhope, directing him to "endeavor to make people there (Madrid) sensible".[235]

Stanhope had previously initiated a campaign to assure the Spanish Court of his own country´s innocence and frustration pertaining to the Company of Scotland. On April 15th he had written Vernon assuring him that England´s position "shall be conveyed to every one of the Counsellors of State upon my word and your authority . . ."[236] Assurance as to the effectiveness of his efforts was transmitted two weeks later, when the Ambassador wrote the Secretary that

> I have, either by myself or friends, published so effectually his Majesty´s disowning the Scotch design in the West Indies, that I am sure not a man in Madrid, that ever heard of the former, but has been informed that his

---

[235] KHLC, U1590, 053/8, Vernon to Stanhope, 16 May 1699 and C. Headlam (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1699* (London 1908), Item 149III, p. 88. Apparently the efforts of the Governor of Jamaica had not provided sufficient assurances to the Governor of Cartagena to prevent the seizures: William Beeston had written his equals in Spain´s colonies in the West Indies as early as December 1698 to disavow English involvement in the Darien colonization. KHLC, U1590, 053/8,Vernon to Stanhope, 27 March 1699.

[236] A. Stanhope, *Spain Under Charles the Second Or, Extracts from the correspondence of the Hon. Alexander Stanhope, British minister at Madrid. 1690-1699. From the Originals at Chevening* (London 1840), p. 129.

> Majesty not only disowns it, but has done all that is possible to disappoint it.[237]

In July Vernon forwarded to Stanhope a copy of the proclamation issued by Governor Beeston of Jamaica prohibiting assistance to and communication with the Scots, instructing the Ambassador to submit it to the Spanish Court.[238] By early August the Ambassador was able to report back that the Spaniards had publicized the substance of the document by printing it in their gazette and that other diplomats had reported to him that the Spanish did indeed "comprehend William III´s sincerity".[239]

The situation from Lisbon was no less perplexing. London´s Ambassador to Portugal Paul Methuen had initially written his equal in Madrid saying that he didn´t consider the Spanish threat to the "American Scots" as substantial, but regarded the greater deterrent to be that the "King´s disowning them, must of necessity rout them, and I fancy it may be likely to make them turn pirate".[240] Within weeks, however, a differing degree of concern was aired. Methuen informed Stanhope of his own efforts at the Portuguese capitol, describing

> a great deal of concern at the Scotch settlement in America although not any ways at the thing itself but the consequences of it at Madrid, which they fear might be a means to render ineffectual the late Agreement which the Cacheo Company has made with several merchants in London concerning the transportation of negroes to the west Indies at a certain price, they finding themselves incapable of going through with it without help. However they are now very well satisfied upon my acquainting

---

[237] Ibid, p. 136. Revealing that the campaign had not resulted in complete success, Stanhope wrote to his son on 8 July, expressing frustration with the Spaniards´ failure to fully acknowledge the parallel with their own inclusion of multiple kingdoms under a single crown. "It is impossible to make these people understand the difference between English and Scotch", he wrote, "though on other occasions, when the complaint was on our part, their Ministers have owned to me their King was properly so of Castille, but that in Aragon and Biscay the subjects were no further so, than they thought stood with their own conveniency." Ibid, p. 142.
[238] KHLC, U1590, 033/15, Vernon to Stanhope, 4 July 1699.
[239] Ibid, 033/15, Stanhope to Vernon, 2/12 August 1699.
[240] Ibid, 029/5, Methuen to Stanhope, 5 May 1699.

> them that his Mgsty has entirely disowned everything the Scotch had done as contrary to his intention and command.[241]

Successive correspondence documents the confusion about the Scottish presence at Darien and doubts over future collaboration between the English and Portuguese companies. On 16 June Methuen wrote expressing disbelief at a report that sickness was decimating the Scottish endeavor, adding that *asiento* representatives were "pressing hard at the Spanish Court to assure the freedom of English ships".[242] Within a week he forwarded a new report that a ship from the Cacheo Company had arrived back in Lisbon "with reports of the great strength of the Scotch".[243] Potential economic consequences remained the major consideration, Methuen pragmatically stating in a September letter that "I know not how the Portuguese will come off of the security they have given in England to be answerable for all damages, or whether their agreement with the English can go on."[244]

Concerns pertaining to the relationship between the two companies had also garnered attention in London. In late August the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Royal African Company found themselves summoned before the Admiralty Board to discuss contracts with their Portuguese partners and specifically whether or not assistance to their ships by the Royal Navy "might not be Prejuditiall to their Company and Contrary to the

---

[241] Ibid, 029/5, Methuen to Stanhope, 26 May 1699. Despite the correspondence from Methuen regarding the Scots and Darien, there is no mention of either in A.D. Francis´s *The Methuens and Portugal 1691-1708* (Cambridge 1966). The involvement of the Cacheo Company is an indication of the potential expansion of historiography to be discovered through examination of Portuguese archives.
[242] Ibid, 029/5, Methuen to Stanhope, 16 June 1699.
[243] Ibid, 029/5, Methuen to Stanhope, 23 June 1699.
[244] Ibid, 029/5, Methuen to Stanhope, 8 September 1699. Methuen´s concerns were prophetic, for he submitted a report to Secretary of State Vernon in November of 1701 indicating that he had received a memorial from English merchants in Lisbon. Their losses in Cartagena had not been reimbursed. Referring to the failure of the merchants to solicit his advice prior to completing their contract, the Ambassador wrote "They never gave me any account of their designs, whereby I might have prevented all loss of this nature, by letting them know the ill posture of the Company´s affairs and advise them not to trust to such an imaginary security for the performance of their contracts." NA, SP89/18, f. 44v. For an accounting of losses claimed by the *asiento* see AHN, *Estado* 1778/31.

Act of Parliament".[245] After being assured otherwise, a Memorial was prepared for and approved by the Lord Justices sanctioning "Orders to be given to the Commanders in the West Indies, to assist such Shipps and Vessells as shall be Employed . . . in Transporting Negroes . . ."[246]

PORTOBELLO

Continuing his mission in the Caribbean, Benbow proceeded to Portobello to ascertain the situation there. On the way he also conducted his initial documented conversation with the Scots. On the 17th of March the log of the *Gloucester* recorded the presence of two small vessels from "Caledonia". They reported that they had been at Cartagena to demand the *Dolphin* and her crew. The Spanish Governor, however, had refused. The Scots, "after giving the Admiral an account", sailed for New Caledonia.[247]

Within a week of the dialogue with the Scots, Benbow´s fleet was anchored outside Portobello, where the Governor gave them less than an enthusiastic reception. Master Thompson of the *Gloucester* documented that a letter had been relayed into port, but the response expressed the Spanish administrator´s "dissatisfaction at their laying within shot of their castle", adding the warning that the *Barlovento* fleet was present in the harbor.[248] The Governor had good reason for caution. Unknown to the English, Admiral don Andrés

---

[245] NA, ADM3/15, Admiralty Board minutes for 25 September 1699.
[246] Ibid, Admiralty Board minutes for 29 September 1699.
[247] NA, ADM52/39, entry for 17 March 1699. The existing record of the content of Benbow´s several communications with the Scots is frustratingly brief, although New Caledonia appeared well aware of his presence. One seemingly misplaced but intriguing comment is offered by Reverend Alexander Shields, writing to the Directors in Edinburgh from the colony in February 1700, informing them of "advice that Admiral Bembo was gone to Portobel to demand prisoners, and was intending to come hither also, which was very supporting to us . . ". Burton, *The Darien Papers*, p. 250.
[248] NA, ADM52/39, entry for 23 March 1699.

de Pez was away in Panama conferring on plans to eradicate the Scots and had left his fleet "with only seamen, ship´s boys, and some officers, in small number".[249]

Subsequent developments at Portobello are documented by both English and Spanish reports to their respective superiors and reflect the tension created by the Scottish presence in the area. In his communication to the Lords of the Admiralty, Benbow expressed his frustration at the continuing belief that England´s interests were inseparable from those of Scotland. . . .

> I used all the arguments I could to persuade them to the contrary but to little progress being denied the privilege of their ports to water, all the country in an alarm, letters passed almost every day wherein I insisted to have the goods, men and vessels that belonged to my prince and subjects, which at last they did consent that if I would go from befor their port my demands should be sent after me, for my lying there was very nervous to them.[250]

Circumstances were exacerbated by an incident documented by one of Benbow´s Captains on the 28th of March, when a sloop "seen in the offing" was brought in by the English fleet. She had come from Cartagena, transporting "ab.103 negros several passengers and goods with three fryars, in the evening cleared the sloop but detained the fryars".[251] The detention and the suspicions it was perceived to substantiate were included in a letter from the Governor of Portobello to his counterpart in Jamaica. The Spaniard expressed his frustration with the Scots, Benbow and claims that New Caledonia had been initiated without King William´s knowledge and sanction . . .

> It appears plain to the meanest capacity that the Scotch being subjects of the King of Great Britaine would not dare without his Licence and permission to undertake so bold an enterprise . . . what hath augmented our suspicions that there is some malicious design on foot is the arrival of the squadron under the Command of Admirall Benbo at the mouth of this Port, and there having layne these 44 days impeding the going out

---

[249] Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XVIII, p. 290. (The Council of the Indies to His Majesty, 16 May 1699).
[250] NMM, PLA/23, f. 9r.
[251] NA, ADM51/341, Captain´s log of the *Falmouth*, entry for 28 March 1699.

> and coming in of our boats of traffick for provisions, imprisoning our religious men . . . for although Admirall Benboe coloured it by saying he came to demand of the *Barlovento* Fleet . . . some prizes that he said they had taken from the English Nation, I can´t persuade myselfe to believe that a Squadron of such strength and cost should come upon a matter of so small importance since the expense of the Admirall´s Fleet must in 15 days amount to more than he asked for.[252]

Not included in any correspondence or formal report from Portobello, but noted in the logs of two of the English ships, was a brief reappearance of the Scots. On 9 April two sails were spotted which identified themselves as being from New Caledonia. They had appeared at night and departed the following morning, but not before the Captain of the *Germoon* had occasion to log the frustratingly brief statement "Rear Admiral with Scotch vessels".[253]

The stalemate between Benbow and the Governor of Portobello continued until the arrival of the *Maidstone* on the 20th of April. She brought urgent news in the form of the proclamations prohibiting any assistance by citizens of English dominions to the Scots. Copies were rapidly transmitted to Portobello authorities and appeared to produce a marked change of attitude. After informing the Spanish Governor of the development, Benbow found himself treated "very civilly". He further noted that a French ship had sailed into port, offering its services against New Caledonia. When Benbow notified his Spanish hosts that he was preparing to sail, he wrote that they now seemed hesitant to let him go

> for fear the Scotch should invade them, to prevent which I preferred to leave two ships with them. The business of my demands not being adjusted I left Captain Pickard of the *Soldado, Falmouth and Lynn* . . . .

---

[252] HL, MSBL10, *Copies of Severall Letters From the Governors of the Spanish West Indies to Sir William Beeston, with his Answers to Them, Governor of Portobello to Governor Beeston,* 16 May 1699.

[253] NA, ADM51/389, Captain´s log of the *Germoon*, entry for 9 April 1699 and ADM52/39, Master´s log of the *Gloucester*, entry for 9 April 1699. The latter includes the fact that the shallop and sloop departed "plying to windward".

> The *Maidstone* I sent to cruise the Gulph of Darien for ten days then to return to Jamaica.[254]

The orders prepared for Captain Pickard specifically address interaction with the Scots and clear intent to provide assistance against New Caledonia should it be requested by the Spanish. Dated the 28th of April 1699 they order the reduced fleet left at Portobello to maintain communication with the Spanish

> Unless it be their request that you stay to protect them from the Scotch, if so then you are to remain there, taking care you use no violence against the Scotch, without they are the first aggressors, and send one of the ships to Jamaica to advise of the matter . . . if the Spaniards . . . nor think well of ye proposal in assisting them, you are to depart that place.[255]

The account from Portobello, not surprisingly, projected a different perspective, reflecting a continuing distrust of the motives for the presence of the English fleet. Admiral of the *Barlovento* fleet don Andrés de Pez had returned from his mission to Panama to discuss operations against the Scots to find a message on his flagship from the English Admiral. The Spaniard sent a vessel after Benbow, who had left that afternoon, leaving the three ships behind "under pretext of embarrassing the Scotch in any unbecoming design they might seek to execute against us". De Pez believed that the actual purpose of the small squadron was "just the contrary, his object being to hamper operations which from here might be undertaken against said Scotch, by so standing watch over any movement we might make".[256]

---

[254] NMM, PLA/23, report from *Gloucester* to London, May 23 1699, ff. 9r,v. The report also notes what was becoming an increasing concern, the death of personnel. Benbow notes the loss of Captain Gethin of the *Germoon* prior to their arrival back in Jamaica. Ibid, f. 10r. Although previously submitted to the Spanish by Benbow, the vital role of the proclamations was independently acknowledged by the Board of Admiralty on 21 June 1699, when they ordered copies forwarded to the West Indies for the Admiral. NA, ADM3/15, minutes of 21 June 1699.

[255] NMM, PLA/23, f. 79r.

[256] MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 18 (Translation of letter from don Andrés de Pez to the Crown, 10 June 1699). The translation includes the correspondence between de Pez and Benbow discussed in the following paragraphs.

In his report to the Crown, the Spanish Admiral included copies of both the letter from his English counterpart and his subsequent reply. Benbow wrote of his frustration at the Portobello Governor´s claim that nothing could be done about releasing a detained English merchant as the prisoner was in de Pez´s custody, at the same time complaining that there seemed to be an effort to directly obstruct communication between the two Admirals. De Pez was challenged to provide an explanation for the continued detention. "I await your honor´s reply", Benbow wrote, "if your honor wish to make one or not, in order to advise the King, my master . . . Since your honor wishes to be arbiter the world over, detaining his vassals and goods without any shadow of justice . . ."

The reply illustrates the murky claims and counterclaims of contemporary maritime diplomacy. De Pez explained he had just returned aboard his flagship and received his correspondence. Listing the concerns Benbow had communicated, the Spaniard wrote that he has been entrusted with protecting the dominions of his sovereign not only against enemies, but also against illicit traders. In the course of these responsibilities he had captured the brigantine of one Juan Fleuet off Havana. Fleuet, recognized as English, had been found in possession of treasure salvaged from a sunken ship, "a grave offense . . not permissible even to Spaniards"[257]. The case had been forwarded to the Council of the Indies in Seville, where it would be judiciously administered in "the procedure to conclude matters of this sort, and which will satisfy your honor". Regarding the detained English merchant

> It is true that I purchased his flour in Cartagena harbour. News that the Scotch had settled in these dominions under patents issued by the British King was the reason of his arrest, it being plain that had no such news arrived he would by now be in his own country, a free man. It is equally clear that my course is justified, for if vassals of the British king, having

[257] The salvage of sunken Spanish treasure had become an attractive source of revenue for a variety of interests. See Cyrus H. Karraker, `Spanish Treasure, Casual Revenue of the Crown´, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 5:3 (Sept. 1933), pp. 301-318. Focusing on the profitable expeditions of Captain (later Sir) William Phips to the Bahama Banks and Hispaniola during the 1680s, Karraker notes that, upon arrival of the salvaged gold, silver and great guns in London, "the entire treasure the Spanish Ambassador immediately (and unsuccessfully) demanded as the property of his master, the King of Spain". Ibid, p. 307.

> no right to do so, proceed as though possessed of absolute authority to intrude upon and settle his majesty´s territory, thereby occasioning expense to his royal treasury, how much greater justification have I to hold his British majesty´s vassals´ property. .? I have no doubt that your honor´s comprehension will be convinced by this explanation . . .

De Pez continued, recounting the numerous times he had offered assistance to English vessels, clarifying that he has included the information "not that the English nation may be grateful to me, but that the gallantry of Spaniards and Englishmen may be known". He then returned to the case of Fleuet, noting the hospitality the Captain had received when aboard the Spanish flagship. "If it is true that he has complained, this is to the discredit of the English nation, for he has lied barefacedly, and he should be punished. I am deeply grieved by the insolence, with which he has defamed the credit of Spaniards."

Finally turning his attention to the question of the Scots in Darien, de Pez acknowledged that Benbow´s assurances that New Caledonia had been occupied contrary to the wishes of King William were at odds with the letters and patents he had seen. Nevertheless,

> Accepting as more reliable the statements contained in your honor´s communications, and realizing that a gentleman of your honor´s qualities and employment could not by any means fall short of the truth, I have forthwith extended to your honor my entire confident relief. I could never persuade myself that his British majesty could employ duplicity and issue patents as they claim, for in this instance to do so would involve implications unworthy of utterance against such majesty as his, therefore I am persuaded that the Scotch claim to possess a patent is false.

In closing, and further testifying to the negative impact the establishment of New Caledonia maintained upon English commerce, Benbow was provided the sole assurance that "as soon as I know that the Scotch have left these dominions" the English merchant and his goods would be liberated.[258]

---

[258] MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 18.

Frustrated and without satisfaction of his demands, Benbow proceeded to depart Portobello for Jamaica, leaving behind Captain Pickard and the reduced squadron to cope with both Spaniards and Scots as stipulated in his orders. On May 10th the remaining ships stood off Portobello, plagued by sickness decimating their crew. The log entry for 17 May notes that two-thirds of the ship´s company was sick, and from the nineteenth to the twentieth "men dying".[259] By the end of the month the small English fleet left by the Admiral was anchored off Cartagena, where they witnessed the arrival from Cadiz of the city´s new Governor, don Juan Pimienta, accompanied by three ships and orders to eliminate the presence of the Scots. The new royal administrator was saluted by the reduced English squadron´s guns, returning the same.[260]

LIFE, DEATH AND THE PURSUIT OF MERCANTILE INTERESTS

Benbow had since arrived back in Jamaica, prompting renewed friction between himself and Governor Beeston. In a letter to Secretary of State Vernon dated 18 August 1699 the Governor acknowledged the high mortality affecting the fleet, but complained that

---

[259] NA, ADM51/341/Part III, Captain´s Log, *Falmouth.* While at Portobello Benbow also lost the services of his translator, an Irishman named Juan Fernandez who had been with the fleet since Jamaica. Citing his Catholic faith as the reason for his desertion, the professional clerk gave his testimony to the Spanish General on 15 May 1699. He substantiated Benbow´s claim that his mission in Portobello had been to secure the return of English ships. There had been communication with Scots off Cartagena, he told the Spaniards, following their unsuccessful attempt to free the men and goods of the *Dolphin*. Warning that peril existed all along the coast, Fernandez explained that Benbow had gone to Jamaica because his ships were taking on water and because the Admiral had experienced some success in trading merchandise he had carried. He expressed his belief that Benbow had been given an order to negotiate with the Scots but that a new order from the British King to provide no assistance had been received. AGI, *Panamá* 109 (unfoliated), testimony taken by the General of Portobello, 15 May 1699.

[260] ADM51/3892, Captain´s Log, *Lynn,* Entry for 29 May 1699.

> To recruit them he Impresses all, and even the men that belong to this place, and have wives and Familyes here, which has caused our seamen to desert the Island, and will undo the place, he will not allow me to have any thing to do on the matter . . . so that I cannot Exercise His Majtys Authority nor protect his subjects who complain to me of the Injurys and Insults they receive . . .[261]

Into the strife sailed survivors from the Company of Scotland, verifying the abandonment of New Caledonia by the first expedition and precipitating additional interactions with the Admiral. Captain Colin Campbell, following the death of Commodore Pennycook and "most of our Sea Officers, and a hundred and thirty or fourty of our men", brought the desperate *St. Andrew* into Jamaica. He requested assistance from Governor Beeston, "butt he could by no means suffer me to dispose of any goods for supplying my men, altho´ they should starve". He then turned to Benbow, asking for men to bring the ship from its anchorage to Port Royal, "she not being safe where she is", but was again refused any assistance. Campbell´s dire circumstances were expressed in his report to the Company of Scotland, which declared the probability of the men mutinying, "for they have nott a weeke´s bread, and besides, they expect to have their wages here".[262]

The presence of Benbow´s fleet, coupled with the arrival of the desperate Scottish survivors, would appear to indicate the opportunity of a labor supply for the former. A comparison of the pay lists for the Admiral´s ships and those of Company of Scotland vessels, however, does not give an indication that there existed any wholesale effort to take on the men from New Caledonia, at least not under their actual names. Benbow´s pay lists do reflect recruits and impressments, not only in Jamaica, but also in Cartagena and Portobello. The sole indication of Darien survivor(s) serving in the English fleet involves William and David Strachan, who are documented as coming aboard the *Maidstone* at Port Royal, Jamaica on 12 February 1700. William may have been the "Guillermo Estrafan" who had been interrogated by the President of Panama the previous month, following his desertion. He had identified himself as having served on *Caledonia*, but neither he nor the

---

[261] NA, CO137/4, f.382r.
[262] Burton, *The Darien Papers*, pp. 150-151. Captain Colin Campbell to the Court of Directors, 18 August 1699.

like-named David are listed on that vessel´s rolls. It is, however, possible that they were not originally seamen but land men and had endured the pragmatic and challenging naval training that their circumstances demanded.[263]

That at least some of the survivors who arrived with the *St. Andrew* did find employment among English military forces is documented in the case of William Hutchinson. He had arrived in Caledonia with a relief expedition to find the colony abandoned and witnessed the burning of the *Olive Branch* and her vital store of provisions.[264] Evaluating the remaining food supply and realizing the shortfall, his group had sailed for Jamaica. They discovered the *St. Andrew* there, expecting it to go to sea within two weeks. The infirmity and mortality of both the sea and land men among her crew, however, dictated Hutchinson´s opinion that the ship would have to remain in port until the Company made alternative arrangements. Hutchinson himself had been severely ill but was now recovered and had been approached by one Colonel Knight regarding potential service commanding the forces at Port Royal. Hutchinson provided assurances to the Directors that his first priority remained the Company of Scotland and that he had consulted with the surviving officers present in Port Royal prior to accepting the position.[265]

The news of Benbow´s presence in the Caribbean, and the potential threat posed towards New Caledonia, had not failed to reach Edinburgh. As relief ships were being dispatched

---

[263] The Company of Scotland pay lists for officers and seamen are at the National Library of Scotland, included in MS Adv. 83.7.4., starting with folio 88r. The pay lists for Benbow´s fleet are at the National Archives in Kew and are as follows: ADM33/204 for the *Germoon*, ADM33/206 for *Lynn* and *Maidstone*, and ADM33/207 for *Gloucester.* Muster books for *Saudados Prize* are in ADM36/3378. In a biography of his ancestor, William A. Benbow states that the arrival of soldiers from Darien brought "an epidemic of fever which decimated Jamaica" severely impacting Benbow´s squadron. A review of contemporary documents presented here, however, shows that the mortality of the Admiral´s personnel was severe prior to the arrival of the Scots on the island. W. Benbow, *Brave Benbow: the Life of Vice-Admiral John Benbow 1653-1702* (Victoria, B.C. 1992), p. 76.

[264] Although the standard accepted cause of the fire was a reckless seaman, a witness stated the loss of the vessel and her critical stores was "through wicked negligence . . . while (Captain) Jameson and his Mate were cutting one anothers throats for a whore". HL, MSBL9, *Copy of Mr. Sheil´s letter*, 25 December 1699.

[265] UGSp, MS1685, Manuscript 16. Letter from Port Royal dated 24 October 1699.

there was speculation about the Admiral´s whereabouts and orders. George Hume, who had invested 500 pounds in the venture the initial day of subscriptions, wrote in his diary of the gossip . . .

> We hope that if Jameson and Stark continued their course and were not interrupted (as some say they are by Bambo) we have 9 months provisions aboard and knowing there were recruits soon to follow would continue in their places . . . . there is talk as if Bambo should all ready have taken possession.[266]

As events in the Caribbean ricocheted from the first abandonment of New Caledonia in June of 1699 to the arrival of the second Company of Scotland expedition in November of that year to the final March 1700 capitulation to the Spanish, the region continued to maintain the normalcy of competing for commercial trade advantage, legal and otherwise. Captain Pickard, following orders to command Benbow´s reduced squadron remaining off-shore near Portobello, was not exempt. Subject to the lure of contraband profit, the Captain would eventually find himself court-martialed following a petition instigated by his own men. Among the list of "misdemeanours" he was accused of committing was that he had overstayed his ordered departure after sixteen days, and instead "stay´d there as many more by the persuation of his Clerke as I heard from himself to relate to sell merchant goods".[267]

The intrepid factor of the Royal African Company, Josiah Heathcote, appeared in Portobello in October, reporting his alarm at the presence off shore of eleven French and Dutch ships. Failing to write of the competition they might present to his own employer, he assessed them to be detrimental to each other´s trade. In port, he discovered that an imposing ship of 60 guns, "loaded with goods", represented a new French trading

---

[266] NAS, GD1/649/2. Diary of George Home of Kimmerghame, entry for 13 Oct 1699. Kimmerghame´s investment is recorded in the list of subscribers provided as an appendix in Burton, *The Darien Papers*, p. 374.

[267] Pickard was acquitted of the majority of the charges, although he was fined for allowing the sale of rum "out of the Steeridge for days together, which made the Men Drunk and disorderly". NA, ADM1/5261, ff. 223r-226r.

company. Expressing his concern, he warned that the situation "doth oblige the Jamaica merchants to conserve themselves for to preserve that trade which decays everday".[268]

Benbow´s ships continued their patrols, the *Lynn* standing off Portobello from the 16th of September to the 3rd of October, then sailing to Cartagena. On the 22nd of October she was anchored at Santa Marta, where she was fired upon three times. After sending in a boat to demand the reason, they were told it was because they were thought to be Scots.[269]

There was also at least one more direct interface between Benbow and representatives of the Company of Scotland. When the relief vessel *Margaret of Dundee* reached St. Thomas her command sought, as directed, to obtain all information available concerning the fate of the colony. Among the news they received, including the blockade of New Caledonia by the Spanish, was that Benbow and the Company´s Captain Thomas Drummond had been on the island simultaneously in October. Drummond was headed back to Darien with supplies acquired in New York and had maintained "good correspondence" with the English Admiral, dining with him and "being very intimate".[270] There is no record of the content of their exchanges.

The final departure of Benbow from the Caribbean in February of 1700 appears to indicate he was fully aware that the Spanish initiated offensive against New Caledonia would be effective and his own fleet staying in the region would provide any needed assistance as well as intelligence. Sometime after the middle of the month Captain Allan of the *Maidstone* filed a report to the Admiralty, expressing appreciation for his new commission and notifying them that he had returned from "enquiring after the Scotch Settlement". His assessment was that "they every Day doe the Spaniards some damage".[271] The Spanish

---

[268] NA, CO137/5, f.8.
[269] NA, ADM51/3892, log of *Lynn*, entries for 14 September-22 October 1699.
[270] Burton, *The Darien Papers*, pp. 311, 337. While at St. Thomas Captain Drummond had negotiated a contract with the *Society* from New England, whose representatives noted the presence in port of Benbow and three ships of war. Headlam, *CSP, Colonial, America and West Indies, 1699,* Item 354x, p. 198.
[271] NA, ADM1/1435. Allan to Admiralty Office, undated, but including a reference to his previous communication of 16 February.

fleet under Governor Pimienta had indeed arrived off New Caledonia and the smaller English squadron remained in the vicinity. According to Reverend Francis Borland´s account

> an English Sloop came into our harbour, pretending to be from Jamaica, but was really a spy from the Spaniards, as afterwards we understood, they had gone from us to the Spaniards, and were in their company, when some few days after this, the Spaniards arrived upon our coast with their Fleet. Likewise about the same time, there were about nine French-men that dropt in among us, in a small Periago with Tortoises to sell to our chief men, that were able and willing to buy the same: and these also afterwards were found to be among our enemies; for there was a mixture of several nations serving in the Spanish fleet that came against us.[272]

Whatever her precise role in the final days of New Caledonia, the *Germoon* was in Jamaica on the first of April. Her Captain Boye filed his report to the Admiralty, notifying them that Benbow had left about a month prior for New England and *Germoon* was fitted both with its full complement of men and six weeks provisions. He requested a continuance "in these parts, being well acquainted with ye Countrey & my men all Seasoned to it".[273]

The negotiations of the Articles of Capitulation undertaken at New Caledonia during March 1700 give no indication of any other than Spanish and Company of Scotland participation. Direct roles of interests other than the primary two, if they existed, are undocumented. While the Scots prepared for final abandonment of their Darien enterprise, the distressed survivors finally had a surprising and pragmatic opportunity for a small piece of the lucrative trade that had prompted their dream. An informal market sprang up between the formerly opposing forces. The men

> With the allowance of the General, came and traded with our people, buying several of their commodities, which our men were very willing to sell to them: and by this means some of our people came to be provided

[272] Borland, *The History,* p. 59.
[273] NA, ADM1/1462, letter to the Admiralty from Captain Boye, 1 April 1700.

> with money to bear their charges, when they arrived at another port, which proved a favorable providence to many of them.[274]

As the remaining seaworthy Scottish ships left the bay, the varied cast which had sought their removal returned to their other assorted missions, equipped with an expanded understanding of allies and adversaries. Upon his return to Cartagena, Pimienta had to face a new onslaught of accusations from the Cacheo Company regarding his interference with the *asiento.* From Jamaica, Governor Beeston hinted at his relief not only of resolution of the Scottish problem, but also of the absence of the challenges of authority presented by Benbow . . . "Now the ships of war are gone all in quiet and amity."[275] The small English naval squadron remained along the Spanish Main until June, the *Germoon* logs recording her presence in the vicinity of Portobello and the nearby San Blas Islands.[276]

On the opposite side of the Atlantic there were obvious acknowledgements of relief following both the first abandonment and the final capitulation. In response to receipt of the news of the failure of the first Scottish expedition, Ambassador Methuen reported from Lisbon on the "very joyful" receipt of the news at the Court, based on the "great hindrance the settlement was to . . . furnishing the West Indies with negroes by our means".[277] To the English Secretary of Embassy in Paris, Alexander Stanhope wrote from Madrid to say the Court there was "extremely pleased with the advice of the Scots´ removal from Darien". He acknowledged the offers of French assistance, adding that "I assure you it was very lustily promised, and would have certainly have been accepted, if the news has staid a little longer".[278] He reiterated the French position in a second communication, emphasizing to

---

[274] Borland, *The History*, p. 68. Borland´s account contrasts with information included in the *Gazeta extraordinaria*, a record of events published in Lima to provide a public chronicle of events surrounding New Caledonia, discussed more fully in Chapter 6. Likely included to indicate the maintenance of Spanish colonial policies regarding illicit commerce, the document maintains that "He (Pimienta) ordered that none of his men should purchase any cloth or any jewelry from the enemy, under penalty . ." Anonymous, *Gazeta*, p. 13. Having no motivation to provide an inaccurate account, Borland´s version is more likely correct.
[275] NA, CO137/5, f. 51, Beeston to Board of Trade, 20 April 1700.
[276] NA, ADM51/389, Captain´s Logs, *Germoon,* entries for 26 and 29 June 1700.
[277] KLHC, U1590, 29/5, Methuen to Stanhope, November 1699.
[278] Stanhope, *Spain*, p. 153.

his Secretary of State the opportune timing of the news, for King Carlos II of Spain had been anticipated to "declare that very day his acceptance or refusal to accept French help to rout the Scots . . . France to furnish 40 Men of War and 1200 land men".[279] Finally witnessing the expected end of a most uncomfortable series of events, King William III could experience some sense of relief over conflicts caused by his northern subjects, about whom he wrote to the Pensionary Heinsius prior to hearing of the capitulation

> I am sorry to be obliged to tell you that affairs go on very badly in the Scotch Parliament. People there are like fools, on the subject of their colony of Darien, which they will not tolerate in England: this causes me great annoyance. What vexes me in particular is that this affair retards my departure for Holland, for which I long more than ever. I shall become ill, if I have to remain here longer . . .[280]

The Caribbean would experience only a brief respite before the long-anticipated death of the King of Spain in November 1700 and ensuing conflicts over the Spanish succession. The survivors from New Caledonia would face continued perils as they struggled toward any source of security, whether it be labor in Jamaica, a new life in the North American colonies, or even transport to Old Spain following shipwreck. Admiral Benbow, now well versed in managing a fleet on duty in the West Indies, had successfully completed a delicate mission that simultaneously ensured Scottish failure, eased the concerns of English, Portuguese and Dutch merchants, and provided a salve to the irritation of the Spanish over Darien. Colonial officials along the Spanish Main had experienced the novelty of both French and English offers of assistance in protecting a highly strategic region of their King´s sovereign lands. Whatever the vantage point, experience gained from coping with the Scottish attempt at colonization ensured that all parties in its wake were wiser regarding their competitors and more conversant concerning the intricate and delicately restored balance of conflicting interests within the Caribbean basin.

---

[279] KLHC, U1590, 022/5, Stanhope to Jersey, October 1699.
[280] Grimblot (ed.), *Letters of William III And Louis XIV*, William III to the Pensionary Heinsius, June 7-18, 1700, p. 415.

CHAPTER 5
THE LONG REACH OF SPANISH JUSTICE

Reaction to the Company of Scotland´s attempt to establish a permanent presence on the Isthmus of Panama was not limited to the military campaigns undertaken from both Spain and her American dominions[281] nor political and economic discord between England and

[281] For discussion of the extent and implementation of the naval and military response see Storrs, *Disaster?*, Hart, *The Disaster*, pages 97-120 and 139-141, and Garcia Casares, *Historia del Darién*, pp. 250-261.

Scotland nor diplomatic wrangling pertaining to the detention of the ships involved in the *asiento* trade. The decision to also involve Spain´s justice system through its *Casa de la Contratación* in Sevilla was a manifestation of New Caledonia in the administrative heart of Spain´s empire. The development was supported by the highest level of government in Madrid and instigated through established interfaces with Spanish Governors in the Americas and the assistance of naval personnel providing the transport of prisoners across the Atlantic. The resulting trial and conviction of members of the Company of Scotland´s first expedition ignited not only high anxiety for the men involved, but resulted in urgent and complex diplomatic negotiation, culminating in direct correspondence between King William III and King Carlos II and reflecting the vital concern both sovereigns held for resolving the provocative and destabilizing actions undertaken by the Scottish enterprise to interpret and ignore existing treaties for its own benefit.

The examination of the legal proceedings presented in this chapter is only made possible following the identification of the previously undiscovered trial record and associated correspondence in the Archive of the Indies.[282] Not only does the material verify the elevated priority Spain attributed to the Scottish incursion and the protection of her holdings across the Atlantic, but it also reveals the clear determination of the *Casa de la Contratación* to pursue financial redress from the Company of Scotland and its management and investors. In addition, the example of the judicial procedure provides a review of the *Casa´s* legal function and its process against international defendants accused of violating treaty stipulations. Lastly, the documented testimonies of the five defendants comprise a rich collection of new detail pertaining to both the Company of Scotland´s struggle to establish and maintain New Caledonia and the individuals who participated. While the resulting convictions and death sentences intensified the web of existing tensions, they also activated a coterie of English and Dutch diplomats working in Madrid, Cadiz and Sevilla to fulfill anxious directives from London, extending the influence of

[282] The file, catalogued as *Contratación* 5726A, *Ramo* 2, consists of over 700 hand written pages of testimony, orders and correspondence. Its complete transcription, translation and publication would not only provide broad access to the trial record, but also the wealth of detail encompassed in the first-hand accounts of the initial expedition presented in the multiple testimonies of each of the five defendants.

New Caledonia far beyond the shores of the Central American isthmus and directly into the highest echelons of international diplomacy.

THE CASA de la CONTRATACIÓN, THE TREATY of MADRID and ARRIVAL of PRISONERS from NEW CALEDONIA

By October 1699, when word reached the Council of State[283] in Madrid via London that a second expedition from Scotland had sailed with additional arms, supplies and colonists, discussion turned to the pursuit of judicial means as well as military force to eradicate the Scottish presence. The members of the Council, questioning the sincerity of King William´s efforts to castigate his subjects, agreed that the gravity of the matter required the application of all solutions legal and possible.[284]

The pursuit of legal recourse in matters relating to Spain´s dominions in the Americas rested in the *Consejo de Indias* or Council of the Indies and its administrative institution, Sevilla´s *Casa de la Contratación*. Initially established in 1503 and receiving its first set of ordinances and a designated university-trained judge by 1510, the *Casa* included a judicial arm assigned jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases pertaining to trade and

---

[283] The powerful Council of State, or *Consejo de Estado*, was responsible for international relations and would advise the King through *consultas*, documenting not only the decisions of the Council as a whole but also addressing the opinions of the various members. The deliberations of the Council during the early years of the seventeenth century regarding the establishment of the English colony in Jamestown provide stark parallels with those concerning the Scots and Darien ninety years later. That the earlier discussions recommended military intervention but, in contrast to the Scottish intrusion, did not result in its implementation indicates the strategic significance of the Isthmus as opposed to the northern location in Chesapeake Bay. For a discussion of the Spanish reaction to the English effort in Virginia, and the equivalent vital role of the Spanish Ambassador in London in gaining intelligence, see William Goldman, `Spain and the Founding of Jamestown´, *The William and Mary Quarterly,* Vol. 68:3 (July 2011).

[284] AGS, *Estado* 4183, minutes of *Consejo de Estado*, 8 October 1699. The *Consejo* had also received word of Admiral Benbow´s presence off Cartagena and his associated claim to be searching for pirates. The supposition of his true motivation, however, was that he was observing the "designs of the (Spanish) authorities against the Scots". Ibid, minutes of *Consejo de Estado*, 5 October 1699.

navigation.[285] With a reach extending over all individuals who violated ordinances designed to protect Spain´s monopoly over her vast American territories, the institution´s functions allowed that defendants could be sent from any portion of the Spanish King´s dominions to trial in Sevilla and would be remanded to the complete control of that court, subject to review solely by the Council of the Indies. Further, the *Casa* had the authority to inflict whatever degree of punishment was deemed appropriate.[286] "Strangers" were succinctly prohibited to trade in the Indies "without express license and permission from His Majesty" and the value of all confiscated goods were to be distributed in equal measure to the King, the judges and any informer. All cases considered would be given both a hearing and a rehearing, with the options for punishment in criminal convictions to include "loss of life, loss of limb, exposing to public shame . . . and other corporal punishment".[287]

Providing the basis for prosecution specifically pertaining to the subjects of King William III at the end of the seventeenth century, remarkable for its listing of offenses realized through actions undertaken by the Scottish Darien initiative, was the Treaty of Madrid. Concluded in 1670 the treaty between the Crowns of Great Britain and Spain had been the latest attempt to assure the "composing of differences, restraining of depradations, and the establishing of Peace in America . . ." Towards those ambitious ends, the monarchs were entrusted with the responsibility to monitor the behavior of their own subjects to eradicate

---

[285] M.C. Mirow, *Latin American Law, A History of Private Law and Institutions in Spanish America* (Austin 1962), p. 21.

[286] Bernard Moses, `The Casa de Contratacion of Seville´, *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1894* (Washington 1896), pp. 94-99. A specific chamber of the *Casa*, established in 1583, eventually consisted of three judges (required to be lawyers) vested with responsibility over all judicial matters. Ibid, p. 101. For a review of the broader evolution of the *Casa´s* authority in legal cases see E. Schafer, *El Consejo Real y Supremo de las Indias, Su historia, organización y labor administrativa hasta la terminación de la Casa de Austria, Tomo I: Historia y organización del Consejo y de la Casa de la Contratación de las Indias* (Sevilla 1935), especially pp. 19-20.

[287] Joseph de Veitia Linage, *The Spanish role of trade to the West Indies: Containing an account of the Casa de Contratación. Written in Spanish by D. Joseph de Veitia Linage . . . . Made English by Captain John Stevens* (London 1702), pp. 36, 85, 123. Veitia Linage´s original work was published in Seville in 1672, with its English translation undertaken on the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession.

"all Force and wrong doing", further denouncing "whatsoever League, Confederation . . , which doth or may impugn against this Peace and Concord". Specifically included was the revocation of all commissions and letters of marque to take prizes or conduct reprisals. Criminal punishment was sanctioned for offenders, as was the requirement to make "restitution and Satisfaction for the Losses to the Parties damnified".

Of critical value to Great Britain had been the stipulation of the treaty formally conceding the possession of "any part of America" then held, which provided tacit sanction for her possession of Jamaica. Although the island´s strategic location was instrumental in England´s lucrative commerce across the Atlantic and the Caribbean, the treaty also attempted to maintain Spain´s monopoly over general commerce with her own American holdings. Allowed safe haven to seek shelter and harbour, ships of both nations were nevertheless required to stay no longer than the pertinent Governor or Chief Magistrate would allow. The conduct of illicit trade, a continuing and perverse condition, remained expressly forbidden. "The subjects of Great Britain", the treaty declared, "shall not sail unto, and Trade in, the Havens and Places which the Catholique King holdeth in the said Indies".[288]

The arrival and establishment of the Scots on the Isthmus was regarded by Spain as a direct assault on her sovereignty and a breach of the stipulations of the 1670 treaty. The February 1699 acquisition of prisoners, trade goods and incriminating documents resulting from the beaching of the *Dolphin* in Cartagena provided a wealth of both evidence and defendants to submit to the judicial arm of the *Casa de la Contratación.* The arrival the

[288] NA, SP 113/6, Item 27. Item 27 constitutes a copy of the *Treaty of Madrid with Spain*, signed in July 1670. According to Jean McLachlan illicit commerce from Jamaica to the Spanish Indies "was inconsiderable" between 1667 and 1700. `Documents Illustrating Anglo-Spanish Trade between the Commercial Treaty of 1667 and the Commercial Treaty and the Asiento Contract of 1713´, *Cambridge Historical Journal*, Vol. 4:3 (1934), p. 308. Based on the numerous concerns and activities documented by both English and Spanish officials and merchants, many of whom are referenced in the previous chapter, it is doubtful they would have agreed with the statement. A strong argument countering McLachlan and surveying the reasons for the proliferation of the contraband trade is provided in Curtis Nettels, `England and the Spanish-America Trade, 1680-1715´, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. III:1 (March 1931), pp. 1-32.

following month of an embassy from New Caledonia demanding the return of the ship, her cargo and her crew, coupled with threats of reprisals should satisfaction not be forthcoming, prompted a Council of War consultation and the immediate refusal on all counts by the Governor of Cartagena. It was further decided that the prisoners should be submitted to Sevilla for trial to "give account to Your Majesty". Four individuals, Captain Robert Pincarton, Captain John Malloch, pilot James Graham and the boy David Wilson were designated to be transported, with the remaining surviving men to be distributed to supplement the crews of Spanish warships currently in the port.[289]

From his prison cell, Pincarton had received word of the first abandonment of the Darien colony in June and had petitioned the new Governor to either free his men and himself or allow them to depart for one of the English islands. In response, Pimienta had told him that the former Governor had given such a bad report of the Scottish Vice-Admiral and Councilor that release was not possible and that he would be remanded to Old Spain. As promised, the three men and one boy were dispatched in September to Havana aboard an advice boat, recently fitted with the guns from the *Dolphin*, to initiate the long journey back across the Atlantic. Upon their arrival in Cuba they found themselves again imprisoned and in irons.[290] It was also in Havana that they experienced an unanticipated reunion with the translator for the Company of Scotland, Benjamin Spencer, whose abandonment by his comrades and subsequent confinement and interrogation is discussed in Chapter 3.

---

[289] The explanation of the decision to send the prisoners to Sevilla is included in a report submitted to Madrid by the new Governor of Cartagena, General don Juan de Pimienta, following his arrival in that city 8 June 1699. Pimienta also described the receipt of numerous documents from the emissaries of New Caledonia which had demanded the return of their men, as well as a suspicious request by Admiral Benbow to intervene both through acquisition of the prisoners and his offer to mediate a settlement. AGI, *Santa Fé* 79, Testimony of Governor Pimienta prepared August 1699. The chronic challenge of high mortality aboard ships in the Caribbean is addressed by J. R. McNeill in *Mosquito Empires* (Cambridge 2010). The author specifically cites the failure to attack New Caledonia prior to February 1699 as a condition of the decimated Spanish naval crews. Ibid, p.113. The acquisition of trained, experienced mariners from the *Dolphin* would have presented a welcome opportunity to supplement personnel.

[290] Burton, *The Darien Papers*, pp. 102-103.

The consolidated group of five defendants would next be boarded onto the homebound fleet of General of the *Guarda Costa*, don Martin de Aranguren Zavala. Zavala, with his flagship *San Ignacio* and her two escorts, had arrived from Veracruz intending to proceed to Cartagena and on to expel the Scots from Darien. As word arrived in Havana corroborating initial reports of the abandonment of New Caledonia the relevance of the orders was reassessed. Deciding to take advantage of the new circumstances, Zavala instead sailed for home on 2 October.[291]

[291] Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XXIX, pp. 338-339. (General Zavala to the Crown, 11 January 1700). Although Zavala only identifies that he is taking five Scots from Darien back with him to Spain, the English Consul in Cadiz, Martin Westcombe, identifies the prisoners by name in his January 1700 memorial to the *Casa de la Contratación.* NA, SP94/212. Chapter 6 further discusses the role of the *Guarda Costa*.



Figure 3: The Long Journey Home: Cartagena, Havana, Cadiz, Sevilla

Source: J.H. Elliott, *Spain and Its World 1500-1700* (New Haven 1989), frontpiece.

Two days out of Havana communication with an unidentified ship from Jamaica requesting information about the prisoners would concern the *Casa de la Contratación* sufficiently that inquiries about the vessel would enter the questioning in the subsequent trial. The prisoners, who were held aboard a ship other than the one communicating with the unfamiliar vessel, reported that they could identify the ship´s construction as being

English, but that they had no knowledge of the content of or motivation for the dialogue that transpired. John Malloch did report that the ship, which he recognized from the river in London, appeared to be that of Captain David Breholt.[292]

Evidence indicates Malloch´s identification was correct, and that Breholt´s actual mission would have been of high interest to the Spanish had it been revealed. The *Carlisle* had recently been active across the Caribbean, being documented in Montserrat in August prior to joining a chase after a pirate off St. Thomas on the seventeenth of the month.[293] Entries in the log of the *Falmouth,* one of Admiral Benbow´s fleet, note that in the first days of September, the *Carlisle,* a merchant ship commanded by "Boryholt" had sailed "being bound on A Spanish wracke that lyes off of the Havannah".[294] Admiral Benbow also acknowledged the vessel, writing to Secretary of State Vernon that he had sailed from Jamaica in September in company of the *Carlisle* "in order to countenance Captain Brahoult who was going also on a wreck which was cast away two years since off the Havana with great treasure. We all sailed together".[295] Although no documentation indicates any direct relationship with the Scottish prisoners, the inquiry made by Breholt is intriguing. Certainly the English captain may have known Pincarton or the other men through their earlier mercantile careers and he would have heard while in Jamaica of the plight of the prisoners. It may have been significant that Pincarton himself had experience recovering Spanish treasure, having served as boatswain for Sir William Phips during an expedition to the Caribbean during the late 1680s. At the least, the incident is illustrative of the informal yet intricate communication networks that existed across the Caribbean and the Atlantic.[296]

---

[292] AGI, *Contratación* 5726A, *Ramo* 2, ff.182v-183r, 213r-214r, 236r-236v, and 255v-256v. The questioning of each defendant regarding the identity of the vessel testifies to the concern of the Spanish over marine traffic generally and specifically any potentially related to Company of Scotland activities.

[293] Headlam, *CSP, Colonial, 1699*, Item 880 ii, p. 480. `Journal of Captain Barker´s Cruize in the Speedwell, August 6-October 3 1699´.

[294] NMM, ADM/L/F/28

[295] Headlam , *CSP, Colonial, 1699*, Item 907, p. 503.

[296] The reference to Pincarton´s earlier experience salvaging Spanish treasures is found in Herries, *A Defence*, p. 36. For an account of Phips´ activities see E. Baker and J. Reid, *The New England Knight* (Toronto 1998). Whatever Breholt´s full agenda, he would continue

Apparently without additional unusual events, the homecoming fleet and her cargo of detainees sailed into Cadiz in mid December, where the five New Caledonia veterans would once again find themselves placed in irons.[297] Their presence soon came to the attention of the port´s English consul, Martin Westcombe, who took up their cause and wrote to the Marquis of Narros, President of the *Casa de la Contratación,* pleading that the men had not been "found in the exercise of any thing that was prohibited, but were only sailing to the parts of the dominion of the King of Great Brittain with marchandizes of their own manufacture". The service of the prisoners on board the *San Ignacio* during the Atlantic crossing was cited, informing the Marquis of their "being the most forward on all occasions of danger that offer´d in the whole course of the voyage". This initial diplomatic effort requesting the men´s release realized only an oral reply, relaying that no resolution would be forthcoming without the King´s order.[298] Nevertheless, the activation of involvement by Consul Westcombe and his deputy, a Scot named James Chalmers,

---

to attract official attention. On 10 June 1700 Governor Nicholson of Virginia wrote to the Council of Trade and Plantations "Last night William Clay, master of the *Endeavor* of South Carolina, who is arrived in York River, told me that Captain Breholt, commander of the *Carlisle,* 36 guns and 120 men, who had been tried for piracy in South Carolina some time before and acquitted, sailed out of Ashley River about March 26, came to anchor without the bar, landed on Sallevard´s Island, and there killed a great many cows, hogs and goats, the best of which they carried on board. He told Captain Clay he designed either to sail for Smith´s Island in Virginia, to get some provisions, or else to Cape de Verd. I have no doubt you will put HMS *Shoreham* in a condition to cruise as soon as possible, and hope you may take this Captain Breholt." C. Headlam (ed.), *CSP, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1700* (London 1910), Item 523 xv (11).

[297] Burton, *The Darien Papers,* p. 103. The five Darien survivors were not the only arrivals to face questionable circumstances. General Zavala would come under suspicion and experience a short imprisonment by the *Casa de la Contratación* when he failed to complete his entry documents or allow the requisite inspection. The matter was compounded by several accounts of French and English launches ferrying materials from his flagship on a moonless night. Zavala responded that, due to his rank and status, he was not subject to the *Casa´*s jurisdiction and that the launches were only bringing foreign officers to express their congratulations on his successful sail, an action for which he was compelled to provide appropriate hospitality. AGI, *Indiferente* 2015 (unfoliated), report prepared by the Marquis of Narros, January 18, 1700. The failure of Zavala to complete his own reporting while conducting whatever other activities he was undertaking appears to have created a delay in bringing the arrival of the prisoners to the attention of the *Casa*.

[298] J. Grant (ed.), *Seafield Correspondence from 1685 to 1708* (Edinburgh 1912), p. 292.

instituted what would become continuing efforts to mitigate the prisoners´ conditions and seek their release. Immediate benefits were liberation of the men from chains and the instigation of communication with the Company of Scotland, the men´s families and the English Secretary of State.[299]

Despite the seemingly positive steps, however, the prescribed examination by the *Casa´s* judicial arm proceeded. At the end of March 1700 the men, still accompanied by the boy David Wilson, were again put in irons and loaded into a small boat for the trip up the Guadalquivir River to Sevilla, where the *Casa´*s own jail and the case against them and the Company of Scotland awaited.[300] The log of the royal prison documents their arrival in custody of boat owner Diego Gomes in April 1700.[301] The long reach of Spanish justice had retrieved the Scottish dream of a trading empire in Darien and presented it before the jurisdiction of the formidable and experienced *Casa de la Contratación.*

ADJUDICATING THE DREAM OF EMPIRE

---

[299] The Company of Scotland submitted the sum of fifty pounds through their representative in London for the subsistence of the prisoners, along with documents intended to assure the Spanish court of their lack of any criminal intent or activity. NAS, RH4/135/1, entries for 3 February and 20 Feburary 1700. In their eventual written testimony to the Company of Scotland, Captain Pincarton and James Graham would specifically cite the assistance of the Cadiz consuls, writing that "we cannot, in gratitude, but say, that Sir Martin Westcombe, the consul in Cadiz, and his vice-consul, Mr. James Chalmers, our countryman, were very generous and kind to us in all respects, and by letters prompted the consul at Seville to appear in our behalf and engaged to free him of all damages, and clear him of all charges upon our account". J. McCormick (ed.), *State papers and letters, addressed to William Carstares, confidential secretary to K. William during the whole of his reign: Relating to public affairs in Great-Britain, To which is prefixed the life of Mr. Carstares* (Edinburgh 1774), p. 678. Declaration of Captain Pinkerton and James Graham, 4 January 1701.

[300] Burton, *The Darien Papers*, p. 103. Recognizing the need to accommodate more than twelve prisoners, provide for more sun and light and better lodge its often "rich and esteemed" detainees, the prison had been relocated in 1611 to a purposefully constructed extension adjacent to the *Casa de la Contratación*. J. Gil-Bermejo Garcia, `La Casa de Contratación de Sevilla (Algunos Aspectos de du Historia)´, *Anuario de Estudios Americanos, XXX* (Sevilla 1973), pp. 43-45.

[301] AGI, *Contratación* 4887, *Entrada de Presos.*

The trial took place in Sevilla throughout the months of April and May 1700,[302] punctuated by short recesses: translation services were secured from Benjamin Pitis, an Englishman and Catholic living in the city[303] and Joseph Moreno, appointed as a special legal guardian for defendants David Wilson and James Graham due to their minority ages, was given time to prepare the defense of his clients.[304] Once the initial examination of expedition translator Benjamin Spencer was completed, presiding Judge Manuel de la Chica ordered that the prisoners be restricted to separate quarters and prevented from communication with each other and outsiders.[305] Each prisoner was brought twice before the tribunal to testify and outside witnesses were also solicited, notably Captain Don Bartolome Antonio Garrote of Sevilla, aboard whose advice boat the prisoners had been transported from Cartagena to Havana.[306]

The critical importance of the study of the trial record, however, rests in the lines of questioning undertaken during the dual examinations of each prisoner. These themes of interrogation (here identified as 1. *Exploring the Intent to Invade the Dominions of his Catholic Majesty*; 2. *A Question of Trade*; and 3. *Indicting the Company of Scotland*) indicate what were considered by Spain to be the most critical aspects of the Company of Scotland initiative. They also illustrate the efficacy of intelligence gathered and transferred across Spanish institutions to reach inclusion among the points of inquiry pursued by the judges of the *Casa.* Lastly, they explore the intent of the Spanish justice

---

[302] Notably, information conveying the arrival at New Caledonia of the second Scottish expedition would be received in Spain from a variety of sources by May 1700. AHN, *Estado* 702/20 and AGI, *Panamá* 165, ff. 575r, 583r and 586r.
[303] AGI, *Contratación* 5726A, *Ramo* 2, ff. 50r-51r.
[304] Ibid, ff. 110r-113v. Graham had testified that his age was twenty-three and a half years, while the court age of majority was twenty-five. The eleven-year-old David Wilson explained to the court that he couldn´t take an oath to tell the truth because he didn´t really understand what it meant and that, according to his religion, an individual must be eighteen years old before doing such things. He clarified his inclusion with the men by testifying that his father, who had been the boatswain aboard the *Dolphin*, had died in the hospital while in Cartagena and he had no mother nor anyone to look after him in his own country. Ibid, ff. 134r-138r, 263r.
[305] Ibid, f. 49r.
[306] Ibid, ff. 150r-158v.

system to seek recompense from the Company of Scotland and its principals, a motivation previously omitted from analyses of the consequences of the Darien expeditions due to the lack of knowledge of the trial record´s existence.

1. Exploring the Intent to Invade the Dominions of his Catholic Majesty

The trio of Spanish judges confronting the five defendants was incredulous that the Scottish fleet could not have known their destination or grasped its critical jurisdictional situation within their King´s American dominions.[307] Why, they questioned Spencer, would anyone sail without knowing their destination? What would happen in the case of separation due to storms or accident?[308] The interrogators could not comprehend how the translator, in light of his testimony that he had worked in customs enforcement while in London, could not have comprehended where the expedition was intending to sail.[309]

When it came to the professional seamen, the disbelief was just as acute. In response to Pincarton´s account of sailing under a series of closed orders to be opened only upon reaching specific destinations, de la Chica and his fellows refused to accept that a Captain claiming over sixteen years of marine experience and holding membership on the seven man Council of New Caledonia appointed in Scotland could not have understood where the fleet was headed.[310] Reiterating ignorance of their final destination within the dominions of the Spanish King, Malloch claimed that, prior to departure, some said they were going to Africa and others claimed they would sail to the Amazon, which appeared to them to be within Portuguese territory.[311]

---

[307] The contention by the defendants that they had not been privy to their ultimate destination would have seemed all the more implausible due to the fact that the Spanish had obtained word of the plan to go to Darien as early as 1697, when a letter submitted from Hamburg transmitted the departure for Scotland of two of the Company´s ships and stated they were intended for an expedition to Darien. AGI, *Panamá* 159, f. 658.
[308] AGI, *Contratación* 5726A, *Ramo* 2, ff. 32v., 56r.
[309] Ibid, f.172v.
[310] Ibid, ff. 53r-57v.
[311] Ibid, f. 218v.

Asked specifically about their understanding of the prohibition against sailing to Spanish territories without express permission, the men claimed a lack of awareness of the law until they had become prisoners in Cartagena and learned otherwise from Spaniards. Pincarton did relate efforts to investigate the populations along the coast near their chosen site to ascertain current jurisdiction, but explained that those efforts discovered only natives and a few Frenchmen, none of whom identified the area as under Spanish control.[312] Pincarton, Malloch and Graham all testified their sole interest in the expedition was their salaries, the Vice-Admiral emphasizing his responsibilities to his wife and family.[313] Malloch admitted that he had recognized from maps the proximity of the site of New Caledonia to Panama, Cartagena and Portobello, but that the local Indians had assured them they were not within lands of the Spanish crown.[314]

The judges also inquired about the military composition of the expedition and the intent and actions to establish a permanent, fortified presence on the Isthmus. Demanding the reason for construction of the armed fortifications of which they had acquired detailed descriptions, the judicial panel received the response that the fort was for defensive purposes only. Pincarton stated to the skeptical judges that the substantial quantity of one hundred cannon had not been intended as offense against the subjects of the Spanish King, but constituted a defense "against pirates, Indians or Spaniards that came like enemies".[315]

Repeating much of the content of interrogations obtained from a wide range of both foreign and domestic sources in Cartagena, Havana, and Portobello, detailed information regarding the military force and composition of the personnel of the expedition was acquired from each prisoner. In addition to the inventory of the ships and their firepower and details of the constructed land defenses, the presence of an engineer was a point of inquiry.[316] Spencer explained that, although the expedition did not include a professional

---

[312] Ibid, ff. 57v-61r.
[313] Ibid, f. 207r.
[314] Ibid, f. 222v.
[315] Ibid, ff. 193r-195r.
[316] The value the Spanish placed on military engineering, particularly in response to the attempted establishment of New Caledonia, will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.

engineer, Captain Thomas Drummond, who had served the King of England for many years in Flanders, had gained knowledge of fortifications during that service and had been put in charge of construction activity at Fort St. Andrew. In response to questions of manpower, the existence of companies of infantry on board the ships, the specific names of their Captains, and the ample complimentary inventory of arms were all detailed.[317] Throughout the entire testimony there was not a single reference to the "planter" moniker discussed in Chapter 2 and established by the Company of Scotland to profess a non-militant motive for its expeditions.

Exemplifying the arrival and review of intelligence from American officials, the reprisals committed by representatives from New Caledonia following the Governor of Cartagena´s refusal to relinquish the prisoners was also a point of scrutiny. The judges asked Spencer why two armed sloops had been dispatched with orders to go along the coast from Portobello to Cartagena and imprison friars or persons of importance to negotiate for the held Scots. Failing to locate appropriate individuals, two barques had been seized carrying corn, hens, sugarcane and beans and the goods transported back to the settlement. Following a reminder of the severity of the crime, Spencer´s defense was that he didn´t take part as he was neither a soldier nor an official.[318]

Expressing particular alarm following intelligence confirming the November 1699 arrival in Darien of the second Scottish fleet, the judges of the *Casa* also probed into the potential future intentions of the Company of Scotland.[319] Spencer, who had retained a presence in

---

[317] AGI, *Contratación* 5726A, *Ramo* 2, ff. 13r-19v, 24v-25r, 61v-66v., 70r-71r., 91r-94r., and118v-122v. Spencer, giving the total population of the colony as 1100, also provided specific testimony regarding the women present on the first expedition, which adds new detail to what has been known regarding its composition. He related that the forty year old wife of William Patterson, their daughter of fourteen or fifteen years, and their maid of approximately thirty all died while in Darien. The two other women on the expedition, both wives of sergeants, had survived to depart the colony with their husbands during the first abandonment of the colony. Ibid. ff. 17v-18r.

[318] Ibid, ff. 181r-182v. For the *Articles of Agreement* pertaining to the reprisals, see Appendix II.

[319] In October of 1699 Governor Pimienta had written the King, recommending occupation of the site of New Caledonia and warning "they may return with greater strength". Hart,

the colony longer than the other four prisoners, could speak first-hand to the intent and conditions of the initial abandonment. They had been seeking refuge in Boston, he related, to resupply and return to Scotland. The decision to abandon the site had resulted from their scant supplies and the absence of any word of the relief convoy that was anticipated from Scotland. They had simply lost hope, particularly after hearing of the proclamations of their own King prohibiting providing them any assistance. New Caledonia´s structures, including 130 of wood and cane, two or three others built to sell rum, beer and other commodities, and the fort had been abandoned as they were because word had been received of forces coming against them and they were not able to defend themselves. Fully one half of the population had been suffering from illness.[320]

Regardless of their continual and prolonged imprisonment, the detainees reported that they had received information on the whereabouts of some of their expedition´s original ships. While in Cadiz they had been told by fellow detainees from England that the *St. Andrew* was in Jamaica, the *Caledonia* in Scotland and the *Unicorn* in New England. Pincarton added that he had heard that it had been published in newspapers that another group had actually returned to Darien.[321]

2. A Question of Trade

At the end of the seventeenth century Spain had not been able to adequately supply its overseas dominions, nor had she been able to effectively halt contraband trade and foreign incursion.[322] In particular, the coastal provinces of New Granada, notably Riohacha, Santa Marta and Cartagena, had become the most important sites within the entire empire for

---

The Disaster, p. 113. Notification of the actual second arrival of the Scots was submitted by the President of Panama to the Crown in mid-January 1700. Ibid, Appendix XXX, p. 340.

[320] AGI, *Contratación* 5726A, *Ramo* 2, ff. 25v, 42v-47r.

[321] Ibid, ff. 48r, 79v.

[322] For a discussion of the interplay between theses economic realities see J.R. Fisher, *The Economic Aspects of Spanish Imperialism in America, 1492-1810* (Liverpool 1997), especially Chapters 6 and 7. Clarence Haring´s *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs* (Cambridge 1918) provides a comprehensive account of the conditions within that shorter time period.

accessing the lucrative illegal Spanish American trade.[323] Considering both Treaty of Madrid prohibitions forbidding subjects of Great Britain to trade within the territories over which it held responsibility, and the unequivocal Company of Scotland effort to construct a permanent base on the strategic site of the Isthmus, the judges of the *Casa de la Contratación* was acutely interested in exploring the commercial intent of its defendants. The extraordinary February 1699 arrival on Cartagena´s beach of the *Dolphin*, the composition of her crew and cargo, the attempts of her Captains to identify themselves as English and fly English colors, and the collection of documents discarded hurriedly into the sea, comprised a strong case substantiating the Scots´ intent to conduct illicit commerce.[324] There was also testimony from Captain Garrote, who had transported the prisoners on the initial leg of their journey to Old Spain, and would provide incriminating evidence substantiating the principal role of Captain Pincarton in the illegal commercial motivations of the Scottish Company.

Not surprisingly, the general story presented by the Scots regarding the *Dolphin´s* mission and trading activities at New Caledonia painted an innocent picture of struggles to maintain expedition participants and denials of pursuing contraband trade. Pincarton declared their linen and wool was destined for Baruada in exchange for much needed provisions. If they were unable to secure the required goods, he elaborated, the *Dolphin* was to proceed to Scotland to give account of their perilous circumstances.[325] Malloch gave the additional information that the *Endeavor*, which he had commanded from Scotland, carried a large quantity of linen while the stores aboard the beached vessel in Cartagena had included white and colored linen, shoes, silks and stockings.[326] In response to questions about plans to establish sugar and tobacco works, Pincarton denied hearing of

---

[323] L. Grahn, *The Political Economy of Smuggling: regional informal economies in early Bourbon New Granada* (Boulder 1997), pp. 20, 23.
[324] In *A History of William Paterson and the Darien Company* (Edinburgh 1907), author James Barbour appears to substantiate illegal trade when he writes regarding the arrival of a sloop in New Caledonia from Jamaica and the purchase of its cargo by the Councilors, followed by its dispatch "to trade upon the Spanish coast", p. 105.
[325] AGI, *Contratación* 5726A*, Ramo* 2, ff. 77r,v. "Baruada" may refer to either the island of Barbuda (see Figure 2), today part of the country of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados or Bermuda.
[326] Ibid, f. 94v.

any such intentions, but Graham divulged that he had indeed heard that such plans were under consideration.[327] Graham also related that he hadn´t witnessed any commerce during his brief months at Darien except for limited barter of shirts and old coats to the native population in return for bananas and other agricultural products.[328] The men did admit that a Dutch ship had entered their bay seeking refuge from the presence of the *Barlovento* fleet, one or two vessels had come from Jamaica to fish for turtle, a French ship was obtaining wood and water, and yet another arrival from New England had brought supplies of wheat and salted fish.[329] Clearly, New Caledonia was attracting an international interest.

The testimony of Captain Don Bartolome Antonio Garrote presented a contrasting portrait of the objectives of the *Dolphin*. The Captain, a resident of Sevilla, informed the tribunal that he had received orders from the Governor of Cartagena to take four prisoners to Havana and forward to the Governor there the request that his passengers remain confined until they could be transported on to Old Spain. He testified that it had been public knowledge that the Scots had been frustrated by their failure to instigate trade with the coastal areas of Santa Maria and Panama. Furthermore, attributing the information to other prisoners in Cartagena, he had been told of Pincarton´s high position within the Company of Scotland and that he had expended up to 80,000 pesos[330] toward the preparation of the squadron and that the goal of the enterprise was to establish itself in Darien and pursue trade with the Spanish territories of Tierra Firme and Peru. Towards that end, he continued, the Scots were to dispatch small ships to the Darien River and penetrate into trading markets with the inland cities of Popayan and Antioquia, both part of the Spanish territory of New Granada.[331]

---

[327] Ibid, ff. 81r,v., 128v.
[328] Ibid, f. 127r.
[329] Ibid, ff. 71v-72r, 98r, 124r.
[330] An 80,000 peso investment would have been precisely the amount paid in 1702 to acquire the position of the treasurer of the mint in Lima, Viceroyalty of Peru. C. H. Haring, *The Spanish Empire in America* (New York 1947), p. 271.
[331] AGI, *Contratación* 5726A, *Ramo* 2, ff. 152v-154v. Garrote´s testimony is undermined by his own controversies with the *Casa de la Contratación*. In December of 1699 he was required to make his own declaration as to the reasons why he had not completed his

The incriminating testimony was corroborated by Captain Philipe del Real, who had served in Garrote´s squadron. The mariner, who resided across the river from Sevilla in the community of Triana, stated his acquaintance with the defendants. Not specifying his source, he said he had learned during the transit from Cartagena to Havana that the establishment of the fort in Darien was to facilitate trade with New Granada, Tierra Firme and Peru, but that the Scots had been motivated to abandon the site due to its harmful climate.[332]

As the defendants were brought forth for their second round of examinations, they were probed both on the damning information acquired from the Spanish naval personnel and further on the intent of the Company of Scotland to pursue contraband trade. The latter was substantiated, they noted, by the specific appropriateness for the Spanish West Indies of the trade goods the *Dolphin* was transporting. Although the judges were primarily investigating the commercial intent of the Scots, their auxiliary evaluation regarding the suitability of the cargo is in marked contrast to the general criticism and even ridicule that has been assigned to the product inventory throughout the Darien historiography. Given the cumulative concern shown by the *Casa,* which for two hundred years had administered the governance and commerce of Spain´s American dominions, reappraisal of the degree of criticism leveled at the Company´s cargo is warranted. Further, without clear definition of the intended market, which was the base of the arguments made in Sevilla, an accurate evaluation of the suitability of the cargo cannot be effectively undertaken.[333]

---

necessary documentation and had veered away from the convoy under General Zavala, instead entering the port of San Lucar. AGI, *Indiferente* 2015, unfoliated. Garrote´s conflicts with the *Casa* appear to have been habitual, as evidenced by continuing accusations of using his advice boat to transport unregistered cargo. AGI, *Indiferente* 316 (*Papeles sobre el caso de Don Barme. Garrote*, 29 November 1701).

[332] AGI, *Contratación* 5726A, *Ramo* 2, ff. 159r-161r.

[333] Michael Fry, exemplifying the criticism, writes in *The Scottish Empire* (Edinburgh 2001) “English proclamations might have made no difference had the Scots carried with them goods that traders wanted to buy” (p. 29). Douglas Watt addresses the issue in *The Price of Scotland* by noting that the “image of vessels carrying useless wigs and bibles has proved a powerful one, influencing historians down to the present day,” but counters that assessment with the explanation of the small per centage of the total cargo that these

Spencer, for instance, was again demanded to explain why, since the linens, wigs, lumber, staves for making pipes and woolens that were on board the *Dolphin* were commodities regularly traded to the West Indies and not to Africa or Asia, he could not have determined where the fleet was destined, particularly with his customs experience. He responded that the expectation of the Scots had been to trade with English, Dutch and French, but not with Spanish. He flatly denied knowing anything about trade with Panama or Santa Maria, only that the *Dolphin* had been ordered to Baruada. The textiles they were transporting, he elaborated, were intended for Jamaica, the Baruadas and Montserrat, all territories of the English King. In response to the specific accusations leveled by Captain Garrote, the linguist reiterated his claim that he knew nothing of plans to trade with Spaniards. Cautioned by the judges to tell the truth and reminded of the Company of Scotland documents obtained and submitted to them by the Governor of Cartagena, Spencer maintained his stance that, although the Company had been created with the sanction of the Scottish parliament and the King of England, they did not expressly say where a colony would be established, only that it would be in Asia, Africa or America in territory not held by any European prince.[334]

Pincarton was recalled, told that he would be required to submit testimony for a second time, and given a review of the grave consequences provided for breaches of the treaty of peace between the Spanish and English Kings. He was also reminded that the importance of his dual positions of Vice-Admiral and Councilor made him privy to the highest levels of decision-making by the Company of Scotland.[335] Apprised of the information acquired from Captain Garrote, which was said to be originally provided by the very men he had sailed with to Cartagena on the *Dolphin*, he was asked to explain his substantial 80,000

---

ridiculed products comprised (pp.122-123). Even Walter Herries provided commentary, writing in his 1701 pamphlet that "the cargo was improper for a West India Trade (it being taken up from all sorts of Tradesmen and Artificers . . . in lieu of their subscriptions)". *An Enquiry*, p. 28. It appears that there are actually two separate points to dispute, one regarding the suitability of the cargo chosen for trade and the other the control (or lack thereof) of fraud at the point of embarkation in Scotland.

[334] AGI, *Contratación* 5726A, *Ramo* 2, ff. 172r-180r.

[335] Ibid, ff. 188v-191v.

peso investment in the Company, particularly when he had claimed ignorance of the destination of the fleet. Forcefully denying the accusations, Pincarton claimed he had no funds other than his salary, especially since he had lost two ships to France during war between that country and England, having been imprisoned and his goods confiscated both times.[336] Now, with the *Dolphin* in Cartagena, he had again lost everything. Furthermore, he had not even heard of the places known as Antioquia and Popayan until this very hour. He claimed complete ignorance of any motivation to trade with Santa Maria or Panama and reiterated that they had been sailing to Baruada when they were forced to run onto the beach near Cartagena.[337]

Garrote´s accusations were also presented to Malloch and Graham. The former flatly denied having said ten words to the Spanish Captain during the passage from Cartagena to Havana and claimed the major portion of the merchandise they transported was for the squadron itself, with the wigs, woolens and shoes to be utilized as trade goods for the English islands.[338] Graham´s response was to explain that the goods they carried could be used everywhere and were to be sold in English and Dutch islands.

3. Indicting The Company of Scotland

The accusation of illegal trade had not been admitted to by any of the prisoners, but the *Casa* was well aware of the larger organization behind the four men and one boy held within their walls. In turning its attention to testimony regarding the composition and authority of The Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, the judicial body

---

[336] The prisoner was referring to the Nine Years´ War of 1688-1697. Pincarton´s previous experience included trans-Atlantic sails during the period of conflict, as evidenced by his 1695 petition to include the *St. Jagoe,* of which he was master, in a convoy. NA, T4/7/90. Apparently he was successful, for correspondence the same year, referring to interruptions in marine transport caused by the French, also include the information that the author was intending to sail "by Captain Pincarton, who was lately at Plimoth wayting for convoy." Fritz John Winthrop to Robert Treat, Governor of Connecticut, July 1695, *Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society, Volume XXIV* (Hartford 1932), pp. 104-107.
[337] AGI, *Contratación* 5726A, *Ramo* 2, ff. 204v-209v.
[338] Ibid, ff. 225r-228r.

of the *Casa de la Contratación* initiated an effort to secure redress far beyond the persecution of the five operatives held in Sevilla. The judges acknowledged that Pincarton´s role as Vice-Admiral and Councilor identified him as the highest ranking among the men held in their custody and the accusations leveled by Captain Garrote indicated a position of greater influence than the prisoner would admit. While the Scot´s actual status and orders would remain a point of contention, it was also well recognized that there were more elevated personages and an association of financial backers supporting the establishment of New Caledonia. With their accumulated documents and intelligence in hand, the judges sought to gain additional evidence to pursue their case against the parent organization that had brazenly attempted to establish a permanent presence in Darien and secure influence over the broad territory of the Isthmus and its strategic position as the narrowest point between the waters of the Atlantic and the Pacific.

The pursuit of information regarding the Company of Scotland corporate structure was understandably largely directed at Pincarton, who had admitted early in his testimony that he had heard from his wife that his employer was actively soliciting King William for the men´s release. Asked for the specific names of those who comprised the authority of the Company as it was formed and sanctioned by the Scottish parliament, the Vice-Admiral and one of seven Councilors appointed in Scotland replied that he only knew that the major part of the nobility of the Kingdom of Scotland was involved.[339] A less elusive response was forthcoming from the young pilot James Graham, who specifically identified the Duke of Hamilton, Lord Panmure and the Marquis of Tweeddale as among those instrumental in Company affairs, although he too related wide participation among Scottish nobility. The widespread support had also been described by Spencer, who when asked to relate the number and status of investors, responded that there were between 150 and 200, including some women. He couldn´t recall their names, but included among them was a wide range of individuals, from dukes, marquises, and counts to merchants and tradesmen, all from Scotland.[340]

---

[339] Ibid, ff. 80r-81r.
[340] Ibid, ff. 34v-35r.

During the second round of testimony the judges returned to identifying principals who had founded and funded the corporation. Pincarton explained that none of them present in Sevilla had been party to forming the Company, nor did any of them hold any financial interest in it. The Governor of Cartagena had in his possession a document, printed in English, which listed all the subscribers and the amount they had invested, as well as a copy of the patent received from the King of England sanctioning the Company.[341]

Signaling an official Spanish recognition of the credibility of King William´s claims of ignorance of the Scot´s intent to establish themselves in Darien, Pincarton was reminded that the Company´s activities were not only an offense against the Spanish Crown, but that the enterprise had simultaneously represented an offense against its own King. Why, the Vice-Admiral was asked, had they continued the occupation of their colony and construction of homes and fortifications when their own King had issued the proclamations prohibiting any form of assistance or interaction with them? To this accusation Pincarton could justifiably respond that they were unaware of the proclamations when they left Scotland. Perhaps the news of them had been one of the motivations for abandoning New Caledonia, but he could not say as he had been a prisoner in Cartagena during that time.[342]

The remaining prisoners were also questioned both about the founders of the Company of Scotland and Pincarton´s specific status. Malloch reiterated that none of his comrades before the *Casa,* including Pincarton*,* were among the names on the list he had read of individuals establishing the corporation. In rebuttal to the accusation that Pincarton had

---

[341] Ibid, ff. 203v-204r. These and other documents had been widely disseminated by the Council of New Caledonia in their effort to seek recruits and validate their undertaking. Copies of the pertinent Act of Parliament and Letters Patent had been personally submitted to the Governor of Cartagena in March 1699 as part of the unsuccessful embassy to recover the men and goods of the *Dolphin.* NLS, MS Adv. 83.7.4, ff. 157-158. The various documents are found included as attachments to correspondence throughout the applicable files of the Archive of the Indies, reflecting the acquisition and dissemination of the same materials throughout Spain´s governing institutions, both in Europe and in the Americas. As discussed in Chapter 3, documents thrown into the sea during the running aground of the *Dolphin* had been retrieved by the Spaniards during the chaos of that Sunday afternoon.

[342] AGI, *Contratación* 5726A, *Ramo* 2, ff. 210r-213r.

80,000 pesos invested in the enterprise, Malloch declared that it was totally false, for he had known the Vice-Admiral for many years and he knew that his personal fortune had never reached 2,000 pesos in all his life.[343] Graham testified that he had never heard of any of his companions having any part in the establishment of the enterprise, nor Pincarton investing even a maravedi. As for the proclamations from their own King, the pilot said he too had only heard of them during his imprisonment in Cartagena.[344]

The weeks of questioning finally came to a conclusion with the second deposition of eleven year old David Wilson, still accompanied by his court-appointed advocate Joseph Moreno, on 15 May 1700. The youth was pressed about what he may have heard from his father or others about the designs and interests of the Company of Scotland. Sounding confused and anxious, likely echoing the emotions of the four men who had accompanied him across the Atlantic, the orphaned boy simply said he didn´t know or hadn´t heard anything about the matters.[345]

DEATH SENTENCE, DELAYED RESPONSE and LINGERING CONCERN

It could have been no surprise given the content and tone of the court´s proceedings when, at the end of June, came the sentence from the *Casa de la Contratación* substantiating all negative predictions. For their crime of having

> gone from the said Kingdom of Scotland to the country called Darien, with a squadron of five ships of war, carrying various articles of

[343] Ibid, ff. 228v-231r.
[344] Ibid, ff. 251r-255v.
[345] Ibid, ff. 257r-266v.

> merchandise, and for having built there forts and houses, and committed other acts mentioned in the report . . . we must pronounce them guilty on these heads.[346]

Pincarton, Malloch, Graham and Spencer were all condemned to death, David Wilson being excepted and liberated on account of his age, but being prohibited from ever returning to Spain´s dominions in the Americas. The time and manner of the four executions were to be determined. All goods belonging to the men, as well as the *Dolphin* and her cargo, were to be confiscated. The sentence was to be immediately dispatched to Governor Pimienta in Cartagena so that he could forward to Spain the proceeds from the sale of the ship and goods as expeditiously as possible.

The judgment also addressed the broader scope of culpability . . . .

> The Duke of Hamilton[347], Lord Panmure, the Marquis of Tweeddale, and others of the kingdom of Scotland who, although subjects of the King of Great Britain, formed without his permission a company to promote this armed settlement in Darien, Panecop (Pennecuik), commodore of the said squadron and other naval and military captains together with several other officers, as well as the members appointed as a board of the said company who embarked in the said squadron, all mentioned in the records of the said trial, and those who remained in the kingdom of Scotland, who are all worthy of punishment for so detestable an outrage, it has been ordered to the end that the good understanding between the crowns of England and Spain, which all the above accused have violated, be maintained, that there shall be drawn up a duly authenticated copy of the records proving the truth of these accusations, to be transmitted by the Lords of the Privy Council to the Spanish ambassador . . . to be communicate in the name of the King our Lord to the King of Great Britain, and that the said Minister make urgent appeal to his Majesty of Great Britain to order his Councils, Parliament, or other Courts of Justice to punish in an exemplary manner the said culprits, representing to him the great damage this outrage has caused the crown of Spain, and the

---

[346] Grant, *Seafield*, p. 296.

[347] As mentioned in Chapter 2, a dispatch from London had erroneously stated that the Duke of Hamilton had been appointed "Governor-in-perpetuity" of the Scottish colony. AGS, *Estado* 4183. To its credit, the Spanish Council of the Indies doubted that an individual of the Duke´s stature would have been issued such a responsibility for so uncertain and unproven an enterprise. MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 41 (English translation of a *consulta* from the Council of Indies to His Majesty, September 9, 1699).

> inconvenience which will result to the whole of Europe if they are allowed to go unpunished. We also command that an account be made out in all the departments concerned of the whole expenses we have been obliged to incur in this kingdom by reason of this invasion, for the outfit of the squadron sent to Darien and to the Golden Islands to subdue them, and all the other expenses incurred in consequence, and that these accounts with the above proceedings be presented to his Majesty of Great Britain, to the end that he may order his councils and Courts of Justice to charge them to the said Scottish company, so that we may receive from them complete and just satisfaction, and that the result of the efforts made by our Minister together with these proceedings may enable the King and the Ministry of War hereafter to resolve what may be most fitting for the service of his Majesty.[348]

The situation in Sevilla had been closely monitored from Company of Scotland headquarters in Edinburgh,[349] but the eventuality of the sentence created a new intensity of concern. The Court of Directors had submitted fifty pounds for the use of the prisoners and forwarded requested documents, also specifically requesting to its appropriate committee that "by any means an Extract of the Process against them be required and

---

[348] Grant, *Seafield*, p. 297. An abstract of the sentence is also available at NLS, MS70, ff. 141-142. The *Casa* further directed criticism towards Governor Pimienta, maintaining that he should have proceeded on his own with punishing the *Dolphin´*s officers and crew, citing the fact that "the audacity of foreigners is increasing daily in the Indies for want of enforcing the appointed penalties". A recommendation was submitted to the King that an official reprimand be issued against the Governor who, as yet unknown in Sevilla, had successfully orchestrated the capitulation of the second Scottish expedition approximately two and a half months earlier. Ibid, pp. 297-298.

[349] The prisoners had continued their correspondence initiated from Cadiz, pleading from their cells in Sevilla that "Our declarations are taken, and their determination is by some dubious, by most thought it will be hard, and we fear the event . . ." Ibid, p. 288. The families of the defendants had also been active in pursuing assistance. Henry Graham of Brackness, Robert Malloch, Merchant in Glasgow, and Mrs. Pincarton prepared a "Humble Petition" to the King´s High Commissioner and Parliament on behalf of their men "taken Prisoners at Cartagena, and now prisoners at Cadiz, and now again sent prisoners to Sevila". They claimed their family members had been detained "for no other reason, but for their being found imploy´d in the Service of the said company and their Colony" and implored the recipients to "put His Majestie in Mind of the Said Prisoners". They reasoned that through "the earnest care used for their Liberation, others in time coming will be more encouraged to engage in that Noble Design, and move cheerfully and readily List themselves in that Company´s Service". NAS, PA7/17/1/23.

obtained if possible to be transmitted hither".[350] After struggling to conduct business due to the inability to attract a quorum, the sentence imposed by the *Casa* was formally considered 20 August 1700. Two hundred additional pounds of credit was dispatched to a merchant in Spain and a trio of officials, including the now officially indicted Marquis of Tweeddale, was designated to call upon the Secretary of State for Scotland, Lord Seafield, to ascertain the status of a previously promised letter from King William soliciting the freedom of the prisoners.[351]

While the Company labored to obtain a quorum, international diplomatic efforts to secure the release of the five prisoners had been implemented at the highest level. King William had been warned of mounting discord in Scotland and the need for intercession. *The Edinburgh Gazette* for the week of 11 to 15 July 1700 had contributed to the public´s outrage through its publication of letters from the condemned prisoners, one of a stream of articles keeping its readership informed of events.[352] The combined ferment over the proclamations prohibiting assistance to the Darien expeditions and threats to the men held in Sevilla had prompted the Treasurer-Deputy in Edinburgh to write to the King´s confidential minister, William Carstares, providing the warning "You may be assured this does not a little blow the coal here".[353]

Lord Seafield also struck the alarm, appealing to his fellow Scot Carstares to intervene with their monarch. News of the men´s death sentence had been received from Spain and "if they suffer death, it will certainly much increase the ferment in Scotland". He further advised the Secretary "when you speak of this matter to the King, do it with great concern, and I am hopeful his letters may yet come in time".[354] Writing also directly to the King, Seafield tactfully reminded his sovereign of previous promises to solicit the men´s freedom and the urgency the death sentence implied. The Secretary for Scotland had consulted, as

---

[350] NAS, RH4/135/1, entries for 9 and 16 July 1700.
[351] Ibid, entry for 20 August 1700. The account for the prisoners´ use was established through one Robert Anderson, a merchant in San Lucar. NLS, MS 70, f. 210.
[352] NLS, RY.II.BS, f. 36. Additional articles relating to Darien are found in ff. 21 and 31.
[353] McCormick, *State Papers*, p. 554.
[354] Ibid, pp. 558-559. Seafield was in Whitehall when he received the news and wrote from there to Carstares, who had apparently departed to join the King at Loo.

directed, with Secretary of State Vernon, who had promised to write to Spain on the prisoners´ behalf and also to "yor Mty for further orders".[355] The following day Seafield wrote again, forwarding numerous entreaties for intervention, including one from the father of the condemned John Malloch and another from the Council of the Company of Scotland stating that a letter from the King would save the men´s lives. Seafield again expressed that he feared the action may come too late, simultaneously requesting his monarch´s pardon for "trobling you so often for the same thing".[356]

In Spain, King William´s consular corps, hampered by the current vacancy of their Ambassador in Madrid, had not ceased in their own efforts to free the prisoners. From Sevilla in early July Consul Robert Godschall wrote Secretary of State Vernon that he had prepared and submitted an appeal, but that the previously promised letter from the King was required to secure the men´s release, for "they will suffer if they have not the Pious interposicion of His Mjty".[357] Consul Westcombe added his own concerns from Cadiz to an unnamed recipient later in the month, acknowledging his receipt of information that the case had been forwarded to the King and adding that Pincarton and his men were still incarcerated.[358] Even the British resident in Brussels, Jacob Aceré Marmande, was requested to assist through his position in the seat of the Spanish Low Countries. He was

---

[355] Grant, *Seafield,* pp. 304-305.

[356] Ibid, p. 305. While mounting discord in Scotland is addressed by historians, the specific dilemma of the men´s trial and impending execution is not given a high degree of attention. Riley does not mention the situation in *King William and the Scottish Politicians*, nor do Whatley and Patrick in *The Scots and Union*. While Mathieson does mention the "irritation" caused by the King´s refusal to personally receive a memorial on behalf of the men, the emphasis is on the King´s denial of the messenger and not the fate of the men themselves. *Scotland and the Union, A History of Scotland From 1695 to 1741* (Glasgow 1905), p. 60. The threat to these Scottish prisoners´ lives, directly impacting their families and associates, deserves recognition for its role in the growing public outrage.

[357] NA, SP 94/212. The letter from Godschall, dated 6 July 1700, indicated that David Wilson, regardless of his exemption from the sentence, was still in the *Casa´*s custody.

[358] Ibid, 13 September 1700.

directed to approach ministers in the city to advocate with Madrid, cautioning them that "an execution may be long kept in remembrance".[359]

The combined campaign finally resulted in action by King William from his Court at Loo on 22 July 1700. In a letter to his "Most serene and potent Prince, very dear brother and cousin, . . . His Most Serene and Potent Prince Charles the Second" the King of Great Britain wrote

> We doubt not that your Majsty has heard what has recently happened to our Scottish subjects, how by agreement with your Majesty´s governor of Carthagena they left the country of Darien, how a short time before one of their ships sailing thence for other parts of America was cast ashore in the neighbourhood of Carthagena and was wrecked, and how those on board, when they repaired to the above-mentioned city to seek help, were seized and thrown into prison, were afterwards transported to Spain and were there condemned to death, and have now appealed to your Majesty´s supreme court at Cadiz for redress. Such is your Majesty´s renowned and known clemency to all men that we most heartily commend to it those our subjects who have been thus condemned for their designs and attempts against your sovereignty, and have already endured such grievous suffering. We believe that, when the condition of these men is known and considered, your Majesty will not hold them unworthy of that clemency. Therefore we have given instructions to our minister, M. Schonenberg, to explain fully to your Majesty their circumstances, and the weighty reasons why their release and restoration to liberty may be hoped for. We persuade ourselves that there will be easy access for his advocacy, and that as all our subjects are now withdrawn from those countries, nothing more remains of that unpleasant enterprise than that those unhappy prisoners may enjoy your Royal clemency and compassion. Such an act so worthy of your Majesty´s noble and magnanimous disposition we well look upon as a singular proof of your Majesty´s goodwill towards us, and we will make suitable return as often as opportunity may arise . .[360]

---

[359] NA, SP 32/12, ff. 52-53. For a discussion of the governance of the Spanish Low Countries at the end of the seventeenth century, see R. Vermier, `How Spanish Were the Spanish Netherlands?´, *Dutch Crossing,* Vol. 36:1 (March 2012).

[360] Grant, *Seafield*, pp. 306-307. Signing the document with King William was Secretary of War Blathwayt.

King William had capitalized on current circumstances to fortify his diplomatic efforts to free the men. The fortuitous recent capitulation of the Scots at New Caledonia had scoured the Isthmus of the Company of Scotland presence. The available expertise of the trusted Franciscus van Schonenberg, envoy from Holland to Spain, provided the required diplomatic stature and experience in Madrid. Secretary of War Blathwayt was assigned the responsibility of soliciting the assistance of the Dutchman, who was entreated to intervene on the understanding that he knew "how these things come about" and, equally critical, the "stir in the world" the intrusion of Darien had created.[361]

While Schonenberg´s skills were put to the test in Madrid, the consular corps was also kept apprised of and included in diplomatic developments. Consul Westcombe was requested to provide the prisoners, at his Majesty´s pleasure, with "all the assistance and succour you can . . . by furnishing them with necessarys and endeavouring their release in the best manner". The Cadiz official was also directed to correspond directly with the Dutch envoy "to bring the matter to resolution".[362]

The coordinated, concerted diplomatic activity forthcoming from Edinburgh, Loo, Madrid, Cadiz and Sevilla, coupled with the fortunate timing and communication of Pimienta´s successful land and sea operation at New Caledonia, resulted in the issue of an order from the Spanish King dated 17 September 1700. Following consultation with his *Junta de Guerra de Indias*[363]*,* the King wrote that, while upholding the seriousness of the crimes and the sentence imposed by the *Casa de la Contratación,* the prisoners would be remanded to the British sovereign for his assured and appropriate justice. The four men

---

[361] Ibid, p. 308.
[362] Ibid, p. 309.
[363] After 1600 the *Junta de Guerra de Indias*, or Council of War for the Indies, had been given jurisdiction over military and naval issues in the Indies. The *Junta* was composed of the President and three members of the Council of the Indies and four individuals from the Council of War of Castile. Haring, *The Spanish Empire*, p. 100. For a discussion of the evolution of the *Junta* see I.A.A. Thompson, `The Armada and Administrative Reform: The Spanish Council of War in the Reign of Philip II´, *The English Historical Review,* Vol. 82: 324 (Oct. 1967)

and David Wilson were officially relinquished to the custody of Consul Godschall in Sevilla 1 October 1700.[364]

Although the rush of international diplomacy had superficially completed a successful course, there remained the lingering concern over potential future implications of the *Casa´*s convictions, either from Spain or from England. The prisoners had been released from their Sevilla incarceration based on King William´s promised custody and dispensation of justice. There had been no pardon or dismissal of charges. The forces behind the Company of Scotland found themselves in a vague and vulnerable legal position, tried and convicted of violating an international treaty, yet receiving no definitive word pertaining to potential future accountability. The anxiety was evident over what legal process, if any, was to be pursued.

Word had been received in Edinburgh via a June letter from Pincarton and the other condemned men of not only their own sentence, but also of the inclusion of the Duke of Hamilton, Marquis of Tweeddale and Earl of Panmure "and whom others of that company" as responsible parties. The *Casa* had stated that the various individuals´ "estates should be confiscated, to make reparations and satisfaction for equipping of a fleet to the Indies, and for all other damages, and their persons to be seized".[365]
Notice of this "droll passage" was submitted to Lord Seafield on the first of August, along with the information that the alarming letter had been seen in the possession of one of the Company Directors.[366] Later in the same month the Secretary of State for Scotland had

---

[364] AGI, *Contratación* 5726A, *Ramo 2*, f. 329r. The King´s command, dated 17 September 1700, and a note signed by Godschall verifying receipt of the men comprise the final documents of the case file in the Archives of the Indies. The log of the royal prison in Sevilla records an October 1700 date of release. AGI, *Contratación* 4887, *Entrada de Presos*. The former detainees were informed by the Consul that they were to be considered prisoners at large until further direction was received from King William. At their request, they were allowed to proceed to Cadiz, where Consul Westcombe told them "he had no order about us, and that we might go what way we pleased". The liberated men and boy arrived in London by 31 October. Burton, *The Darien Papers*, pp. 110-112 and NLS, Adv. 83.8.5, f. 177.
[365] McCormick, *State Papers*, p. 533.
[366] Ibid, p. 586. The Advocate to Lord Seafield, Edinburgh, Aug. 1 1700.

arrived in Edinburgh and could assess the situation for himself. He wrote to Carstares at the end of August describing his estimation of the various factions in the Scottish parliament . . .

> What connects and unites the opposing party is that resolve concerning Caledonia; and the argument they use is, that, if the right of Caledonia be not declared, the directors themselves are not safe from being prosecute; for they have got information that the King of Spain will apply to the King, that it may be so . . .[367]

The findings of the *Casa de la Contratación* had clearly caught the attention of Company of Scotland management and investors, who proceeded to seek protection for themselves from what was considered a viable threat. Seafield remained in Scotland, attempting to resolve conflicts expected to infest the upcoming session of parliament, yet thwarted by the cloud of the Spanish sentence. Writing again to Carstares he reiterated the concern . . .

> The great point that they stick upon, is still that matter of Caledonia; and they say plainly, that, unless the King and parliament declare their right of Caledonia, the managers may be prosecute; and that therefore their safety depends on the doing this. I am of opinion, that there should be an instruction for passing some act for the security of the managers and directors of the company; but I cannot particularly condescend upon the words of the instructions . . . until I advise with the rest of his Majesty´s servants.

He also included a word of caution that "should they carry a vote upon us in this, it is like it might unite them in other particulars. . . . . you may let his Majesty know what I have written".[368]

---

[367] Ibid, p. 629. Earl of Seafield to Mr. Carstares, Edinburgh, August 30 1700.
[368] Ibid, pp. 650-651. Lord Seafield to Mr. Carstares, Cullenhouse, Sept. 17 1700. For a discussion of the broader political situation in Scotland and the failed campaign to seek sanction for the Darien initiative, see Riley, *King William,* pp. 134-138 and Whatley and Patrick*, The Scots,* pp. 172-175, 186.

A defensive campaign was also being waged from within the Company of Scotland. On the 7th of November letters were read before the Directors from both Consul Westcombe and Pincarton. While they awaited the arrival of their Vice-Admiral in Edinburgh, it was decided to express written gratitude to the Cadiz diplomat, at the same time requesting that he procure and send the process against their convicted representatives.[369] Failure to bring home these same legal documents issued by the *Casa* was also one of the five concerns Pincarton and Graham were asked to explain in a written deposition they submitted to the Directors of the Company on 4 January 1701. They wrote that the Consul in Sevilla had told them that obtaining copies of the records would be costly. When the men had pressed the issue and told Godschall that funds would be forthcoming from Edinburgh they were further advised

> . . . He could not understand for what end we required it; and that, in regard it might give jealousy and raise ill blood, he would not appear in it, without a special order from the King his master, or from the English Secretary of State.[370]

Contentious sessions of the Scottish Parliament held during 1701 witnessed heavy discord over preparation of an Act designed to assert the "our Right to Caledonia". Despite the efforts of the Duke of Hamilton, the submission of the draft to the King, declaring . . .

> that the said company´s colony in Darien, on the continent of America, was a legal and rightful settlement, precisely in the terms of the act of parliament and letters patent, by which the said company was established, and doth hereby ratify and confirm the same; and his Majesty and the estates of parliament will assist and support the said company in the lawful prosecution of the rights thereof, and protect them in the full and free enjoyment thereof . . .

was refused. The unsuccessful contingent of Parliament cited that only with the King´s assertion of the legality of the settlement could the Company and its participants be

---

[369] NAS, RH4/135/1, Vol. 2, minutes for 7 November 1700.
[370] Burton, *The Darien Papers*, pp. 110-112.

protected from prosecution. Otherwise, they remained subject to accusations of being "unjust invaders of the dominions of another nation".[371]

By July the Company of Scotland had sought an alternative path toward legal protection by presenting a petition to the Privy-Council in Edinburgh for their concurrence of an address to the King. The document, subject to delays designed to effect its dismissal, required that no treaty be concluded with either France of Spain until the latter "acknowledges the company´s right to Caledonia, and make up all their losses".[372] The campaign continued into the reign of Queen Anne, when it was again unsuccessfully petitioned that treaties be withheld until reparations could be acquired for "great losses and damages sustained by the injuries and violences of the Spaniards".[373]

The repetitive and unrequited pleas from Scotland testify to the vulnerability, whether perceived or actual, of the Company of Scotland and its individual constituents to prosecution by the King of Spain. Although the degree that the liability was exploited, particularly during negotiations toward the Treaty of Union of 1707, cannot be defined from available records, it remains a factor meriting consideration. The inclusion in the Treaty of the Equivalent, providing compensation for financial losses incurred pertaining to Darien, went a long way to assuring its passage, but the reality of continued influence over individuals, particularly those such as the Duke of Hamilton with estates to protect and finances in need of constant replenishment, maintained a tempting susceptibility ripe for manipulation.[374]

Spain´s administrative and financial commitment to pursue legal redress for Scotland´s ill-fated attempts to create a permanent trading establishment in Darien provides its own

---

[371] McCormick, *State Papers*, pp. 679-680, 684-690.
[372] Ibid, p. 702.
[373] NAS, GD26/13/119, Petition to the King by the Council-General of the Company of Scotland, 28 July 1701.
[374] T.M. Devine, *The Scottish Nation* (New York 1999), pp. 12-15. Devine particularly notes on page 14 the various inducements received to assure approval of the Treaty of Union, writing "the promise of favours, sinecures, pension, offices and straightforward cash bribes became indispensable to ensure successive government majorities".

eloquent testimony to the vital importance the Spanish Court assigned to the incursion. The scant scholarly attention given to the judicial effort, understandable due to the previous lack of knowledge of the trial record, can now shed additional light on the entire multi-national story of the Company of Scotland. The judicial reach of Spain did literally extend across the Atlantic to transport operatives of the Scottish enterprise back to the Old World and place them before the tribunal of the *Casa de la Contratación* to answer to violations of the Treaty of Madrid. The resulting international diplomatic effort to avoid execution of the defendants in Sevilla spread across Europe and culminated in direct correspondence between the Kings of Spain and Britain.

The unintended consequences precipitated by the five ships sailing from Leith in 1698 were, however, in no way halted by the eventual release of the prisoners to the custody of King William´s consular corps. The lingering threat of prosecution by Spain, unresolved through any assurances of immunity, loomed over the Company of Scotland and its investors and administrators, influencing continuing conflicts following the final capitulation at New Caledonia. Spanish justice had asserted itself on a major scale and created its own reciprocal intrusion into the affairs of the nation which had sought its own dream of empire.

CHAPTER 6

VIEW FROM THE AMERICAS I
FROM LIMA TO EAST JERSEY

> On the 14th of July of the current year 1700 common joy came even before dawn, the public rejoicing in the city of Lima being aroused by the merry peal of the bells. This was commenced at the Cathedral at half past one in the morning, and was followed by other churches and chapels, and by religious institutions. The joyful sound was so unseasonable and so untimely that it led people to believe that without doubt it portended good news to the city and to the country on the day of St. Bonaventure, news that might dispel the fear that reigned in their minds lest there should be a repetition within the same year of the earthquake that last year, on the same day and with a slight difference in the time of day, had violently laid the city in ruins. Soon the news spread of the success that the army of His Majesty had in the dislodgement of the Scotch.[375]

The celebratory reaction undertaken in Lima to the final departure of the Scots, far distant geographically from the site of New Caledonia, was one of many responses across the Americas provoked by the Company of Scotland´s attempt at colonization. From New York and New Jersey to Jamaica and the Caribbean and throughout Spanish America there were numerous and highly-varied unintended consequences resulting from the enterprise. Although the vast majority of scholarly effort, including the previous chapter of this work, has been directed at exploring events in Europe, this chapter and the one following will, respectively, establish the substantive legacy of the Company of Scotland across the broad swath of the Americas and, more specifically, within the region of Darien. Although New Caledonia would not survive it would produce both short and long-term consequences disproportionate to both its longevity and the size of its land-base. While Scotland would experience its own sociopolitical convulsions following the failure of the Darien expeditions, the Americas would witness a panorama of political, social and economic impacts resulting from the intended colony as the region struggled to maintain peace and economic viability.

---

[375] Anonymous, *Gazeta*, p. 1. The preparation and distribution of the *Gazeta* in Lima, seat of the Viceroy of Peru, testifies to the importance of the events it relates. The first appearance of such a printed document had occurred in 1594, when news was dispersed regarding the capture of Richard Hawkins, the English privateer. Although such *Gazetas* usually extended up to four pages, the edition quoted here ran double that length. It was not until 1793 that Lima would have what became the first daily newspaper in America. Haring, *The Spanish Empire*, pp. 230-231.

The examination of these impacts on the western side of the Atlantic also provides additional explanation for the critical concerns expressed by the judges of the *Casa de la Contratación* during the trial examined in the previous chapter. Not only was the attempt to establish a colony on the Isthmus perpetrated at a time of palpable fear within Spanish America resulting from both a series of foreign raids and local unrest, but it also incorporated the unprecedented merging of two vital factors. Firstly, New Caledonia was conceived to be a permanent and armed community and, secondly, its designated location placed it within the most strategic and valued geography bridging the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. The implementation of the plans of the Company of Scotland to establish and maintain international commerce from a fortified location upon the mainland dominions of the Spanish King constituted the gravest of threats to an already precarious order, simultaneously offering the promise of opportunity to old enemies and new allies.

There was also the inseparable matter of religion, which would prompt comment from as far away as Boston and Rome and provoke the Papal Court to impose financial responsibilities on Catholic churches from Mexico City to Lima for over a decade. Nor were the religious conflicts limited to those between Catholicism and Protestantism. There would be an exacerbation of existing Jewish-English merchant struggles in Jamaica, coupled with attendant Spanish-American concerns over a Jewish presence within the Scottish undertaking.

The impacts of the Scottish expeditions to Panama were, therefore, not limited to the royal courts of Spain or England, or to mercantile houses from Edinburgh to Lisbon, or to the halls of justice of Sevilla. This chapter will demonstrate that the Company of Scotland´s short-lived attempt at permanent colonization in the strategic heart of Spanish America reverberated across the two American continents, imposing a myriad of stresses and change into the lives of highly varied societies and institutions.

THE VIEW FROM SPANISH AMERICA-A HISTORY OF OFFENSES

The Scots had unwisely inserted their own expectations into a volatile landscape characterized not only by a history of raiding, but also currently experiencing, as discussed in earlier chapters, a thriving and highly competitive contraband trade penetrating the coasts of the mainland.[376] The depth and extent of the unintended consequences of the initiation of New Caledonia not only added a new cast member to the international high-stakes game of illegal commerce, but it also directly impacted upon local populations. It was the permanent residents who faced immediate threats and disruption to themselves, their families, and their financial resources. Royal officials throughout Spanish America were also well aware that their own appointments and thus their careers could be assigned, tested, threatened, or extended depending on orders issued and performances delivered.

Nowhere were such causes more pronounced than in the case of Cartagena, where the memory of vulnerability and both communal and personal loss was still fresh. It had only been in 1697, the year prior to the arrival of the Scots in Darien, that a joint contingent of the French navy and French corsairs had appeared with a fleet of twenty-six ships, 5000 men and 538 cannon, constituting nothing less than the largest invasion force yet mobilized in the West Indies. Pushing its way into the city´s heavily defended harbour, the combined land and sea operation subjected the port to an initial round of treasure looting, only to be followed by a second wave of plunder when the buccaneer faction returned to compensate themselves for what they considered an unsatisfactory division of the spoils.[377]

---

[376] Exemplifying the pervasiveness of the contraband trade was the report from a returning Franciscan that he had witnessed fourteen foreign vessels trading in the Riohacha vicinity. AGS, *Estado* 3996 (*Consulta* from Council of State to the King, 31 January 1699).

[377] Illustrative of the contemporary complexities of Caribbean realities, the same Governor DuCasse who offered to assist the Governor of Cartagena in ridding the region of the Scots in early 1699 had commanded the corsairs raiding the city in 1697. Galvin, *Patterns*, pp. 64-65 and F.R. Hart, *Admirals of the Caribbean* (Boston 1922), p. 117. Notably, the French scourge, like the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, had been funded by a private enterprise through the collection of subscriptions. Ibid, p. 111. For a discussion of the campaign, and particularly the conflicts between the leaders of the two French factions, see Chapter VIII, `Siege of Cartagena´ in Nellis Crouse´s *French Struggle for the West Indies, 1665-1713* (New York 1966), pp. 212-245. An additional source, providing an explanation of the funding of the expedition and ramifications among the

Among other indignities, Cartagena suffered a hole torn in its cathedral and the flight of much of its population, "many being drowned on the way, buried in the mud and many more dying of hunger".[378] Of those that stayed some were subject to torture as homes and convents were sacked. Among the worst atrocities, committed by aggressors who declared themselves practitioners of the same devout Catholic faith as their victims, was the murder of a friar attempting to prevent the despoiling of a golden crown adorning a statue of the Virgin.[379] The degree of financial loss and fear of future depredations had been so acute that a substantial part of the commerce of Cartagena had moved itself inland to Mompox, where life and economic resources were considered more secure.[380]

The scourge presaged major changes for the city, whose strategic location and expansive, sheltered bay had made it the primary trading center of the Caribbean coast. It had, since its founding in 1533, established itself as the initial entry point for convoys coming from Spain as well as the ships of the *asiento* trade in slaves. Concurrently, it had also evolved into the dominant military, governmental and ecclesiastical center of the region.[381] Although the Treaty of 1670 provided some assurance that English-perpetrated raids such as those of Hawkins in 1568 and Drake in 1586 would no longer occur, there was no equivalent agreement with the French, allowing the population to be terrorized for weeks until spared from permanent occupation by the onset of yellow fever among the unseasoned visiting navy.[382]

British and the Dutch, is William Morgan´s `The Expedition of Baron de Pointis against Cartagena,´ *The American Historical Review,* Vol. 37:2 (Jan. 1932).

[378] Arciniegas, *Caribbean*, p. 240.

[379] Ibid, pp. 240-242.

[380] E. Lemaitre, *Historia General de Cartagena, Tomo II, La Colonia* (Bogota 1983), p. 238.

[381] For an examination of the development and vital role of Cartagena in the region see L. Grahn, `Cartagena and its Hinterland in the Eighteenth Century,´ in F. Knight and P. Liss (eds.), *Atlantic Port Cities, Economy, Culture, and Society in the Atlantic World, 1650-1850* (Knoxville 1990), pp. 168-195.

[382] The decisive role of disease throughout the Caribbean is the subject of J. McNeill´s *Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914.* Specifics regarding the raid on Cartagena are presented on pages 145-147. McNeill stresses that the 1690s witnessed particularly bad outbreaks due to increased arrivals of vulnerable

Cartagena had certainly suffered most recently, but other locations had experienced their own episodes of terror at the hands of foreign intruders. Between 1655 and 1671 a total of eighteen cities, four towns and over thirty-five villages had been plundered, these totals only encompassing locations along the vulnerable and easily accessible Spanish-American coast of the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Many communities had been subjected to multiple depredations, while locations in Cuba, Hispaniola and Central America suffered "innumerable times". After 1671 expeditions against Portobello, Campeche and Cartagena were undertaken, with that year´s January capture and sacking of Panama by Henry Morgan, who had departed Jamaica only a month following signing of the Treaty of Madrid, the most rewarding and renowned.[383]

Regardless of treaties negotiated, the periodic presence of the *Barlovento* fleet and the development of a *Guarda Costa*, augmented after 1674 with *piraguas* specifically designed to monitor coastal and riverine waters,[384] the danger did not cease. As the French raid on Cartagena exemplified, malevolent foreigners came in a variety of categories and

---

populations as well as meteorological conditions conducive to the survival of the larva of *Aedes aegypti*, the yellow fever vector. Ibid, p. 147. The author devotes an entire eighteen pages (105-122) to the virulent cocktail of dysentery, malaria, dengue fever and yellow fever that affected New Caledonia, noting that even veterans of the "years at sea or . . . Flanders´ camps and barracks, both fine environments for improving one´s portfolio of disease immunities" would succumb. Ibid, p.121. Not included in McNeill´s work, but relevant to the critical role of disease in the misfortunes of the Scots, is the documentation of a water-borne outbreak caused by supplies collected at Crab Island, a stop on the way to Darien. Hector McKenzie, one of the surgeons on the expedition, wrote of the universal "general distemper" on board his ship. He noted that the suspected water had been collected from an "unsettled puddle that received it from the adjacent hills, unknown woods, shrubs, plants, etc., and all for the most part in a very deluge of rain". In this case, the Scots likely transported at least one form of contagion with them to their final destination. Letter from Hector McKenzie to Laird of Gleneagles, December 1698, NLS, Adv. 83.7.4., f. 128r.

[383] Haring, *Trade and Navigation*, pp. 249-250.

[384] The *piraguas* were well-suited to deployment in coastal areas as they were flat-bottomed, having a draft of only a foot and a half. They could accommodate a crew of 120 and were typically armed with a single long gun located in the bow and four additional pieces in the stern. Ibid, pp. 256-257. The *Guarda Costa*, initiated in 1633, was composed of ships to be built and maintained within the colonies. Ibid, p. 253.

guises and could operate with or without a sovereign´s sanction, under a variety of financial schemes and regardless of professing a common religion. The Scots were only the most recent in a long line of interlopers whose attempts to share in the financial rewards of the Americas would impose a threat, but their intent to establish a permanent presence in a strategic region recently subjected to a devastating raid raised the alarm to the highest level.

DISSEMINATING THE ALARM, PREPARING THE DEFENSE

In sharp contrast to the pealing of bells portending good news described at the beginning of this chapter, a flurry of frantic dispatches ricocheted across Spanish America and on to Spain in response to reports of the appearance in the Caribbean, and eventual arrival at Darien, of the Scottish fleet. In a remarkably comprehensive report sent from Caracas only weeks prior to the arrival of the first Company of Scotland expedition, Governor Francisco de Berroteran reported to the Conde de Adanero[385] of notice he had received via the Dutch trading entrepot of Curacao.[386] The document related the presence of a fleet of six vessels, identified as English but transporting 1200 Scots, bound to the vicinity of Darien. The convoy "united thither all nationalities and qualities of persons, to make the settlement more populous". The group´s intent was to fortify themselves, with the expectation of the impending arrival of six more ships transporting building materials and equipment. Privileges had been awarded by the King of England, with printed copies of these assurances having been distributed in Curacao, even being submitted to its Governor. The

[385]The Conde de Adanero held the position of President of the Council of the Indies. Schafer, *El Consejo*, *Tomo I*, p. 353. Don Francisco de Berroteran had been appointed Governor of the province of Venezuela in 1692. E. Schafer, *El Consejo Real y Supremo de las Indias, Tomo II, La Labor del Consejo de Indias en la Administración Colonial* (Sevilla 1947), p. 561.

[386] Curacao, acquired by the Dutch in 1634, was strategically situated for trade with the Spanish-American mainland and developed into a key crossroads. Not only were warehouses and provisions available, but the port facilitated communication of intelligence from and between Europe, Africa and the Caribbean. For a discussion of Dutch activity in the South Atlantic, see T. Benjamin, *The Atlantic World: Europeans, Africans, Indians and Their Shared History, 1400-1900* (Cambridge 2009), pp. 251-255.

militaristic intent of the group was substantiated by one of the clauses of the notice, which declared the intruders would make war against the vassals of the Spanish King should efforts be undertaken to interfere with their efforts.

Berroteran then proceeded to elaborate on the hazards to Spain of such an initiative, pointing out that the intended destination of the Scots was within proximity of the gold mines in Darien. Not only would this valued resource, which had previously been raided by the pirate Lorencillo,[387] again be vulnerable, but there was the attendant threat of the introduction of illicit commerce. It would be an easy and logical step to seek to cross to the Pacific and exchange trade-goods for large sums of gold. Again referring to the history of raiding, the Governor reminded Adanero that this had been accomplished by pirates in the past, for the Isthmus was a mere eighteen leagues across. Moreover, the intended establishment of fortifications exacerbated the threat, for it would increase the possibility of occupying Portobello, Chagres and Panama. In response to the severity of the situation, the author explained he was writing also to the Viceroy of New Spain in order that means to check the situation might be deployed from Mexico City. The President of the *Audiencia* of Santo Domingo, the Governor of Cartagena and the President of the *Audiencia* of Panama would also receive the intelligence so that appropriate responses could be formulated.[388]

Given the distances, topography and means of communication available, the reaction was both swift and dispersed, reflecting the acknowledged severity of the threat. For the same reasons, the response was plagued by lack of uniformity as officials grappled with often

---

[387] Berroteran´s reference to Laurens-Cornelis Boudewijn de Graaf, or "Lorencillo", exemplifies the degree of alarm being communicated. The Dutch pirate, who had served in the Spanish navy prior to becoming a buccaneer, eventually entered the service of the French King. He so terrorized the population of Spanish America that "in the public prayers in the churches Heaven was invoked to shield the inhabitants from his fury". C. Haring, *The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the XVII Century* (New York 1910), p. 246, ft. 10.

[388] MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 1 (Translation of letter from Francisco de Berroteran to Conde de Adanero, Caracas, November 15 1698), original from AGI, *Panamá* 163.

incomplete and inaccurate information. Strategies were debated, revised and sometimes obstructed as officials sought to justify their actions and decisions, or lack thereof.

Berroteran had indeed dispatched the information to the Count of Monctezuma, Viceroy of New Spain, who had previously received confirmation of events from the Governor of Havana. A Council of War had been convened in Mexico City where it was unanimously decided that the *Guarda Costa* fleet of General Zavala, then in port at Veracruz, would be deployed against the Scots. In the midst of preparations, a dispatch was received from the President of Panama, transmitting additional information received from the President of Santo Domingo. Adding to the present emergency was the even more alarming rumor that 4000 of the enemy were anchored off the former Spanish settlement at Rancho Viejo, where they were anticipating reinforcements of six additional vessels, 6000 men, arms, ammunition and livestock.

Despite the growing panic, the arrival of the Spanish fleet from Florida forced a decision. The French had entrenched themselves in Pensacola and it was decided by subsequent Council of War sessions in both Mexico City and Veracruz that the French incursion was the priority. As the months passed, however, the accumulation of new intelligence across the region dictated a shift of strategy. Word had come via Guatemala that the General of the *Barlovento* fleet had been called to Portobello by the President of Panama to assist against the Scots. The vital role of the *asiento* in information-gathering was reinforced when its commissioner in Jamaica, don Santiago del Castillo, reported the presence on that island of Admiral Benbow´s formidable fleet and the naval officer´s confusing assurances that the Scots had acted without the patent or authority of their King. The decision to act against the French was reversed, based on the opinion that the situation in Pensacola "could do less irreparable harm", particularly when English and Scots had been confirmed in the region.[389]

---

[389] Hart, *The Disaster,* Appendix XXI, pp. 299-305. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, General Zavala would proceed with his *Guarda Costa* fleet from Veracruz to Havana, where he would be informed of the first abandonment of New Caledonia, prompting his return to Spain with the five Company of Scotland prisoners. For a detailed discussion of the situation surrounding the Pensacola region, see Chapter 8, `Rivals Face to Face, The

While the Viceroy in Mexico City pursued preparations and debated tactics and priorities within the context of information and resources at his disposal, royal officials more directly threatened also were reacting. Panama´s President, the Count of Canillas, had received word from a French Captain, within weeks of the Scots´ landfall, of both their presence and their intent to establish themselves and make war. Further, the French informant had spoken with some of the indigenous Cuna who had actually been aboard the enemy ships and been offered treaties of peace in exchange for being allowed to occupy the land and construct fortifications. Everything, from women to munitions, had been brought to create a settlement.

In response, the President of Panama called his own Council of War. Notice was quickly sent not only to the General of Portobello, the Governor of Cartagena and the local factor for the *asiento,* but also the Viceroys in Mexico City and Lima. In recognition of the international implications, Canillas also wrote the Governor of Jamaica expressing his concern over the latest developments and "insult".[390] In these and subsequent dispatches, the President also referred to the historical vulnerability of his jurisdiction, the threat to the Pacific coast and his decision to proceed with plans for a land operation while the fleets readied themselves. The Scots had, he reported, been distributing printed invitations

> to their flag the pirate and foreign squadrons and single ships which in large number are off these coasts, it is feared that the strength of these settlers be daily increased by this sort of people, and if the fleet of six large ships, which they expect, arrive, the Windward fleet will not suffice to oppose them, even when joined by Don Martin de Zavala´s vessels and what other reinforcement might be assembled in New Spain.

It was, declared the plans submitted to the King by his President in Panama, a question of preventing "the total ruin of these dominions".[391]

Race for Pensacola Bay 1698-1699´ in Robert S. Weddle´s *The French Thorn, Rival Explorers in the Spanish Sea, 1682-1762* (College Station 1991), pp. 119-134.

[390] AGI, *Panamá* 181, ff. 167r-173v.

[391] Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XVI, pp. 261-282. For the content of the referred to declarations distributed by the Company of Scotland, see Appendix I of this work.

From Cartagena it was Governor Rios who was experiencing the most direct repercussions of the Scottish threat. In the midst of over-seeing seizures of foreign vessels "loitering" along the coast to participate in the contraband trade, it had at first proved challenging to differentiate the gravity of the Scottish activity.[392] As reports began to multiply, including an anonymous warning of the intended "English establishment", along with a list of the suspect vessels, he sent a launch to gather intelligence. While he anticipated its return the compilation of alarming dispatches continued from the Bishop of Santa Marta, the Governor of Portobello and a passenger arriving from Havana and Curacao. Although the informants varied in the quantity of the enemy, there was full agreement regarding their actual arrival and their considerable supplies of munitions and building materials.[393]

Upon the return of the surveillance vessel, which had been thwarted by a Scottish craft on watch, the Governor learned that land clearing had commenced and thirty to forty huts had been constructed. The new information was disseminated to Madrid and fellow royal officials, while, in turn, Rios became informed of plans to initiate a land operation from Panama. Turning his attention to the security of his own jurisdiction, he issued orders throughout his province requiring reinforcements to consolidate in Cartagena.[394] The response was less than enthusiastic, typified by the report that came in from the Captain of Rio de Caucas that "people are escaping without wishing to obey".[395] The Governor complained of the situation to Madrid, adding that his efforts were further undermined by the actions of the President of the *Audiencia* of Santa Fe, who had "detained and embargoed all the appropriations" since the French raid of 1697.[396]

---

[392] MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 8, f. 1r. This document, along with some of its numerous attachments, comprises the English translation of a submittal to the Crown by Governor Don Diego de los Rios y Quesada dated in Cartagena, February 24 1699 and covering events from the previous December. The original is found in AGI, *Panamá* 160.
[393] Ibid, ff. 1r-2r.
[394] Ibid, ff. 2r-2v.
[395] AGI *Panamá*, 215, f. 143v. The forces Rios was trying to activate were generally composed of negroes, mulattoes and mestizos who were poorly equipped and poorly trained, but were intended to function as a militia in the event of emergencies. Haring, *The Spanish Empire*, p. 115.
[396] MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 8, ff. 2r-2v.

Rios was next presented with a request from Panama to dispatch the *Barlovento* fleet, which had arrived in his city, to Portobello to confer over plans to expel the Scots. He doubted the wisdom of the strategy, however, citing the contrary winds and recommending that action be initiated directly from Cartagena. In this he was "unanimously" supported by his Council of War, including the experienced pilots he had summoned to participate. The Governor was also adamant about the necessity of concurrence and on-going communication with the representative of the *asiento*, particularly since that company´s ships remained impounded. A dispute ensued regardless of Rios´s self-professed best intentions and the advice of his Council. The Admiral of the *Barlovento* fleet was determined to proceed to Portobello with the sequestered ships of the slave trade at his disposal. Both the Governor and the *asiento* concessionaire objected, declaring the sail to be unnecessary expense without merit for the campaign.[397]

Suddenly added to the chaos of broad and earnest debate over tactics, funding and deployment, came dubious offers of external assistance. The French Captain Rache was the first to arrive, offering his services against the Scots. Rios had the visiting frigate inspected, recording only subsistence, arms and water on board. Feeling reasonably confident of the Captain´s sincerity he took his deposition, and was told the falsehood that, during the Frenchman´s recent stay in Jamaica, he had witnessed that island´s Governor provisioning the five Scottish ships.[398]

Considering his options amid the rapidly evolving circumstances, Rios likely felt some sort of relief as he arrived at the decision to send the French vessel, under the watchful guise of

---

[397] Ibid, ff. 2v-4r. An attachment devoted solely to the debate between the Governor and the General is included from f. 10v. to f. 13r., ending with the comment that "The municipal council of Cartagena through its commissioners represented to General Pez that the *Barlovento* fleet should remain . . . to protect that place, because it was dismantled, was suffering a serious alarm, and was being abandoned by its population."

[398] Ibid, ff. 4r-4v. The Scottish fleet, of course, had not called at Jamaica. Rache also offered the false information that the Scots had with them dismantled wooden houses "to be nailed together wherever they might settle, and worked stone to erect a port". Ibid, f. 13v.

the *Barlovento* fleet, out of Boca Chica and on to Portobello,[399] thereby ridding himself of two problematic personalities. Any respite, was, however, brief. Within a few days two vessels arrived under the "blue squadron flag of the King of England, a surprising sight in these parts". Admiral Benbow, whose specific interaction with Rios is discussed in Chapter 4, had entered the bay, accompanied by a ship of the slave concession and claiming his mission to be removal of the Scots.[400] Once again the Governor found himself hosting a foreign contingent professing the motive of assuring the failure of New Caledonia.

Understandably, Rios´s report does not present the final release of the *asiento* ships as bowing to pressure imposed by either Benbow or merchants, but it does contain references to Article 22 of the Slave Trade Concession and the Governor´s self-professed responsible compliance with it as the ultimate motivation for permitting the vessels to clear.[401] Quickly returning to the theme of his efforts regarding the Scots, the Governor recounts the day following the English Admiral´s departure, when yet another offer of French assistance reached his hands. This time the communication was from the same Monsieur DuCasse who had conducted the raid on Cartagena in 1697, subjecting Rios to the humiliation that would eventually cost him his position.[402] In his role as Governor of Pitiguao, the Frenchman was now offering munitions, firearms and assistance. He was expecting warships, he informed the Governor, "in which he will come to confer with your majesty´s president of the *Audiencia* of Panama, with your majesty´s Governor at

---

[399] Ibid, f. 5r.
[400] Ibid.
[401] Ibid, unfoliated attachments marked as 175a.
[402] During the siege of Cartagena by the French Rios had been forced to march out of his city at the head of a 2800 man Spanish force, leaving its future to the raiders. Crouse, *The French Struggle,* p. 232. His replacement, General don Juan Pimienta, would be appointed in Madrid in June 1698 but not arrive in Cartagena for an entire year. N. Del Castillo Mathieu, *Los Gobernadores de Cartagena de Indias (1504-1810)* (Bogota 1998), pp. 79-80. It is intriguing to speculate on the degree to which Rios´s actions in response to the Scots were conducted as potential opportunities for redemption following the 1697 humiliation.

Portobelo, and with me, on the best method of expelling this evil people from these parts".[403]

Benbow had departed on the 12th of February 1699 and the letter from Pitiguao had arrived on the 13th, but both events were overshadowed on the 15th with the even more unexpected occurrence of the grounding of the *Dolphin* and the subsequent arrest, incarceration and interrogation of her crew. With the concrete intelligence acquired from the prisoners, Rios was able to inform his fellow officials and his King of the actual conditions at New Caledonia, emphasizing the ambiguities and proximity of foreign interests in the entire affair and the requirement to avoid delay. He would, he assured his correspondents, "take part with all my strength".[404]

Geographically isolated from the Councils of War, debates over tactics and financial arguments was the Count of Monclova, Viceroy of Peru. Although the site of New Caledonia fell within his jurisdiction, he was separated from it by distance and topography. Having previously served as Viceroy in Mexico City, Monclova initially doubted the reports of the Scottish presence[405], although he fully comprehended both the threat presented by New Caledonia and the challenges of a military campaign to check its progress. Universally praised for his personal deportment, honest administration and bravery in battle, the Viceroy had completed three years of service in Lima and, regardless of a campaign by prominent citizens in Mexico City to have him reappointed there, he was anticipating the arrival of his replacement and a return home to Spain. Instead, he found

---

[403] MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 8, f. 6r.
[404] Ibid, ff. 5v-7r. Concurrent with the presence of Spanish, French, and English naval personnel and the slave concession, Cartagena was also witnessing preparation for military action, including provision of casaba bread for the *Barlovento* fleet and continued appeals for additional men to supplement depleted crews. Ibid, attachment designated as f. 18.
[405] Monclova wrote that he doubted King William would risk a war with Spain by sending an enterprise intended to settle a colony. AGI, *Lima* 91 (Count of Monclova to the King, 13 February 1699).

himself in receipt of orders from Madrid, extending his tenure in Peru by three years due to the alarm created by the Scots.[406]

Not only was his anticipated retirement denied, but Monclova was also ordered to personally travel to Panama to command the offensive.[407] Having been initially informed of the presence of the Scots via the December 1698 notice from President Canillas, the Viceroy had responded with 300,000 pesos and quantities of supplies, which he sent by warship up the Pacific coast the following month. A contingent of 500 soldiers was also deployed from Lima to augment existing military personnel in the impacted region.[408]

From his opposite side of the continent, across the formidable obstruction presented by the Andes, Monclova attempted to respond to the responsibilities of his position, the requests for assistance, the changing scope of the situation as the Scots first abandoned their colony and then returned, and the mandate from his King sent July 1699 that he oversee the military response. Although events would eventually negate the need for his presence, he attempted to explain to Madrid the challenges involved with some of its requests. The transportation of the mandated artillery to Cartagena, initiated after the French raid on that city and increased in importance with the arrival of the Scots, for instance, was plagued by

---

[406] L. Hanke, *Guia de las Fuentes en el Archivo General de Indias para el estudio de la administracion virreinal Espanola en mexico y en el peru, 1535-1700* (Germany 1977), p. 307 and M. Moreyra y Paz-Soldan and G. Cespedes del Castillo, *Virreinato Peruano Documentos para su Historia, Coleccion de Cartas de Virreyes, Conde de la Monclova, Tomo III (1699-1705)* (Lima 1955), p. xxiv. Pages xxii to xxx of the prologue to Moreyra y Paz-Soldan´s and Cespedes del Castillo´s work comprise a particularly rich Spanish language accounting of issues pertaining to the Scottish intrusion. The editors describe the state of alarm in Madrid, witnessed by increasingly frequent meetings of the Council of the Indies, the involvement of the Papacy, acute French interest in events, the resulting deployment of resources on both sides of the Atlantic, and communication between Lima and Mexico City. Coupled with transcriptions of significant relevant correspondence, both *Tomo III* and *Tomo II*, the latter covering the earlier years of 1696 to 1698, deserve but have not previously been given a prominent place in Company of Scotland historiography. Although the Viceregal term of office had been stipulated to be three years since 1629, in practice holders of the position frequently served for much longer periods. Haring, *The Spanish Empire*, p. 116.

[407] Moreyra y Paz-Soldan, *Virreinato, Tomo III*, p. xxviii.

[408] Ibid, p. xxvii.

the conditions of the Isthmus, making impractical both land or water transport.[409] There were only three months when land operations could be successfully undertaken with any intent of success due to the great intensity of rainfall the remainder of the year. Attempting to communicate the impact of the vast distances, "which cannot be understood by those who have not been here", the Viceroy explained that they were a serious impediment to coordinating any response among different locations. He illustrated the claim with the case of New Caledonia: he had received on 9 March notice that the Scots had returned to Darien to reoccupy the site. On that very day, he would eventually receive notice 21 July, General don Juan Pimienta and his vessels out of Cartagena, united with those of Admiral don Francisco Salmon out of Portobello, were present off New Caledonia assuring the expulsion of the Scots.[410] No less than "the loss of America"[411] had been prevented.

SUCCESS AND AFTERMATH

Following the humiliating French raid on Cartagena the government in Madrid had decided to replace that city´s Governor. Don Juan Diaz Pimienta y Zaldivar, possessing a lengthy resumé of military experience and family honor, had been named to the position on 17 June 1698. He sailed in the company of Captain Diego de Peredo, 500 infantry, 110 pieces of artillery and munitions, and arms intended to improve both the security and morale of his beleaguered jurisdiction. Pimienta would take possession of the city the same afternoon of his arrival on 7 June 1699. Not only would his presence relieve the disgraced Governor Rios of having to manage the continuing crisis in Darien and pressures

[409] Ibid, p. 64, Count of Monclova to His Majesty, Lima, 2 December 1699. Original in AGI, *Lima* 91.
[410] Ibid, p. 100, Count of Monclova to His Majesty, Lima, 26 August 1700. Original in AGI, *Panamá* 181.
[411] Ibid, p. 92.

related to the thriving contraband trade, but his soldiers, supplemented later by those who arrived with the armada sent from Cadiz to expel the Scots, would appreciably alter the population of a city which had shrunk to 2500 white inhabitants.[412]

In late August the new Governor prepared his report for Madrid, reviewing the conditions he had found upon his arrival, a summary of events concerning the Scots and the status of his original orders to eliminate the threat of New Caledonia. As he had immersed himself in preparing the offensive, he wrote, news reached him that seven prisoners released by the Scots had reported the abandonment of the colony. A vessel sent to verify the news had returned 22 July with confirmation, also providing details on the structures and conditions at the site, including the presence of 400 graves outside the fort and two within its interior. Accompanying Pimienta´s report to Spain were four Scottish prisoners from Darien, being transported in order to provide direct account to the *Casa de la Contratación*.[413]

Pimienta sent the King a duplicate of this same correspondence in early October via a Portuguese vessel headed directly to Lisbon. Included was an update of conditions, reporting the continuing decimation of his troops due to illness and death and pleading for competent reinforcements. He explained that negligence committed in Spain had contributed to the situation, for those manning the ships at departure

> only attend to passengers, traders to whom they sell or grant the favour of a passage to the Indies and who go off to the places whither their interests have brought them, leaving your majesty´s ships deserted, rendering useless the expenses your majesty has incurred on them . . .

---

[412] Pimienta´s troops had been raised largely in Andalucia, particularly Cadiz, San Lucar and Sevilla. Their combined presence with later arrivals under the command of Don Pedro Fernandez de Navarrete would not only markedly increase the census of Cartagena, but would integrate a distinctive Andalusian character into civic life. Del Castillo Mathieu, *Los Gobernadores*, pp. 79-80. The significance of emigration from Andalusia over a wider timeframe is recognized by Carlos Martínez Shaw in *La emigración española a América, 1492-1824* (Colombres, Asturias 1994), particularly in Chapter V, `El Restablecimiento Del Flujo Emigratorio en el Siglo XVIII (1700-1824)´, pp. 163-246.

[413] AGI, *Santa Fé* 79, unfoliated, dated August 1699. The prisoners were Robert Pincarton, John Malloch, James Graham and David Wilson, whose subsequent trial is related in the previous chapter.

The Governor continued with a more current warning. He had received notice that one of the departed ships of the Scots had been in Jamaica and expected that the others were dispersed around the region. He advised the occupation of the site of the colony, for it had been mapped by the intruders during its occupation and it was possible they "may return with greater strength, especially when the measures that are taken in America to repulse any enemy are so costly and useless, as your majesty will have experienced in what happened at Panama with the Windward fleet and land forces opposed to said settlement of Scots at Darien".[414] Of greatest importance, however, were the Governor´s concluding remarks. He had received notice via a sloop from Panama only the day before that two ships of Scotsmen were once again present in their original location. Pimienta was preparing his expedition to confront the situation, but did not waste the opportunity to inform the King of the impact of diverting valuable resources away from Cartagena. He would take necessary troops with him, but "yesterday I dispatched orders for the same number . . . to enter this city as I withdrew . . . I do not exaggerate to your majesty how difficult it is to do this for besides the trouble it costs to drag these troops to anything that looks like fighting your majesty lacks everything here." The Governor included his personal assessment regarding the exploitation of the emergency by the French Governor of Pitiguao

> . . . your majesty will observe that the governors, and particularly this Frenchman with all his offers and all his compliments, are only seeking a

[414] Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XXVII, p. 319. Pimienta is referring to the failed attempt by the Conde de Canillas, President of Panama, to mount a successful ground offensive. The aborted campaign, which had neglected to effectively consider the incessant rainfall and impassable terrain, resulted in the President´s suspension from office in July 1699. Following a review which included the dire situation of the Scottish return, he would be reinstated in December of the same year. Gallup-Diaz, *The Door*, pp. 139-140. Pimienta´s attitude toward his fellow official in Panama could not have been helped by the latter´s correspondence to the new Governor of Cartagena dated 22 September 1699, in which he chided "evils will follow the return of the Scots to the place they had settled, they finding it in the same condition in which they had left it notwithstanding the repeated requests that my clear duty and solicitude have made to your Excellency to be pleased to have it demolished should have been sufficient for it to have been done." Hart, *The Disaster*, p. 114. The failed land offensive, which had taken place prior to Pimienta´s arrival, is addressed more thoroughly in the following chapter.

> way, be it under the pretext of driving away Scotsmen from Darien (though hard) or of cleaning these seas, to get into our ports loaded to the brim with merchandise."[415]

Pimienta´s identification of the opportunity seized by the French to ingratiate themselves with the Spanish and his concerns over unchecked illegal commerce, both exacerbated by his necessity to deal with the Scottish threat, provide evidence for two of the major immediate impacts of the attempt to establish New Caledonia. Not only would merchants, legal and otherwise, be free of the Governor´s interference while he commanded the situation in the Bay of Caledonia, but the same man who had participated in devastating Cartagena two years earlier was in active pursuit of obtaining redemption through offers of military assistance.

Regardless of the impacts of his absence, the reemergence of the Scots demanded a definitive response and Governor Pimienta initiated his expedition against New Caledonia on 12 February 1700. He departed Cartagena in the squadron of Governor don Diego de Peredo, with whom he had transitted the Atlantic the previous year. A vital addition to the contingent, signifying the critical status of the campaign, was the military engineer Juan de Herrera y Sotomayor, who had just arrived from Havana and been entrusted with overseeing the construction of trenches and bastions.[416]

---

[415] Ibid, Appendix XXVII, p. 321. The accuracy of the Governor´s assessment is reflected in the fact that, during the very month he dispatched his letter, the Archbishop of Milan, Papal Nuncio to the King of Spain, was presenting an offer of French assistance to assure the expulsion of the Scots. AGS, *Estado* 3091, (*Consulta* from the Council of State to the King, October 24 1699). Although Pimienta´s actions would render the offer unnecessary, its formal submission provided a significant opportunity for France to mount a campaign towards a more significant alliance. The role of France in the entire Darien affair, referred to here in several chapters, merits its own body of research.

[416] Del Castillo Mathieu, *Los Gobernadores*, p. 80. As Pimienta departed a letter to him from the King dated 11 January 1700 had been dispatched, notifying the Governor of the existence of yet another Scottish fleet and ordering him to do everything possible to eliminate the threat. AGI, *Panamá* 113, *Ramo* 3.

The tribulations and eventual success of the coordinated effort of forces from Panama, Portobello and Cartagena, well-documented by Pimienta´s diary,[417] culminated in the negotiated capitulation of the Scots on 11 April 1700. The following day a message was sent to Canillas in Panama, conceding the future governance of the site to his discretion and offering him the opportunity to forward word to Spain. In the same dispatch, a request is made that all assistance possible be directed to Don Antonio de Paredes, who is being ordered to "proceed to Lima as fast as he can to inform the Viceroy of the state of this region".[418]

Pimienta returned in triumph to Cartagena on the 8th of May, filing a full report to the King dated 1 July 1700. With the submission he included two maps produced by his military engineer, documenting both the surrounding area and specific site of New Caledonia, as well as the fortifications involved in the recent campaign.[419] There was no opportunity, however, for a respite from any of his duties as Governor. Two activities demanded his immediate attention and energy. With the Scottish threat resolved, the services of Herrera could now be applied in Cartagena, where the repair and strengthening of the city`s defenses became a priority.[420] Pimienta also, as he had anticipated, resumed his attempts to control the continuing and rife illegal trade of his jurisdiction, submitting a report in early October testifying to the "excesses, frauds, and introduction of textiles and negros" by the factors of the *asiento*.[421] There had also been one more requisite negotiation with the Darien Scots. Only two days following his own return to Cartagena the *Hope* from New Caledonia had arrived on one of the off-shore islands with twelve men, seven of them Scots. The pilot, Alan Waugh, spoke Spanish and entered the city to report their presence and their proposal. The small vessel had been taking on so much water and the crew so decimated by illness that they were unable to continue their voyage. An Irish resident of Cartagena was summoned to translate and it was soon understood that the men had agreed

---

[417] An English translation of the diary, cited previously, comprises Appendix XXXI of Hart, *The Disaster*. A copy of the original Spanish version is in AGI, *Panamá* 164.
[418] Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XXXII, p. 394. (Don Juan Pimienta to the Conde de Canillas, 12 April 1700, Reporting the Spanish Victory and the Terms of the Capitulation).
[419] AGI, *Santa Fé* 435, Don Juan Pimienta to the King, 1 July 1700. (unfoliated).
[420] Del Castillo Mathieu, *Los Gobernadores*, p. 81.
[421] AGI, *Santa Fé* 435, Testimony dated 5 October 1700.

among themselves to attempt to sell their vessel and its contents to the Spanish and trade their personal possessions to fund their way home. The *Hope* was deemed unworthy for royal service, but declarations were taken, a full inventory completed, a price negotiated and the men allowed to depart.[422]

Over four months following the capitulation in New Caledonia Cartagena witnessed the arrival of the squadron of Pedro Fernanadez de Navarette y Ayala. The armada had departed Cadiz the 19th of June 1700 and anchored in Cartagena the 18th of August, having been deployed specifically in response to the Scottish threat. Preceded by additional engineers, the introduction of the new force, accompanied by ample supplies, arms and ammunition provided a welcome supplement of personnel and resources.[423] Despite having lost 180 men during the Atlantic crossing and putting 60 into the two Cartagena hospitals upon arrival, Navarette´s remaining contingent of healthy crew members could nevertheless be diverted to substantially improving the region´s defenses.[424]

While disputes resumed between the returned Governor of Cartagena and the *asiento* and Navarette´s fleet had been crossing the Atlantic expecting to engage the Company of Scotland, don Antonio de Paredes reached Lima to report to the Viceroy the 21st of July 1700. He had completed his journey from New Caledonia, across the Isthmus, and down the coast to Lima in slightly over three months.[425] His arrival in the city with the fortunate notice of the expulsion of the Scots, however, was not unanticipated. Pimienta´s emissary had been preceded by a communication through the prosecuting attorney for the Viceregal court of Quito, who had been in Guayaquil and duly forwarded several private notices

---

[422] AGI, *Panamá* 181, ff. 691r-735v, from a collection of documents submitted by Pimienta 27 October 1700.
[423] Moreya y Paz-Soldan, *Virreinato, Tomo III,* p. xxvii. The American utilization of Navarette´s fleet and its resources will be further discussed in the following chapter. As noted previously, the eventual integration of the armada´s men would have long-term impacts on the population of Cartagena. For the extensive challenges faced in Spain during the of mounting of Navarette´s expedition see Storrs, *Disaster?*
[424] AGI, *Panamá* 182, Report of Navarette´s accountant, submitted in Cadiz, 1701, f. 230r.
[425] Moreyra y Paz-Soldan, *Virreinato, Tomo III,* p. xxix.

from Panama recounting the positive outcome at Darien. Thus, even before official word was received, Lima celebrated. The same day the Viceroy received the initial notice . . .

> . . .His Excellency with the Royal Tribunal, the Finance Board and the City Council went to the Cathedral to give Our Lord thanks for such a happy outcome. Accompanied by musical instruments the *Te deum laudamus* was sung, and there was a solemn high mass with exposition of the Sacred Host. After this, he was congratulated by the Archbishop, Tribunal, Councils, religious bodies, and members of the nobility, and he ordered religious services and masses to be conducted and said as acts of thanks. The news was celebrated in all kinds of ways, as it was a victory of the religion and faith against heretics, to the glory of Our King and Lord, the reputation of his arms, and for the peace and purity of these countries, for there should be fear of heretical teachings that might impress the Indians and other uncultured inhabitants.
>
> That night the city celebrated with fireworks and illuminations, the Viceroy Palace, the balconies of the archbishop´s house, the galleries of the Town Hall, and Main Square being all decorated with long candles of white wax. His Excellency ordered that solemn high mass be sung the following day at the Presidio of Callao, and this was done with many artillery salvoes. Said fortress celebrated for three days with bullfights in a ring with parapets. . .
>
> . . .And in order that the due and just happiness resulting from such good news might not be marred by the unpleasant regret for the severe punishment and sad death of three unfortunates who already were in the death house ready to be hung next day, His Excellency, who until then had been inexorable to the insistent pleas of those who appealed to his clemency for their pardon, in commemoration and honor of the happy event saved their lives, commuting the sentence of death to perpetual exile in the Presidio of Valdivia, that they might serve the King in the fortress.[426]

While the pardoned prisoners adjusted to their new circumstances created by the expulsion of the Scots, another confirmation arrived from Quito on the 16th, followed by the entry of the first eyewitness, Paredes, on the 21st. The Viceroy was briefed on the details of the

---

[426] Anonymous, *Gazeta,* pp. 2-3. The forms of victory celebration were reminiscent of those conducted in Madrid following Carlos II´s successes in Catalonia, Italy and Flanders. C. Storrs, *The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665-1700* (Oxford 2006), p. 174.

campaign,[427] which were also recounted in the *Gazeta* for public distribution. Not surprisingly, the printed document emphasized Pimienta´s responsible orchestration of operations, but it also noted the vital supportive roles of the military engineers and the critical intelligence provided by the ample number of deserters, the French, and allied natives.[428] Pimienta´s denial of an earlier offer of peace was related, along with his explanation to the Scots that they were "a company of merchants; that if they were troops of their king he would, and not otherwise, as it would be a disgrace to the troops of his own king".[429] Paredes himself had served as a hostage during final negotiations, hosted by the enemy on one of their ships for twenty-two hours. Other details, some of which are included in the following chapter, included troop movements, the specific placement of cannon, mortars and bombs, the dimensions of batteries and the size of enemy shells. There was a recounting of the negotiations leading up to the final capitulation and the conditions that the agreement contained. Events undertaken to evaluate and relinquish the infrastructure at New Caledonia to Spanish control and deal with those Indians who had allied themselves with the Scots were related. Also mentioned was the role of the "Scotch boy", a servant to Pimienta, who confirmed his loyalty by reporting "he had heard one of the newcomers say that reinforcements of 2200 men and 300 women were to come".[430]

In closing, the account included Pimienta´s later communication that the Scotch had finally sailed from the site on 26 April and a notice had been sent to Spain on the 29th. A contingent of 200 Spanish troops remained behind to secure the site. The final words of

---

[427] Monclova would have been particularly interested in the events and strategies employed, having been awarded his position as Viceroy following an impressive military career. Not only had he served in France, Flanders, Sicily, Portugal and Africa, but he had experienced multiple imprisonments and injuries, including the loss of his right arm, in place of which he had been fitted with a metal prosthesis. A more thorough review of his military resumé is included in the prologue of Moreyra y Paz-Soldan, *Virreinato, Tomo III,* p. vii.

[428] Anonymous, *Gazeta*, pp. 6-7.

[429] Ibid, p. 7. The *Gazeta´*s translation, which comprises fourteen typed pages, contains a wealth of detail not available elsewhere. Like the interrogations of Benjamin Spencer discussed in Chapter 3 and the trial record related in the previous chapter, the document deserves publication for its value in broadening the full understanding of the Company of Scotland within the larger international world.

[430] Ibid, p. 13.

the *Gazeta*, communicating the triumph and power of Spain to the population of Lima at the behest of the Viceroy, reiterated the underlying premise . . . "May the Lord be thanked for all."[431]

FAITH AND FINANCE

In addition to the elimination of the economic and territorial threat the establishment of New Caledonia had presented, the Viceroy was expressing gratitude for the preservation of the Catholic faith. The Council of the Indies, in a May 9 1699 *consulta* to the King had expressed its "great regret and pain" over confirmation of a Scottish foothold in Darien. Citing the dire consequences of allowing the foreign intrusion to go unchecked, the Council wrote "the Catholic religion will perish, which is what will most deeply grieve your majesty´s Catholic heart".[432]

The absolute necessity to protect Catholicism from the heresy of the Scots is well illustrated in the words of the *Gazeta* and the religious nature of the events conducted in response to the capitulation, yet the church did not restrict its activities against such an affront to conducting masses or enforcing royal edicts regarding evangelizing the native population. The Bishop of Santa Marta submitted intelligence to the Governor of Cartagena regarding the first arrival of the Scots that, although incorrect in many details, did provide an additional confirmation of their presence in the region and their intent to establish themselves near Golden Island.[433] The new Bishop of Panama, Juan de Argüelles, had immediately ascertained that "civilization" of the troublesome indigenous groups in his bishopric was hampered by the unrest created by New Caledonia. Having

---

[431] Ibid, p. 14.
[432] MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 13.
[433] AGI, *Panamá* 215, ff. 5v-6r. The submission from the Bishop, which the Governor forwarded to Madrid, related that 3000 men and 500 women, all Scots, had come in English ships to St. Thomas and were operating with the full sanction of their King.

only arrived on the Isthmus in 1699 he nevertheless prepared a "detailed" report to the King following the final abandonment of the colony.[434]

Nor was the church´s role in protecting the faith relegated solely to the provision of intelligence or analysis of events by ecclesiastical officials. A lasting and significantly more concrete affirmation of the degree of concern was witnessed by the financial responsibilities assigned to churches and associated facilities across Spanish-America. Generally exempted from forms of taxation required of secular sources, there was no equivalent prohibition against imposition of the *donativo*, or "free gift".[435] Once the necessary Papal permission was granted to the King, the ecclesiastical institutions would find themselves designated to provide revenue assigned to improve the defenses of Spain´s West Indian dominions. The resulting revenue-producing campaign would last over a decade and its records would state clearly and repeatedly that it had been motivated by the attempt of the Scots to establish New Caledonia.[436]

Pope Innocent XII had, in 1693, set a precedent by creating a subsidy to be paid from the incomes of churches, convents and hospitals in the Spanish Indies for a period of three years.[437] The declared purpose of the fund was the repression of piracy and, although it

---

[434] G. Rojas y Arrieta, *History of the Bishops of Panama* (Panama 1929), pp. 87-90. Unfortunately, Rojas y Arrieta, who himself served as Archbishop of Panama, does not provide the location of Argüelles´s report nor additional information about its content. Numerous searches in the *Archivo General de Indias*, the *Archivo General de Simancas* and the *Archivo Historico Nacional* in Spain have failed to locate the document. Its eventual discovery and study could provide an intriguingly different perspective on events, particularly since the new Bishop was a native of Lima.

[435] The use of the *donativo* was particularly characteristic of Carlos II´s reign, when its value as a revenue source from a specific sector of society for a specific cause was frequently used during periods of armed conflict to satisfy military needs. Storrs, *The Resilience*, pp. 129-134. For an overview of the finances of the churches across Spanish America, see Gabriel Martínez Reyes, *Finanzas de las 44 dioceses de Indias 1515-1816* (Bogota 1980).

[436] A record of the implementation of the *donativo,* spanning the years from 1699 to 1721 is included in the back of AGI, *Panamá* 166, extending from folio 805r to 929v. A summary prepared in 1721 attributes the origin of the fund to the extermination of the Scots from Darien. Ibid, f. 909r.

[437] AGI, *Panamá* 164, f. 17.

initially failed to be implemented, its basic form and function was revitalized in response to the Papacy´s recognition of the threat presented by the Company of Scotland. [438] Not only did the church actively intervene with a warning to the King "that, although the Scotch have abandoned the country of Darien, your majesty should now be more than ever alert"[439], but on July 14 1699 the Pope issued a revision and reconfirmation of the earlier dispensation of one million ducados.[440] The new brief explicitly designated the funds for "repression of the attacks of the Scottish squadrons in America".[441] The King followed with a set of instructions, signifying that the resources were to be used to assist in preparing for war against "heretic Scots that intended to populate Darien" and others who might attempt to occupy or commit hostilities against the American dominions. Accompanying the royal orders were copies of the brief itself, translated from the original Latin and printed for distribution.[442]

The necessary mandates to implement collection of the subsidy, to be comprised of 10% of annual income until the eventual sum of a million ducados would be reached, were prepared in Madrid in duplicate and triplicate for the prelates in the Americas. In addition to their submission to the Archbishops and Bishops for further dispersal, they were also sent to the officials of the Inquisition in the Americas. The geographical extent of the order was vast, ranging from Puebla and Michoacan in New Spain to Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras, Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Venezuela and Lima.

---

[438] Storrs, *Disaster?*, pp. 22-23.
[439] MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 70 (translation of communication from the Papal Nuncio in Madrid to the Crown). Although the letter itself is undated, an accompanying royal order of December 29, 1699 requires submission of the document to the Council of the Indies.
[440] AGI, *Panamá* 166, ff. 805r-v.
[441] AGI, *Panamá* 162, f. 277.
[442] Ibid, ff. 277, 282r. A total of thirty-four printed dispatches were prepared for the various recipients in the Americas. Ibid, f. 299r. Contained in the back of the *legajo* are samples of some of the printed documents.

Florida was also to be included, although the Philippines and the Marianas were specifically exempted.[443]

The impact of the financial imposition across the ecclesiastical communities was expressed by the Archbishop of Lima in a letter to the King, assuring the sovereign of compliance but also describing the intense hardships already faced by diminished sources of revenue. The extreme poverty of the region, he explained, had been exacerbated by repetitive earthquakes over the previous decade, destroying homes and reducing the fertility of the soil, simultaneously causing a reduction in the church´s income of over a third while increasing the demands for assistance.[444] That actual collection of the funds became a challenge can be assumed from the resubmissions of the order that were issued in November 1713 to all the prelates of Peru and their Viceroy.[445] Regardless of the problems inherent in the administration and success of the program, however, its existence continued to be attributed to the Scottish intrusion and the intensity of the threat it had presented, reminding both the population and the church of the continued danger of foreign heretical influences.

AMERICAN VIEWS FROM OUTSIDE SPANISH AMERICA
ENTERPRISING MERCHANTS

Earlier chapters have presented a range of consequences of the Darien initiative in the non-Spanish Americas. From the dispersal of deserters and political discomfort caused the Governor in New York (Chapter 2) to the fears of Governor Beeston that the lure of New Caledonia and rumors of gold would prove irresistible to his island´s populace to subsequent Jamaican efforts to secure valuable military experience from Darien survivors (Chapter 4), the impacts were varied in character and intensity. Indicative of the economic

---

[443] AGI, *Panamá*, 166, ff. 863r-898v. The exclusions were likely designated due to their geographical isolation from the defensive initiatives, designed to protect the coast of *Tierra Firme.*
[444] AGI, *Lima* 520, unfoliated (Archbishop of Lima to the King, 20 November 1701).
[445] AGI, *Panamá* 166, f. 908r.

environment, opportunities for adding New Caledonia to existing trading links, often building on preexisting relationships, caught the immediate attention of Jamaican mercantile interests.

During the first expedition´s October 1698 stopover in St. Thomas to secure a pilot, William Paterson renewed his acquaintance of years earlier with Captain Richard Moon of Jamaica. Convinced to divert from his journey between New York and Curacao, Moon followed the Scots back to the remainder of the fleet anchored at Crab Island, where negotiations for trade were undertaken in the hope of acquiring much-needed provisions. When an accord failed to appear, Paterson warned his fellow colonists of the "ill consequence for us not only to miss such a quantity of good and new provisions, but the report he might give of our goods being overrated would unavoidably be an ill preparative for others". As his pleas had gone unheeded and Moon was preparing to sail, Paterson again approached the Captain with the recommendation "if he and his friends would send us a sloop with provisions from Jamaica, and also come himself as soon as he could, I did not doubt but he would dispose of them to his sufficient satisfaction".[446]

Whatever the specifics of Moon´s subsequent report, the mercantile traffic entering the bay at New Caledonia began to establish itself under the clear motivation of exploring mutual interests. On the 20th of December a sloop dispatched by Moon and under the command of Edward Sands arrived at the colony. Negotiations were successful and the Scottish goods in payment for desperately needed supplies were to be transferred to Captain Moon upon his return to the colony in approximately a month.[447] The return passage to Jamaica also provided transport, and further strengthening of ties and communication, as the colony dispatched its first emissaries to report to the Directors in Edinburgh.[448]

---

[446] Barbour, *A History of William Paterson,* pp. 93-94 (`Report of Matters relating to the Colony of Caledonia, made to the Right Honble. The Court of Directors of the Indian and African Company of Scotland, at Edinburgh, the nineteenth day of December, 1699´, authored by William Paterson).
[447] Ibid, p. 99
[448] Ibid, pp. 100-101. This would have been the same passage that accommodated Walter Herries on his return to England. Moon did reappear as scheduled, along with his owner Peter Wilmot. The Jamaican merchant provided a lesson in Caribbean economics,

Soon after Moon´s departure came the return of Captain Sands, accompanied by a second vessel under one Pilkington, both successfully negotiating the sale of their cargo to the colony. Taking advantage of the Jamaican vessels´ appropriateness for local conditions[449], the men were subsequently dispatched on missions for the colony, the former to hunt turtle and the latter to take a load of goods to trade along the Spanish coast.[450] The latter assignment, reported by William Paterson in his subsequent written report to his Council of Directors, substantiates the intent of the expeditions to indulge in the illicit commerce that was such a great concern to the judges of the *Casa de la Contratación.*

In the second week of February 1699 two additional Jamaican sloops arrived in close succession. Although the principle motivation for the latest visitors was fishing the French wreck in the bay[451], they also carried provisions and were willing to consider a sale, but only in exchange for money, a commodity in insufficient supply in the colony. Regardless of the visitors´ awareness of the serious needs through "the murmurs of the people and other circumstances" they adhered to their stipulations for doing business and retained their cargo.[452]

Captain Pilkington returned to New Caledonia in early March, having experienced little success in selling the trade goods "due to the unsuitableness of the cargo". He also

---

complaining that he could have the goods the Scots offered "as cheap, if not cheaper, in Jamaica," and parting with the warning that he would not sell further provisions at the same price, "complaining that he should be a loser". Ibid, p. 102.

[449] The Company of Scotland had failed to provide the expedition with a single small coasting sloop, a detail which, Paterson would report, put the colonists "in a prison for want of sloops, brigantines, or other good, stiff, windwardly vessels". Ibid, p. 98. The same unheeded deficiency had been noted two years prior to the departure from Leith by Robert Douglas, a Scottish merchant in London. Ibid, p. 99, ft.1.

[450] Ibid, p.105.

[451] The French vessel *Maurepas* had sunk as it hit a rock attempting to leave the bay on the previous Christmas Day. The loss was 24 individuals and a bounty of gold and silver. Among the survivors were the Captain and his Lieutenant, the latter being the Frenchman who played an integral part in the arrest of Captain Pincarton and his crew in Cartagena, discussed in Chapter 3. Insh, *The Company*, pp. 138-139.

[452] Barbour, *A History of William Paterson,* p. 106.

brought the news of the capture of the *Dolphin* and her crew. Both Pilkington and Sands suddenly found themselves hired for a diplomatic assignment which involved transporting a messenger from the colony to Cartagena to demand the *Dolphin* and her personnel. If that mission was unsuccessful, the Jamaicans were both provided with commissions allowing them to commit reprisals.[453] Both vessels and the messenger were back in New Caledonia by the end of the month, communicating the complete failure of the effort and bringing a letter of refusal from the Governor of Cartagena.

The Articles of Agreement with Sands and Pilkington were a clear expansion of contacts with the Jamaican merchant community. Not only did the contracts arrange for hire of the men´s ships, but they constituted nothing short of letters of marque, allowing for shares of any prizes taken and compensation for wounded and disabled men. The document is notable in that it also includes one of the few references to any involvement in the slave trade. The 5th Article, considering compensation for disability incurred during the voyage, assures that "in such case, the same man shall have and receive six hundred pieces of eight, or six able slaves, if so much be made in the said voyage".[454]

Although Paterson´s later report to the Company Directors indicated a poor financial return from the reprisals[455], Walter Herries once again provides a contrasting opinion that intimates illegal and aggressive activity. The surgeon included in one of his pamphlets that Pilkington and Sands "sometimes shared 2 or 300 pieces of eight a man (tho´ little came into your colony´s treasury)" and related that the two Captains ranged along the coast "snapping up every Spanish thing that came in their way".[456]

---

[453] Ibid, pp.107-108.
[454] Ibid, pp. 112-113. See Appendix II for a transcription of the "Articles of Agreement Betwixt the Council of Caledonia and Captain Ephraim Pilkington", signed at Fort St. Andrew, 11 March 1699.
[455] According to Patterson, the reprisal campaign was limited to two weeks and resulted in a single prize, "that of a sloop . . . found riding at anchor . . ., without anybody in her." Ibid, p. 113.
[456] Herries, *An Enquiry*, p. 37.

Regardless of the relative success or failure of their efforts, while pursuing the reprisals the two hired Captains received disturbing news from Jamaica threatening them for involving themselves with the Scots. Upon their return to New Caledonia they informed the colony of the communication and returned to Jamaica, Pilkington promising to send another sloop with provisions and eventually to return himself, accompanied by his family and effects.[457]

JAMAICAN FAITH AND FINANCE

Indications of the discord in Jamaica that greeted Pilkington and Sands upon their return are recorded in the *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica*. A controversy had first been acknowledged on 14 March 1699, when a paper attributed to "Mears and Sadler" was read before the body, resulting in an order to take the authors into custody based on the content being "a great grievance and prejeudice to the island, and contempt of his majestys government". Messengers were dispatched to Port Royal to seize the pair´s books and papers, their boats were to be stopped and Mears was to be confined to close custody without pen, ink or paper.

The cause of the furor was a paper entitled *A Scheme for the improvement and good management of a trade for the Scots colony at Caledonia in America,* effectively a business plan for profitable commerce with the Company of Scotland. It had been signed by Jacob Mears and John Sadler in Port Royal on the previous January 23rd and listed seven points to assure a lucrative trade development:

1) Jamaica had the most to offer the colony, including the supply of provisions and negroes.
2) Jamaica was the most advantageous site for communicating with Europe.
3) The Company of Scotland should assign a factor to reside in Jamaica, securing his protection from the King to assure the Governor would not interfere with his efforts.

---

[457] Barbour, *A History of William Paterson*, p. 114.

4) A sum of cash should be provided the factor so that advantage could be taken of low prices for provisions, liquors and negroes.
5) The Spanish trade would be served by sending large parcels of goods to Caledonia, which should realize substantial profit within a year.
6) Because the Spanish will not conduct trade with the Scots, or anyone who sails under their flag, sloops should be purchased in Jamaica and outfitted with English colours, under English command and include some English crew. The said ships should go to Caledonia, load their respective goods, and proceed on for trade, "by which means neither Spaniards nor any other nations can imagine otherwise than that they belong to Jamaica".
7) The designated factor should be well-acquainted with affairs of both Europe and America, and particularly the Spanish trade, in order to provide the best advice to both the colony and the Company Directors in Scotland.[458]

The investigating committee reported back to the Assembly on 21 March that they had found a letter dated December 1698 that appeared to be a solicitation to become a factor for the Company of Scotland from a Joseph Cohen D´Asvedo.[459] Other evidence included additional letters "in a strange character, we understand not". Further, there was correspondence pertaining to a debt Mears was attempting to recover for a client from a man purported to be a member of the Assembly, a circumstance the investigators thought "it obliged to shew some resentment thereon".[460]

Sadler and Mears petitioned to be heard. Appearing before the Assembly´s Committee of Grievances on 29 March they explained they had discussed supplying the Scots with

[458] NLJ, MS J28L434, *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica, Volume 1*, pp. 190-192.
[459] Early Kingston merchants identified from inscriptions in the city´s Jewish cemetery included one Abraham d´Azevedo, who died in 1722. M. Delevante and A. Alberga, *The Island of One People-An Account of the Jews of Jamaica* (Kingston 2006), p. 20.
[460] NLJ, MS J28L434, entry for 21 March 1698-99.

provisions with Mr. Cunningham[461], who had promised substantial gains. They had also consulted with Sir James del Castillo, the local factor for the *asiento,* after which they had drawn up the controversial proposal. The involvement of Castillo caused additional alarm, and the factor found himself before the committee the following week. He was informed that aspects of the subject document "contained many things reflecting upon his majesty, and that they were directly tending to the ruin of the interest and trade of this island". Told he was considered to be "aiding and abetting", Sir James replied he recalled seeing the paper, but had no hand in creating it. Sadler and Mears were then recalled and informed they were guilty of no less than "endeavouring to subvert and turn the current of the trade of this island . . in contempt of his majesty´s authority and government". They were fined and consigned to good behavior for twelve months.[462]

An explanation of the conflict´s context, indicative of the extent of concern it provoked, was provided by Secretary of State Vernon in a report to the King dated 13 June 1699. Initially the Secretary related several items of troubling news from Jamaica, including "a Scotch agent trying to promote the enterprise". He then addressed a dispute between Jewish and English merchants over access to potential profits in trade with New Caledonia. "The Assembly of Jamaica had taken notice cognizant of it upon finding there was an inclination to give a preference to the Jews", Vernon wrote. He continued, attributing the information to "Herries the surgeon" while criticizing Governor Beeston for "making no mention of any of these particulars".[463]

---

[461] Cunningham was returning to Scotland from the colony as its initial emissary to Edinburgh. Barbour, *A History of William Paterson*, pp. 99-100.

[462] NLJ, MS J28L434, pp. 194-198.

[463] BL, ADD MS 40774, f. 50v. The friction between the two groups of merchants was an on-going source of strife. The Jewish community in Jamaica had, following England´s acquisition of the island in 1655, taken a prominent part in its commercial activity, capitalizing on family connections with Christian converts on the mainland of Spanish America and proficiency in speaking Spanish. Although they could openly practice their religion, they were restricted from holding public office and voting and were subject to special taxation. It is estimated that the Jewish community was taxed at three times the normal level in 1700. M. Arbell, *The Portuguese Jews of Jamaica* (University of West Indies 2000), pp. 13, 41, 44. For further discussion see R. Kagan and P. Morgan (eds.), *Atlantic Diasporas: Jews, Conversos and Crypto-Jews in the Age of Mercantilism* (Baltimore 2009), particularly Chapter 4, H. Snyder, `English Markets, Jewish Merchants

Traces of the debate would also find their way into the highest level of Spanish correspondence and acknowledge concern over religious threat from other than solely Protestant sources. Ambassador to London Canales, who of course was receiving intelligence from Herries, reported his concerns to his King in late August

> What I observe here, sire, is that business begins to assume the aspect of Conquest, and especially the element of the Jews, which element is strong in capital and altogether unchecked by Law, Divine or human.[464]

FORCED ADAPTATION AND ACCOMMODATION

Competition for the New Caledonia trade was soon muted by the issuance of the proclamations forbidding commerce or assistance to the colony and the final capitulation to Pimienta´s forces. Governor Beeston, in spite of Secretary of State Vernon´s insinuations of a lack of zeal in thwarting the designs of the Company of Scotland, was the first to issue a ban in the King´s name on 8 April 1699. Shortly to follow were equivalent orders from Barbados, Virginia, New York, Rhode Island, Massachusetts Bay, East New Jersey, Connecticut, South Carolina, New Hampshire, New Providence and Maryland.[465] In addition to their targeted impact on New Caledonia, the proclamations also affected those that were prepared to trade with the Scots. Inadvertently, they also mapped the geographical extent of interest in the venture. A significant percentage of the far-flung locations issuing the proclamations would receive numbers of survivors, adding an unforeseen and unsolicited contingent of newcomers to their communities.

Due to its location and commercial activity, Jamaica had found itself inextricably tied to the fortunes of New Caledonia. Besides its piqued economic interests, the island also

---

and Atlantic Endeavors-Jews and the Making of British Transatlantic Commercial Culture, 1650-1800´, pp. 50-74.

[464] MHS, Hart Collection, Darien Item 37 (Translation of the letter from the Marquis of Canales to the Crown, August 31, 1699).

[465] Hart, *The Disaster*, p. 154.

served as a communication entrepot between Edinburgh and those coming and going from Darien. Capitalizing on the existence of an established community of Scots[466], the conduit for much of the contact was one Dr. Blair, who is credited with directly corresponding with the Directors in Edinburgh, updating them as to the arrival of relief ships and the acquisition of pilots for the remaining crossing to the Isthmus.[467] Although Blair resided in Kingston, where he had routine exposure to the events of the port and the seat of royal government, a Dr. Stewart residing near the eastern anchorage of Port Morant often provided the first point of contact. As designated in her sailing orders, the relief ship *Margaret of Dundee* made her initial call in Jamaica at that port, from where the Captains sought Stewart and Captain Robertson, "both Scotsmen, who will either come, or send such intelligence to you as they can from thence".[468]

In the aftermath of successive abandonments of New Caledonia, many of the survivors also either transitted through or settled in Jamaica. Following the capitulation, the Reverend Francis Borland would reside for a month in the home of planter Charles Graves. Preaching and baptizing, he moved on to Port Royal, where he was gifted with "things for his voyage" to New England by a lengthy list of residents, including the aforementioned Dr. Blair.[469]

The substantial needs of Jamaica created permanent opportunities for a significant number of other survivors recorded in various histories of the island. According to Dr. Henry Barham´s unpublished work, "many of the Scots came to Jamaica and although they missed of a settlement in Darien they soon found very good ones . . . God be thanked, by

---

[466] Although actual numbers do not exist, Smout et al cite "identifiable concentrations of Scots in Jamaica and Nevis by 1670". T.C. Smout, N.C. Landsman and T.M. Devine, `Scottish Emigration in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries´, in Nicholas Canny (ed.), *Europeans on the Move-Studies on European Migration, 1500-1800* (Oxford 1994), p. 87.
[467] NLS, Adv. MS 83.7.5, f. 152r.
[468] Burton, *The Darien Papers*, p. 307.
[469] University of Edinburgh Library, Centre for Research Collections, MS Laing 262, *Memorial or Diary of Mr. Francis Borland, 1661-1722*, pp. 26-27.

marrying rich fortunes".[470] Douglas Hamilton writes that Darien survivors "swelled the Scottish numbers" of Jamaica and identifies the specific community of Argyll in the western part of the island as dating from the period. At the center of the settlement was Colonel John Campbell, who became a member of both the Assembly of Jamaica and its Council and would entice additional immigration from Scotland "based on kinship and locality".[471]

Charles Leslie, in his 1740 *A New History of Jamaica, From the Earliest Accounts, to the Taking of Porto Bello by Vice-Admiral Vernon,* provides a wider perspective of the arrival of the survivors. He writes of the two ships that reached Jamaica experiencing high mortality, but also that "several lived to make fine Estates in this Place." Among those who thrived were Colonels Guthrie and Dowdall, the former initially employed as an overseer, "but his good Parts could not lie long concealed, he soon raised himself, was distinguished by the successive Governors, and now enjoys a fine Estate, and the first Honours of the Island".[472]

Between the extremes of continuing mortality and marrying great wealth likely existed the majority of survivors. What appears to be one such group, which "ruined in their fortunes and starved out of their possessions, solicited, and, at length obtained, permission to join . . . planters in Jamaica. They established themselves between Bluefields and Luana point; where they may yet be traced at Culloden and Auchindown".[473] The net result was the introduction to a marginally-populated colonial island of a seasoned group of survivors

---

[470] BL, ADD MS 12422, Dr. Henry Barham, M.D., *The Civil History of Jamaica to the Year 1722,* p. 222. Barham also relates a near-tragedy involving the entry into port from Darien of the *St. Andrew*. As the ship was saluted, the magazine on shore started on fire, causing a "bold sailor" to strip off his shirt, saturate it with water, and extinguish the blaze. It appeared the hero got no compensation for his quick response, but his Major later "claimed the deliverance to be his management for with he got the Honour of Knighthood". Ibid.

[471] Douglas Hamilton, *Scotland, the Caribbean and the Atlantic World 1750-1820* (Manchester 2005), pp. 4 and 56.

[472] Leslie, *A New History*, pp. 264-265. Additional information on Colonel Dowdall´s service with the Company of Scotland is provided in Chapter 2.

[473] Rev. G. Bridges, *The Annals of Jamaica* (London 1828), p. 328.

who had expected to settle elsewhere, but now effectively adapted to their unforeseen circumstances. In the words of Governor Beeston, who had expressed his concern over losing population to the Scots, "it is far better they were here to strengthen this country than to go amongst the French or Dutch, where they will be lost to His Majesty on his service".[474]

Although Jamaica witnessed its emergence as a "settled colony" as a result of the Scots´ desperation[475], it was by no means the sole locality in the Caribbean to be impacted. In March of 1700, as Pimienta´s fleet anchored off New Caledonia, a controversy sprang to the forefront of problems confronting Governor Grey of Barbadoes. A George Duncan, the royal official wrote to the Council of Trade and Plantations, had "spoke several seditious words against His Majesty" in the offices of the Clerk. Depositions were taken and a prosecution was undertaken. A "scandalous" book supporting the Scottish right to Darien had infiltrated the island by some "disaffected persons", resulting in the encouragement of several of "the people of that nation to take a greater liberty in talking than is fit for me to suffer". The Governor added that he was confident that the example he made of Duncan would suffice to keep the Scots in order. For his part, the defendant had been declared drunk, but not before expounding his opinion that "the Scotch were as good as the English, no subjects of King William, and that there would soon be a change".[476] From Nevis came alarm of a different claim associated with New Caledonia. Intelligence from the Virgin Islands warned that the notorious pirate, Captain Kidd, was heading to Darien to join forces with his countrymen.[477]

---

[474] UGSp, MS 1686, Governor William Beeston to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 14 April 1699.
[475] Patrick Browne, *The Civil and Natural History of Jamaica* (London 1789), p. 8.
[476] Headlam, *CSP, Colonial, 1699*, Items 245 and 245ii, pp. 133-134.
[477] Ibid, Item 501, p. 276. Captain Kidd, who had been in Madagascar, was not heading to New Caledonia. He would be arrested in Boston, transported back to England and eventually executed. A full account of his activities, providing a contemporary backdrop to the Company of Scotland saga, is available in Robert Ritchie´s *Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates* (Cambridge, Mass. 1986).

Resentment and suspicion would not readily disappear as the Scots strove to integrate themselves into their new communities. In 1707 Governor Park of the Leeward Islands, writing during the War of the Spanish Succession concerning the vulnerability of his small domain, added a postscript with a plan to solve multiple problems

> If the Queen will not spare English troopes, send us Ten Thousand Scotch, this Warm Climate will Meliorate them, and make them of a more Sociable Religion, the Queen need be at no great Expence, only furnish them with arms and Transports, and Some Oatmeal, we will join them with what men can be spared here. If We take Martinique the Queen gains a fine Island, the Scotch shall have the Land, and we will have the Plunder. The Queen ventures little, and may gain the Sugar Trade , This will be a better Project than their beloved Darien, and if they . . . out all Zealous Kirk men, I promise they shall never trouble the Queen´s affairs more, If they do not take Martinique I will get them Disposed of; And I think that will be some Service. [478]

Farther to the north events in Darien had been followed with high interest, not solely of a commercial nature. Judge Samuel Sewall of Boston had been particularly intrigued by the potential religious opportunities the Company of Scotland might create. Writing in his diary that the intentions of the Scots "Makes much Discourse in Town"[479], Sewall offered his own private assessment, reflecting on his firm beliefs relating to the prophecies of scripture, that the "Company of Scotland is the Sixth Angel".[480] He took it upon himself to write to the surviving ministers in New Caledonia, providing his support and concern lest Governor Pimienta, "a Low-Country Souldier, should come upon you while you are few, and not well settled, and somewhat dispirited by reason of the late Dissipation".[481] It was

---

[478] MHS, Hart Collection, MS N-189, (Copy of a Letter from Col. Park, Her Majesty´s Governor of the Leeward Islands, to the Lord Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, St. Christophers, January the 13th 1706/7).
[479] M. Thomas (ed.), *The Diary of Samuel Sewall 1674-1708, Volume 1* (New York 1998). Entry for December 20 1698.
[480] Sewall was also convinced that the dominions of Spanish America were the work of the Antichrist. T. Pears, Jr., ` The Design of Darien´, *Journal of the Department of History of the Office of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.,* (March-June 1926), p. 81.
[481] S. Sewall, *Letter-book of Samuel Sewall, Volume 1* (Boston 1886), pp. 82-83.

also indicative of the web of interrelationships that linked New Caledonia with the other colonies of the Americas that the Judge was a friend of local merchant John Borland, who not only received New Caledonia correspondence from William Paterson,[482] but would also house his own brother, Darien survivor Reverend Francis Borland, during his sibling´s recuperation in Boston from September 1700 to April 1701.[483]

Another clergyman, Archibald Stobo, did forge a new life in the Americas. He had accompanied Borland on the second expedition, reaching Charleston, South Carolina following the capitulation. Surviving the hurricane-caused shipwreck of the *Rising Sun* while in that port, he would practice the ministry within the colony until his death in 1741.[484]

The dispersal of survivors also contributed to the population of the Jerseys, where simmering hostilities had surfaced, exacerbated by events on the Isthmus. Governor Basse documented his frustration following passage of the Jamaica Act by the Assembly of East Jersey. The legislation was, he explained, aimed at privateers and pirates, but was vehemently opposed by "the Scotch gentlemen, who among us are grown to a very great height from the prospect of a gentleman of their own nation filling the seat of government in these provinces by his Majesty´s approbation, and the success that their countrymen meet withal in the settlement". The principle traders of not only East and West Jersey but also Pennsylvania were Scots, Basse reported, and there were active assertions that "His Majesty dare not interrupt them in their settlement." Furthermore, the troublesome Scots

---

[482] Paterson thanked Borland for two books he had sent him at Fort St. Andrew, underscoring the two-way lines of communication established between New England and New Caledonia. Thomas, *The Diary*, entry for May 8 1699. The contents of the letter was apparently of such high interest that it was printed. Ibid, p. 409.

[483] Borland would eventually return to Scotland in August of 1701 and be reunited with his children, becoming one of the few Darien participants to return home on a permanent basis. University of Edinburgh Library, Centre for Research Collections, MS Laing 262, pp. 28-31.

[484] D. Dobson, *The Original Scots Colonists of Early America, Caribbean Supplement 1611-1707* (Baltimore 1999), p. 130. Stobo was one of a group of fifteen who were on shore when the hurricane struck, sinking the *Rising Sun* and drowning those aboard. Insh, *The Company*, p. 198

were “encouraging the inhabitants of these colonies to go thither to trade and settle on the proposals made them by the Council of State in Calidonia.” The Governor offered the only effective means of resolving the situation was to effect “a total exclusion of them from any share in the Government of these plantations”.[485]

Basse would do his part to prohibit the commerce with Darien by issuing the requisite proclamation 1 August 1699.[486] His action would not, however, prevent the influx of survivors who chose to establish themselves near the existing Scottish community of Perth-Amboy, creating a new settlement known as Scots Plains.[487] Among them was Captain John Anderson, who had commanded the *Unicorn* to safety following the first abandonment of New Caledonia. Anderson´s role in his new home would run counter to Basse´s recommendations, for the Scot would establish himself as a trader and planter and, despite efforts to block his nomination, serve on His Majesty´s Council for the Province of New Jersey, becoming President of the body just prior to his death in 1736.[488]

THE CASE OF SAMUEL VETCH

Also reaching New York and New England, but following an entirely different course after the first expedition, was Samuel Vetch. Having been educated at Utrecht and rising to the rank of Captain during service against the French in the Netherlands[489], he would, according to his biographer, become a citizen of the empire, motivated by “the uneasy aspiration of the three groups which had struggled separately until now without success:

---

[485] Headlam, *CSP, Colonial, 1699*, Item 512, p. 281. Letter from Mr. Basse, Governor of Jerseys to Secretary Popple, 9 June 1699.
[486] W.Whitehead (ed.), *New Jersey Archives, First Series, Volume II, Documents Relating to the Colonial History of New Jersey, (1631-1776)* (Newark 1881), p. 297.
[487] P.M´Robert and C. Bridenbaugh, `Tour through Part of the North Provinces of America´, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 59:2 (April 1935), p. 169.
[488] D. Lockhart, `The Scottish Origin of Colonel John Anderson: Commander of the *Unicorn* During the Darien Expedition and President of His Majesty´s Council for the Province of New Jersey´, *The American Genealogist*, Vol. 83:1 (Jan-April 2008), pp. 1-3.
[489] G. M. Waller, *Samuel Vetch, Colonial Enterpriser* (Chapel Hill 1960), pp. 11-13.

British imperialists, colonial expansionists, and his fellow Scots".[490] Initially struggling into New York with the Drummonds following the 1698 expedition, Vetch elected not to return to Darien, opting for marriage into the family of prominent local Scot Robert Livingston and participation in trading ventures which adroitly maneuvered between legality and practicality.[491] Building on the established community network of Scottish trading interests, he became an associate of the previously introduced John Borland of Boston.[492] Following an unsuccessful request for a commission as Captain of one of the Crown companies stationed in New York[493], a 1705 prisoner exchange requiring a voyage to Canada presented convenient cover for the more commercial motives of the Borland-Vetch enterprise. Having raised suspicions, the vessel was seized upon its return, to which Vetch responded that stormy weather had forced him into Acadian ports, after which he was compelled to trade to assure the security of his vessel and crew.[494]

Capitalizing on both his Darien and Canadian experience, Vetch began to formulate a plan to defeat France in a northern offensive. He offered Scots as practical colonists for Canada, explaining that the region was "a healthful place and more agreeable to a people bred in cold countries than the West Indies, which proves a grave to (an) abundance of people that go there". Submitting his scheme to the Board of Trade in 1708 he emphasized the interconnectedness of the colonies and the potential for France to drive "the English out of the continent all together". Supported by a cast reminiscent of Darien: William Paterson, Seafield, Carstares, and the Duke of Hamilton, his proposal was approved and forwarded to the Privy Council. The scheme conveniently not only strove to expel the French from portions of their Canadian territory, but also provided a mechanism to ameliorate the lingering dream of a Scottish colony and residual opposition to the Treaty of Union. In February 1709 orders were signed and sealed for the campaign. Vetch would receive a

---

[490] Ibid, p. viii.
[491] Ibid, pp. 34-43. One of Livingston´s nephews was the surgeon who escaped from imprisonment in Cartagena following the capture of the *Dolphin* and her crew.
[492] Ibid, p. 56.
[493] Ibid, p. 70.
[494] Ibid, pp. 79-86.

commission as colonel and oversee preparation in the colonies, serving under a British field officer but to be rewarded with the Governorship of the resurrected Nova Scotia.[495]

The new Colonel returned to the colonies and proceeded with provisioning. Harkening back to Darien experience, the indigenous population and former prisoners of the French were used to obtain intelligence but anxiety increased as it was realized that news of the impending campaign had reached the adversaries. As the organized colonial forces anticipated the arrival of the fleet from England, they instead received notice that the expedition had been "laid aside", the fleet having been diverted to Spanish waters.[496]

Seemingly undaunted by the setbacks, Vetch strove to take advantage of successive opportunities. Understanding that plans were also being formulated to reduce New Spain, Vetch was quick to capitalize on his New Caledonia experience, offering that he was "ready to contribute my mite of advice and assistance, having been formerly upon that coast". Yet another turn of strategy from London, however, resulted in a smaller expedition to the northern port of Annapolis Royal, where Vetch achieved his appointment as Governor. Surviving a harsh winter of death, illness and desertion, and under constant fear of attack, Vetch found himself recalled to New England in the summer of 1711 to command forces designated to attack Quebec. Success also eluded that campaign, with colonists and English forces blaming each other for its failure.[497]

Turning his attention to the survival of the outpost at Annapolis Royal, Vetch attempted in vain to determine what negotiations in Utrecht to end the War of the Spanish Succession would mean for the status of the tiny colony. Coping with the need to sustain his forces, Vetch finally received word that he would continue as Adjutant General to the new

---

[495] Ibid, pp. 101-119. For a discussion of the previous attempt at Scottish colonization in Nova Scotia between 1629 and 1632, and its demise as a negotiating tool to end hostilities between England and France, see George Pratt Insh´s *Scottish Colonial Schemes 1620-1686* (Glasgow 1922), especially Chapter II, `Nova Scotia´, pp. 40-90.
[496] Waller, *Samuel Vetch*, pp. 122-156.
[497] Ibid, pp. 173-231. For comprehensive discussion of the 1711 campaign and its failure, see Adam Lyons, *The 1711 Expedition to Quebec: politics and the limitations of British global strategy* (New York and London 2013).

Governor of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, finally becoming Governor himself in 1715. His expertise was also requested in London to serve as a Commissioner investigating the boundaries between France and Great Britain in the Americas, a position providing opportunities for audiences with the Board of Trade and a platform to continue advocating for additional colonists in Nova Scotia. His proposals remained unfulfilled, however, and, suffering yet another reversal of fortune, he would die in Debtor´s Prison in London in 1732.[498] Perhaps more than any other individual, Vetch had taken his practical experience, including the months in Darien, and attempted to apply it to future attempts at colonization.

Far from the huts of New Caledonia, the arrival of the Company of Scotland on the Isthmus produced a litany of consequences across the Americas, forcing communities throughout both continents to come to terms with novel sets of circumstances and fears of uncertain and threatening changes. From the residents of Spanish America anxious over again losing personal wealth and security, to expedition participants fighting for survival in locations they never expected to settle, the conditions of an insecure future created similar anxieties. For the men representing King William III and King Carlos II, futures were diverted by a scheme that, though short-lived, constituted a major aggression and opened the door to new allies and enemies. As the unintended bands of survivors dispersed across the map of British America from Jamaica to New York, often echoing prior paths taken by deserters, they would alter the face of Atlantic colonies, assisting in forging new communities and adding to discord in others. Spanish America would find itself taught a difficult lesson, reminded of its vulnerability and the acute need to restore both internal and external security in its most strategic region.

[498] Ibid, pp. 238-284.

CHAPTER 7

THE VIEW FROM THE AMERICAS II

DARIEN CONSEQUENCES

The location chosen for New Caledonia was far from an isolated territory devoid of its own history and society. Not only was the site currently surrounded by populations of native Cuna, well versed in interaction with international interests following two centuries of European contact, but there were also pronounced indicators of foreign presence, exemplified by the French inhabitant who greeted the Scots upon their arrival.[499] This chapter will examine the complex local sociopolitical fabric into which the Company of Scotland inserted itself and, conversely, the short and long-term consequences the colony, regardless of its ephemeral establishment, imposed on the region. Unlike the remainder of the Americas, which either coped with the arrival of groups of expedition survivors or celebrated their departure, the province of Darien and its people would experience an intensified and disquieting focus of attention. Although eventually empty of would-be Scottish colonists, the area would nonetheless be severely impacted by their aborted effort, convulsing through both the attempts to establish the settlement and the reciprocal military effort to assure its demise. The lengthy and volatile record of interaction between the Cuna and the Spanish[500] would be exacerbated by the former´s alliances with the Scots, resulting

---

[499] Among those making immediate contact with the newly arrived Scots was the Frenchman, who had resided locally for four years and provided an informed review of Spanish-Indian politics. Also on the list of welcoming parties were two native captains who expressed their enthusiasm for new allies against the Spanish. Insh, *The Company*, p. 129.

[500] David Weber calls Spain´s relations with unconquered indigenous groups "the most consistently vexing challenge Spain faced" across Spanish America, adding that "Prior to

in new campaigns to bring the notoriously independent native populations under colonial control. The Company of Scotland´s flagrant attempt to establish a permanent settlement provided an eloquent reminder that Darien possessed not only uniquely strategic assets and valuable resources, but that these same benefits were highly vulnerable to domestic threat and foreign incursion, both of which demanded a strong response to assure continued but tentative Spanish domination.

A CROWDED AND TURBULENT STAGE

By the time of the arrival of the Scots, the local Cuna had established their own history of both protecting their sovereignty and successfully accommodating the presence of foreigners. Although Rodrigo Bastides had first sailed along the Darien coast in 1501, and Columbus would touch upon the coast during his fourth voyage a year later[501], it was the establishment of Santa Maria la Antigua del Darien in 1511[502] that initiated protracted interaction between the Spanish and indigenous groups of the Isthmus. To their advantage

---

1700 the Habsburg dynasty had enforced Spain´s humane and paternalistic law unevenly, never resolving the tension between its wish to protect Indians and its interest in exploiting Indian labor." D. Weber, *Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment* (New Haven 2005), p. 5. The situation faced with the Cuna and their failure to kneel to any form of civil or religious subjugation is a prime example of the "vexing challenge". Elman Service explores the issue in his study of how the Spanish attempted to force indigenous groups to adapt to aspects of colonial policy; but, conversely, had to adapt its policies to accommodate the wide range of indigenous society within its colonial empire. E. Service, `Indian-European Relations in Colonial America´, *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 57:3 (June 1955), pp. 411-425.

[501] David Howarth, *The Golden Isthmus* (London 1966), pp.14-15. The story of Columbus´s foray on the Isthmus, hardly establishing goodwill among native groups, is recounted on pages 14-29. Assuming knowledge of the behavior of the Spaniards spread among the various tribes it is intriguing to consider just what the Cuna heard of this initial period of interaction.

[502] Ibid, p. 38. A group of survivors of a Spanish expedition had expropriated the native village, renaming it after a church in Sevilla and adding Darien in deference to the native name for the adjacent river. The group was led to the village by a veteran of Bastides´s earlier voyage whose name would become inextricably linked with the Isthmus, Vasco Nuñez de Balboa. For the detailed story of the initial Darien settlements by the Spanish and relations with the Cueva, Cuna and other indigenous groups, see Kathleen Romoli, *Balboa of Darien: Discoverer of the Pacific* (New York 1953).

the Cuna then inhabited lands on the periphery of this initial interface with Spain. From their vantage point they would have had the opportunity to witness initial favorable relations with Governor Vasco Nuñez de Balboa, his beheading by fellow Spaniard and successor Pedrarias de Avila, and the decimation through disease and slavery of the contemporary resident indigenous group, the Cuevas.[503] By 1519, when the Spanish removed themselves and their livestock to what were anticipated to be improved conditions in Panama, lessons had been learned. The Cuna expanded into the newly vacated region, firmly anti-Spanish and predisposed to alliances, assistance and commerce with other foreign interests, particularly those seeking a share of the wealth of the Americas at the expense of Spain.[504]

Regardless of the abandonment of their initial settlements, however, Spanish officials fully comprehended the necessity of asserting a semblance of control over the Isthmus and struggled to contain the dual threat of foreign penetration and domestic strife. The actuality was that colonial policies were not achieving either goal. Attempts at evangelization and the reduction of the native population into Spanish-style nuclear villages were met with tenacious and violent opposition[505] and restrictions aimed at controlling Cuna access to weapons and tools served only to assure the continued welcome of Dutch, British and French smugglers offering the desired goods. The appointment of Julian Carrisoli, a Spaniard reared by Cuna, to the position of Protector of the Indians provided some measure of relief when, in 1645, it was reported that the Dutch had landed on the northern coast of Darien and promised accommodation of Cuna customs in return for support of a

---

[503] Romoli describes the Cuevas as "the Indians they (Spanish) knew best, treated worst, and admired even as they destroyed them". Ibid, p.130. Differences between the Cuevas and Cunas are further explored in R. Torres de Arauz, `Nuevo Edimburgo del Darien, Los Cunas: Anfitriones de Los Escoceses´, *Loteria,* Vol. 314-316 (May-July 1982).

[504] The "disaffection" created by Pedrarias is noted by the Spaniard don Antonio Arevalo in his 1761 report on conditions within the area. A. Cuervo (ed.), *Colección de Documentos Inéditos sobre la Geografía y la historia de Colombia, Sección Primera, Geografia y Viajes, Tomo II, Costa Pacifica, Provincia Litorales y Campañas de los Conquistadores*, p. 256.

[505] Two attempts by the Capuchin order, departing from Cadiz in 1647 and 1681, to evangelize the Cuna and establish missions resulted in complete failure. A. Castillero Calvo, *Conquista, Evangelización y Resistencia, ¿Triunfo o Fracaso de la Politíca Indigenista?* (Panama 1995), p. 227.

settlement. Carrisoli´s diplomatic and language skills, reinforced by ties of kinship, were used by the emerging leader to persuade the group of approached Cuna to refuse the proposition, a success that deeply impressed Spanish officials.[506] Nevertheless, there was to be no reign of uniform or persistent peace in the region. A plea to Madrid for military assistance from Panama in 1651 described the latest insurrection . . .

> as if they were one man, the Indians of the province of the Darien rose up in rebellion. They were motivated solely by their own natural malevolence, since they had received nothing but good treatment from the Spaniards acting in your name.[507]

The continuing lure of Darien´s gold mines, coupled with treasure shipped from Peru for transport across the Isthmus and on to Spain, provided unrelenting enticement for foreign intrusions, a point which was reinforced by a series of piratical raids conducted between 1680 and 1695.[508] Although Luis Carrisoli, now serving in his father´s role, had measures of military success with his Cuna defensive forces, other groups of Cuna simultaneously established vital roles for themselves as guides and informants for the cast of plundering

---

[506] For a discussion of Carrisoli´s unique role in Darien sociopolitics, see Gallup-Diaz, *The Door*, pp. 43-53. The author emphasizes the convenience of Carrisoli´s unique circumstances in the ambiguous geographic interface between the jurisdictions of Panama and Cartagena. It was the Governor of the latter who made the appointment of Protector of the Indians, a frequently used position denoting authority over both the native population and Spanish activities within the designated region. Ibid, pp. 44-45. Carrisoli´s dual sanction by both the President of Panama and the Governor of Cartagena is also indicative of the multiple jurisdictional administrative world into which the Scots intruded. Carrisoli would eventually be rewarded with titles and lands assuring him and his descendants a future in the history of the Isthmus. Ibid, p. 52.

[507] Ibid, p. 50. Original in AGI, *Panamá 31* (Letter of the *Cabildo* of Panama, 20 November 1651). Gallup-Diaz adds that Madrid, lacking the resources for a military offensive, responded with silence.

[508] Among those attracted to the aggregate of adventure and potential fortune was Lionel Wafer, a surgeon whose experience living with the Cuna for four months while he recuperated from wounds would gain him fame and financial reward. Wafer´s subsequent return to London and intent to put his story into print for profit came to the attention of the Company of Scotland and would provide much of the impetus for the designation of Darien as the destination of choice. Wafer would ultimately be brought to Scotland to consult with the "Secret Committee" regarding the assets of the Isthmus. The individual tasked with escorting the surgeon out of Edinburgh following his stay was none other than Walter Herries. Insh, *The Company*, pp. 109-114.

and trading foreigners. It was clear that the sociopolitical situation was profoundly fragmented and subject to rapid and unanticipated change.

This kaleidoscope of entangled and shifting alliances, chaotic at best, is what preceded the arrival of the Company of Scotland fleet into what would become Caledonia Bay. Within days of their arrival the Councilors had every indication that they had entered a world as complex as any they had left behind.[509] Captain Andreas was one of the first Cuna to approach the Scots, asking if they were friends of the Spanish, expecting that they intended to cross to the South Sea, and relating his friendships with English privateers.[510] Four days later came a group of visitors including the previously mentioned Frenchman and two individuals from Martinique, one of which spoke Cuna fluently. They explained that the story the Scots had been told about a supreme leader over all the Cuna was untrue and went on to relate the intricate network of diverse contemporary leaders, their territories, and their political affiliations. Captain Diego, with an estimated 3000 men under his control, was regarded as the most powerful and had spent the last year at odds with the Spanish over gold mines within his jurisdiction. Most recently, the strife had resulted in the murders of 20 Spaniards and three priests. Captain Paussigo´s lands lay between those of Diego and Andreas, the latter allied with his brother and residing closest to the Scottish settlement. The two siblings had traditionally maintained a more amicable relationship with the Spanish, even allowing some of them to reside in the area and keep officials in Panama abreast of events. All had changed within the previous two months, however, when Captain Ambrosio, quasi-leader of yet another adjacent territory, had convinced them to join him in the killing of ten Spaniards on nearby Golden Island.[511]

---

[509] Bridget McPhail contends similarities between the Scots and the Cuna positively contributed to the interactions between the two groups, citing the former´s own history with clan-based society. *Through a Glass*, p. 141.

[510] Burton, *The Darien Papers*, pp. 64-65, Entry from *Mr. Rose´s Journal* for 2 November 1698.

[511] Ibid, pp. 66-67, Entry for 6 November 1698. Corroborating the information transmitted to the Scots in Caledonia Bay is a Spanish *consulta* provided by the Council of War to the King dated from Madrid the following July. The document relates a message from the President of Panama dispatched just prior to his being informed of the presence of the Scots, describing the "uppity" posturing of the Indians in Darien and their killing of three Franciscan priests and 32 Spaniards. AGI, *Panamá* 105 (The Council of War to His

The various Captains also possessed a range of personal resumés reflecting their individual acquisition of skills and experience that allowed them to promote their interests both within their own territories and on foreign soil[512], a circumstance that would deeply influence their individual reactions during the periods of Scottish residence. Ambrosio´s son-in-law Pedro was a fluent Spanish-speaker, having learned the language in Panama while being kept there as a slave. His language skills also included French, which he had acquired while living in Pitiguao. French support was also characteristic of Captain Corbete, who had assisted a group of French privateers and been offered compensation from Governor DuCasse. Sailing to meet the Governor, Corbete had been captured by the English and taken to Jamaica, where he was sold into slavery along with two other Indians. Monsieur DuCasse had eventually learned of the incident and demanded the release of the three, which was realized, allowing Corbete not only to travel twice to the French stronghold at Pitiguao, but also to Cartagena. Neighboring Corbete´s lands was Captain Nicola, who had been brought up among the Spanish and was not only a fluent speaker, but able to read and write. He had remained a Spanish ally until only twelve months earlier, when he had relinquished a treasured French firearm, acquired from a buccaneer, to a Spaniard for repair. The weapon had captured the attention and been retained by the

---

Majesty, 14 July 1699*)*. Herries provides additional details regarding the recent murders, relating that, following the killing of the priests and the robbery of the chapel of its furniture, Diego´s son had "brought the vestments and chalice to Captain Fraser at New Caledonia". Ambrosio, for his part in the murder of the Spaniards on Golden Island, "never expected to be pardoned". W. Herries, *A Short vindication*, p. 35.

[512] Langebaek elaborates on the importance of these foreign experiences and their related acquisition of both exotic goods and knowledge as instrumental to attainment of prestige and position within the Cuna communities. Whether or not the tradition had existed prior to European contact, the move of the Cuna closer to the coast facilitated their interaction with a variety of international interests. C. Langebaek, `Cuna Long Distance Journeys: The Result of Colonial Interaction´, *Ethnology*, Vol. 30:4 (Oct 1991), pp. 371-380. The phenomenon of Cuna (or Tule) acquisition of authority and its symbiosis with European interests is explored by Gallup-Diaz in *The Door of the Seas and Key to the Universe*, particularly in Chapter Two, `Teaching the Tule to Become Tribal, 1640-1667´, pp. 25-52.

Governor in Portobello, with the result that Nicola could now be counted among the enemy.[513]

The Scots were also quickly made aware of not only differences but discord among the Cuna communities. Ambrosio, who appeared to be very frank about his outlaw status among the Spaniards, warned that Andreas was not to be trusted and was functioning as a spy. Later questioned about the accusation, the latter Captain related a critical account that was to be echoed following the eventual departure of the Scots. Andreas explained that 16 or 17 years prior his people had assisted French and English in raids on both sides of the Isthmus, receiving promises in return for continued protection from Spanish reprisals. Two years later, however, once the raids reaped sufficient treasure, the foreigners departed and the Cuna groups were "expos´d to the Cruelty of the Spaniard, who have cut off most of the Indians thereabouts, and that for several years they were oblig´d to live obscurely in the Mountains".[514]

The situation was further complicated by other, non-indigenous constituencies. The presence of Frenchmen had been, of course, quickly made obvious to the Scots. These ex-buccaneers had integrated themselves into Isthmian society, rearing half-Cuna families. They welcomed the Scots as another intruding group who would not only provide trading opportunities, but would also serve as a deflection from unwanted Spanish attention. [515]

---

[513] Burton, *The Darien Papers*, pp. 67-69. Entry from *Mr. Rose´s Journal* for 6 November 1698.

[514] Herries, *A Defence*, pp. 58-59. Following attempts by the Scots to negotiate between the Cuna leaders, the discord between Andreas and Ambrosio would eventually erupt into a physical altercation and the death of Andreas from a suspicious fall through an open hatch on one of the Scottish vessels. Ibid, p. 60. Indicating censorship aimed at reporting nothing short of unmitigated success (also discussed in Chapter 2 in regards to problems with desertion), the fatality of their native ally was not transmitted to Edinburgh, the victim simply disappearing from any further communication.

[515] Gallup-Diaz, *The Door*, pp. 108-109. The author emphasizes that this group was essentially stateless, conducting themselves from the perspective of inhabitants of Darien, not representatives of their King. In 1740 the group would petition to become vassals of the Spanish King. Ibid, p.109, ft. 9.

The non-resident French community was also active, and provided its own narrative of sociopolitics within Darien. Captain Thomas of the *Maurepas*, the French vessel which would eventually sink attempting to sail out of Caledonia Bay on Christmas Day 1698 (See Chapter 3), related to Commodore Pennycook the information that about eight months prior there had been a slave revolt in Portobello. The original 700 rebels had rapidly risen to 1500, aided by arms and ammunition from English, French and Dutch traders. The Governor had been "forc´d to come to very dishonourable terms . . . to allow them to be a free people".[516]

Although the specific Portobello insurrection related by Thomas could not be verified, the account is indicative of a series of local slave-related quests for freedom. Inevitably, the acquisition of slave labor in the region had created an attendant problem of slave escapees, which could reach up to 300 of every 1000 individuals. The sheer numbers, coupled with the jungle environment that provided unique conditions of shelter and security, resulted in the creation by 1570 of at least three settlements of fugitives on the Isthmus. The largest of these, Ronconcholon, was said to include 1700 fighting men and maintained not only a level of tension across the area, but also a reserve of conspirators for the host of intruders.[517] As early as 1572 Francis Drake had discovered the benefits of allying with such communities, which provided invaluable survival and guiding skills, as well as intelligence on all-important movements of Spanish treasure.[518] Returning to England, Drake passed on the assets of the alliance, assuring its future use.[519]

---

[516] Insh, *Papers*, pp. 92-93, Captain Pennycook´s Journall from the Madera Islands to New Caledonia in Darien, entry for December 12, 1698.
[517] Howarth, *The Golden Isthmus*, pp. 64-65.
[518] Ibid, pp. 72-73. A group of these escaped slaves, or maroons, guided Drake across the Isthmus to Panama, stopping in their town of fifty-five homes and deeply impressing the Englishmen that it was "kept so cleane and sweet that not only the houses but the verie streets were verie pleasant to behold". Ibid, pp. 76-77. The earlier history of escaped slaves in the region is examined by Armando Fortune is his four-part series `Los negros cimarrones en Tierra Firme y su lucha por la libertad´, *Loteria,* Vols. 171-174 (Feb-May 1970).
[519] Frederick Rodriguez, *Cimarron Revolts and Pacification in New Spain, the Isthmus of Panama and Colonial Colombia, 1501-1800*, unpublished PhD thesis, Loyola University of Chicago, 1979, pp. 143-144. While Rodriguez uses the term *cimarrones* (maroons) to encompass renegade slaves and indigenous individuals, Howarth (*Panama*: *The Golden*

In return, desperate to retain the necessary source of labor, some modicum of security, and prevent the potential for wholesale revolt, Spain attempted evangelization, general amnesty and military action, resorting to mutually beneficial capitulations only in extreme circumstances.[520] By 1607, illustrative of the durability of the problem, it was recorded that ninety-four menacing *cimarrones* resided in the vicinity of Panama, subsisting off small farm plots but able to mobilize quickly and avoid capture.[521] The threat, and the economic strain created by military deployments attempting to remedy it, resulted in the imposition of a *cimarron* tax on local slave owners in 1639.[522]

While the recent purported capitulation in Portobello related by the Frenchman may have created an apparent pause in slave insurrections, the current situation also presented both a new concern and a potential opportunity for the Spanish. Acknowledging the reality of possible assistance to the Scots by remaining fugitive maroons, in May 1699 the Council of War of the Indies recommended via a *consulta* to the King that the enticement of amnesty be offered to secure communities of remaining outlaw slaves in return for assistance in the campaign to eradicate New Caledonia.[523]

The dynamic conditions of the Isthmus at best verged on unchecked disorder, devoid of Spanish control. In addition to problems related to established residents, there was the vague mission of the newly arrived French, currently resting in the bay alongside the Scots

---

Isthmus) defines the term as delineating solely the former. Howarth´s more specific meaning is used here.

[520] Ibid, pp. 4-7.

[521] Ibid, p. 152. The date of the study is variably typed in the manuscript as 1607 and 1697, the latter most likely the true date.

[522] The tax, intended to subsidize the military, had previously been established in Mexico City, Cartagena and Havana. Its imposition on the Isthmus was to be collected from the slave-owners of Panama. Ibid, pp. 152-153.

[523] AGS, *Estado* 4183, *Consulta* dated 12 May 1699. As noted later in this chapter, negroes and mulattos were frequently recorded as accompanying Spanish forces in action against the Scots. Emphasizing Spanish concern over the potential role of the two populations, Rodriguez states that the Viceroy of New Spain had expressed concern that blacks and mulattos in Pacific ports might join with the Scots in securing the Isthmus from Spanish control. Rodriguez, *Cimarron Revolts*, p. 155.

and purportedly hunting pirates. There was also the ill-defined expedition of Captain Richard Long. Claiming to be searching for old wrecks, the Englishman had been on the coast for about a month prior to the Scots´ arrival. His furtive presence made even the Scots suspicious, with the resulting adoption of a policy to indulge the Captain´s propensity for alcohol "in order to find out his Designes".[524] Revealing no firm intelligence, the English Captain did leave a small English presence on the Isthmus when he left three men and one woman behind with the Cuna Captain Diego.[525] As if any Spanish official needed a reminder of the incessant and potentially violent equation of local unrest and foreign intrusion, there were now five well-armed ships of Scots in the heart of the Isthmus. Not only were they expressing their intent to establish themselves by constructing fortifications, but they were actively forging alliances with the Cuna while awaiting substantial reinforcements from Scotland.

A POWERFUL AND COSTLY REHEARSAL

---

[524] Insh, *Papers*, pp. 88-89, Captain Pennycook´s Journall from the Madera Islands to New Caledonia in Darien, entry for November 20 1698.

[525] Ibid, p. 93, Entry for December 14 1698. One of the individuals left by Long would arrive in New Caledonia on 19 December 1698, reporting that his small group, joined by the local Indians, had killed seven Spaniards. He requested "some powder and shot but we would spare them none". The visitor also reported that Long had told some of the Spanish Indians that the Scots "were a pack of Theives and robbers". Ibid, p. 94, entry for December 19 1698. The full range of Long´s motivations are open to debate, but a communication from Secretary of State Vernon to the Lords of the Admiralty, dated over a year before the Scots departed from Leith, discusses Long´s proposed search for gold and "two Plate Wracks". Ibid, p. 97. A 15 February 1699 letter from Jamaica to the Duke of Leeds, written by Long himself, discusses his investigations into the gold mines of the Isthmus, as well as his efforts to establish good relations with the various indigenous groups of the area and his interactions with the Scots. Ibid, pp. 97-106. The submission of the report to the Duke is made more intriguing by Leeds´s uncharacteristically consistent attendance in the House of Lords during debate related to the Scots in Darien. A. Browning, *Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby and Duke of Leeds 1632-1712, Volume 1, Life* (Glasgow 1951), p. 549, n.1. Gallup-Diaz notes Long´s efforts to cement agreements with the Cuna Captain Diego, including the Englishman´s warning against dealing with the Company of Scotland representatives. Gallup-Diaz, *The Door*, pp. 114-115. As late as 1707 Captain Long was still promoting the treasure to be realized by a voyage to the Isthmus, writing a letter to the Duke of Hamilton soliciting funds for a private expedition. NAS, GD406/1/5437 (See also the related story of George Chine in Chapter 2).

While initiating their settlement there was no lack of sources of intelligence reaching the Scots warning of impending Spanish reaction. The visiting French Captain Thomas relayed the news that the President of Panama had alerted officials in both Portobello and Cartagena of the Company´s arrival and that "the Spaniards all along the whole Coast are in a wonderfull consternation". Although he declared that the Spanish supposition was that the Scots´ "designe was on the River Messissippi" and ships had been dispatched there, three vessels of the *Barlovento* fleet were currently at anchor in Cartagena. Furthermore, "Mexico was all in a confusion", to the degree that the Viceroy there "will speedily set up for himself".[526] The aforementioned Captain Long had also contributed intelligence regarding the *Barlovento* fleet, notifying the newcomers that it was "taking in provisions to attack us in a few days", prompting the Scots to make "haste in our baterie" and position their ships in a battleline across the mouth of the bay.[527] From the Cuna Captain Andreas came word of the actual mobilization of a ground force marching from Panama to Portobello to augment a naval contingent consolidated from Portobello and Cartagena.[528]

---

[526] Insh, *Papers*, pp. 92-93, Captain Pennycook´s Journall from the Madera Islands to New Caledonia in Darien, Entry for December 12 1698. Thomas´s assessment of the intensity of the reaction from Mexico, discussed in the previous chapter, was correct. The Count of Monctezuma, Viceroy, Governor and Captain General of New Spain wrote of the threat not only to Portobello and Panama, but also to the South Sea and even the Philippines. Citing his responsibility to take action "against any other nation attempting to set foot in these seas", he issued his own orders, eventually rendered unnecessary by the first abandonment of New Caledonia, to the *Guarda Costa* fleet of General Zavala . Hart, *The Disaster,* Appendix XV*,* pp. 258-260.

[527] Insh, *Papers*, p. 93, Entry for December 14 1698.

[528] Ibid, pp. 93-94, Entry for December 16 1698. Unfortunately, Captain Pennycook´s journal terminated December 28 with the departure of a Jamaica sloop transporting the first emissaries and dispatches back to Scotland. There had been time, however, to include an account of the French ship´s abortive attempt to depart New Caledonia. The vessel had crashed apart against the rocks, resulting in the drowning of twenty-four crew members and the loss of "60,000 pieces of eight in Gold and Silver, besides 30,000 more in goods and cloath". The Captain and his Lieutenant were saved, "but both almost dead and sadly bruis´d and wounded". Ibid, pp. 95-96, Entry for December 25 1698.

The providers of intelligence, however, did not restrict themselves to communicating with the intruders. The value of information as a commodity was fully comprehended and exploited by a selection of native Captains who not only possessed the highest degree of proximity and access to events at New Caledonia, but also the knowledge of how most efficiently and effectively to transmit the information, and to whom the substance of the message would be of greatest importance. The President of Panama, while highly critical of Cuna truthfulness prior to the arrival of the Scots, soon found himself formulating strategies based largely on the intelligence they provided.[529] He had originally dispatched Spanish Captain Betancur to assess the threat of the French presence and arrest the Cuna Captains Ambrosio and Pedro for the recent murders, with orders to burn their villages as punishment. Instead came the even more disturbing report that five Scottish warships were in the vicinity. Much of the information had been acquired during an interview with Corbete, who readily conceded he had actually been aboard one of the Company of Scotland´s vessels, also noting that 18 Cuna captains had declared themselves allied with the new arrivals.[530]

Corbete´s remarks encompassing the alliances forged with the Scots were accurate, for a written treaty was formulated between the Council of Caledonia and Chief Diego and signed on the 24th of February 1699. The document, while declaring the parties to "henceforward be friend and confederates, and are hereby obliged mutually to defend the persons, lands, territories, dependencies, and properties of each other by land and sea", also included a critical stipulation mirroring the potential for a broader alliance. According to its fourth provision, the agreement provided that

> It is herby likeways agreed that Captain Corbet of Conception River,
> Capn Ambrosio of Coco, Capn Nicola of Sept, Capn Pansego of Carreta,

---

[529] Gallup-Diaz, *The Door*, p. 127.
[530] Ibid, pp. 128-129. Gallup-Diaz uses the interview between Corbete and Betancur to illustrate the autonomy of the Cuna leaders and their adept maneuvering between the varied interests that comprised the contemporary Darien reality.

> and Capn Pedro of Golden Island, and their people, shall, upon application, be admitted into this treaty.[531]

Notably, the Scots had included the specific pair of Cuna leaders the royal administrator had sought to have arrested. New Caledonia had not taken long to firmly enmesh itself in the convoluted political world of Darien.

The first campaign against the Scots, instigated from Panama, was led by President Canillas and, as reported to the King[532], portrayed both the environmental challenges of Darien which thwarted Scot and Spaniard alike, and the extensive and varied human resources which were drawn upon in support of operations. As companies of Spanish, creole and negro volunteers were organized to reinforce regulars guarding Panama, Portobelo and Chagres[533], a 52 day campaign extending through March and April 1699 was undertaken to check the Scots before "they could finish fortifying, and before the rainy season should set in among the mountains". Although Canillas was careful to include in his report the concession that the intended land expedition

> might not inflict becoming chastisement upon the enemies, expelling them from their fortifications, it would alarm them and let them know that in this kingdom there is force and inclination to oppose them in the very province through which they must pass, crossing it, in order to fortify themselves on the Pacific coast or to navigate the waters beyond that coast

---

[531] Burton, *The Darien Papers*, pp. 87-88. Diego had been specifically courted by Captain Long, who claimed he had established a viable English alliance with the Cuna leader. According to Gallup-Diaz, Diego´s pragmatism in also signing a treaty with the Scots illustrates the assumption of "failed imperial ideology" by both Long and the Scots. Gallup-Diaz, *The Door*, p. 111.

[532] The President´s report to the King is included in Hart, *The Disaster*, as Appendix XVI, pp. 261-282.

[533] Ruben Carles, *220 Años del Periodo Colonial en Panamá* (Panama 1959), p. 169. Civic security and defense was typically provided by militias, composed and stratified to reflect the society at large. During periods of actual combat there was a high percentage of desertion, particularly among the lower ranks. Among the command, prestige often took precedence over military prowess or experience. Mario Gongora, *Studies in the Colonial History of Spanish America* (Cambridge 1975), pp. 115-116.

There was, however, a vital additional benefit that the President expediently noted . . .

> the Indians of that province have been six months, now, in rebellion, and have done some killing. . . this movement of our arms would terrify the Indians, who would perceive that we have the means to punish them whenever Your Majesty may permit it, for they have been advertising that without them the Spaniards can accomplish nothing.[534]

The resources deployed for the mission were impressive. Ten large barks were used to ferry troops on the six day sail to El Escuchadero on the Pacific side of Darien. From there an assembly of canoes was to transport men and supplies to the outpost of Tubacanti, a plan that had to be altered when the inadequate capacity of the vessels was realized. Led by native guides through "those impenetrable forests penetrated only by some few Indians reared in that wilderness", Canillas instead marched overland to the outpost, where he joined four companies of militia under Carrisoli, creating a combined force of 1500 men. Conditions worsened as the troops now had to carry their own 10 day supply of rations in addition to "muskets, arquebuses, and rifles . . . bags of shot, and fifty balls which each soldier carried loose". Darien´s topography severely impaired the march, as the men "first had to cross a river shut in between cliffs and full of boulders . . . and had to march through the actual bed of the stream". Falls were common, wetting rations, but progress continued. The men traversed the range, "extremely impenetrable, both because of the height of the mountains and . . . the precipices encountered at every step", eventually reaching a marshy area two leagues from New Caledonia. From their campsite the Spanish forces could hear regular intervals of artillery fire, taken as an indication of the Scots´ knowledge of their presence. During that night heavy rains began to flood the camp and, over the following three days, continued to both restrict any movement and destroy diminishing food supplies. The dire conditions were underscored when "although a hundred negroes arrived on the second day with biscuit and cheese (all wet), these carriers were half drowned and had lost their lances". The inability "to advance over the intervening distance to meet the enemy or

---

[534] Hart, *The Disaster,* Appendix XVI, pp. 262-263.

accomplish anything when we should encounter him, for all the arms and munitions were wet" forced a decision to retreat.[535]

The aborted campaign of the land forces was accompanied by the abandonment of a concurrent strategic effort. In return for ten thousand pesos to be delivered upon completion of the task, a contingent of Frenchmen, with native support, had been positioned to undertake the burning and/or the cutting of cables of Scottish vessels once Spanish troops were within sight of New Caledonia. The combined French-Cuna company, however, had been subjected to the same problems of incessant rainfall and insufficient food supply. Upon notification of their condition, and the critical factor of their perception by the Scots, they were also recalled.[536]

The anti-climactic initial assault on New Caledonia did, however, witness the first incident of armed conflict between the Scots and Spanish forces. In his account of the colony´s history, Borland describes "one small skirmish" with a forward patrol approaching the colony "either to spy . . . or to see if they could apprehend any . . . stragglers in the woods, or to entice the Indians to forsake our men". Informed of the Spanish presence by native allies, the Scots deployed 150 men under Captain Montgomery. In their company were two previously apprehended Spanish prisoners who successfully shouted a warning as the New Caledonia force moved forward through thick woods. Firing began, killing two Scots and wounding 14 as the Spanish patrol, vastly outnumbered, retired.[537]

---

[535] Ibid, pp. 264-267. Canillas, understandably, emphasized the unanimity of the decision to abort the campaign, including the factor of the significant loss of men from the supporting *Barlovento* fleet: out of a contingent of 750, 90 had deserted upon reaching land and 80 more had been hospitalized in Panama. An alarm concerning the arrival of English warships in Portobello had also been raised, which mandated Admiral de Pez´s return to his fleet. Bibiano Torres Ramirez, *La Armada de Barlovento* (Sevilla 1981), pp. 164-165. The English vessels were those of Admiral Benbow.

[536] Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XVI, pp. 267-268. The quantity and quality of resources deployed for the intended engagement, according to Hart, indicates the likelihood that "More may have been expected of this attack than was realized or afterwards claimed." Ibid, p. 116.

[537] Borland, *The History*, p. 21. The Spaniards who provided the warning to their own contingent appear to have been captured during the operation, for Borland reports that they knew "where their countrymen lay hid". Ibid. The skirmish was also the incident which

The failed outcome of the Panamanian operation, regardless of the initial abandonment of New Caledonia by the Scots in June 1699 and the accompanying assumed elimination of the threat, would cost Canillas dearly. Pending an investigation, he would find himself relieved of his Presidency in early July 1699. The suspension would be short-lived, for reinstatement would occur on 23 December of that same year following a letter from the King, particularly citing the value of the President´s military experience.[538]

Significant changes in the administration of Darien were not limited, however, to the disgraced President in Panama. Initiated by Canillas prior to his suspension, a new Governor of the province of Darien had presented himself, his appointment threatening to supplant Luis Carrisoli and the decades of supremacy his family had held over the conduct of local affairs.[539] Arriving from Cadiz with the daunting mandate to populate his jurisdiction, pacify the natives and impede the activity of pirates[540], don Miguel de Cordones[541] would find himself not only with an established and resentful local authority,

---

resulted in the acquisition of the Spanish prisoner de la Rada, whose circumstances and eventual return to his countrymen are discussed in Chapter 3.

[538] AGI, *Panamá* 113 (unfoliated), (The King to the Count of Monclova, 14 August 1699). Canillas´s lack of popularity among his fellow administrators is specifically noted by Manuel Maria Alba in *Cronología de los Gobernantes de Panama 1510-1967* (Panama 1967), pp. 104-105. Contributing to the suspension was the hostility of the supporters of the President´s predecessor, the Marques de Mina, who Canillas had both replaced and imprisoned. Gallup-Diaz, *The Door*, p. 112, n. 1.

[539] Ibid*,* p. 141

[540] AGI, *Panamá* 167 (unfoliated), (Dispatches from Cordones to the King, 1 March 1699).

[541] Although Cordones´s precise background is undetermined, he was a member of the prestigious Order of Santiago and received a five year appointment as Governor from the King on 9 January 1699. AGI, *Panamá* 113 (unfoliated). He was included along with Pimienta and naval commander Peredo as a recipient of orders to "exercise care and vigilance to the most important end of preventing the Scots from establishing a footing in those parts, for, although his majesty had previously resolved to erect a fortification at Darien to settle that territory and protect it against foreigners, there had not been time to carry this resolution into effect". Hart, *The Disaster,* Appendix XXVII*,* p. 322, original in AGI, *Panamá* 161. As previously discussed, efforts to secure the region had been erratic and unsuccessful, with the recent murders of Spanish soldiers and friars by groups of Cuna and the presence of English, French and Scots all testifying to the degree of lawlessness.

but also the immediate crisis of the new wave of Scots arriving in Darien, willing to use military force to secure their colony.

RESTORING AUTHORITY OVER THE KING´S LAND

While the second expedition of Scots struggled to reestablish themselves in New Caledonia, one commodity consistently in ample supply was intelligence about the forces assembling against them. A visiting Jamaican brigantine, attempting to market its cargo of dry goods and 40 slaves near Portobello, had been chased by a Spanish warship, reporting it to be part of a force to be consolidated with "four men of warr come from Old Spain" to move against the Scots. The threat was underscored by word that the bakers in Portobello were "all busy baking bread for the expedition".[542] As February 1700 progressed, such communications began to be a daily occurrence, culminating in a specific alarm from Cuna allies of a force approaching by land. On the 13th, under the newly arrived Captain Campbell of Fonab, a company of 200 Scots, joined by 60 natives under Captains Pedro, Augustine and Brandy, left New Caledonia. Marching to the Spanish outpost at Tubacanti, on the 15th they engaged in heavily forested terrain with a mixed contingent of 300 "Malatoes, Creolleos, Negroes, and Indians" under the new Governor Cordones, killing nine or ten and taking three prisoners. Casualties within the allied New Caledonia force numbered eight dead and 18 wounded. Among those requiring the attention of the Scottish surgeons was Captain Campbell, as well as Captain Pedro, the latter among several Cuna commended for their service.[543]

Any relief or elation following the Tubacanti action, however, was soon overshadowed by the reality of the composition, size and strategies of the emerging Spanish military

---

[542] NLS, Adv. MS 83.7.5., f. 62r. (On board the *Rising Sun* in Caledonia Bay, 7 February 1700).

[543] Burton, *The Darien Papers*, p. 251. (Letter from the Revd. Alexander Shiels, February 1700). The engagement would be reported to Scotland as a "victory", causing Edinburgh to go "wild with joy". Hart, *The Disaster*, p. 138. Tubacanti would also be impacted by the previously presented hostilities between Cordones and Carrisoli, who failed to effectively coordinate their activities, resulting in the absence of the latter´s forces during the skirmish. Gallup-Diaz, *The Door*, p. 138.

operation under the command of Cartagena´s Governor Pimienta. As introduced in Chapter 4, the Reverend Francis Borland documented visits to gain intelligence by both an English sloop "pretending to be from Jamaica" and a group of nine Frenchmen purporting to trade in tortoises, but eventually exposed "to be among our enemies". [544] Borland, a witness to these events, relates that as fears of the ultimate arrival of the Spanish increased, a flurry of activity was undertaken to repair and enhance the batteries around Fort St. Andrew. Simultaneously, two sloops and the *Rising Sun´*s longboat were dispatched to discover the identity of vessels detected off the coast. Chased by their prey, which were Spanish, the sloops made it back safely, but the longboat was abandoned along the coast as her crew fled, resulting in the loss of a key resource.[545]

The anticipated arrival of the full offensive force was recorded on the 23rd and 25th of February, comprised of "eleven sail of Spanish vessels great and small". As Borland attests

> We daily expected their coming into our harbour to attack our Fort and ships . . . all hands, sea-men and Land-men, were put to work, to fortify the place as well as they could: They also made several Fire-ships of their smaller vessels, putting themselves in as good a posture of defence as they could. But the Spaniards did not come in with their ships, for they knew this harbour well enough, which is easy for great ships to come into, but difficult and dangerous to get out again; the wind this season of the year, generally blowing right into it. So they went another way to work, less dangerous to themselves, and more disadvantageous to us, which was, To hem us in both by sea and land.

While the naval blockade guarded the mouth of the bay, Pimienta landed men near Caret Bay, merging his own forces with those "that came over land from Panama and Santa Maria, accompanied with numbers of Indians, Negroes and Molattoes, who were expert in

---

[544] Borland, *The History*, p. 59. As discussed previously, the English sloop was most likely part of the residual fleet of Admiral Benbow remaining in the Caribbean.
[545] Ibid.

knowing the woods, and cutting passages through the thorny thickets of the woods in their way".[546]

Fully realizing the strategic value of New Caledonia´s wind-locked bay, the Governor had indeed arrived and ordered the landing of men on either side of the bay´s entrance.[547] Accompanying him was chief military engineer of Cartagena Don Juan de Herrera y Sotomayor, who provided a graphic representation of the proceeding strategy (See Figure 4).

As illustrated in Herrera´s map, a strangle-hold was created and gradually tightened around New Caledonia ("A") as the Spanish deployed both land and sea forces. Denoted by the letter "D" are the initial points where the Governor landed troops at Rancho Viejo and Careto, on either side of the Scots, followed by a later landing at Caleta ("F"). Following engagement with the Scots at their forward point ("E") on the 11th of March, the progress of confining the colonists is demarcated by the advancing locations of the third ("G"), fourth ("H"), fifth ("I") and, finally, sixth ("L") Spanish encampments, the last of which was established with artillery on the 7th of April.

---

[546] Ibid, pp. 59-60.

[547] As he pushed the Scots toward capitulation, Pimienta would remind his adversaries of their predicament, writing to them of his regret that, should he be required to "order the naval fleet to force that port, and storm their trenches . . . under such circumstances, it would not be possible to give quarter, and also because, on account of the winds which prevail on this coast, my ships would be unable to emerge from that port after the engagement to go about the business in which I may need them". Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XXXI, p. 374. He would reiterate the factor of the winds as negotiations faltered, reminding the Scots of their vulnerabilities by lamenting that his own vessels would have difficulty "in getting out of it in two months". Ibid, p. 380.

Figure 4 Spanish Campaign, 1700 (Source: AGI, *Mapas y Planos*, *Panamá* 120)[548]

[548] What appears to be a draft or working copy of Herrera´s map is held in the University

Instrumental to both Herrera´s work and Pimienta´s tactics was the attendant continual stream of sound and timely intelligence. With the arrival of the impressive allied Spanish forces, the diverse and fluid Cuna factions had to expediently evaluate the anticipated outcomes of the impending armed conflict. Not only were the actual confrontations taking place within their home territory, but they also had to consider their own and their families´ futures within the context of the two volatile centuries of contact with both Spanish governance and foreign intruders. The opportunity to ingratiate themselves to Pimienta´s command would at least provide some measure of future security over the less attractive alternative of continued allegiance to a faltering and unstable group of intruders who had only months previously abandoned their fledgling colony.

Reaching the Isle of Pines and waiting to assemble with the vessels dispatched from Portobello, Pimienta had sent a launch from his flagship to secure information. It returned with an unidentified "Indian that had deserted from the Scotch" who provided critical details "about the fortress, the fortified dock and battery, and said that they had 23 pieces of artillery, 700 able men, 200 sick, supplies for two months and help from the Indians in the form of agricultural products". The initial landing at Careto not only included 200 men, three captains, two engineers, and three Frenchmen, but also the omnipresent Corbete, serving as "Indian guide" to help reconnoiter the mountainous terrain.[549] That detailed knowledge of the site was highly valued was acknowledged in Pimienta´s own campaign diary entry for 13 March 1700. Having been thwarted by the impossible disembarkation and placement of artillery at Careto due to the "roughness of the mountains and the rivers which surrounded the place", his engineers had acquired knowledge from "certain natives" of an inlet closer to Caledonia that was "suitable for landing the artillery, subsistence and other stores".[550]

---

of Glasgow Special Collections as MS Gen 1685, Item 16.
[549] Anonymous, *Gazeta*, pp. 4-6.
[550] Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XXXI, p. 371.

Native participation from other parts of Darien was also evident with the arrival of Louis Carrisoli from his station near the gold mines at Cana, commanding a force of "100 Indian allies". The group of Pacific natives, constituting a domestic incursion into local Cuna territory, was assigned to protect rear positions as the Spaniards advanced, Pimienta later complaining that they "did nothing but devour stores. For what little they brought for our men they got a good price". [551]

As the Spanish, reinforced by a diversity of both regional and foreign participants, and the Scots, successively reduced to operating from within their fortifications and cut off from their water supply, played out their conflict, the changing political conditions and growing discomfort facing the Cuna did not go unrecognized by either principle party. With the Spanish stranglehold increasing at New Caledonia and an estimated 2000 men engaged in the immediate area, Borland noted the impact of the loss of relief previously provided by "our Indian friends", who now had to "shift for themselves, for fear of the Spaniards". He also commented on the pragmatic fact of Darien existence, that "some of them had gone over to the Spaniards, and had secret correspondence with them; for they commonly join with the strongest side, and little trust is to be put in most of them".[552] The Spanish perspective was somewhat equivalent, Pimienta directing that the natives be cordially welcomed, but maintained under a watchful eye . . .

> The Indians who may come aboard these ships they will detain, or, if they desire to join me, they will send to my port. They will treat these Indians well and in such manner that they shall not resent their detention, seeking pretexts to keep them aboard; especially if they come aboard with their bands they will send them to me with the first vessel going to Carreto, assuring these Indians always of our friendship.[553]

---

[551] Ibid, p. 385.
[552] Borland, *The History*, pp. 70-71.
[553] Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XXXI, p. 371.

ATTEMPTING TO RESTORE CONTROL OVER THE KING´S SUBJECTS

As negotiations progressed towards the capitulation and ultimate abandonment of New Caledonia, the Scots made an attempt to assure the welfare of their Cuna allies. Article VII of a draft of the agreement included a stipulation that "the Indians who have been friendly to us, and conversed with us, since we came hither, shall not be molested upon that account". Asserting his King´s jurisdiction, Pimienta vetoed the proposal and directed particular anger at the Scottish Reverend Shiels, who had presented the specific petition. "The Indians were the king of Spain´s subjects", the Governor stated, "and he knew best how to treat his own subjects, and if the Indians would keep out of his way, he would not search after them".[554] The proposal and subsequent refusal of amnesty was also included in the account related in the *Gazeta extraordinaria,* printed and distributed in Lima later in the year, with the explanation that Pimienta had not regarded the condition as advantageous to his King.[555]

A deliberate and public assertion of control over the native population continued as the Scots prepared to embark and the Spanish force began to occupy the site of the colony. Pimienta, having entered the formerly Scottish harbor and landed at its fortified dock, dispatched men to inspect the ships of the "enemy and to bring on land all the Indians he should find. Only eleven were found and they were brought before Señor Pimienta who ordered them to be taken handcuffed to the inlet, and to be kept under guard." That night "three musket shots were heard, alarming everybody, who immediately seized their weapons. It was learned that two of the Indians that had been brought as prisoners had thrown themselves into the sea, and that the sentinels had fired on them." Orders were also given a Spanish officer to take twenty-five men to find and arrest the Cuna Captain Brandy "who the Scotch said was the one who sold the land to them".[556] Yet another incident

---

[554] Ibid, Appendix XII (Articles of Capitulation), p. 249.
[555] Anonymous, *Gazeta*, p. 10.
[556] Ibid, p. 13. As cited previously, a Captain Brandy had also fought with the Scots at the Tubucanti engagement. Pimienta had previously been apprised of Brandy´s questionable loyalties when the Captain had approached the Spanish. Choosing to "avoid worse

occurred, also documented in Pimienta´s diary, when the Governor noticed an Indian canoe tied to one of the Scottish ships as it was being prepared to depart. The subsequent investigation revealed that a group of Cuna had been delivering subsistence. Once the perpetrators were in custody they, too, were transferred to Pimienta´s camp.[557]

There is a marked silence in contemporary documents regarding eventual action taken against the seized Cuna, with the exception of that provided by Walter Herries. As noted at the end of Chapter 3, the writer-surgeon-spy reported a number of the native allies were "impaled alive" by the Spaniards for the service they had provided the Scots at Tubacanti.[558] Taking into account the murders committed prior to the arrival of the Scots, coupled with obvious continued alliances forged with intruders, it is not inconsistent that Pimienta elected to impose on both foreign and native populations a dramatic and explicit demonstration of Spanish authority over rebellious subjects.[559]

While addressing the issue of native betrayals, the Spanish simultaneously turned their attention to the fortifications of New Caledonia and the artillery and ammunition they had acquired.[560] The Governor, following the signing of the capitulation at 5 p.m., had ordered a force of 200 men to occupy Fort St. Andrew, now renamed St. Charles after the Spanish King, that same day. "Accompanied by officers and some curious persons", Pimienta

---

consequences" regardless of his suspicions, the Governor elected to have him "entertained as the others had been." Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XXXI, p. 366.

[557] Ibid, p. 391.

[558] Herries, *An Enquiry*, p. 40. Since Herries was not present in Darien at the time of the capitulation, he would have had to obtain the account from one of the several returning Scots with whom he had contact.

[559] Such outcomes for the indigenous population were not atypical. A 1779 report, relating the history of one of Darien´s mines in hopes of obtaining permission to resume operations, noted that "the rebel Indians, enemies of the Crown, after having been reprieved, were put to the knife at five in the morning". Martínez Cutillas, *Colonial Panama*, pp. 582-584.

[560] Stipulations of the capitulation did allow the Scots their personal arms and baggage and powder and ammunition necessary for the defense of their ships on the journey home. There was also a reciprocal exchange of prisoners and no vessel affiliated with the Scottish enterprise arriving within two months would be attacked, providing it made no hostile gesture. All other infrastructure, artillery and war stores were relinquished to Spanish control. Anonymous, *Gazeta*, pp. 10-11.

"went into the fortress and found it to be fairly strong". In addition to the structure itself, there were 28 or 30 pieces of artillery and "the houses, as many as seventy, . . . of thatch, and in their midst the headquarters, and the storehouses near the dock".[561] Having taken formal possession, the Governor then retired to his own camp, "where remained only invalids, negroes and mulattoes, leaving Campmaster don Melchor Ladron de Guevara in command of the infantry within the fortress".[562]

Once again, the vital skills of the military engineers were mobilized to document what had now, with the inadvertent assistance of Scottish lives and labor, become a Spanish military outpost in the trouble-plagued region of Darien. Documentation of the infrastructure of the new Fort St. Charles, along with its situation related to the Spanish encampments, was completed (See Figure 5), illustrating the fortifications of the Scots ("A"), their warehouses ("B"), their batteries ("C"), the principal encampment of the Spanish forces ("D"), the sequence of offensive positions and fortifications established by the Spanish ("E" through "I"), the aforementioned embarkation point for the Spanish artillery ("L"), the routes utilized to implement the campaign ("M"), the Scottish flag ("N") and the housing area within the fort ("O").[563]

---

[561] Ibid, p. 12. The debate over the basis of the Scots´ claim to rightfully establish themselves in Darien is presented within the trial testimony before the *Casa de la Contratación* included in Chapter 5.

[562] Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XXXI, p. 390. Borland reports that, following the capitulation, "we were much afraid lest the Spaniards should have proven false and treacherous to us, but God over-ruled them, that they made no open breach of the treaty." Borland, *The History*, p. 68.

[563] The map, also prepared by Royal Engineer Don Juan de Herrera y Sotomayor, is entitled *Topographical and iconographical ground plan of the site settled and fortified by the Scottish nation, named by them New Caledonia on the coast of El Darien surrendered to the arms of the Catholic Carlos II on 11 April 1700 by siege led by His Excellency Juan Diaz Pimienta, governor and captain-general of the city of Cartagena and its province*. A similar version, catalogued as AGI, *Mapas y Planos*, *Panamá* 119, has been published in Martínez Cutillas´s *Colonial Panama, History and Images*, pp. 452-453.



Figure 5: Plan of New Caledonia, 1700

Source: AGI, *Mapas y Planos, Panamá* 119 BIS

The active participation of the engineers was instrumental to not only the implementation and documentation of the military success in securing New Caledonia, but would have far-ranging impacts regarding the body of institutional knowledge of the geography of the region. The institutionalization of engineering units within the Spanish military had evolved significantly during the final decades of the seventeenth century, and would spread across Spain´s American dominions, no where better exemplified than by the activities of the brothers José and Juan de Herrera y Sotomayor. The latter, whose efforts supported the Darien campaign, would eventually be appointed the King´s leading military engineer in the Americas.[564] His and his colleagues´ work, cited frequently in Pimienta´s diary[565], would also be acknowledged in an anonymous 1739 Spanish manuscript on Darien. The author writes of the expulsion of the Scots and the priority given the area´s security following its final resolution . . .

---

[564] David Buisseret, `Spanish Military Engineers in the New World before 1750´, in Dennis Reinhartz and Gerald Saxon (eds.), *Mapping and Empire: Soldier-Engineers on the Southwestern Frontier* (Austin 2005), p. 52. Juan Herrera y Sotomayor´s engineering efforts toward fortifying Spanish America would continue until his death in 1732 and be particularly recognized for his defensive projects in Cartagena. E. Marco Dorta, *Cartagena de Indias, Puerto y Plaza Fuerte* (Cartagena 1960), p. 211. Two additional military engineers were also dispatched with Navarette´s expedition, arriving after the expulsion of the Scots but readily employed in collaboration with Jaime Franc, who had been serving in Mexico. Moreyra y Paz-Soldan, *Virreinato, Tomo III*, p. xxvii. For a general discussion of the development of Spanish cartography of the Americas and its role in understanding the vast new territories, see David Buisseret´s *The Mapmaker´s Quest; depicting new worlds in Renaissance Europe* (Oxford 2003), especially Chapter 4, `Mapping in the expansion of Europe, 1400-1700´. Buisseret notes that Drake´s raid of 1586 initiated not only a spate of engineering effort to improve defenses surrounding the city of Panama, but established the initial presence of military engineers in Spanish America. Ibid, pp. 90-91. For a broader discussion of the role of the profession, see Bruce Lenman (ed.), *Military Engineers and the Development of the Early-Modern State* (Dundee 2013), particularly the editor´s own chapter entitled `Amphibious Engineers and the Margins of Seaborne Empire´ which addresses the secrecy with which Spain regarded much of the cartography of its American dominions. Ibid, p. 223. The strategic value accorded such documentation underscores the importance of the map of New Caledonia provided by the spy Walter Herries to Ambassador Canales in London (see Chapter 2).

[565] In one of his numerous entries recording the laudable efforts of the engineers, Pimienta relates that he ordered Herrera to construct a cannon-proof battery "on a salient a pistolshot from the enemy, which point commanded all his place. He was busied in this all night." Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XXXI, pp. 387-388.

> I was able to learn all that had happened and was carried out from the same officers who served then and from the experts who were taken along as well as about the survey they made of the country, mountains and the places which were then inhabited by the same Cunacuna Indians.[566]

As the Spaniards reimposed their authority upon the Darien region of the Isthmus, the engineers completed their surveys and mapping, and the Cuna sought whatever security they could determine, a reassertion of the Catholic faith was also conducted. While the Scots struggled out of their wind-locked bay, finally succeeding "with the help of the Spaniards, who were glad to be rid of us, as we were of them . . ."[567], Pimienta did not fail to acknowledge religion or King, designating one of the now vacant warehouses as the "first temple, where the first mass was said, consecrating the place to Saint Charles".[568]

NO RESTORATION OF PEACE

A flurry of activity followed the cessation of military action on Darien soil, although peace continued to elude the region on several fronts. The President of Panama, recently restored to his post, had remained in Portobello with reinforcements, where he received regular correspondence from Pimienta regarding developments. Canillas duly included these documents in his report to the King, along with references to his own sacrifices, the "prompt measures I took . . . for the extermination of the Scots", and the complaints he had received regarding the Governor of Cartagena´s administration of the campaign. Characteristically, the President had not been reluctant to offer his advice, and Pimienta´s reaction to the unsolicited commentary, particularly following Canillas´s initial failed overland campaign against the Scots, likely included a high degree of disgust . . .

---

[566] Henry Wassén (ed.), `Anonymous Spanish Manuscript from 1739 on the Province Darien´, *Etnologiska Studier* (10:1940), p. 111.
[567] Borland, *The History*, p. 74.
[568] Hart, *The Disaster*, Appendix XXXI, p. 391.

> Only my considerate regard entreats your excellency to reflect that this is not a country in which to do what according to military regulations should be done, since this is precisely what cannot be done; and to ponder how necessary it is to alter the plan of those general lines along which in Europe one advances and fights, for conditions in this realm are not such that one can succeed by use of means which there are successful.[569]

For his efforts, however questionable, the President of Panama would be amply rewarded with appointment as interim Viceroy of Peru.[570] The diversion of credit did not go unnoticed, for the 1739 anonymous source quoted above regarding the instrumental role of the engineers also recorded an analysis he had received in Cartagena regarding the appointment . . .

> At this time the count of Canillas who as reward for the successful outcome of this undertaking was made Viceroy of peru, in spite of the fact that it was the afore-mentioned Governor Pimienta who accomplished this by personally conducting the expedition. The said count did not leave Panama and his help was of no importance for the results of this significant triumph which was reached by the capable people of the country and by the defenders of the forts which Pimienta had been able to collect in Cartagena and by the naval unit which had control of this harbor.[571]

---

[569] Ibid, p. 425. Canillas´s full report is included as Appendix XXXIII (The Conde de Canillas to the Crown, 14th April 1700, Communicating a Full Report on the Campaign with Copies of Orders and Correspondence). The city of Panama responded in a similar manner to Lima, providing a mix of military, civil and church expressions of celebration, the only difference being the bestowing of credit on "two champions, the two sirs Conde de Canillas and Don Juan Pimienta". Biblioteca de la Presidencia de Colombia, *Historia Documentada de la Iglesia en Uraba y el Darien, Desde el Descubrimiento Hasta Nuestros Dias, Volumen IV, Segunda parte, America Española, 1550-1810* (Bogota 1956), p. 251.

[570] Canillas´s death in Panama in October 1701 prevented his ultimate acquisition of the position. His appointment as Viceroy in Lima had, however, finally allowed permission to be granted for the long-serving Monclova to fulfill his wish to return to Spain. AGI *Panamá*, 110, unfoliated, (Resolution of the Council of the Indies, 8 April 1701). Unfortunately, the Viceroy would die before his retirement and homeward journey could be realized.

[571] Wassén, *Anonymous*, pp. 111-112.

For his part Pimienta appears to have opted out of debate with the President of his neighboring jurisdiction, from which he had just commanded the successful expulsion of the enemy, instead issuing an order for an officer and 200 men to remain in New Caledonia and returning to the formidable challenges of his own government in Cartagena.[572] In his notification of eventual success to Canillas the Governor tactfully acknowledged that New Caledonia was in Panamanian territory without glorifying his own role in the military mission. Pimienta related that he was leaving the fort in a secure condition "that it can be held as long as your lordship may desire". Two men had expressed their wishes to be placed in charge of the garrison, one being Canillas´s appointee to the Governorship of Darien and the other being Campmaster Melchor de Guevara. The decision as to which man would receive the appointment Pimienta deferred to Panama´s President, "for I wish the selection to be whichever your lordship finds more suitable and to your lordship´s taste."[573]

The intended permanent presence of Spanish forces at the newly acquired outpost would not last. Admiral Navarette, following his orders to assess the state of regional defenses should his resources not be needed to eliminate the Scots, had visited the site and, in his report written from Cadiz in April 1701, noted that the majority of the guard had either deserted or died. He related that he had provided a reinforcement of 100 men and provisions, along with a chaplain sent by Governor Pimienta.[574] These supplementary resources failed to eliminate the challenges of the assignment and an attack by 22 pirates in the summer of 1701, along with the opportune arrival of a brigantine providing a source of evacuation, provoked Spanish abandonment of the fort. Citing the lack of supplies, the prevailing illness of the men, and the resulting inability to protect themselves either from the recent or any future assault, a *junta* held in "Plaza Caledonia" produced the unanimous

---

[572] Anonymous, *Gazeta,* p. 14.
[573] Hart*, The Disaster*, Appendix XXXII, p. 394. The conflict was not resolved by Canillas, for a letter from the King dated 20 October 1700 acknowledges the dispute between the two contenders for the position and defers the decision to the Viceroy in Peru. AGI, *Panamá* 113, *Ramo* 3.
[574] AGI, *Panamá* 181 (report of Alm. Gen. Don Pedro Navarette, Cadiz, 6 April 1701).

decision to evacuate.[575] Despite King Carlos II´s recent declaration of Santa Theresa as patron saint and protector of Darien, and the assignment of an annual local fiesta in her honor to commemorate the successful expulsion of the intruders[576], the reality of challenges facing sustained occupation of the former New Caledonia continued to thwart the establishment of a permanent European presence.

The Cuna lacked, of course, either a viable alternative or desire to vacate what was their homeland, yet their situation was no less problematic. Although it was their territory that had suffered both the influx of the mixed Spanish-mulatto-*cimarron*-external native forces and witnessed the actual combat, there were no assessments or documentation of losses asked of them and their opinion was not solicited by either the colonial administration or Madrid. Nevertheless, two intriguing sources addressing their reaction can be elicited from later documents. The first is contained in annotations accompanying the *Anonymous Spanish Manuscript from 1739 on the Province Darien.* The editor, Henry Wassén, relates that, although the episode of interaction with the Scots was not included in the oral chronicle of Cuna history dictated to ethnographer Erland Nordensklold, the latter´s Cuna collaborator, Ruben Perez, did clarify that

> The Scots are mentioned in their stories only in the case of Nele Patignana´s having let loose illnesses which the Scots could not withstand and which therefore forced them to leave the country.[577]

---

[575] AGI, *Panamá* 181, ff. 1039r-1043v. Canillas reacted to the abandonment, which took place only a few months prior to his October 1701 death, by issuing one additional complaint about Governor Pimienta. Writing to the King, the President of Panama inferred the Governor of Cartagena was responsible for the decision to evacuate the garrison "without notice or order from the President of Panama". AGI, *Panamá* 177, unfoliated (Canillas to the King, August 1701).

[576] Carlos II issued the declaration 28 September 1700, signifying the 15th of October (the day designated as the first abandonment of the colony by the Scots) to become the day of the Festival of Santa Theresa of Darien. Biblioteca de la Presidencia de Colombia, *Historia documentada*, pp. 252-253.

[577] Wassén, *Anonymous*, p. 126. An English translation of Nordensklold´s and Perez´s work was published in 1979 as *An historical and ethnological survey of the Cuna Indians/by Erland Nordenskiold, in collaboration with the Cuna Indian, Ruben Perez Kantule; arranged and edited from the posthumous ms. and notes, and original Indian documents at the Gothenburg Ethnographical Museum by Henry Wassen* (New York

Commentary of a contrasting and more historically explicit stance is found in another oral history documented by the Governor of Portobello in 1741 during the visit to his city by a group of Cuna including an individual able to converse in Spanish. The informant related that disparity and autonomy among the various groups of Cuna had been reflected in interaction with foreigners, French and English often being accepted for the tools and textiles that they brought. The people identifying themselves as Scots, however, had solicited a license to establish themselves in the area. The novelty of that request had created a substantial level of discord, as some factions supported the Spanish effort to expel the newcomers and others did not. Perhaps more importantly, promises of continued defense against the Spanish included in the forged alliance proved false, for "16 months had not passed when they abandoned the place", leaving their allied Cuna once again responsible for their own security.[578]

DARIEN EPILOGUE

While ramifications of the failed Scottish expeditions across the remainder of the Americas were reflected through the dispersal of its survivors, lasting impacts in Darien centered on reinvigorated attention by the Spanish to secure the continuing lures of the resources and

---

1979). The comment is especially pertinent to the discussion of critical epidemiological factors and their relationship to the failure of the Scottish expeditions presented in *J.R.* McNeill´s *Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Carribbean, 1620-1914* and addressed in the previous chapter. For an explanation of the powerful leadership role of Neles (or Leres) in Cuna society, see Gallup-Diaz, *The Door,* especially Chapter 1, `Mythohistories of Ibelele and Tiegun: The Nature of the Tule Leres´ Power´. The 1739 date of the manuscript is pertinent due to the concurrent failure of efforts by Spain and England to avoid the War of Jenkins´ Ear, which was provoked by the extent of England´s illicit commerce with Spanish America and Spanish depradations on English trading vessels. See Harold Temperley, `The Causes of the War of Jenkins´ Ear´, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,* Vol. 3 (December 1909), pp. 197-236.

[578] AGI, *Panamá* 307, ff. 1197r-1209v. A portion of the manuscript is also discussed by Torres de Arauz in *Nuevo Edimburgo del Darien,* pp. 137-138, where the anthropologist notes that it provides a political and geographic context for what sometimes is regarded as a characteristic erratic tendency of Cuna society.

geography of the Isthmus. As the physical infrastructure of New Caledonia, successively rebuilt and fortified by the Spanish, would serve as a concrete reminder of vulnerability to foreign intrusion, relentless domestic strife would continue to seed the potential for dangerous native-foreign alliances. The audacious attempt by the Scots to establish themselves in the dominions of the Spanish King would not be forgotten as attempts to pacify the region continued through the decades of the eighteenth century.

The attraction of the territory´s attributes would rapidly reassert itself, exacerbated by open conflict during the War of the Spanish Succession. Darien was subjected to an assault on its gold mines in Cana by a force of 700 English and 300 rebel natives in September 1702, two and a half years following the Scottish capitulation.[579] This and a number of subsequent raids, afflicting primarily the southern side of the Isthmus, were followed two decades later by a major region-wide native uprising led by the mestizo Luis Garcia. 1725 and 1726 witnessed the abandonment not only of the aforementioned mines, but also livestock, sugar and timber operations along the Pacific slope. The severity of the insurrection, according to L.E. Joyce, was so acute that not only "for the next fifty years Spanish lives were unsafe", but long-established French and French-Cuna families were also killed.[580]

While internal tumult suppressed Spanish economic enterprises, the world of illicit commerce continued to thrive. The newly appointed President of Panama, Don Dionisio de Alsedo y Herrera, had been specifically reminded in his 1742 orders of the former Scottish

---

[579] Alfredo Castillero Calvo, *Conquista, Evangelización y Resistencia, ¿Triunfo o Fracaso de la Política Indigenista?* (Panama 1995), p. 228. This appears to be the same raid on Cana in which Robert Allen, the Darien deserter chronicled in Chapter 2, participated and is illustrative of the value of practical experience and knowledge gained through surviving the contemporary physical and political environment of the Isthmus.

[580] L. E. Elliott Joyce (ed.), Appendix 3 `The Cuna Folk of Darien´, *A new voyage and description of the isthmus of America by Lionel Wafer, Surgeon on Buccaneering Expeditions in Darien, the West Indies, and the Pacific from 1680 to 1688* (Oxford 1934), pp. 169-170. For a review of the complex underlying factors of the insurrection, and the instrumental role of the Cuna history of interacting with intruders, see Ignacio Gallup-Diaz ` "Haven´t We Come To Kill Spaniards?" The Tule Upheaval in Eastern Panama, 1727-1728´, *Colonial Latin American Review* 10:2 (2001), pp. 251-271.

incursion, and how Cartagena, Portobelo and Panama had been left without defense during the New Caledonia campaign.[581] As the new President made his way up the coast from Cartagena towards his post the following year, surveying his jurisdiction and attempting to ascertain how some measure of control might be attained, he gathered first hand knowledge of the challenges he faced. In his report he documented his interviews with Cuna who verified an active "English presence". He was given the specific information that one "Major Cunningham" had been there the previous year and traded substantial quantities of arms and ammunition. After surveying the ruins of New Caledonia and considering all he had seen and heard, he commented that the native population had been living in complete liberty, benefiting from foreign traders, but devoid of any benefits from the Spanish.[582]

A dramatic illustration of the benefits to be derived from foreigners was later described by the Jesuit Jacob Walburger in his 1748 *Relacion sobre la Provincia del Darien,* in which he recorded the case of two sons of one of the "Captains of Caledonia" who had some years earlier gone to Jamaica, where the "English" had taught them their language and to read and write. The brothers returned a year and a half later, impressively dressed, bearing gifts, and soliciting additional Cuna men to return with them to the island. From that point, according to the Jesuit, "it was not permitted to say anything negative regarding the English".[583]

---

[581] AGI, *Panamá* 255 (Orders to the President Elect of Panama, Don Dionisio de Alsedo y Herrera, Cadiz, July 10 1742). The reminder was underscored by the recent (1739) seizure of Portobello and Fort San Lorenzo by English Admiral Vernon.

[582] Ibid, *Diario de Don Dionisio de Alsedo y Herrera, Governador y Comandante General del Reyno de Tierra Firme y Presidente de la Real Audiencia de Panama*. At least one Major Cunningham had participated in the first expedition from Scotland, recorded by Herries as being one of the first emissaries sent back to Scotland via Jamaica in December 1698. According to Herries, Cunningham was the individual that requested the surgeon refrain from submitting any criticism of the Company of Scotland to Edinburgh. Herries, *A Defence*, p. 160.

[583] AGI, *Panamá* 307. The Jesuit´s comments regarding "English" in Jamaica are particularly noteworthy due to the number of Scots settling there following their failed attempt to establish New Caledonia. A record of parallel lessons is provided in the manuscript attributed to "Gentleman lately arriv´d", which describes a language exchange during the Scottish presence at New Caledonia. Gentleman Lately Arrived, *The History of*

The continuing failure to establish either domestic peace or effectively stymie illegal commerce[584] mustered support for a far-reaching plan in the final two decades of the eighteenth century that would once again emphasize the strategic importance of the former Company of Scotland site. By 1785 Governor of Panama Andres de Ariza had initiated the construction of a road towards Caledonia Bay, supported by the fort of El Principe approximately half way across the Isthmus. Heading to the military outpost from Caledonia three years later, a Spanish engineer would report the sighting of Cuna rebels.[585] Their presence could have only underscored the urgency of the administration´s full intentions for the area, for more than military subjection of the territory was intended. Elaborate plans had been formulated to establish five communities inhabited by both civilian and military personnel, one of which was to be Caledonia. The network of new settlements would be strategically located not only to secure anchorages along the coast, but also to establish influence in the interior, thus imposing a living statement of possession while simultaneously providing for communication and a semblance of civilization. In addition to military support,

---

Caledonia: or, The Scots colony in Darien in the West Indies: With an account of the manners of the inhabitants, and the riches of the countrey (London 1699), pp. 43-44, 51. The combined circumstances of trade with the individual identified as Cunningham and the language effort indicate there may have been continued communication with the Cuna and their former Scottish neighbors settled in Jamaica. At least two references document Cuna interaction with Jamaica in the first half of the eighteenth century but after the abandonment of New Caledonia. The island´s Governor in 1706, Thomas Handasyd, wrote that four "Chief Indians from Darien" had requested arms and munitions following purported murders by the French. "It was unanimously agreed on in a Coucil of War that they should have thirty-five arms given them with powder ball and flints proportionable after which I sent them home in the same sloop that brought them". NA, CO 137/45, f. 351v. A 1741 Memorial from the agent of then-Governor Trelawny lists an expenditure for "presents to the Darien Indians". NA, CO 137/48, f. 157.

[584] Bourbon policies during the reign of Carlos III to reform trade underscored the importance of the Isthmus and, simultaneously, the challenges presented by the continuing failure to subdue the Cuna population. For a review of the period and the efforts to resolve the problem of the "rebels and barbarians", see Daniela Vásquez Pino, `Políticas Borbónicas en la Frontera. El Caso del Darién. 1760-1810´, *Historia 2.0*, Vol. 2:3 (2012), pp. 89-103. The gravity of the problem, and the trade the Cuna maintained with English, Dutch and French pirates and merchants, provoked a royal order in 1783 for "reduction or extermination" of the Cuna. Weber, *Bárbaros*, p. 175. and p. 334, ft. 232.

[585] Joyce, *A new*, Appendix III, pp. 169-170.

each site was to include the various professions necessary to make a viable community. Among the minimum 50 families at each location would be 10 or 12 carpenters, a bricklayer, two blacksmiths, a surgeon and a chaplain.[586] The plan, in fact, shared some characteristics with its predecessor implemented by the Company of Scotland. Probably reflecting the understandable hesitancy of any local Spaniard to participate in the enterprise, the colonists were to be imported from outside the area (in this case, the newly independent United States, specifically Philadelphia) and were to be an international group (113 English, Irish and German individuals, along with 15 French who had previously been in Caledonia). Unlike the Scots before them, however, these expectant settlers would never reach their destination. Arriving and maintained in Cartagena at the Crown´s expense, they would find themselves reboarded on a Spanish vessel and sent back to Philadelphia, never glimpsing what was to have been their new homeland.[587] Citing enduring concerns over establishing foreigners in such a strategic area, the new Viceroy of New Granada had cancelled the project.[588]

Perhaps the best witness to the unmitigated insecurity of Darien is a letter from the Governor of Jamaica to the Viceroy dated November 1785. Responding to concerns expressed over the activities of English merchants, the island´s Governor Clark repeated virtually the identical claims his predecessor Sir William Beeston had made during the occupation of the Scots almost a century before. "The persons calling themselves British subjects, who have dispersed themselves into Caledonia Darien", he wrote, " . . . have had no encouragement from this government."[589]

CONCLUSION

---

[586] AGI, *Panamá* 307, ff. 1040r-1047r and 1153r-1165v.
[587] AGS, *Secretaria del Despacho de Guerra* 7054, (dispatch from Governor Cañaveral, Cartagena de Indias, 27 April 1790).
[588] Vasquez Pino, `Políticas Borbónicas´, pp. 96-97. In an effort to provide better defense for Cartagena and the region´s coastline, the new Viceroyalty of New Granada, administered from Santa Fe, had been established permanently in 1739. Parry, *The Spanish*, p. 288.
[589] AGI, *Panamá* 307 (Governor of Jamaica Clarke to the Archbishop of Santa Fe/Viceroy of the Kingdom of Granada, November 30 1785).

Writing in the 1950s of his recent archaeological surveys across the Darien, José Maria Cruxent described the early abandonment of the Atlantic coastline by the Spanish, with the result that other Europeans, motivated by the riches of the New World and fortified by alliances with the native population, were drawn to the region. Most of the incursions, the Spanish-born Venezuelan explained, were essentially raiding parties and inconsequential to his scientific studies. The major exception was the uniquely different Scottish arrival in 1698 with its intention to establish a permanent presence on the Isthmus.[590] Cruxent had located the site of their Fort St. Andrew, easy to delineate due to its defensive canal excavated in coral-rock and bricks unique among the other sites he examined across the area. Also documented were the scattered ceramics, dated to the latter seventeenth century and identified as having been produced in the "Lower Rhine and exported to England and its colonies in great quanitity".[591]

In his cataloguing of the anomalous infrastructure and dispersed artifacts of the Company of Scotland´s settlement, the archaeologist provides a metaphor of the singular impacts of the Darien expeditions and their durable yet scattered vestiges on three continents. His accompanying reference to the allure of the strategic narrow land base between the Atlantic and Pacific, enhanced by minimal Spanish development and proven opportunities for native support, also addresses the high value of the property for both the Scots and the cast of opposing interests determined to assure New Caledonia´s failure.

---

[590] José Maria Cruxent, `Informe Sobre un reconocimiento Arqueológico en el Darién (Panamá)´, Publicaciones de la revista *Loteria,* No. 9, (Publicación efectuada en el *Boletin Del Museo De Ciencias Naturales*, Caracas, Correspondiente a los tomos II, III, años 1956 y 1957), pp. 12-14. Later archaeological work conducted by Mark Horton is discussed in his chapter `To Transmit to Posterity the Virtue, Lustre and Glory of their Ancestors: Scottish Pioneers in Darien, Panama´, contained in Caroline Williams (ed.), *Bridging the Early Modern Atlantic World: People, Products and Practices on the Move (Ashgate 2009),* pp. 131-150. A report of Horton´s initial survey work is found in *A preliminary report on the archaeological project of Operation Drake, Caledonia Bay Panama, 1979* (London 1980).

[591] Cruxent, *Informe*, pp. 74-76.

As illustrated in the previous chapters, the international ramifications of the attempt to create a trading entrepot in Darien were far broader and substantial than previously considered. Although the enterprise had pronounced influence on the evolution of Scottish-English relations, that well-examined aspect of the Company of Scotland should not be allowed to eclipse recognition of its implications and influence across a far broader geography. From New York and Jamaica, from Rome to Lima and in Sevilla, reactions were deliberate and dramatic. From the testimony of Councilor Captain Robert Pincarton before the *Casa de la Contratación* to the payment of the *donativo* by churches across Mexico to conflicts created between Jewish and English merchants in Jamaica, reverberations to the unprecedented Darien initiative asserted themselves. Economic implications were manifested not only in the mercantile interest piqued across the Caribbean and up the coast of British North America, but also in the Court of Portugal, where Spanish impoundment in Cartagena of the lucrative Cacheo Company´s slaveships and those of its English subcontractors resulted in lost revenues and frayed relations.

Within the chaotic opportunism that characterized the place and period, the situation also prompted new opportunities for alliance, redemption and intelligence-gathering that were expeditiously exploited. Juxtaposed against the concurrent arbitration of the Partition Treaties and the anticipated death of King Carlos II, the Scottish offense to Spain allowed Louis XIV the ideal circumstance to offer armed naval assistance and information, ingratiating France to the same Governor of Cartagena who had been so soundly humiliated less than three years prior during the raid on his city. The English also showed little hesitation in seeking an advantage, deploying Admiral Benbow to the Caribbean with offers of assistance to Spanish Governors along the coast. The accompanying acquisition of intelligence from his squadron´s calls along the Spanish Main not only provided updates to London on the activities of the Scots, but would enhance the Royal Navy´s knowledge of ports and defenses during military engagements of the forthcoming War of the Spanish Succession. Surviving their own experiences within the colony, men such as the deserter David Allen and eventual Governor of Annapolis Royal Samuel Vetch would strive to seek personal advancement through the marketing of their individual experiences and acquired knowledge.

Nor was the highest level of European diplomacy exempted from involvement in the short but turbulent history of New Caledonia. While the Spanish Ambassador in London met with his Scottish spy and relayed latest events to Madrid, King William III was forced to initiate a campaign to assure Spain of his non-involvement and astonishing lack of knowledge of the activities of his Scottish Kingdom. The English monarch would finally heed the caution of his advisers, assigning the Hague´s trusted envoy to Madrid to seek from the Spanish King a stay on the execution of four Darien survivors convicted of piracy by the courts of the *Casa de la Contratación*.

There were no less significant impacts for Spanish America. The threat imposed by the intent to create a permanent foreign enclave between the vital centers of Portobello and Cartagena, with its potential to interrupt movement of wealth from Pacific to Atlantic so vital to Spain, activated the intricate and powerful colonial complex of administrative, intelligence and military resources that would effectively expel the Scots, even without the support of the armada mounted and dispatched from Cadiz. The native Cuna, in whose territories events unfolded and armed conflict was waged, would witness among the most profound impacts of all. Having cultivated relationships with a succession of European arrivals over the previous two centuries, their equally established history of discord with the Spanish, coupled by alarm over the actual attempt at permanent foreign occupation, provided a brutal reminder not just to Panama and Cartagena , but also to Lima and Madrid, of the absolute requirement to impose control over the highly coveted but porous Isthmus. In the words of Rosalia Ferrari Ortiz, "if the situation was difficult for England and Scotland, it was no less so for Darien".[592]

Inevitably, the investigation of the broader implications of Scotland´s Darien expeditions also reveals new details about and insights into the individuals that participated, the events that unfolded, and the way history has recorded them. From the interrogations of deserters

[592] Rosalia Ferrari Ortiz, *Una Introducción al estudio de la Importancia de las Expediciones Escocesas al Darien (1698-1700),* (University of Panama/unpublished *trabajo de graduación*, 1963), p. 118.

and prisoners to the identification of Walter Herries as a spy dealing directly with the Spanish Ambassador to the testimony of the four men incarcerated in Sevilla to the reports of various Spanish officials of conversations with Admiral Benbow, new voices have been contributed to the story of the Company of Scotland. The military composition of the enterprise´s participants, its clear intent to trade illegally with the Spanish Main, its international crew members, and its initial censorship of the degree of desertion all contribute to a broader understanding of what transpired and why. The contention of the judges of the *Casa de la Contratación* that trade goods stowed on the *Dolphin* proved the intent of the Company to trade illegally along the Spanish-American coast directly contrasts with criticism prevalent in previous histories that the cargo was ill-chosen for its intended purpose, while correspondence from the Governor of Cartagena verifies the accuracy of the often dismissed accounts provided in pamphlets authored by Surgeon-Spy Herries.

The lack of a coordinated or consolidated departure from New Caledonia by its surviving participants, including its deserters, has been a deterrent to a thorough examination of the roles they played in the diaspora they inadvertently created. Though a small number did return to Scotland, the contributions of the majority who settled in new communities scattered across the Americas would be notable. Certainly Colonel John Anderson´s future in New Jersey, the acquisition of an estate on Jamaica by Colonel Guthrie, and the addition of Alexander Stobo to the ministry in South Carolina are all significant, yet the undocumented lives of those who integrated into cities and villages across both Spanish America and British America also deserve credit for their adaptation to completely unintended circumstances and itineraries.

An overwhelming realization acquired during the preparation of the previous chapters is that there remains a significant amount of material regarding the Darien expeditions that has yet to be brought to the historical record. Limited as it is to two languages, this work self-restricts itself to that portion of manuscripts. Nevertheless, the material available in English and Spanish also indicates, through its revelation of involvement by the French and the Portuguese, and the interest documented from Vienna, Hamburg and

Amsterdam[593], that pertinent material is resting in a significant array of archives, waiting to add to the history of Darien and the Atlantic World at the end of the seventeenth century. The closely observed irritation the expeditions created between Spain and England, the reaction of the Papacy and the eager assistance offered by France, the financial opportunity for merchants operating out of Caribbean and North American ports, and the shared concern of both Scotland and Spain involving Pacific shores all indicate that there are additional aspects of New Caledonia´s story, reaching far beyond the British Isles, yet to be discovered.

APPENDIX I

[593] From Vienna in August 1699 came word from the English representative A. Sutton to Under Secretary of State J. Ellis that "the establishment of the Scotch Company upon the Coast of Darien is become a concern at this Court also". BL, ADD MS 28903, Vol. VIII, f. 401r. Chapter III of Insh´s *The Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies*, examines pre-expedition efforts and political machinations in Amsterdam and Hamburg, particularly by English representative Paul Rycaut, pp. 82-105.

Caledonia: The Declaration of the Council constituted by the Indian and African Company of Scotland, for the government and direction of their Colonies and Settlements in the Indies.

The said Company pursuant to the Powers and Immunities granted unto them by His Majesty of Great Britain, our Sovereign Lord, with Advice and Consent of His Parliament of Scotland, having granted and conceded unto us and our Successors in the Government for all times hereafter, full Power to equip, set out, freight, and navigate our own or hired Ships, in warlike or other manner, from any Ports or Places in amity, or not in hostility with His Majesty, to any Lands, Islands, Countries, or Places in Asia, Africa, or America, and there to plant Colonies, build Cities, Towns or Forts, in or upon the places not inhabited; or in or upon any other place, by consent of the Natives or Inhabitants thereof, and not possest by any European Soveraign, Potentate, Prince, or State; and to provide and furnish the aforesaid Places, Cities, Towns, or Forts, with Magazines, Ordinance, Arms, Weapons, Ammunition and Stores of War; and by force of Arms to defend the same Trade, Navigation, Colonies, Cities, Towns, Forts, Plantations, and other Effects whatsoever; and likewise to make Reprizals, and to seek and take reparation of damage done by Sea or by Land; and to make and conclude Treaties of Peace and Commerce with Soveraign Princes, Estates, Rulers, Governours or Proprietors of the aforesaid Lands, Islands, Countries, or places in Asia, Africa or America.

And reserving to themselves five per Cent, or one twentieth part of the Lands, Mines, Minerals, Stones of value, precious Woods, and Fishings, have further conceded and granted unto us, the free and absolute Right and Property in and to all Such Lands, Islands, Colonies, Towns, Forts and Plantations, as we shall come to establish, or possess in manner aforesaid; as also to all manner of Treasures, Wealth, Riches, Profits, Mines, Minerals and Fishings, with the whole Product and Benefit thereof, as well under as above the Ground, as well in Rivers and Seas as in the Lands thereunto belonging; or for or by reason of the same in any sort, together with the right of Government and Admiralty thereof; as likewise that all manner of Persons who shall settle to inhabit, or be born in any such Plantations, Colonies, Cities, Towns, Factories, or Places, shall be, and be reputed as Natives of the Kingdom of Scotland. And generally the said Company have communicated unto us a Right to all the Powers, Properties and Privileges granted unto them by Act of Parliament, or otherwise howsoever, with Power to grant and delegate the same, and to permit and allow such sort of Trade, Commerce and Navigation unto the Plantations, Colonies, Cities, and Places of our Possession, as we shall think fit and convenient.

And the chief Captains and Supream Leaders of the People of Darien, in compliance with former Agreements, having now in most kind and obliging manner received us into their Friendship and Country with promise and contract to assist and join in defense thereof, against such as shall be their or our Enemies in any time to come: Which, besides its being one of the most healthful, rich, and fruitful Countries upon Earth, hath the advantage of being a narrow ISTHMUS, seated in the heighth of the World, between two vast Oceans, which renders it more convenient than any other for being the common Store-house of the

insearchable and immense Treasures of the spacious South Seas, the door of Commerce to China and Japan, and, the Emporium and Staple for the Trade of both Indies.

And now by virtue of the before-mentioned Powers to us given, We do here settle, and in the name of GOD establish Our Selves: and in Honour and for the Memory of that most Ancient, and Renowned Name of our Mother Kingdom, We do, and will from hence-forward call this Country by the Name of Caledonia; and our selves, Successors; and Associates, by the name of Caledonians.

And suitable to the Weight and greatness of the Trust reposed, and the valuable Opportunity now in our hands, being firmly resolved to communicate and dispose thereof in the most just and equal manner for increasing the Dominions and Subjects of the King Our Soveraign Lord, the Honour and wealth of our Country, as well as the benefit and advantage of those who now are, or may hereafter be concerned with us: We do hereby declare, That all manner of People soever, shall from hence-forward be equally free and alike capable of the said Properties, Privileges, Protections, Immunities, and Rights of Government granted unto us; and the Merchants and Merchants Ships of all Nations, may freely come to and trade with us, without being liable in their Persons, Goods or Effects, to any manner of Capture, Confiscation, Seizure, Forfeiture, Attachment, Arrest, Restraint or Prohibition, for or by reason of any Embargo, breach of the Peace, Letters of Mark, or Reprizals, Declaration of War with any foreign Prince, Potentate or State, or upon any other account or pretence whatsoever.

And we do hereby not only grant and concede, and declare a general and equal freedom of Government and Trade to those of all Nations, who shall hereafter be of or concerned with us; but also a full and free Liberty of Conscience in matter of Religion, so as the same be not understood to allow, connive at or indulge the balspheming of God´s holy Name, or any of his Divine Attributes; or of the unhallowing or prophaning the Sabbath Day.

And finally, as the best and surest means to render any Government successful, durable, and happy, it shall (by the help of Almighty God be ever our constant and chiefest care that all our further Constitutions, Laws, and Ordinances, be consonant and agreeable to the Holy Scripture, right Reason, and the Examples of the wisest and justest Nations, that from the Truth and Rightcon . . . thereof we may reasonably hope for and expect the Blessings of Prosperity and Increase.

By Order of the Council,
Hugh Ross, Secretary
New Edinburgh
December 18, 1698

Source:
Anonymous, *An Enquiry into the Causes of the Miscarraige of the Scots Colony at Darien or an Answer to a Libel Entituled* `A Defence of the Scots Abdicating Darien´. *Submitted to the Good People of England* (Glasgow 1700), pp. 67-69.

APPENDIX II

Articles of Agreement betwixt the Council of Caledonia and Captain Ephraim Pilkingtoun

WITNESSETH AS FOLLOWES.

First, The said Ephraim Pilkingtoun shall have and receive for the hyre of his Shalloop twelve full shares.

2d, The said Ephraim Pilkingtoun shall have and receive for himselfe two shares and a halfe.

3d, The Doctor shall have one hundred pieces of eight for his chest of Medicins, and one share in common.

4th, The said Council reserves to themselves one tenth part of all the loading of any prize taken at sea – the wounded and disabled men being first provided for, and the like share of all booty taken upon land.

5. If any man be disabled in the service of the voyage, in so much that he be put from getting a future lyvlyhood, in such case the same man shall have and receive six hundred peeces of eight, or six able slaves, if so much be made in the said voyage

6. All the remaining part of the profit of the voyage to be equally divided amongst the men belonging to the vessels, share and part alike.

7. That the said Ephraim Pilkingtoun have his choice of first, second, or third prize taken in the voyage in the lieu of his, not exceeding three in number.

In virtue wherof, both parties have herto set their hands at Fort St Andrew the Elevinth day of March One thousand six hundred nynty nyn

Robert Jolly, J Ephr Pilkington

Source: John H. Burton (ed.), *The Darien Papers: Being A Selection Of Original Letters And Official Documents Relating To The Establishment Of A Colony At Darien By The Company Of Scotland Trading To Africa And The Indies. 1695-1700* (Edinburgh 1849), p. 101.

Abbreviations

AGI Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla

AGS Archivo General de Simancas

AHN Archivo Historico Nacional, Madrid

BL British Library, London

CSP Calendar of State Papers

HL Huntington Library, San Marino, California

KHLC Kent History and Library Center, Maidstone

MHS Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston

NA National Archives, Kew

NAS National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh

NLJ National Library of Jamaica

NLS National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh

NMM National Maritime Museum/Caird Library, Greenwich

RBS Royal Bank of Scotland Archives, Edinburgh

UGSp University of Glasgow, Special Collections

ULIHR University of London, Institute of Historical Research

Bibliography

Manuscript Sources

England:
British Library (London)
ADD MS 12403 Long, E., *Political History of Jamaica to 1717*
ADD MS 12422 Barnham, Dr. Henry, *The Civil History of Jamaica to the Year 1722*
ADD MS 28903 Papers of J. Ellis, Vol.VIII, March-Aug. 1699
ADD MS 28904 Papers of J. Ellis, Vol. IX, Sept 1699-April 1700
ADD MS 28905 Papers of J. Ellis, Vol. X, May-Sept., 1700
ADD MS 37992 W. Blathwayt Letter Book, 1698-1701
ADD MS 40774 Vernon Papers, Volume IV
ADD MS 46542 Lexington Papers-Letters and Documents concerning the Council of Trade and Plantations of which he was a member, 1699-1702

Kent History and Library Center (Maidstone)
U1590 Stanhope of Chevening Manuscripts

National Archives (Kew)
ADM1 Admiralty Correspondence and Papers (Vols. 1435, 1462, 1463, 2003, 2004, 2033, 5261)
ADM2 Admiralty, Out-Letters (Vol. 25)
ADM3 Admiralty, Minutes (Vol. 15)
ADM6 Admiralty Service Records (Vol. 5)
ADM7 Collection of Memos and Remarks on a Voyage to the West Indies (Vol. 833)
ADM33 Admiralty, Navy Board, Ships´ Pay Books (Vols. 204, 206, 207)
ADM36 Admiralty, Royal Navy Ships´ Musters (Vol. 3378)
ADM51, Admiralty, Captains´ Logs (Vols. 341, 389, 571, 3892)
ADM52, Admiralty, Masters´ Logs (Vols. 34, 39)
ADM106 Admiralty, Navy Board Records (Vols. 525, 533)
CO137 Colonial Office and Predecessors: Jamaica (Vols. 4, 5, 44)
CO142 Colonial Office: Misc. Jamaica, Shipping Returns, 1680-1705 (Vol. 13)
CO324 Commissions, Instructions, Board of Trade Correspondence (Vol. 5)
SP32 Secretaries of State: State Papers Domestic, William and Mary (Vols. 11, 12)
SP89 Secretaries of State: State Papers Foreign, Portugal (Vols. 17, 18)
SP94 Secretaries of State: State Papers Foreign, Spain (Vols. 74, 75, 212, 229)
SP103 Secretaries of State: State Papers Foreign, Treaty Papers (Vol. 66-1)
SP104 Secretary of State´s Letter Book 1695-1701 (Vol. 198)
SP113 State Papers: Gazettes and Pamphlets: Treaties (Vol. 6)
T4 Treasury: Reference Book of Applications (Vol. 7)
T70 Company of Royal Adventurers of England, (Vols. 61, 119)

National Maritime Museum/Caird Library (Greenwich)
Lieutenants´ Logs (ADM/L/F/28, ADM/L/G/47, ADM/L/M/21)
Phillipps Collection (PLA/23)

Jamaica:
National Library of Jamaica (Kingston)
J28L434 Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica (Vol. 1)
MS60 Legislative Council Minutes (Vol. 12)
MS 1049 Notes on the Illicit Trade Carried on by Sloops from Jamaica with the Spanish in the Gulf of Mexico

Scotland:
Collection of Blair Castle, Perthshire, NRAS 234, Box 45, Bundle 1
National Archives of Scotland (Edinburgh)
GD1/649/2 Diary of George Home of Kimmerghame
GD26/13/119 Petition to the King by the Council-General of the Company of Scotland
GD406/1 Hamilton Papers
GD446 Papers of the Douglas Family of Strathendry, Fife
PA7/17 Parliamentary Papers
PC12/1700 Records of the Privy Council
RH4/135 Darien Company Papers

National Library of Scotland (Edinburgh)
Adv MS 83.2.5-83.9.3 Darien Papers
MS 70
MS 846 Journey of *The Unicorn*
MS 1914 Darien Company
Ch.A.238-42 Company of Scotland Letter Book

Royal Bank of Scotland Archives (Edinburgh), Manuscripts of the Company of Scotland

University of Edinburgh Library, Centre for Research Collections, MS Laing 262, Memorial or Diary of Mr. Francis Borland, 1661-1722

University of Glasgow Library, Special Collections, Spencer Collection, MS General 1681,1685, 1686, 1687

Spain:
Archivo General de Indias (Sevilla)
Sección de Casa de la Contratación, Legajos 4887, 4987, 5726A
Sección de la Audiencia de Lima, Legajos 91, 407, 520
Sección de la Audiencia de Mexico, Legajo 61
Sección de la Audiencia de Panamá, Legajos 105, 109, 110, 113, 159, 160, 161, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 175, 177, 181, 182, 215, 243, 255, 306, 307
Sección de la Audiencia de Santa Fé, Legajos 48, 79, 435
Sección de la Audiencia de Santo Domingo, Legajo 375
Sección de Contaduria, Legajo 1780A
Sección de la Escribania de Cámara, Legajos 477A, 622A-C, 1048B, 1108B, 1179A, 1192
Sección de Indiferente General, Legajos 316, 2015
Sección de Mapas y Planos, Panamá, Legajos 119, 119BIS, 120, 149, 255

Archivo General de Simancas
Sección de Estado, Legajos 3091, 3944, 3970, 3971, 3996, 4183
Sección de Secretaria del Despacho de Guerra, Legajos 7054, 7242

Archivo Historico Nacional (Madrid)
Sección de Estado, Legajos 195, 702, 1778

United States:

Huntington Library, San Marino, California
Huntington Manuscripts 32265-32296, West Indies: MS32282, MS32283
Papers of John Egerton, 3rd Earl of Bridgewater, 1594-1700: MS9714
Papers of William Blathwayt, 1657-1770: MSBL6, MSBL7, MSBL8, MSBL9, MSBL10

Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston), Francis Russell Hart Collection, Section IV, Darien Scots´ Settlement, 1697-1701

Printed Manuscript Collections and Indices

Angel de la Plaza Bores, D., *Archivo General de Simancas, Guia del Investigador* (Madrid 1980)

Archivo General de Indias, *Catálogo de Mapas y Planos-Panamá, Santa Fé y Quito* (Madrid 1985)

Archivo General de Indias, *Inventario Analitico de los papeles que vinieran de la contratación de Sevilla a este Archivo General de Indias, Tomo IV* (Sevilla undated)

Archivo General de Indias, *Inventario de Escribania de Camará, Tomo VII* (Sevilla 1995)

Archivo General de Indias, *Seccion V Gobierno, Audiencia de Panamá Inventario* (Sevilla 1980)

Archivo General de Indias, *Seccion V Gobierno, Audiencia de Santa Fé Inventario* (Sevilla undated)

Bannister, Saxe (ed.), *Writings of William Paterson, Volume 1* (London 1859)

Bateson, E. (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of William III, 1699-1700* (London 1937)

Bateson, E. (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, William III, April 1700-March 1702* (London 1937)

Burton, J.H. (ed.), *The Darien Papers: Being a Selection of Original Letters and Official Documents Relating to the Establishment of a Colony at Darien by the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies. 1695-1700,* (Bannatyne Society, Edinburgh 1849)

Camacho Sánchez, Miguel, *Bibliografía General de Cartagena de Indias, Tomo III* (Mompox 2007)

Centro Oficial de Estudios Americanistas, Archivo General de Indias, *Catálogo: Cuadro General de la Documentación* (Sevilla 1918)

Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society, Volume XXIV (Hartford 1932)

Cuervo, Antonio (ed.), *Colección de Documentos Inéditos Sobre la Geografía y la Historia de Colombia, Seccion 1-Geografía y Viajes, Tomo I, Costa Atlántica* (Bogota 1891)

Cuervo, Antonio (ed.), *Colección de Documentos Inéditos Sobre la Geografía y la Historia de Colombia, Seccion 1-Geografía y Viajes, Tomo II, Costa Pacifica, Provincia Litorales y Campañas de los Conquistadores* (Bogota 1892)

Davis, Robert, *Colombia: World Bibliographical Series* (Oxford 1990)

Dickinson, W. and Hitchcock, E., *The War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713, A Selected Bibliography* (Westport, CT., 1996)

Donnan, Elizabeth, *Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America, Volume I:1441-1700* (Washington, D.C. 1930)

Gasteazoro, Carlos Manuel, *Introducción al estudio de la historia de Panamá, Tomo I, Fuentes de la Epoca Hispana* (Mexico, D.F. 1956)

Gonzalez Palencia, Angel, `Extracto del Catalogo de los Documentos del Consejo de Indias Conservados en la Sección de Consejos del Archivo Historico Nacional´, *Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos, Tomo XLI* (Madrid 1920)

Goslinga, Marian, *A Bibliography of the Caribbean* (Lanham, Maryland. and London 1996)

Grant, J. (ed.), *Seafield Correspondence from 1685 to 1708* (Scottish Historic Society, Edinburgh 1912)

Grimblot, Paul (ed.), *Letters of William III and Louis XIV and of Their Ministers, Illustrative of the Domestic and Foreign Politics of England from The Peace of Ryswick to The Accession of Philip V of Spain, 1697 to 1700* (London 1848)

Gutierréz, Horacio, *A Escravidao na América Latina E No Caribe: Bibliografia Básica* (Sao Paulo 1990)

Hanke, Lewis, *Guia de las Fuentes en el Archivo General de Indias para el estudio de la administración virreinal Española en Mexico y en el Peru, 1535-1700* (Germany 1977)

Hart, Russell Francis, `Spanish Documents Relating to the Scots Settlement of Darien´, *Proceedings of Massachusetts Historical Society*, Vol. 63 (March 1930)

Headlam, Cecil (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1699. Also Addenda, 1621-1698. Preserved in the Public Record Office* (London 1908)

Headlam, Cecil (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series. America and West Indies, 1700. Preserved in the Public Record Office* (London 1910)

Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on the Laing Manuscripts Preserved in the University of Edinburgh, Volume II* (London 1925)

Ingram, K.E., *Manuscript Sources for the History of the West Indies* (Kingston 2000)

Insh, G.P. (ed.), *Papers Relating to the Ships and Voyages of the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies 1696-1707* (Edinburgh 1924)

James, G. P. R. (ed.), *Letters Illustrative of the Reign of William III from 1696 to 1708 Addressed to The Duke of Shrewsbury, by James Vernon, Esq., Secretary of State* (London 1841)

Joyce, L.E. Elliott (ed.), *A new voyage and description of the isthmus of America by Lionel Wafer*, *Surgeon on Buccaneering Expeditions in Darien, the West Indies, and the Pacific from 1680 to 1688* (Oxford 1934)

Kapp, Kit, *The Early Maps of Panama up to 1865* (Ohio 1971)

Langstaff, Eleanor, *Panama: World Bibliographical Series* (Oxford 2000)

Lucena Salmoral, Manuel, *Historiografia de Panamá* (Panama 1967)

Macera, Pablo, *Papeles de Panamá, Siglo XVIII* (Lima 1989)

McCormick, J. (ed.), *State Papers and letters, addressed to William Carstares, confidential secretary to K. William during the whole of his reign: Relating to public affairs in Great-Britain, To which is prefixed the life of Mr Carstares* (Edinburgh 1774)

Moreyra y Paz-Soldan, Manuel and Cespedes del Castillo, Guillermo, *Virreinato Peruano Documentos para su Historia, Colección de Cartas de Virreyes, Conde de la Monclova, Tomo II (1695-1698)* (Lima 1955)

Moreyra y Paz-Soldan, Manuel and Cespedes del Castillo, Guillermo, *Virreinato Peruano Documentos para su Historia, Colección de Cartas de Virreyes, Conde de la Monclova, Tomo III (1699-1705)* (Lima 1955)

Nelson, William and Honeyman, A.V.D. (eds.), *New Jersey Archives, 1st Series, Extracts from American Newspapers, Relating to New Jersey, 1704-1775, Volume I, 1704-1739* (New Jersey 1894)

Ortega Ricaurte, Enrique, *Misiones Colombianas en los Archivos Europeos* (Mexico, D.F. 1951)

Paz, J. and Magdaleno, R., *Archivo de Simancas, Catalogo XVII, Secretaria de Estado, Documentos Relativos a Inglaterra (1254-1834)* (Madrid 1947)

Pescador del Hoyo, Maria del Carmen, *Documentos de Indias, Siglos XV-XIX, Catalogo De La Serie Existente En La Sección De Diversos* (Madrid 1954)

Rose, G.H. (ed.), *A Selection from the Papers of the Earls of Marchmont, Volume III* (London 1831)

Sanchez Belda, Luis, *Direccion General de Archivos y Bibliotecas, Guia del Archivo Historico Nacional* (Madrid 1958)

Scott, John, *A Bibliography of Printed Documents and Books Relating to the Darien Company* (Edinburgh 1904)

Scott, W.R., *Scottish Economic Literature to 1800* (Glasgow 1911)

Sewall, Samuel, *Letter-Book Volume 1* (Massachusetts Historical Society/Boston 1886)

Spencer, J.J., `Some Darien Letters´, *The Scottish Historical Review*, Vol. 11 (1914)

Stanhope, Alexander, *Spain under Charles the Second, Or, Extracts from the correspondence of the Hon. Alexander Stanhope, British minister at Madrid, 1690-1699. From the originals at Chevening* (London 1840)

Susto, Juan Antonio, *Catálogo de la Audiencia de Panamá sección del Archivo de Indias de Sevilla* (Madrid 1926)

Thomas, D. and Case, L. (eds.), *Guide to the Diplomatic Archives of Western Europe* (Philadelphia 1959)

Thomas, M. (ed.), *The Diary of Samuel Sewall, Volume I: 1674-1708* (New York 1998)

Walne, Peter, (ed.), *A Guide to Manuscript Sources for the History of Latin America and the Caribbean in the British Isles* (London 1973)

Ward, Christopher, `Historical Writing on Colonial Panama´, *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 69:4 (Nov. 1989)

Whitehead, William A. (ed.), *New Jersey Archives, First Series, Volume II, Documents Relating to the Colonial History of New Jersey (1631-1776)* (Newark 1881)

Contemporary Published Pamphlets and Correspondence

Allen, Robert, *An Essay on the Nature and Methods of carrying on a TRADE to the SOUTH SEA, by Robert Allen, Who Resided Some Years in the Kingdom of Peru* (London 1712)

Allen, Robert, *Essay on the nature and methods of carrying on a trade to the South-Sea, A new trade laid open from the islands of Tobago, Granados, . . to the Spanish main, in the Kingdom of Peru, And from Cape Florida to the Havana and La Vera Cruz, in the Kingdom of Mexico, By a gentleman who resided many years in both kingdoms* (London 1763)

Allen, Robert, *The great importance of the Havannah, set forth in an essay on the nature and methods of carrying on a trade to the South Sea, and the Spanish West Indies. By Robert Allen, Esq.; Who Resided some Years in the Kingdom of Peru* (London 1762)

Anonymous, *An Enquiry into the Causes of the Miscarriage of the Scots Colony at Darien or an Answer to a Libel Entituled* `A Defence of the Scots Abdicating Darien´. *Submitted to the Consideration of the Good People of England.* (Glasgow 1700)

Anonymous (with trans. by G. Rivera), *Gazeta extraordinaria del feliz successo: que las Armas Españolas invieron en el desalejamiento del Escoces que se avia fortificado en el Playon, Costa de Portovelo, Provincia del Darien en el Reyno de Tierra firme, á 11 de Abril de este presente año 1700,* (Lima 1700)

Belhaven, John Hamilton; Ridpath, George; Fletcher, Andrew; Foyer, Archibald, *A defence of the Scots settlement at Darien: With an answer to the Spanish memorial against it. And arguments to prove that it is the interest of England to join with the Scots, and protect it. To which is added, A description of the country . . .* (Edinburgh 1699)

Byres, James, *Letter to a Friend at Edinburgh from Roterdam* (Edinburgh? 1702)

Gentleman Lately Arrived, *The history of Caledonia: or, The Scots colony in Darien in the West Indies: With an account of the manners of the inhabitants, and the riches of the countrey* (London 1699)

Herries (Harris), Walter, *A Defence of the Scots Abdicating Darien: Including An Answer to the Defence of the Scot´s Settlement there* (Glasgow 1700)

Herries (Harris), Walter, *A New Darien Artifice Laid Open; in a notable instance of Captain Maclean´s name being used (in the Flying Post, February 11 and 13 1700/01) to vouch for the* Caledonian *Company, after that Gentleman hath been persecuted by them these thirteen months past for vouching against them* (London 1701)

Herries (Harris), Walter and Hodges, James, *A Short vindication of Phil. Scot´s Defence of the Scots abdicating Darien being in answer to the challenge of the author of the defence of that settlement, to prove the Spanish title to Darien, by inheritance, marriage, donation, purchase, reversion, surrender or conquest: with a prefatory reply to the false and*

scurrilous aspersions, of the new author of, The just and modest vindication, &c., and some animadversions on the material part of it, relating to the title of Darien (London 1700)

Herries (Harris), Walter, *An Enquiry into the Caledonian Project, with a Defence of England´s Procedure (In point of Equity) in Relation thereunto, In a Friendly Letter from London, to a Member of the Scots African and Indian company in Edinburgh, to guard againft Paffion* (London 1701)

Ridpath, George, *An Enquiry into the causes of the miscarriage of the Scots Colony at Darien, or, An answer to a libel entitled A defence of the Scots abdicating Darien submitted to the consideration of the good people of England* (Glasgow 1700)

Ridpath, George, *Scotland´s Grievances relating to Darien etc., humbly offered to the consideration of the Parliament* (Edinburgh (?) 1700)

Secondary Sources

Alba C., M., *Cronologia de los Gobernantes de Panama 1510-1967* (Panama 1967)

Alsedo y De Herrera, Dionisio, *Piraterías Y Agresiones De Los Ingleses Y De Otros Pueblos De Europa En La América Española: Desde El Siglo XVI Al XVIII* (Madrid 1883)

Anderson, Dr. C.L.G., *Old Panama and Castilla del Oro, a narrative history of the discovery, conquest, and settlement by the Spaniards of Panama, Darien, Veragua, Santo Domingo, Santa Marta, Cartagena, Nicaragua, and Peru: including the four voyages of Columbus to America . . .* (Boston 1911)

Araúz, Celestino and Tello Burgos, Argelia, *Manual de Historia de Panamá, Tomo I* (Panama 2006)

Araúz, Celestino, *Panamá y sus relaciones internacionales, Vols. 1 y 2* (Panama 1994)

Arbell, Mordechal, *The Portuguese Jews of Jamaica* (University of the West Indies 2000)

Arce, Enrique, *Guia historica de Panama* (Panama 1942)

Arce, Enrique J. and Sosa, Juan B, *Compendio de Historia de Panamá, Tomo I, El Descubrimiento-La Conquista y la Colonia* (Panama 1934)

Arciniegas, Germán, *Caribbean: Sea of the New World,* translated by H. de Onis (New York 1946)

Armitage, D. and Braddick, M. (eds), *The British Atlantic World 1500-1800* (Basingstoke 2009)

Bailyn, Bernard, *The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge 1955)

Baker, Emerson and Reid, John, *The New England Knight, Sir William Phips, 1651-1695* (Toronto 1998)

Bakewell, Peter, A History of Latin America, Empires and Sequels 1450-1930 (Oxford 1997)

Balf, Todd, *The Darkest Jungle* (New York 2003)

Barbour, James S., *A History of William Paterson and the Darien Company: With Illustrations and Appendices* (Edinburgh 1907)

Baxter, Stephen, *William III* (London 1966)

Becker, J. and Groot, J.M., *El Nuevo Reino de Granada en el siglo XVIII* (Madrid 1921)

Benbow, William A., *Brave Benbow: the life of Vice-Admiral John Benbow, 1653-1702* (Victoria, B.C. 1992)

Benjamin, Thomas, *The Atlantic World-Europeans, Africans, Indians and Their Shared History, 1400-1900* (Cambridge 2009)

Biblioteca de la Presidencia de Colombia, *Historia documentada de la Iglesia en Uraba y el Darien, Desde el Descubrimiento hasta nuestros dias, Volumen IV, Segunda Parte, 1550-1810* (Bogota 1956)

Bishop, Farnham, *Panama, Past and Present* (New York 1913)

Borland, Rev. Francis, *The History of Darien 1700* (Glasgow 1779)

Bourne, Ruth, *Queen Anne´s navy in the West Indies. [With a map and a bibliographical note.]* (New Haven 1939)

Bridenbaugh, Carl and Roberta, *No Peace Beyond The Line: The English in the Caribbean 1624-1690* (New York 1972)

Bridges, Rev. George W., *The Annals of Jamaica* (London 1828)

Brooks, George E., *Eurafricans in Western Africa: Commerce, Social Status, Gender and Religious Observance from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century* (Ohio 2003)

Brown, Lesley (ed.), *The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles* (Oxford 1993)

Brown, Patrick, *The Civil and Natural History of Jamaica* (London 1789)

Browning, Andrew, *Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby and Duke of Leeds 1632-1712, Volume 1, Life* (Glasgow 1951)

Buisseret, David, *The Mapmaker´s Quest; depicting new worlds in Renaissance Europe* (Oxford 2003)

Burnet, Bishop Gilbert, *History of His Own Time, Volume II, From the Revolution to the Conclusion of the Treaty of Peace at Utrecht in the Reign of Queen Anne* (London 1734)

Burns, Sir Alan, *History of the British West Indies* (London 1965)

Campbell, John, *Lives of the admirals, and other eminent British seamen: containing their personal histories, and a detail of all their public services; including a new and accurate naval history from the earliest account of time; and clearly proving by a continued series of facts, our uninterrupted claim to, and enjoyment of our seas; interspersed with many curious passages relating to our discoveries, plantations, and commerce; supported by proper authorities* (London 1761)

Carles, Ruben D., *220 Años del Periodo Colonial en Panamá* (Panamá 1959)

Castillero Calvo, Alfredo, *Conquista, Evangelización y Resistencia, ¿Triunfo o Fracaso de la Política Indigenista?* (Panamá 1995)

Castillero Calvo, Alfredo, *Historia general de Panamá: Volumen 1, Tomo 1- Las Sociedades Originarias, El Orden Colonial* (Panamá 2004)

Castillero Reyes, Ernesto, *Historia de la comunicación interoceanica y de su influencia en la formación y en el desarrollo de la entidad nacional panameño* (Panamá 1999)

Castillero Reyes, Ernesto, *Historia de Panamá* (Panamá 1948)

Clarke, T.E.S. and Foxcroft, H.C., *A Life of Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury* (Cambridge 1907)

Clayton, Tim, *Tars, The Men Who Made Britain Rule the Waves* (London 2007)

Covi, Giovanna (ed.), *Caribbean-Scottish Relations, Colonial and Contemporary Inscriptions in History, Language and Literature* (London 2007)

Crouse, Nellis, *The French Struggle for the West Indies* (New York 1966)

Crowhurst, Patrick, *The defence of British trade, 1689-1815* (Folkestone 1977)

Cullen, Edward, *Isthmus of Darien Ship Canal, With a Full History of the Scotch Colony of Darien, Several Maps, Views of the Country, and Original Documents* (London 1853)

Cundall, Frank, *The Darien Venture* (New York 1926)

Davenport, Frances G. (ed.), *European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies, Volume II 1650-1697* (Washington, D.C. 1929)

Davenport, Frances G. (ed.), *European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies, Volume III 1698-1715* (Washington, D.C. 1934)

Del Castillo Mathieu, Nicolas, *Los Gobernadores de Cartagena de Indias (1504-1810)* (Bogotá 1998)

Delevante, Marilyn and Alberga, Anthony, *The Island of One People-An Account of the History of the Jews of Jamaica* (Kingston 2006)

Devine, T.M., *The Scottish Nation* (New York 1999)

Dobson, David, *The Original Scots Colonists of Early America, Caribbean Supplement 1611-1707* (Baltimore 1999)

Earle, Peter, *Sailors: English Merchant Seamen 1650-1725* (London 1998)

Elliott, J.H., *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven 2006)

Elliott, J.H., *Imperial Spain 1469-1716* (London 1963)

Elliott, J.H., *Spain and Its World 1500-1700, Selected Essays* (New Haven 1989)

Ferguson, William, *Scotland´s Relations with England: s Survey to 1707* (Edinburgh 1977)

Fernández Nadal, Carmen María, *La política exterior de la monarquía de Carlos II-El Consejo de Estado y la Embajada en Londres (1665-1700)* (Gijon 2009)

Fisher, J.R., *The Economic Aspects of Spanish Imperialism in America, 1492-1810* (Liverpool 1997)

Fisher, Lillian, *Viceregal Administration in the Spanish-American Colonies* (University of California 1926)

Forrester, Andrew, *The Man Who Saw the Future* (New York 2004)

Foster, G.J., *Doctors´ Commons: Its Courts and Registries* (London 1871)

Francis, A.D., *The Methuens and Portugal 1691-1708* (Cambridge 1966)

Fry, Michael, *The Scottish Empire* (Edinburgh 2001)

Fry, Michael, *The Union: England, Scotland and the Treaty of 1707* (Edinburgh 2006)

Furber, Holden, *Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800* (Minneapolis 1976)

Gallup-Diaz, I. J., *The Door of the Seas and the Key to the Universe: Indian Politics and Imperial Rivalry in the Darien, 1640-1750* (New York 2005)

Galvin, Peter, *Patterns of Pillage: A Geography of Caribbean-based Piracy in Spanish America, 1536-1718* (New York 1958)

Garcia Casares, Joaquin, *Historia del Darién-Cunas, Españoles, Afros, presencia y actualidad de los Chocoes* (Panamá 2008)

Gause, Frank, *The Story of Panama: The New Route to India* (Boston 1912)

Gongora, Mario, *Studies in the History of Spanish America* (Cambridge 1975)

Gonzales Garcia, Pedro, *Discovering the Americas-The Archive of the Indies* (New York 1997)

Gottheil, Richard, *The Belmont-Belmonte Family: A Record of Four Hundred Years* (New York 1917)

Graham, Eric, *Seawolves: Pirates and the Scots* (Edinburgh 2005)

Grahn, Lance, *The Political Economy of Smuggling; regional informal economies in early Bourbon New Granada* (Boulder 1997)

Grosjean, Alexia and Murdoch, Steve (eds.), *Scottish Communities abroad in the early modern period* (Leiden 2005)

Hamilton, Douglas, *Scotland, the Caribbean and the Atlantic World, 1750-1820* (Manchester 2005)

Hamshere, Cyril, *The British in the Caribbean* (Cambridge 1972)

Haring, Clarence H., *The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the XVII Century* (New York 1910)

Haring, Clarence H., *The Spanish Empire in America* (New York 1947)

Haring, Clarence H., *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs* (Cambridge 1918)

Hart, F.R., *Admirals of the Caribbean* (Boston 1922)

Hart, F.R., *The Disaster of Darien, The Story of the Scots Settlement and the Causes of its Failure 1699-1701* (New York 1929)

Hattendorf, John, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702-1712* (New York and London 1987)

Herzog, Tamar, *Defining Nations - Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America* (New Haven 2003)

Herzog, Tamar, *Upholding Justice - Society, State, and the Penal System in Quito (1650-1750)* (Ann Arbor 2004)

Holton, Robert J., *Globalization and the Nation-State* (New York 1998)

Horton, Mark, *Caledonia Bay, Panama, 1979, A preliminary report on the archaeological project of Operation Drake* (London 1980)

Houston, James and Bickerstaff, Jacob, *Memoirs of the life and travels of James Houston, M.D. from the year 1690 to this present year 1747 . . . . Collected and written by his own hand* (London 1747)

Howarth, David, *Panama, The Golden Isthmus* (London 1966)

Howe, James, *Chiefs, Scribes, and Ethnographers, Kuna Culture from Inside and Out* (Austin, Texas 2009)

Insh, G.P., *Historian´s Odyssey* (Edinburgh 1938)

Insh, G.P., *Scottish Colonial Schemes, 1620-1686* (Glasgow 1922)

Insh, G.P., *The Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies* (London 1932)

Jacobsen, Gertrude, *William Blathwayt: a Late Seventeenth Century English Administrator* (London 1932)

Jaén Suárez, Omar, *La población del Istmo de Panamá desde el siglo XVI al XX* (Panamá 1978)

Kamen, Henry, *Spain 1469-1714, A society of conflict* (London 1983)

Kamen, Henry, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century 1665-1700* (London 1980)

Kamen, Henry, *Spain´s Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power 1492-1763* (London 2002)

Kamen, Henry, *The War of Succession in Spain 1700-15* (Bloomington 1969)

Klooster, Wim, *Illicit Riches-Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648-1795* (Leiden 1998)

Koot, Christian, *Empire at the Periphery, British Colonists, Anglo-Dutch Trade, and the Development of the British Atlantic, 1621-1713* (New York 2011)

Lane, Kris, *Pillaging the Empire; Piracy in the Americas 1500-1700* (London 1998)

Langdon-Davies, John, *Carlos: The King Who Would Not Die* (New Jersey 1962)

Lemaitre, Eduardo, *Historia General de Cartagena, Tomo II, La Colonia* (Bogota 1983)

Lenman, Bruce P. (ed), *Military Engineers and the Development of the Early-Modern European State* (Dundee 2013)

Leslie, Charles, *A New History of Jamaica, From the Earliest Accounts, to the Taking of Porto Bello by Vice-Admiral Vernon* (London 1740)

Long, Edward, *The history of Jamaica: or general survey of the ancient and modern state of that island: with reflections on its situation, settlements, inhabitants, climate, products, commerce, laws, and government* (London 1774)

Lynch, John, *New Worlds, A Religious History of Latin America* (New Haven 2012)

Lynch, John, *Spain Under the Hapsburgs, Volume Two: Spain and America, 1598-1700* (New York 1984)

Lyons, Adam, *The 1711 Expedition to Quebec: politics and the limitations of British global strategy* (New York and London 2013)

MacKay, Ruth, *Lazy, Improvident People* (Ithaca 2006)

Mackenzie, W. C., *Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun* (Edinburgh 1935)

Marchena Fernandez, Juan, *La Institucion Militar en Cartagena de Indias en el Siglo XVIII* (Sevilla 1982)

Marco Dorta, Enrique, *Cartagena de Indias-Puerto y Plaza Fuerte* (Cartagena, Colombia 1960)

Maria Alba, Manuel, *Cronología de los Gobernantes de Panama 1510-1967* (Panamá 1967)

Marsh, Richard, *White Indians of Darien* (New York 1934)

Marshall, Rosalind K., *The Days of Duchess Anne: Life in the Household of the Duchess of Hamilton 1656-1716* (London 1973)

Martin, Miguel, *España entre Inglaterra y Francia 1711-1714* (Panama 1964)

Martínez Cutillas, Pedro, *Colonial Panama, History and Images* (Barcelona 2008)

Martínez Reyes, Gabriel, *Finanzas de Las 44 Diocesis de Indias 1515-1816* (Bogotá 1980)

Martínez Shaw, Carlos and Alfonso Mola, Marina, *Europa y los nuevos mundos en los siglos XV-XVIII* (Madrid 1999)

Martínez Shaw, Carlos, *La emigración a América, 1492-1824* (Colombres, Asturias 1994)

Mathieson, William, *Scotland and the Union, A History of Scotland From 1695 to 1741* (Glasgow 1905)

Matson, Cathy, *Merchants & Empire, Trading in Colonial New York* (Baltimore 1998).

McCullough, David, *The Path Between the Seas* (New York 1977)

McLachlan, Jean, *Trade and Peace with Old Spain* (New York 1974)

McNeill, J. R., *Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914* (Cambridge 2010)

M´Crie, Thomas (ed.), *Memoirs of Mr. William Veitch and George Brysson, Written by Themselves: with Other Narratives Illustrative of the History of Scotland, from the Restoration to the Revolution* (Edinburgh 1835)

Means, Philip Ainsworth, *The Spanish Main, Focus of Envy 1492-1700* (New York 1935)

Mijers, E. and Onnekink, D. (eds.), *Redefining William III: The Impact of the King-Stadholder in International Context* (Aldershot, Hampshire 2007)

Miner, Dwight, *The Fight for the Panama Route* (New York 1940)

Mirow, M.C., *Latin American Law, A History of Private Law and Institutions in Spanish America* (Austin 1962)

Nordensklold, Erland, *An Historical and Ethnological Survey of the Cuna Indians/by Erland Nordensklold, in collaboration with the Cuna Indian, Ruben Pérez Kantule: arranged and edited from the posthumous ms. and notes, and original Indian documents at the Gothenburg Ethnographical Museum by Henry Wassén* (New York 1979)

Oldmixon, John, *Memoirs of North-Britain; taken from authentick writings, as well manuscript as printed.: In which it is prov´d, that the Scots nation have always been zealous in the defence of the Protestant religion and liberty. Containing, I. An account of the cruelties exercis´d by the Tories, against the protestants, in King Charles´s and King James´s reigns. II. Of the trials and murder of the Earl of Argyle, and Robert Bailie of Jerviswood Esq; III. Of the revolution, and Dundee´s rebellion. IV. Of Glenco´s death, and the Darien colony; with a vindication of King William´s honour and justice therein. V. Of the designs of the Jacobites in opposing the Union, and of their invasion-plot after it. VI. The agreement between the English and Scots Tories, since the change of the old ministry, in their attempts against the protestant succession.* (London 1715)

Olsen, Margaret, *Slavery and Salvation in Colonial Cartagena de Indias* (University Press of Florida 2004)

Oviedo, Gonzalo Fernández, *Writing from the Edge of the World: The Memoirs of Darién, 1514-1527, translation and introduction by G. F. Dille* (University of Alabama 2006)

Palacios Preciado, Jorge, *La Esclavitud de los Africanos y la Trata de Negros: Entre la teoría y la Práctica* (Tunja, Boyacá, Colombia 1988)

Palacios Preciado, Jorge, *La Trata de Negros por Cartagena de Indias 1650-1750* (Tunja 1973)

Pares, Richard, *War and Trade in the West Indies 1739-1763* (Oxford 1936)

Pares, Richard, *Yankees and Creoles. The trade between North America and the West Indies before the American Revolution. [With endpaper maps.]* (London 1956)

Parnell, Arthur, *The war of the succession in Spain during the reign of Queen Anne 1702-1711 based on original manuscripts and contemporary records* (London 1905)

Parry. J.H., *The Spanish Seaborne Empire* (London 1966)

Pereira de Padilla, Joaquina and Segura, Ricardo (eds.), *Aproximacion a la Obra de Reina Torres de Arauz* (Panama 1983)

Prebble, John, *Darien-The Scottish Dream of Empire* (Edinburgh 2000)

Preston, Diana and Preston, Michael, *A Pirate of Exquisite Mind-Explorer, Naturalist, and Buccaneer: The Life of William Dampier* (New York 2004)

Price, Richard (ed.), *Maroon Societies* (Baltimore 1979)

Rahn-Philips, Carla, *The Treasure of the San José; Death at Sea in the War of the Spanish Succession* (Baltimore 2007)

Riley, P.W.J., *King William and the Scottish Politicians* (Edinburgh 1979)

Ritchie, Robert C., *Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates* (Cambridge, Mass. 1986)

Roberts, Orlando, *Narrative of Voyages and Excursions of the East Coast and in the Interior of Central America* (Edinburgh 1827)

Rojas y Arrieta, Guillermo, *History of the Bishops of Panama* (Panama 1929)

Romoli, K., *Balboa of Darién: Discoverer of the Pacific* (New York 1953)

Rose, Craig, *England in the 1690s: Revolution, Religion and War* (Oxford 1999)

Schafer, Ernesto, *El Consejo Real Y Supremo De Las Indias: Su historia, organización y labor administrativa hasta la terminación de la Casa de Austria, Tomo 1: Historia y organización del Consejo y de la Casa de la Contratación de las Indias* (Sevilla 1935)

Schafer, Ernesto, *El Consejo Real Y Supremo De Las Indias: Su historia, organización y labor administrativa hasta la terminación de la Casa de Austria, Tomo II: La Labor Del Consejo De Indias En La Administratción Colonial* (Sevilla 1947)

Scelle, Georges, *Histoire Politique de la Traite Negriere aux Indes de Castille Contrats et Traites D´Assiento* (Paris 1906)

Seeman, Berthold, *History of the Isthmus of Panama 1867* (Panama 1867)

Serrera Contreras, Ramón María, *La América de Los Habsburgo (1517-1700)* (Sevilla 2011)

Smout, T.C., *Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union 1660-1707* (Edinburgh 1963)

Sojo, José Raimundo, *El comercio en la historia de Colombia* (Bogotá 1970)

Squibb, G.D., *Doctors´ Commons, A History of the College of Advocates and Doctors of Law* (Oxford 1977)

Stater, Victor, *High Life, Low Morals* (London 2000)

Stein, S. and Stein, B., *Silver, Trade and War-Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore 2000)

Stephen, L. and Lee, S., *Dictionary of National Biography, Volume XXIV* (London 1890)

Storrs, Christopher, *The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665-1700* (Oxford 2006)

Thiers, Adolphe, *The Mississippi Bubble: A Memoir of John Law* (New York 1859)

Thompson, I.A.A. and Yun Casalilla, B. (eds.), *The Castilian crisis of the seventeenth century* (Cambridge 1994)

Thompson, William R., *The Emergence of the Global Political Economy* (London 2000)

Torres Abrego, José (ed.), *Poblacion, economia y sociedad en Panamá, contribución a la critica de la historiografia panamena* (Panama 2000)

Torres Ramirez, Bibiano, *La Armada de Barlovento* (Sevilla 1981)

Veitia Linage, Joseph de, *The Spanish rule of trade to the West-Indies: containing an account of the Casa de Contratacion. Written in Spanish by D. Joseph de Veitia Linage. Made English by Capt. John Stevens* (London 1702)

Walker, Geoffrey, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700-1789* (London 1979)

Waller, George, *Samuel Vetch: Colonial Enterpriser* (Chapel Hill 1960)

Ward, Christopher, *Imperial Panama-Commerce and Conflict in Isthmian America 1550-1800* (Albuquerque 1993)

Watt, Douglas, *The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union and the Wealth of Nations* (Edinburgh 2007)

Weber, David, *Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment* (New Haven 2005)

Weddle, Robert S., *The French Thorn, Rival Explorers in the Spanish Sea, 1682-1762* (College Station 1991)

Whatley, C.A., *The Scots and the Union* (Edinburgh 2006)

Willis, Sam, *The Admiral Benbow, The Life and Times of a Naval Legend* (London 2010)

Journal Articles, Essays, Theses, and Chapters within Books

Agostini, Thomas, `Deserted His Majesty´s Service: Military Runaways, the British-American Press, and the Problem of Desertion during the Seven Years´ War,´ *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 40 No. 4 (Summer 2007)

Alexander, Arthur, `Desertion and Its Punishment in Revolutionary Virginia,´ *William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, Vol.3 No. 3 (July 1946)

Alsop, J.D., `A Darien Epilogue: Robert Allen in Spanish America,´ *The Americas*, Vol. 43 (1986)

Armitage, D., `Making the Empire British: Scotland in the Atlantic World 1542-1707´, *Past and Present*, Vol. 155 (May 1997)

Araúz Monfante, Celestino, *Bocas del Toro y el Caribe Occidental: periferia y marginalidad siglos XVI-XIX* (Panamá 2007)

Arroyo Vozmediano, Julio Luis, *El Gran Juego-Inglaterra y la Sucesión Española*, unpublished PhD thesis (UNED 2012)

Barbour, Violet, `Dutch and English Merchant Shipping in the Seventeenth Century´, *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 2:2 (January 1930)

Bassett, William Godfrey, *The Caribbean in International Politics 1670-1707*, unpublished PhD thesis (University of London 1934)

Bassett, W.G., `English Naval Policy in the Caribbean, 1698-1703´, *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research,* XI (1933-34)

Bingham, Hiram, `The early history of the Scots Darien Company´, *Scottish Historical Review*, Vol. 3:10 (January 1906)

Bingham, Hiram, `Virginia letters on the Scots Darien colony, 1699´, *American Historical Review*, Vol. X:4 (July 1905)

Botella-Ordinas, Eva, `Debating Empires, Inventing Empires: British Territorial Claims Against the Spaniards in America, 1670-1714´, *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies*, Vol. 10:1-Special Issue: The Spanish Connection (Spring 2010)

Boulle, Pierre, `French Mercantilism, Commercial Companies and Colonial Profitability´, in Emmer, Pieter and Gaastra, Femme (eds.), *The Organization of Interoceanic Trade in European Expansion, 1450-1800* (Aldershot 1996)

Brown, Vera Lee, `Contraband Trade: A Factor in the Decline of Spain´s Empire in America´, *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 8:2 (May 1928)

Buisseret, David, `Spanish Military Engineers in the New World before 1750´, in Reinhartz, Dennis (ed.), *Mapping and Empire: Soldier-Engineers on the Southwestern Frontier* (University of Texas 2005)

Burnard, Trevor, `European Migration to Jamaica, 1655-1780´, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Series, Vol. LIII:4 (October 1996)

`Campaña de don Juan Pimienta, Gobernador de Cartagena, contra los escoceses del Darién, Diario de operaciónes. Año 1700,´ *Boletin de Historia y Antiguedades, Vol. XIX,* Numeros 224 y 225 (Bogotá, October and November 1932)

Cappon, Lester, `The Blathwayt Papers of colonical Williamsburg, Inc.´, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, Vol. 4:3 (July 1947)

Castillero Calvo, Alfredo, `Conflictos sociales, Guerra y Pax Hispana´, *Historia General de Panamá, Volumen I, Tomo I* (Panamá 2004)

Céspedes del Castillo, Guillermo, `La Defensa Militar del Istmo de Panamá a Fines del Siglo XVII y Comienzos del XVIII´, *Anuario de Estudios Americanistas, Tomo IX* (Sevilla 1952)

Christelow, Allan, `Contraband Trade between Jamaica and the Spanish Main´, *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 22 (1942)

Cromwell, Jesse, `Life on the Margins: (Ex) Buccaneers and Spanish Subjects on the Campeche Logwood Periphery, 1660-1716´, *Itinerario*, Vol. 33 (2009)

Cruxent, Jose Maria, `Informe Sobre un Reconocimiento Arqueológico en el Darién (Panamá),´ Publicaciones de la revista *Loteria*, No. 9, (Publicación efectuada en el *Boletin Del Museo De Ciencias Nautrales*, Caracas, Correspondiente a los tomos II, III, años 1956 y 1957)

Ferrari Ortiz, Rosalia, *Una Introducción al estudio de la Importancia de las Expediciónes Escocesas al Darien (1698-1700)* (Universidad de Panama/unpublished *trabajo de graduación* 1963)

Fortune, Armando, `Los negros cimarrones en Tierra Firme y su lucha por la libertad´, *Loteria,* Vols. 171-174 (Feb-May 1970).

Fradera, Josep, `The Caribbean between Empires: Colonists, Pirates, and Slaves´, in Palmié, Stephan and Scarano, Francisco (eds.), *The Caribbean, A History of the Region and its Peoples* (Chicago 2011)

Gallup-Diaz, Ignacio, "`Haven´t We Come to Kill the Spaniards?´ The Tule Upheaval in Eastern Panama, 1727-1728", *Colonial Latin American Review*, Vol. 10:2 (2001)

Gil-Bermejo Garcia, Juana, `La Casa de Contratación de Sevilla (Algunos Aspectos de su Historia)´, *Anuario de Estudios Americanos XXX* (Sevilla 1973)

Goldman, William S., `Spain and the Founding of Jamestown´, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 68:3 (July 2011)

Grahn, Lance, `Cartagena and its Hinterland in the Eighteenth Century´, in Knight, Franklin and Liss, Peggy (eds.), *Atlantic Port Cities-Economy, Culture, and Society in the Atlantic World, 1650-1850* (Knoxville 1990)

Grahn, Lance, `Political Corruption and Reform in Cartagena Province, 1700-1740´, *Discussion Paper Series, Center for Latin America* (Milwaukee 1993)

Grand Darien Ship Canal Company, *The Grand Darien Ship Canal Company, for connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, etc. [A prospectus. With a map]* (London 1850)

Gutiérrez Azopardo, Ildefonson, `El Comercio y Mercado de negros esclavos en Cartagena de Indias (1533-1850)´, *Quinto Centenario* (Madrid 1987)

Hart, Francis Russell, `Spanish Documents Relating to the Scots Settlement at Darien´, *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, Vol. 63 (March 1930)

Hidalgo, Dennis R., `To Get Rich for Our Homeland: The Company of Scotland and the Colonization of the Isthmus of Darien´, *Colonial Latin American Historical Review*, Vol. 10:3 (Summer 2001)

Horton, Mark, `To Transmit to Posterity the Virtue, Lustre and Glory of their Ancestors: Scottish Pioneers in Darien, Panama´, in Williams, Caroline (ed.), *Bridging the Early Modern Atlantic World: People, Products and Practices on the Move* (Ashgate 2009)

Jones, W.P., "`The Bold Adventurers´: A Quantitative Analysis of the Darien Subscription List (1696)", *Scottish Economic and Social History*, Vol. 21 (2001)

Karraker, Cyrus H.,`Spanish Treasure, Casual Revenue of the Crown´, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 5:3 (September 1933)

Karraker, Cyrus H., `The Treasure Expedition of Captain William Phips to the Bahama Banks´, *The New England Quarterly, Inc.*, Vol. 5:4 (October 1932)

Landsman, Ned, `Nation, Migration and the Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the Americas 1600-1800´, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 104:2 (1999)

Langebaek, Carl, `Cuna Long Distance Journeys: The Result of Colonial Interaction´, *Ethnology,* Vol. 30:4 (Oct. 1991)

Lemaitre, Eduardo, `Tomo II: La Colonia´, *Historia General de Cartagena* (Bogota 1983)

Letters on the Isthmus of Darien Ship Canal, with Commander Prevost´s Report (London 1857)

Lockhart, Donald, ` The Scottish Origins of Colonel John Anderson: Commander of the *Unicorn* During the Darien Expedition and President of His Majesty´s Council for the Province of New Jersey´, *The American Genealogist*, Vol. 83:1 (January-April 2008)

Manzano, Juan, `Como Funcionaba el Consejo de Indias´, *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 15:3 (August 1935)

McLachlan, Jean, `Documents Illustrating Anglo-Spanish Trade between the Commercial Treaty of 1667 and the Commercial Treaty and the Asiento Contract of 1713´, *Cambridge Historical Journal,* Vol. 4:3 (1934)

McPhail, Bridget, `Through a Glass, Darkly; Scots and Indians Converge at Darien´, *Eighteenth Century Life*, Vol. 18 (1994)

Morgan, William, `The Expedition of Baron de Pointis against Cartagena´, *The American Historical Review,* Vol. 37:2 (January 1932)

Moses, Bernard, `The Casa de Contratacion of Seville´, *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1894* (Washington 1896)

M´Robert, Patrick and Bridenbaugh, Carl, `Tour through Part of the North Provinces of America´, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 59:2 (April 1935)

Munive, Moisés, `Por El Buen Orden: El Diario Vivir En Cartagena Y Mompox Colonial´, *Historia Critica*, No. 028 (2004)

Nettels, Curtis, `England and the Spanish-America Trade, 1680-1715´, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. III:1 (March 1931)

Oliva Melgar, José María, `La Metrópoli sin territorio. ¿Crisis del comercio de Indias en el siglo XVII o perdida del control del monopolio?´, in Martínez Shaw, Carlos and Oliva Melgar, José María (eds.), *Sistema atlántico español: (siglos XVII-XIX)* (Madrid 2005)

Ortiz, Sergio, `Volumen III: Nuevo Reino de Granada. Real Audiencia y Presidentes, Presidentes de Capa y Espada (1654-1719)´, in Martínez Delgado, Luis, *Historia Extensa de Colombia* (Bogota 1965)

Paul, Helen Julia, `The Darien Scheme and Anglophobia in Scotland´, *Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics,* No. 0925 (University of Southampton, 2009)

Pears, Thomas Jr., `The Design of Darien´, *Journal of the Department of History of the Office of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.* (March-June 1936)

Pike, Ruth, `Black Rebels: The Cimarrons of Sixteenth-Century Panama´, *The Americas,* Vol. 64:2 (Oct 2007)

Robles, Gregorio de, *America a fines del siglo XVII, Noticias de los lugares de contrabando* (Valladolid 1980)

Rodriguez, Frederick Marshal, *Cimarron Revolts and Pacification in New Spain, the Isthmus of Panama and Colonial Colombia, 1503-1800* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Loyola University of Chicago 1979)

Rosa de Muñoz, Maria and Muñoz Pinzón, Armando, `La colonia escocesa en Darién: synopsis histórica´, *Tareas*, Nro. 113: enero-abril 2003 (Panama 2003)

Sanders, G. Earl, `Counter-Contraband in Spanish America; Handicaps of the Governors in the Indies´, *The Americas,* Vol. XXXIV: July 1977-April 1978 (New York 1978)

Satsuma, Shinsuki, `The South Sea Company and its plan for a naval expedition in 1712´, *Historical Research*, Vol. 85:229 (August 2012)

Scelle, George, `The Slave Trade in the Spanish colonies of America: The Asiento´, *The American Journal of International Law,* Vol. 4:3 (July 1910)

Scott, W.A., *A Scottish Economic Literature to 1800: A List of Authorities Prepared For the Committee* (Glasgow 1911)

Service, Elman, `Indian-European Relations in Colonial Latin America´, *American Anthropologist*, Vol 57:3 (June 1955)

Smout, T.C., Landsman, N.C., and Devine, T.M., `Scottish Emigration in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries´, in Canny, Nicholas (ed.), *Europeans on the Move-Studies on European Migration, 1500-1800* (Oxford 1994)

Snyder, Holly, `English Markets, Jewish Merchants and Atlantic Endeavors-Jews and the Making of British Transatlantic Commercial Culture, 1650-1800´, in Kagan, R. and Morgan, P. (eds.), *Atlantic Diasporas: Jews, Conversos and Crypto-Jews in the Age of Mercantilism* (Baltimore 2009)

Steckley, George, `Litigious Mariners: Wage Cases in the Seventeenth-Century Admiralty Court´, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 42:2 (June 1999)

Storrs, Christopher, `Disaster at Darien (1698-1700)? The Persistence of Spanish Imperial Power on the Eve of the Demise of the Spanish Habsburgs´, *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 29:5 (1999)

Storrs, Christopher, `Intelligence and the Formulation of Policy and Strategy in Early Modern Europe: The Spanish Monarchy in the Reign of Charles II (1665-1700)´, *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 21:4 (August 2006)

Storrs, Christopher, `The Union of 1707 and the War of the Spanish Succession´, *The Scottish Historical Review*, Vol. 87: Supplement (2008)

Strain, Issac, *A Paper on the History and Prospects of Interoceanic Communication by the American Isthmus, read by Lieut. I.C. Strain, U.S.N., before the New York Historical Society, June 17, 1856* (New York 1856)

Taylor, Benjamin, `The Darien Expedition´, (name of journal missing from copy available as Spencer 71, University of Glasgow Special Collections), (Paisley 1892)

Temperley, Harold, `The Causes of the War of Jenkins´ Ear, 1739´, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* (Vol. 3: December 1909)

Thompson, I.A.A., `The Armada and Administrative Reform: The Spanish Council of War in the Reign of Philip II´, *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 82:325 (Oct. 1967)

Torres de Araúz, Reina, `Datos Etnohistoricos Cunas Segun Documentos (1699-1779) de la Colonia Escocesa en Darien´, *Universidad de Panamá, Centro de Investigaciones Antropológicas Instituto Nacional de Cultura y Deportes, Dirección del Patrimonio Histórico, Actas Del II Symposium Nacional de Antropologia, Arqueologia y Etnohistoria de Panamá* (Panamá 1971)

Torres de Araúz, Reina, `Nuevo Edimburgo del Darien, Los Cunas: Anfitriones de Los Escoceses,´ *Loteria*, Vols. 314-316 (May-July 1982)

United States Bureau of Naval Personnel, *Report of Historical and Technical Information Relating to the Problem of Interoceanic communication by Way of the American Isthmus* (Washington D.C. 1883)

Vásquez Pino, Daniela, `Políticas Borbónicas en la Frontera. El Caso del Darién. 1760-1810´, *Historia 2.0*, Vol. 2:3 (2012)

Vaughan, G.E., `Historia de la Colonia Escosesa en el Darién (1698-1700) y su Importancia en los Anales Britanicos´, *Loteria*, Vol. VII:81 (August 1962)

Vaughan, G.E., `The Story of the Scottish Settlement in the Darien (1698-1700) and Its Importance in British History (improved version of lecture given in Spanish at the

University of Panama 15 June 1962, and published in Panama in *Loteria*, Volume VII, No 81, August 1962)´, (unpublished, undated)

Veitch, William, *Memoirs of Mr. William Veitch, and George Brysson/written by themselves: with other narratives illustrative of the history of Scotland, from the restoration to the revolution. To which are added, biographical sketches and notes, by Thomas M´Crie* (Edinburgh 1825)

Vermier, R., `How Spanish Were the Spanish Netherlands?´, *Dutch Crossing*, Vol. 36:1 (March 2012)

Waller, G.M., `Vetch, Samuel´, *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, Vol. 2, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003-, accessed October 23, 2013, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/vetch_samuel_2E.html.

Walsh, Patrick,`The Bubble on the Periphery: Scotland and the South Sea Bubble´, *The Scottish Historical Review*, Vol. XCI, 1:231 (April 2012)

Wassén, Henry (ed.), `Anonymous Spanish Manuscript from 1739 on the Province Darien´, *Etnologiska Studier* (10:1940)

Webb, Stephen, `William Blathwayt, Imperial Fixer: From Popish Plot to Glorious Revolution´, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, Vol. 25:1 (January 1968)

Webb, Stephen, `William Blathwayt, Imperial Fixer: Muddling Through to Empire, 1689-1717´, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 26:3 (July 1969)

Young, John, `The Scottish Parliament and the Politics of Empire: Parliament and the Darien Project, 1695-1707´, *Parliament, Estates and Representations*, Vol. 27 (2007)

Zahedieh, Nuala, `Economy´, in Armitage, David and Braddick, Michael (eds.), *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800* (New York 2002)